PRESENT: All the Justices
CRAIG M. LINNON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 130179 JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS
January 10, 2014
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether a teacher had a
custodial or supervisory relationship with a student within the
meaning of Code § 18.2-370.1(A). We also consider whether
arguments relating to proposed jury instructions were properly
preserved.
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Craig Linnon taught a building trades class at a
vocational school. He also was assigned the responsibility of
supervising students in the cafeteria during lunch one day each
week and on the sidewalk outside his classroom before, after,
and between classes each day. His wife, Angela, was the school
nurse. She also occasionally monitored a cosmetology class
when the teacher stepped out. A.G. was a 16-year-old female
student in the cosmetology class. A.G. was not one of Craig’s
students but they saw each other every day when he monitored
the sidewalk near the bus loading zone.
In December 2009, A.G.’s cosmetology class had a party on
school grounds to celebrate the end of the semester. At the
party, Angela invited A.G. and A.G.’s female friend to the
Linnons’ home that night. The two girls accepted the
invitation and the Linnons picked them up that evening. At
their home, the Linnons supplied A.G. and her friend with
alcohol in exchange for marijuana. Craig told A.G. that Angela
had sexual fantasies about her and that he had a video of
Angela fellating one of his male students. A.G. and her friend
were disturbed by the sexual content of the conversation and
decided to leave. Craig drove them to the friend’s home.
The following night, the Linnons again invited A.G. to
their home. A.G. returned in the company of Jared Todd, her
ex-boyfriend, and Tyler Scott, Todd’s friend. Both Todd and
Scott were 18 years old. Todd was one of Craig’s students.
The Linnons and the teenagers drank alcohol; the Linnons,
Scott, and A.G. also smoked marijuana.
The group began playing a sex-themed version of Charades
in the living room. The game devolved into a sexual orgy when
Angela actually fellated Todd and Scott rather than merely
miming. During the activities that followed, Craig inserted
his penis into A.G.’s mouth. Craig also inserted his fingers
into A.G.’s vagina and anus. He also implored her to have sex
with Angela.
Sometime thereafter, Todd and Scott went to the bathroom
and decided to leave the Linnons’ home. When A.G. realized
2
Todd and Scott had left the living room, she found her clothes
and got dressed. When Todd and Scott returned from the
bathroom, they got dressed and announced that they were
leaving. The three teenagers departed as the Linnons continued
having sex on the living room floor.
Craig was subsequently indicted on three counts of taking
indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or
supervisory relationship, in violation of Code § 18.2-370.1(A).1
He and Angela were tried jointly but were represented by
separate counsel. At trial, he moved to strike both when the
Commonwealth rested its case and at the close of the evidence,
arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had a
custodial or supervisory relationship with A.G. The circuit
court denied his motions. Angela objected to three of the
Commonwealth’s proposed jury instructions and Craig objected to
a fourth. The court also rejected two jury instructions Craig
proposed. The jury thereafter convicted Craig on all three
counts and he was sentenced to a term of eleven years’ active
incarceration.
Craig appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the
circuit court erred by denying his motions to strike, by
1
Craig also was indicted on additional offenses not
relevant to this appeal. Angela was indicted on several
charges relating to this and other incidents but she is not a
party to this appeal.
3
granting the Commonwealth’s four proposed jury instructions
over defense objections, and by rejecting his proposed jury
instructions. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court
did not err in denying Craig’s motions to strike because the
evidence showed he had a custodial or supervisory relationship
over A.G. It concluded that his argument about the
Commonwealth’s proposed jury instructions was not preserved for
the purposes of Rule 5A:18 because he failed to state any
ground for his objection to one and he did not join Angela’s
objections to the other three. Finally, it determined that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing his
proposed jury instructions because it had already adequately
instructed the jury on one issue and the other proposed
instruction incorrectly stated the law.
We awarded Craig this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. MOTIONS TO STRIKE
Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming
the circuit court’s rulings on his motions to strike because,
under its interpretation, mere employment as a teacher when a
minor attends school establishes the relationship necessary for
conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1(A). We disagree.
