UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80257
(303) 844-3157
Patrick J. Fisher, Jr.
Clerk
February 22, 2001
TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE OPINION
RE: 00-6210, Locke v. Saffle
Filed on January 31, 2001
Footnote three on page 9 of the court’s slip opinion is corrected to read as
follows:
We note that, in his response brief, Mr. Locke argues “[i]n the
alternative” that “conclusion of direct review” as used in § 2244(d)(1)(A)
“means the date of the return of the state court of last resort’s mandate
from the lower court to the state court of last resort.” Aple’s Br. at 3.
We need not reach this alternative argument, having ruled in Mr. Locke’s
favor on his primary argument.
A corrected copy of page 9 is attached.
Sincerely,
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By: Keith Nelson
Deputy Clerk
encl.
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JAN 31 2001
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
WENDELL LOCKE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v. No. 00-6210
JAMES SAFFLE,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 98-CV-1176-C)
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Patrick T. Crawley,
Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-
Appellant.
Vance William Armor, Attorney at Law, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Petitioner-Appellee.
Before HENRY , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. 1
HENRY , Circuit Judge.
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without
oral argument.
Petitioner-Appellee Wendell Locke, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on August 24, 1998. The government responded with a
motion to dismiss on the ground that Mr. Locke’s petition was time barred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). After the motion was denied, the
government asked the district court to stay the order; it also asked permission to
file an immediate appeal. The district court granted both requests. The
government then sought this court’s permission to file an immediate appeal,
which was also granted. Consequently, we now consider the government’s
contention that Mr. Locke’s petition was not timely filed. We affirm for the
reasons set forth below.
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I. PROCEDURE AND BACKGROUND
Mr. Locke was convicted in Oklahoma County District Court of one count
of first-degree murder and two counts of use of a vehicle to facilitate the
intentional discharge of a firearm. Mr. Locke subsequently brought an appeal
before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals – the court of last resort in the
state – which affirmed the conviction on August 1, 1997. See generally Locke v.
State , 943 P.2d 1090 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Mr. Locke did not seek direct
review of his case before the United States Supreme Court, nor did he seek post-
conviction relief in state court.
On August 24, 1998, Mr. Locke filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court. The government moved to dismiss on the basis that the petition
was time barred under § 2244(d)(1)(A), but the district court denied the motion.
The district court noted that, in prior cases, this court had addressed the issue of
timeliness and that, in those cases, inconsistent results had been reached. See
Aplt’s Br., Ex. C, at 2 (district court order, filed Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Dist.
Ct. Order]. Among those cases, however, there was only one published opinion,
Rhine v. Boone , 182 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 1999), and, under Rhine , Mr. Locke’s
petition was timely filed.
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II. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Locke argues that this interlocutory appeal is
improper because the government is seeking “to enlarg[e] its own rights or
lessen[] the rights of its adversary absent a cross appeal.” Aple’s Br. at 4. We
find this argument to be without merit, and so the only issue remaining is whether
Mr. Locke’s petition was timely filed pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because the
parties do not dispute the facts, we have before us a purely legal question, and
thus we review the matter de novo. See Gibson v. Klinger , 232 F.3d 799, ---
(10th Cir. 2000).
Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that
[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for
a writ of habeas corpus . . . . The limitation period shall run from the
. . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). According to the district court, Mr.
Locke had until October 29, 1998, to file his petition. The district court arrived at
this date in the following manner: (1) on August 1, 1997, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, the state court of last resort, affirmed Mr. Locke’s conviction;
(2) ninety days later – i.e., on October 30, 1997 – Mr. Locke’s time to seek direct
review before the United States Supreme Court expired, see U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13;
(3) Mr. Locke’s conviction was thereby final on October 30, 1997, at least for the
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purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A); and (4) consequently, the one-year limitation period
began to run on October 30, 1997.
The government argues that, as a matter of law, the district court erred in
determining the day by which Mr. Locke’s petition had to be filed. More
specifically, it argues that the district court improperly calculated the date on
which Mr. Locke’s conviction was final by including the ninety days during
which Mr. Locke could have filed (but did not) a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court. According to the government, Mr.
Locke’s conviction was final on August 1, 1997, the day that Mr. Locke had
exhausted his state remedies. In short, the government’s contention is that “direct
review” as used in § 2244(d)(1)(A) only means review within the state court
system; review by the United States Supreme Court is not counted. The
government grounds its argument on two premises: (1) The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) was enacted to accelerate the habeas
process; and (2) AEDPA is focused on the exhaustion of state remedies.
We are not persuaded by the government’s argument. We note first that, in
Rhine v. Boone , 182 F.3d at 1153, we stated that for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A)
“the judgment is not final and the one-year limitation period for filing for federal
post-conviction relief does not begin to run until after the United States Supreme
Court has denied review, or, if no petition for certiorari is filed, after the time for
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filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court has passed .” Id. at 1155
(emphasis added); see also Habteselassie v. Novak , 209 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th
Cir. 2000) (“Because [the petitioner] did not file a petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, the one-year period of limitation started to run
ninety days after October 15, 1996, the date the [state court of last resort] denied
his petition for certiorari and his state court review was thus completed.”).
