Luckhart v. State

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

GEOFFREY A. RIVERS JEFFREY A. MODISETT
JOSEPH P. HUNTER Attorney General of Indiana
Muncie, Indiana
PRISCILLA J. FOSSUM
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

NANETTE LUCKHART, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
) Supreme Court Cause Number
v. ) 18S00-9905-CR-276
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert L. Barnet, Judge
Cause No. 18D01-9807-CF-62

ON DIRECT APPEAL

October 4, 2000

RUCKER, Justice

Nanette Luckhart appeals her conviction for murder committed during
perpetration of a robbery as a result of the stabbing death of her seventy-
five-year-old neighbor Paul Gann. In this direct appeal Luckhart claims
the trial court erred by admitting her confession into evidence, and that
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the conviction. We disagree and
therefore affirm.

Facts

The facts most favorable to the verdict show that Luckhart was a
friend of Jeff Gann. Jeff lived with his father Paul Gann in the same
Muncie neighborhood as Luckhart. The record shows that Luckhart was aware
that Paul kept money in his house because Jeff told her he had stolen money
from his father numerous times to purchase drugs and beer. Around 3:00
a.m. on July 3, 1998, Luckhart left the trailer she and her five children
shared with her mother-in-law and invited Jeff to go with her to purchase
crack cocaine in Whitely, Indiana. Luckhart’s husband Eric was in jail at
the time. Luckhart purchased the cocaine from Yolanda Cobb, who had sold
drugs to Luckhart on prior occasions. Luckhart then drove to an isolated
rural area where she and Jeff smoked crack cocaine. When Jeff got out of
the car to answer nature’s call, Luckhart drove away without him.
Luckhart returned to Whitely approximately two hours later and
purchased more crack cocaine from Cobb. Cobb noticed that Luckhart
appeared very nervous and was not wearing any shoes. Luckhart told Cobb
that she got the money to purchase the drugs from a friend and that she
“might’ve killed the old mother f***er.” R. at 665.
In the meantime, after hitchhiking back to Muncie, Jeff arrived home
around 6:00 a.m. and discovered that his father was dead. Paul had been
struck in the head with a ceramic lamp and stabbed at least seven times,
with fatal wounds to his neck and chest. Jeff ran to Luckhart’s trailer
and accused her of killing his father.
Later that day, police questioned Luckhart about Paul’s murder, and
she denied any involvement. One week later, police contacted Luckhart and
asked her to talk with them again about Paul’s murder. Luckhart
voluntarily went to the police station around 8:00 p.m. on July 9, 1998.
After executing a waiver of rights, police interrogated Luckhart for
approximately five hours, all of which was recorded on videotape.
Initially, Luckhart again denied any involvement in Paul’s murder, claiming
that she had been in her trailer all night. However, Luckhart gradually
changed her story as police confronted her with incriminating evidence,
some of which was true and some of which was fabricated. Ultimately,
Luckhart told police that she took Cobb to Paul’s house in order to steal
money and, when Paul unexpectedly awoke, Luckhart smashed a lamp on his
head and assisted Cobb in stabbing him. Luckhart also told police that she
and Cobb took $100 from Paul’s home. Cobb was never considered a suspect
in Paul’s murder.
At trial, Luckhart changed her story once again, testifying that she
had spent part of the night smoking crack cocaine in her car with Jeff and
that Jeff had confessed to her that he killed his father. The jury
convicted Luckhart of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial
court sentenced Luckhart to sixty-five years on the felony murder
conviction. No sentence was imposed on the voluntary manslaughter
conviction. This direct appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth
below where relevant.

Discussion

I.
Luckhart first asserts the trial court erred by admitting into
evidence her videotaped confession. Specifically, Luckhart contends that
her confession was involuntary because it was the product of police
deception and she was under the influence of crack cocaine. When a
defendant challenges the admissibility of her confession, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given voluntarily.
Carter v. State, 730 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. 2000); Schmitt v. State, 730
N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. 2000).[1] The voluntariness of a confession is
determined from the “totality of the circumstances.” Berry v. State, 703
N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind. 1998). The “totality of the circumstances” test
focuses on the entire interrogation, not on any single act by police or
condition of the suspect. Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind.
1989). We review the record for evidence of inducement by way of violence,
threats, promises, or other improper influences. Berry, 703 N.E.2d at 157.
Although deception on the part of police is not conclusive, Light, 547
N.E.2d at 1079 (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)), it does weigh
heavily against the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. Heavrin
v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Ind. 1996). In the end, we must judge
whether the police conduct in relation to the specific suspect was
overbearing. Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1079. We do not re-weigh the evidence,
but rather determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s findings. Berry, 703 N.E.2d at 157. Here, the trial
court issued an order denying Luckhart’s motion to suppress her videotaped
confession, which includes the following factual findings:
1. On the evening of July 9th, 1998, and the early morning of July
10th, 1998, Defendant was interrogated by members of the Muncie
Police Department following execution of a valid waiver of rights.
The interrogation lasted approximately five (5) hours.
. . . .

3. Defendant voluntarily presented herself for an interview at the
Muncie Police Department at approximately 8:00 p.m. on July 9th,
1998. Defendant was presented a written waiver of rights which was
read to her and then she was given time to read the document
herself. Following this procedure, Defendant signed the waiver.
Sergeant Steve Bell detected no evidence of alcohol use or drug
use. Defendant was able to carry on a lucid conversation and
appeared to be in control of all her faculties. Defendant was able
to walk without assistance and her coordination did not appear to
be impaired. According to Sergeant Bell, Defendant appeared to be
of average intelligence. Defendant was granted rest breaks and
Defendant did not ask to cease the interview. No physical threats
were ever made. Defendant’s responses to the officers were
sequential and coherent. The officers offered no legal advice to
Defendant. Defendant had been involved in the criminal justice
system on a prior occasion and was not untutored in the conduct of
a police investigation.