A motion to strike challenges whether
the evidence is sufficient to submit the
4
case to the jury. What the elements of the
offense are is a question of law that we
review de novo. Whether the evidence
adduced is sufficient to prove each of
those elements is a factual finding, which
will not be set aside on appeal unless it
is plainly wrong. In reviewing that
factual finding, we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth and give it the benefit of all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. After so viewing the evidence,
the question is whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. In sum, if there is evidence to
support the conviction, the reviewing court
is not permitted to substitute its
judgment, even if its view of the evidence
might differ from the conclusions reached
by the finder of fact at the trial.
Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 223-24, 738 S.E.2d 847,
868, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 427 (2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Code § 18.2-370.1(A) provides that “[a]ny person 18 years
of age or older who, except as provided in § 18.2-370,
maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship over a child
under the age of 18 and is not legally married to such child
and such child is not emancipated who, with lascivious intent,
knowingly and intentionally” engages in certain proscribed acts
“shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.” The purpose of the
statute “is to protect minors from adults who might exploit
certain types of relationships.” Sadler v. Commonwealth, 276
5
Va. 762, 765, 667 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2008). The key question in
determining whether a given relationship falls within the
statute is whether the defendant “had the responsibility for
and control of the [child’s] safety and well-being.” Krampen
v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 163, 168, 510 S.E.2d 276, 278
(1999); see also Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453, 459-60,
592 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (2004) (rejecting the argument that the
child must be specifically entrusted to the defendant’s care
through explicit parental delegation of responsibility).
As a general rule, primary and secondary school
administrators and teachers meet this criterion. We have held
that school administrators have a responsibility “to supervise
and ensure that students could have an education in an
atmosphere conducive to learning, free of disruption, and
threat to person.” Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 671, 727
S.E.2d 634, 643 (2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). They have “a duty to supervise and care for” all
students who are on school premises or engaged in school
activities. 2 Id. This responsibility extends to those to whom
2
The vast majority of primary and secondary school
students are minors. In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 286 Va. 349,
357, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2013), we assumed without deciding
that a similar responsibility existed at post-secondary
educational institutions, where many students are adults.
Thus, the question in that case was not whether the
responsibility existed but whether the institution had a
6
administrators assign it within the scope of the assignment,
even those who are not teachers and have no students. 3 When an
administrator assigns this responsibility to a teacher in
addition to the teacher’s classroom duties, it encompasses
students not enrolled in the teacher’s classes.
The evidence established that Craig was assigned
responsibility for student safety and supervision in the
cafeteria one day each week and on the sidewalk before, after,
and between classes each day. This assignment was beyond the
scope of his regular classroom duties and encompassed students
not enrolled in his classes. He therefore had the relationship
required by the statute with respect to A.G. even though she
was not his student.
However, Code § 18.2-370.1(A) also requires that the acts
proscribed by the statute occur while the defendant “maintains”
the required relationship. The proscribed acts in this case
did not occur on school premises or during any school activity.
Accordingly, Craig’s mere status as a teacher is insufficient
specific duty to warn students about the potential for injury
arising from the criminal acts of a third party. Id.
3
For example, in Guda, the defendant was a school security
officer and assistant football coach and the victim was 15-
year-old female tenth grader. The defendant encountered the
victim in the hall during class. The victim asked the
defendant for a hall pass and he directed her to his office in
the boy’s locker room, where he assaulted her. 42 Va. App. at
455-56, 592 S.E.2d at 749.
7
to warrant conviction. Conversely, the facts that the
proscribed acts occurred at his home and were unrelated to any
school activity are insufficient by themselves to warrant
acquittal.