Of course, this statement in Rhine was technically dicta, the holding of the
case dealing with § 2244(d)(2) instead of § 2244(d)(1)(A), 2
and therefore we are
not bound by it. Still, we find the statement to be instructive; at the very least, it
cannot be ignored, especially in light of Habteselassie , see id. , and further in light
2
Although Rhine discusses the limitation period with respect to § 2244(d)(1)(A),
which deals with direct review, its actual focus is § 2244(d)(2), which deals with
post-conviction or collateral review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time
during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall
not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”).
Notably, § 2244(d)(2) does not take into account the time during which a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court can be filed. See Rhine ,
182 F.3d at 1156. That is, if a person has been denied relief in a state post-
conviction or other collateral proceeding, and the person then seeks review of that
decision before the United States Supreme Court, the limitation period does not
toll during the time the person seeks review from the United States Supreme
Court. See id. This holding in Rhine on § 2244(d)(2), however, is subject to
change. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a Second
Circuit case to determine whether “other collateral review” under § 2244(d)(2)
includes properly filed federal habeas petitions or only applications for state
review. See Walker v. Artuz , 208 F.3d 357, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. granted , 121 S.
Ct. 480 (2000).
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of United States v. Burch , 202 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). In Burch , this court
addressed the issue of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Like § 2244, § 2255 is
a habeas statute but, while § 2244 applies to prisoners held in state custody, §
2255 applies to prisoners held in federal custody. In discussing the issue of
timeliness under § 2255, this court held that, “if a prisoner does not file a petition
for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court after [his] direct
appeal, the one-year limitation period begins to run when the time for filing a
certiorari petition expires.” Id. at 1279. Since the ninety-day period is included
with respect to federal prisoners, we see no reason not to do the same with respect
to state prisoners, see id. at 1278 (“We agree that there is simply no indication
that Congress intended to treat state and federal habeas petitioners differently.”) –
especially since § 2244 contains language that suggests the period should be
counted and § 2255 does not. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (“The
limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review .”) (emphasis added), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1) (“The limitation period
shall run from . . . the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.”).
Finally, we note that the circuit courts that have explicitly ruled on the
issue of timeliness under § 2244(d)(1)(A) are in accord with Rhine ; that is, all
have held that “the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)
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includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner
actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe , 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir.
1999); see also Bronaugh v. Ohio , No. 99-3886, 2000 WL 1847861, at *2 (6th
Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (“This circuit . . . recently decided . . . that, under §
2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari for direct review in the United
States Supreme Court has expired.”); Smith v. Bowersox , 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th
Cir. 1998) (“We conclude that the running of the statute of limitations imposed by
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) is triggered by either (I) the conclusion of all direct criminal
appeals in the state system, followed by either the completion or denial of
certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme Court; or (ii) if certiorari
was not sought, then by the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state
system followed by the expiration of the time allotted for filing a petition for the
writ.”).
We agree with the reasoning employed by our sister circuits, in particular,
that used by the Eighth Circuit in Smith . In Smith , the respondent argued, as the
government does here, that a conviction becomes final on the day state court
review is concluded; in other words, “direct review” as used in § 2244(d)(1)(A)
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does not include review by the United States Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit
rejected the respondent’s argument, stating the following:
Review of a state criminal conviction by the Supreme Court of
the United States is considered direct review of the conviction.
Moreover, there is a well-established body of federal case law that
interprets the phrase ‘final by the conclusion of direct review’ to
include an opportunity to seek certiorari. When Congress elects to
use terminology that has become commonplace in court decisions in
a particular field of law, the rules of statutory construction call for us
to define the statute’s terms in harmony with that accepted judicial
meaning. Thus, a chance to solicit review of constitutional issues
before the United States Supreme Court, after the end of state court
proceedings, properly falls within the meaning of ‘final by the
conclusion of direct review.’
Smith , 159 F.3d at 348 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 3
To conclude, we hold that Mr. Locke’s petition was timely filed with the
district court pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A): Under the statute, a petitioner’s
conviction is not final and the one-year limitation period for filing a federal
habeas petition does not begin to run until – following a decision by the state
court of last resort – “after the United States Supreme Court has denied review,
or, if no petition for certiorari is filed, after the time for filing a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court has passed.” Rhine , 182 F.3d at 1155. To the
3
We note that, in his response brief, Mr. Locke argues “[i]n the alternative” that
“conclusion of direct review” as used in § 2244(d)(1)(A) “means the date of the
return of the state court of last resort’s mandate from the lower court to the state
court of last resort.” Aple’s Br. at 3. We need not reach this alternative
argument, having ruled in Mr. Locke’s favor on his primary argument.
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extent that other cases in this circuit may be read to suggest otherwise, 4
see, e.g. ,
Gibson v. Snyder , No. 99-6304, 2000 WL 300212, at *1 n.3 (10th Cir. March 23,
2000) (unpublished opinion); Bridges v. Booher , No. 99-6191, 1999 WL 617723,
at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999) (unpublished opinion); Rodriguez v. Klinger , No.
98-6407, 1999 WL 394562, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. June 16, 1999) (unpublished
opinion), those cases are not to be cited.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
4
It is not clear to what extent these unpublished opinions are contrary
because the factual discussion in each is limited.
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