Loral Corp. v. Swiftships, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-9249.

LORAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SWIFTSHIPS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

March 13, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:95-cv-2285-CC), Clarence Cooper, Judge.

Before ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Loral Corporation filed this case, pursuant to § 9 of the

Federal Arbitration Act (Act), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994), seeking

confirmation of an arbitration award which required Swiftships,

Inc., to deposit certain milestone payments due to Swiftships from

the Arab Republic of Egypt into an escrow account. Loral also

sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary

injunction because Swiftships had indicated that it did not intend

to deposit the payments as required. The TRO was granted.

Swiftships moved to dismiss the case and to dissolve the TRO,

arguing, inter alia, that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, that venue was improper,

and that the TRO was improperly granted. Following a hearing on

Swiftships' motion to dismiss and on Loral's motion for a

preliminary injunction, the district court found that subject

matter jurisdiction was proper based on diversity of citizenship

and that personal jurisdiction and venue were proper because the
parties had agreed to arbitrate in Atlanta. The court denied

Swiftships' motion to dismiss. Finding that the risk of harm to

Swiftships did not outweigh the risk of harm to Loral, the court

denied Swiftships' motion to dissolve the TRO and granted Loral's

motion for a preliminary injunction. Swiftships appeals, raising

the issue of whether the district court for the Northern District

of Georgia had subject matter jurisdiction.1 We affirm.

Federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $50,000 ... and is between ... citizens of different

States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). A corporation is a "citizen of

any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where

it has its principal place of business." Id. at (c)(1). The

parties do not dispute that the amount in controversy exceeds

$50,000 or that Loral is a New York corporation with its principal

place of business in New York and Swiftships is a Delaware

corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana. The

district court, therefore, had original jurisdiction of this civil

action pursuant to § 1332.

Citing McGregor & Werner, Inc. v. Motion Picture Lab.

Technicians Local 780, 806 F.2d 1003 (11th Cir.1986), Swiftships

argues that § 9 of the Act creates jurisdictional requirements in

1
Swiftships also raises the following issues: (1) whether
the district court erred in finding that personal jurisdiction
and venue were proper in the Northern District of Georgia, (2)
whether the district court erred in determining that the
arbitration award was final for purposes of confirmation, and (3)
whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the
preliminary injunction. These issues are without merit, and we
affirm. See 11th Cir.R. 36-1.
addition to those in § 1332. In McGregor & Werner, this Court held

that "jurisdiction [was] proper in the federal court in the

district within which the arbitration award was made." Id. at

1005.

After reviewing the record, we hold that the district court

did not err in finding that the parties agreed to arbitrate in

Atlanta. For purposes of § 9, the arbitration award was made in

Atlanta, and jurisdiction was therefore proper in Atlanta.

We are concerned, however, by Swiftships' interpretation of

McGregor & Werner and do not want this opinion to be misconstrued.

By holding that this case falls within the requirements of McGregor

& Werner, we are not extending the holding in that case. McGregor

& Werner does not limit subject matter jurisdiction to courts in

the district within which the arbitration award was made. Nor do

we do so here.

Subject matter jurisdiction for cases filed pursuant to § 9

of the Act must be based upon either diversity of citizenship or

the existence of a federal question and is not dependent upon the

location in which the arbitration award was made. Section 9

defines the appropriate venue for confirming an arbitration

agreement and grants personal jurisdiction over the parties to the

agreement; it does not limit subject matter jurisdiction. The

district court did not err in finding that it had subject matter

jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.

AFFIRMED.