In Sadler, we considered the case of a softball coach
convicted of molesting a minor female on his team. Ten days
after a team fundraiser and three days before a softball
tournament, the defendant visited the victim at her home, where
he kissed her and rubbed her buttocks. He also showed her the
team’s new uniforms. 276 Va. at 764, 667 S.E.2d at 784. On
appeal, the defendant argued that he was not acting in his
capacity as a coach during the visit and that the conduct
therefore did not occur in the context of the relationship
required for conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1(A). Id. at
765, 667 S.E.2d at 784. We rejected that argument, holding
that a defendant may maintain the required relationship even
when the proscribed acts occur outside the context giving rise
to it. We concluded that “[w]hether such a relationship exists
at the time of the offending conduct is a matter of fact to be
determined on a case by case basis.” Id. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at
785.
That is the rule to be applied here. Although the acts
occurred at Craig’s home outside school hours and during the
winter recess, school was due to resume in a few weeks and he
8
and A.G. would again see each other there on a daily basis as
he performed assigned administrative duties. These facts are
materially indistinguishable from those in Sadler. There, the
proscribed acts took place at the victim’s home. The required
relationship existed several days before (during the team
fundraiser) and several days after (during the softball
tournament). While the required relationship may have been
abeyant in the interstice, it did not cease to exist. Rather,
it continued, with a known past and an expected, imminent
future. See id. at 765-66, 667 S.E.2d at 785.
Moreover, A.G. testified that when she went back to school
in January, Craig lay in wait for her and pursued her as she
went to class:
He was waiting on the inside of the
building. It was very close to the bell
being rung, so it was weird; he would only
be outside. . . . I saw every other girl
walk past him and he didn’t say a word to
them, so I knew he was waiting for me to
come.
. . . .
I kept walking and I could see his
reflection in the glass door coming after
me.
. . . .
He said, “That was the best night I
ever had, and I hope you come over again.”
This testimony establishes that Craig renewed his advances at
school, where the relationship required by the statute
9
undoubtedly existed. The jury could reasonably infer from
Craig's conduct that his relationship with A.G. was the same
whether they were on or off school grounds, and whether school
was in or out of session. Moreover, he chose to initiate
predatory contact at school, where he held a position of
authority and where A.G. was a captive audience, unable to
resist or avoid contact with him. This is precisely the type
of exploitation the General Assembly enacted the statute to
deter. Sadler, 276 Va. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find that the proscribed
acts occurred while Craig “maintain[ed] a custodial or
supervisory relationship” for the purposes of Code § 18.2-
370.1(A).
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1. THE COMMONWEALTH’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The Commonwealth proposed four contested jury instructions
that were given to the jury by the circuit court. The first
stated, “A custodial relationship arises when the supervising
adult exercises care and control over the child, with the care
including the responsibility for and control of the child’s
safety and well being.” The second stated, “The term ‘custody’
is not limited to legal custody. It can include those standing
in loco parentis such as teachers or babysitters who may have
10
temporary custody of children.” The third stated, “One may
become a person ‘responsible for the care of a child’ by a
voluntary course of conduct and without explicit parental
delegation of supervisory responsibility or court order.” The
fourth stated, the “[o]ffense of taking indecent liberties with
a minor does not require proof of a direct nexus of any type
between the custodial or supervisory relationship and the
defendant’s wrongful conduct.” In his appeal to the Court of
Appeals, Craig asserted that these proposed jury instructions
were incorrect statements of the law.
We focus initially on the first three proposed jury
instructions. The Court of Appeals ruled that only Angela
objected to them and therefore Craig failed to preserve his
argument for appeal under Rule 5A:18. Craig asserts that the
Court of Appeals erred because the circuit court understood the
joint nature of the defense, and therefore Angela’s objections
should be imputed to Craig even though he did not expressly
join them. He also argues that the purpose of the
contemporaneous objection rule is to ensure that the circuit
court has an opportunity to rule on the argument before it is
submitted to the appellate court as ground for error. He
contends Angela’s objection was sufficient to fulfill this
purpose. According to him, the question is whether the circuit
11
court had an opportunity to rule on the issue, not who raised
it. We disagree.