4. During the course of the interrogation, as least two (2) factual
misrepresentations were made to Defendant by police interrogators.
Defendant was advised the police were in possession of a
fingerprint linked to Defendant and that two (2) witnesses had seen
the Defendant at the subject premises. Neither of these
representations was true. These representations were made, at
least in part, to judge Defendant’s reaction to this information.
No evidence exists of any additional substantial misrepresentations
made by the police. No evidence exists of any promises made
regarding leniency or special treatment or other inducements.

R. at 106-108. The trial court then concluded “beyond a reasonable doubt
that Defendant’s statement was made freely and voluntarily and that
Defendant’s will was not improperly overborn by the police. . . . Although
unfortunate, the two (2) misrepresentations made by the police to this
Defendant did not substantially impact this Defendant’s will to resist.”
R. at 111.[2]
After independently reviewing the videotapes and transcript, we find that
the police undoubtedly used deception and trickery in their interrogation
of Luckhart. The officers even admitted as much. For example, Sergeant
Bell testified at trial that it is a common police technique to “bluff”
suspects during interrogations. R. at 854. Lieutenant Steven Stanley
testified that the purpose of this technique is to judge a suspect’s
reaction to the bluff. R. at 973.
Although we do not condone such deceptive police conduct, see Light,
547 N.E.2d at 1079, we cannot say that under the totality of the
circumstances Luckhart’s confession was involuntary. Luckhart knew she was
a suspect in Paul’s murder, selected a time convenient for her to give a
statement to police, voluntarily went to the police station to give a
statement,
signed a waiver of her Miranda rights before giving the statement, and knew
that the interrogation was going to be videotaped. See Heavrin, 675 N.E.2d
at 1081 (signing a
waiver of rights form provides some indication that a defendant’s
confession was made voluntarily). Although the interrogation lasted five
hours, police gave Luckhart two breaks and allowed her to smoke during the
interrogation, even giving her cigarettes. See Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1079
(noting that in most cases where confessions are held involuntary, the
suspects are interrogated for days, not hours). Further, Luckhart never
indicated that she wanted to stop the interrogation, and she never asked
for an attorney. More importantly, police did not use violence or threaten
Luckhart at any point during the interrogation. The police deception did
not render Luckhart’s videotaped confession involuntary.
As for Luckhart’s assertion that her confession was involuntary
because she was under the influence of crack cocaine during the
interrogation, we have held that a confession may be given knowingly and
voluntarily, notwithstanding voluntary intoxication. Ellis v. State, 707
N.E.2d 797, 802 (Ind. 1999). We will deem a defendant’s confession
incompetent only when she is so intoxicated that it renders her not
conscious of what she is doing or produces a state of mania. Id.
Intoxication to a lesser degree only goes to the weight to be given to the
confession, not its admissibility. Id.
Sergeant Bell testified at trial that during the interrogation
Luckhart did not exhibit any signs of drug or alcohol use, was oriented as
to time and place, answered questions in a logical sequence, and was able
to walk without assistance. R. at 859. Additionally, the trial court
observed that during the interrogation Luckhart was able to carry on a
lucid conversation, appeared to be in control of her faculties, and was
able to walk without assistance. R. at 107. Luckhart’s alleged
intoxication did not render her confession involuntary.
II.
For her last allegation of error Luckhart contends the evidence was
not sufficient to support the conviction. Luckhart seems to acknowledge
that a confession standing alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
See Morrison v. State, 516 N.E.2d 14, 16 (Ind. 1987). She complains,
however, that her confession was the product of police suggesting the
answers that she ultimately gave and that there are other reasonable
theories of who may have murdered Paul, including his son Jeff. Luckhart’s
contention amounts to an invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence.
We decline. Luckhart presented her alternative theories to the jury, and
it rejected them. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do
not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Brown
v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (Ind. 1999). Rather, we look to the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict
and will affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
The evidence as recited in the facts section of this opinion is
sufficient to sustain Luckhart’s conviction. We also note that Luckhart
provided information to the police that was never made public during the
investigation. She told police precisely the location and positioning of
Paul’s body, the type of knife used and the location of wounds, that Paul
was
struck on the head with a lamp, and that the telephone cord had been torn
from the wall. R.
at 991-1024. We reject, as apparently did the jury, the notion that the
police supplied this information to Luckhart.

Conclusion
Judgment affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] We note that the federal constitution requires the State to prove
only by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s confession was
voluntarily given. Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238, 1246-47 n.11 (Ind.
1997) (citing Colorado v. Conelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1986); Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972)). However, in Indiana we require the
State to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt,
and trial courts are bound to apply this standard when evaluating such
claims.
[2] Luckhart takes issue with the trial court’s findings that police
made only two misrepresentations. According to Luckhart, the police told
fourteen separate lies. Most of the alleged misrepresentations do not
merit discussion. Illustrative of Luckhart’s claims is the assertion
police lied to her when they told her “several people had given sworn
testimony that they saw Luckhart’s car leave the night of the murder.”
Amended Brief of Appellant at 10 (emphasis in original). The record shows
the police interviewed only two neighbors who saw Luckhart’s car leave the
night of the murder, and their statements were not sworn. R. at 471-72.
One of the additional misrepresentations is only slightly more substantial.
Officer Bradshaw told Luckhart that her burglary of Paul’s home three
nights before the murder was not technically a crime because Paul never
reported it. This certainly is not true. Indeed Luckhart was charged with
burglary in this case but the jury acquitted her. In any event, we do not
agree that this additional misrepresentation affected Luckhart’s will to
resist.