We review interpretations of the Rules of this Court de
novo. LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 469-71, 722 S.E.2d
838, 840 (2012). Although we have never before considered
whether an objection raised by one party may be attributed to
another party who does not expressly join it, courts that have
considered that question have answered in the negative. E.g.,
Barnes v. State, 310 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. App. 1983) (“If
several parties are entitled to make an objection, and it is
made by any number less than all, it does not inure to the
advantage of the party or parties not joining in it. Thus,
where a defendant does not expressly adopt the objection of a
co-defendant, he thereby waives that objection and may not
utilize it to gain review.”); accord Daniels v. Yancey, 175
S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. App. 2005); Cook Assocs. v. Warnick, 664
P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983); Thomas v. Bank of Springfield, 631
S.W.2d 346, 351 (Mo. App. 1982); Roskoten v. Odom, 87 P.2d 338,
340 (Okla. 1939). We adopt the general rule articulated in
these cases and hold that one party may not rely on the
objection of another party to preserve an argument for appeal
without expressly joining in the objection.
Craig also argues that the circuit court understood that
the two defendants were presenting a joint defense. His
12
argument is contradicted by the record. Tellingly, Craig
expressly noted his separate objection to the Commonwealth’s
fourth proposed jury instruction, stating through counsel
“Judge, I’d like to note an objection to the fourth one offered
by the Commonwealth,” while remaining silent as to the
preceding three. Further, the record reflects at least six
additional occasions where one of the defendants expressly
joined in the other’s objections to preserve an argument for
appeal. We therefore reject Craig’s argument that this case
calls for an exception to the general rule we adopt today.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding
that Craig did not preserve for appeal any objection to these
three proposed instructions.
We now turn to the fourth proposed jury instruction.
Although Craig did object, the Court of Appeals again declined
to consider his argument, determining that it was not preserved
under Rule 5A:18 because he failed to state a basis for his
objection at trial. Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals
erred because this proposed jury instruction directly relates
to whether the Commonwealth was required to prove a direct
nexus between the required relationship and the proscribed
acts. He notes that he and the Commonwealth vigorously
contested that question in their arguments on his motion to
strike, which preceded the circuit court’s consideration of the
13
proposed jury instructions. He asserts the circuit court
therefore was fully apprised of the argument relevant to this
proposed jury instruction and intelligently ruled on it. We
agree.
Craig argued on his first motion to strike that the
Commonwealth was required to demonstrate a nexus between any
relationship with A.G. at school and the proscribed acts. The
Commonwealth responded that, under Sadler, no such nexus was
required. The circuit court rejected Craig’s argument and
denied the motion. Accordingly, this argument was adequately
presented to the circuit court to provide it “an opportunity to
rule intelligently on the issue[].” Scialdone v. Commonwealth,
279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although Craig’s motion and argument were made before he
presented his case, he renewed them at the conclusion of all
the evidence. The circuit court again rejected the argument
and denied the motion. It then proceeded immediately to
consider jury instructions:
The motions to strike are overruled.
Your objections are noted for the record.
All prior motions are incorporated and the
rulings are the same.
We’re now ready to discuss
instructions.
14
Both Rule 5A:18 and Rule 5:25 require an objection to be
timely and Craig’s objection was. The basis of the objection
was encompassed by his argument on the motions to strike, which
the circuit court had recently considered and rejected. We
conclude that this was sufficient to satisfy the Rules. The
Court of Appeals therefore erred in determining under Rule
5A:18 that Craig failed to state a basis for his objection to
the fourth proposed jury instruction.
Nevertheless, the error was harmless because Craig’s
argument on appeal is not the one he made to the circuit court. 4
On appeal, Craig argues that the instruction was misleading
because the word “nexus” encompasses the temporal association
suggested by the word “maintain[]” as used in Code § 18.2-
370.1(A). As noted above, the required relationship must exist
at the time of the proscribed acts. Craig argues that the
instruction that no proof of a nexus “of any type” was
necessary for conviction therefore had a tendency to mislead
the jury that the relationship and the proscribed acts need not
coincide as the statute requires.
4
“Under the doctrine of harmless error, we will affirm [a
lower] court's judgment when we can conclude that the error at
issue could not have affected the court's result.” Dorr v.
Clarke, 284 Va. 514, 526, 733 S.E.2d 235, 242 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
15
Craig did not make this argument below. His argument on
the motion to strike was limited solely to the issue we
considered in Sadler and his attempt to distinguish that case
from this one on their facts. 5 He therefore did not preserve
this argument for appeal and we will not consider it. Rule
5:25; see also Online Res. Corp. v. Lawlor, 285 Va. 40, 57, 736
S.E.2d 886, 895 (2013); Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Target
Corp., 274 Va. 341, 351-52, 650 S.E.2d 92, 97-98 (2007).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ erroneous determination that
Craig failed to state any basis for his objection to the
instruction is harmless.
2. CRAIG’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Craig proposed two jury instructions. The first stated,
“One who is a guest is one who decides on her own to leave the
home, and where the host has no personal authority to direct or
punish the guest.” The second stated, “Only those persons who
maintain a custodial relationship with their victim can be
convicted of Indecent Liberties.” The circuit court refused
both and the Court of Appeals affirmed its rulings.
5
Although Craig referred to the winter break in his
argument on the motion to strike, he did not suggest that the
break terminated the custodial or supervisory relationship. To
the contrary, he argued that the fact of the break, together
with his limited contact with A.G. at school and the lack of
parental entrustment or knowledge with respect to her presence
at his house, was evidence that the relationship was not
custodial or supervisory.
16
Craig argues that the first proposed jury instruction was
necessary “to explain the ‘hostess and guest relationship’
referenced in” another of his proposed jury instructions, which
the circuit court gave to the jury. 6 However, he did not make
this argument in support of the refused jury instruction to
circuit court. We therefore will not consider it on appeal.
Rule 5:25; see also Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 274 Va. at
351-52, 650 S.E.2d at 97-98. 7
Craig argues that the second proposed jury instruction was
necessary to correct other instructions proposed by the
Commonwealth and given to the jury by the circuit court.
According to those instructions, he argues, the Commonwealth
need only prove that Craig “maintained a custodial or
supervisory relationship over A.G.” (Emphasis added.) He
concludes that the use of the preterite verb form “maintained”
indicated that the required relationship need not exist at the
time of the proscribed acts. Again, he made no such argument
to the circuit court. Furthermore, he did not object to the
6
That instruction stated, “For a custodial or supervisory
relationship to exist, the custodian or supervisor must hold
some form of legal or actual authority over the child. Those
who maintain [a] hostess and guest relationship do not maintain
a custodial or supervisory relationship.”
7
Although the record reveals that Angela argued in favor
of the “hostess-and-guest relationship” instruction, neither
she nor Craig offered any argument in support of this refused
instruction he now contends was necessary to explain it.
17
proposed jury instructions containing the preterite verb form.
We therefore will not consider his argument on appeal. Rule
5:25; see also Online Resources, 285 Va. at 60-61, 736 S.E.2d
at 897; Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 274 Va. at 351-52, 650
S.E.2d at 97-98.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring.
I concur in the Court's judgment, except as to the
Commonwealth's fourth jury instruction. The Court of Appeals
found that the argument with respect to that instruction was
waived under Rule 5A:18. I agree and would affirm that ruling.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE MILLETTE
join, dissenting.
In this case, the majority takes the position that Craig
preserved his argument with regard to whether the
Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction was a correct
statement of the law. Having determined that he did preserve
this argument, the majority then takes the position that Craig
did not actually preserve the issue for appeal because the
18
argument he makes here is not the same as the one he made
before the trial court and, therefore, the trial court’s
decision to give an incorrect jury instruction was harmless
error. Notwithstanding the obvious internal inconsistency in
the majority opinion regarding preservation, I believe that
Craig’s argument to the trial court clearly encompassed the
argument he now makes to this Court. Accordingly, I must
respectfully dissent.
As an initial matter, I believe it is important to address
the fact that the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed instruction
is, in fact, a patently incorrect statement of the law.
We review jury instructions to see that the
law has been clearly stated and that the
instructions cover all issues which the
evidence fairly raises. . . . It is error
to give an instruction that incorrectly
states the law; whether a jury instruction
accurately states the relevant law is a
question of law that we review de novo.
Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 228, 738 S.E.2d 847, 870
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We have further recognized that “a jury verdict based on
an erroneous instruction need not be set aside if it is clear
that the jury was not misled.” Orthopedic & Sports Physical
Therapy Assocs. v. Summit Group Props., 283 Va. 777, 784, 724
S.E.2d 718, 722 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, “it is error to give” an “instruction [that] may
19
reasonably be regarded as having a tendency to mislead the
jury.” Castle v. Lester, 272 Va. 591, 605, 636 S.E.2d 342, 349
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The plain language of Code § 18.2-370.1 indicates that the
defendant must maintain a custodial or supervisory relationship
over the child at the time of the wrongful conduct. In other
words, the existence of the relationship at the time of the
wrongful conduct must still be proven. See Sadler v.
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 762, 765, 667 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2008)
(“Whether such a relationship exists at the time of the
offending conduct is a matter of fact to be determined on a
case by case basis.”). Thus, it is the fact that the existence
of the necessary relationship coincides with the wrongful act
that is the necessary link (i.e., nexus) allowing for a
conviction under this statute. Stated another way, absent a
custodial or supervisory relationship being maintained (i.e.,
absent the nexus) at the time of the wrongful act, there can be
no conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1.
The purpose of Code § 18.2-370.1 “is to protect minors
from adults who might exploit certain types of relationships.”
Sadler, 276 Va. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785. We have recognized
that such exploitation is the result of the victim feeling
compelled to obey the perpetrator due to the present existence
of a custodial or supervisory relationship. Id. The
20
compulsion that facilitates the wrongful act is clearly
dependent on the underlying relationship.
1
Thus, while the wrongful conduct does not have to occur at
school or during a school-related event, see id., it still must
occur because of the underlying relationship formed at school.
There must exist a nexus between the relationship and the
wrongful conduct. Indeed, it is axiomatic that a defendant
cannot be said to have exploited a relationship if there is not
a nexus between that relationship and the wrongful conduct.
Thus, the law is clear that the Commonwealth was required
to demonstrate a nexus between any relationship with A.G. at
school and the proscribed acts. The Commonwealth’s fourth
proposed instruction, however, takes the exact opposite view,
stating that the “[o]ffense of taking indecent liberties with a
minor does not require proof of a direct nexus of any type
between the custodial or supervisory relationship and the
defendant’s wrongful conduct.” (Emphasis added.) This
instruction specifically disavows the need for the Commonwealth
to prove an element of the crime, as it strongly implies that
the offense of taking indecent liberties with a minor does not
1
To be clear, I do not take the position that the
wrongful act must occur during the activity upon which the
relationship is based; our holding in Sadler specifically
addresses this point. However, the relationship itself must
exist and be maintained at the time of the wrongful act-- this
is the nexus on which the offense hinges.
21
require proof that the custodial or supervisory relationship
was maintained at the time of the wrongful conduct.
Accordingly, I believe that the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed
instruction is a patently incorrect statement of the law.
Furthermore, I believe that not only is the Commonwealth’s
fourth proposed instruction an incorrect statement of the law,
but the language also had the potential to mislead and confuse
the jury. Indeed, a jury could interpret this instruction to
require that the Commonwealth only prove the wrongful conduct
and the existence of a custodial or supervisory relationship at
some point in time, but not necessarily at the time that the
defendant engaged in the wrongful conduct.
In stating that Craig did not preserve his argument, the
majority focuses on the fact that, at one point, Craig
attempted to distinguish the facts of the present case from
those in Sadler. In so doing the majority neglects the fact
that, in Sadler, the issue was whether the custodial
relationship existed (i.e., was maintained) outside of
activities directly related to that relationship. See 276 Va.
at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785 (rejecting the “assertion that a
custodial or supervisory relationship is maintained for
purposes of Code § 18.2-370.1 only when the objectionable acts
are undertaken in the course of performing activities giving
22
rise to that relationship”). In other words, the issue in
Sadler was whether the necessary nexus existed at all.
Additionally, the majority neglects the entirety of
Craig’s argument. While arguing that the Commonwealth failed
to prove the existence of a custodial relationship, Craig also
argued:
I’ll argue to you that the fact that we
have a break here is significant. This
isn’t during the school year. The school
semester is over and there’s been no
evidence that she’s continuing the school
year or was at that time.
The obvious implication of Craig’s argument is that, even
if the Commonwealth proved the existence of a custodial or
supervisory relationship, the Commonwealth has failed to prove
that it was maintained at the time of the wrongful act.
Indeed, Craig further argued:
[T]he requirement of a custodial
relationship is not merely a basis for
enhancing punishment[;] rather . . . a
custodial relationship maintained with
respect to the victim is a predicate to
guilt. Clearly they [the Commonwealth]
have to prove it.
. . . .
As we know, this didn’t occur anywhere near
the school and [A.G.] readily admitted that
there was no related school activity at
all. [Craig] was not a teacher of hers at
all and had no real contact except at the
bus stop. During the school break there’s
no evidence that she was going back at that
time. Looking at that case by case factor
23
analysis, even at this level, the
Commonwealth does not satisfy [its burden].
Thus, it is clear that Craig argued that the Commonwealth
was required to prove that there was some connection (i.e., a
nexus) between the custodial or supervisory relationship and
the wrongful act.
Similarly, the record clearly demonstrates that the trial
court understood this to be the argument raised by Craig. In
overruling the motion to strike, the trial court specifically
addressed the issue of whether the relationship was maintained
at the time of the wrongful act (i.e., whether there was a
nexus between the relationship and the wrongful act). Indeed,
the trial court specifically stated:
Now, the next question is: Does that
relationship end at the sidewalk outside of
the school or does it end at the end of the
school day or as the Commonwealth argues,
does it continue?
. . . .
If I do accept for purposes of the motion
that there was a preexisting relationship
of a custodial and supervisory relationship
that when the custodian and supervisor
seeks to engage in additional relationships
or further relationships with the children
outside of the venue or the context of the
school, the other case law is clear that
the relationship doesn’t terminate at the
sidewalk, it doesn’t end when the bell
rings and that relationship continues.
If I accept the facts here as presented by
the Commonwealth, it’s clear that everyone
understood that Mr. and Mrs. Linnon were
24
still the teacher and the nurse and they
stood in that relationship.
Furthermore, although the majority quotes Craig’s second
offered jury instruction, 2 it ignores the fact that the trial
court expressly stated that it considered it to be a “competing
instruction” to the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed instruction.
This demonstrates that the trial court clearly understood that
these instructions were mutually exclusive. This Court has
specifically recognized that an “objection may also be shown
and preserved where, in a refused instruction, the objecting
party propounds the contrary theory to one set forth in a
granted instruction.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Karcher, 217 Va.
497, 498, 229 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1976). Although the
instructions in this case are structured differently, the only
significant difference between the instructions was the use of
the term “maintain” in Craig’s instruction and “nexus” in the
Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction. As such, it
is clear that these were the terms that the trial court
considered to be mutually exclusive.
Thus, in my opinion, Craig placed the issue of whether the
Commonwealth must prove a nexus between the custodial
relationship and the wrongful act squarely before the trial
2
Craig’s instruction stated: “Only those persons who
maintain a custodial relationship with their victim can be
convicted of Indecent Liberties.”
25
court and, indeed, the trial court ruled on the argument.
Accordingly, I believe that this issue was preserved and that
the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction was an
incorrect statement of the law that had a tendency to mislead
the jury. In my view, the verdict must be set aside and the
case should be remanded for retrial, should the Commonwealth be
so inclined.
26