F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 11, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JAMES PATRICK MALICOAT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-6301
MIKE MULLIN, Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary at McAlester,
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-01-018-M)
Scott W. Braden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Death Penalty Federal
Habeas Corpus Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Jennifer J. Dickson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (W.A. Drew
Edmondson, Attorney General, with her on the brief), State of Oklahoma,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner James Patrick Malicoat was convicted in Grady County,
Oklahoma District Court of first-degree felony murder by child abuse. Following
the jury’s recommendation, the trial court imposed the death penalty.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Mr. Malicoat’s
conviction and sentence. See State v. Malicoat, 992 P.2d 383 (Okla. Crim. App.
2000). Then, in an unpublished opinion, the OCCA denied Mr. Malicoat’s
application for post-conviction relief. Subsequently, the federal district court
denied Mr. Malicoat’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition.
In this appeal, Mr. Malicoat argues that: (1) his counsel on direct appeal
was ineffective for failing to argue that a carving in the courtroom bearing the
inscription “AN EYE FOR AN EYE AND A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH” deprived
him of a fair trial. Mr. Malicoat also argues that the OCCA erred by (2)
concluding that, under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980), he was not
entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree
depraved-mind murder; (3) concluding that no finding of Mr. Malicoat’s intent to
kill was required to support the death sentence, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment principles set forth in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); (4) rejecting Mr. Malicoat’s claim that the
prosecution’s closing arguments during the guilt and sentencing stages deprived
him of a fair trial; (5) concluding that the admission of a photograph of the victim
-2-
while alive, although error, was harmless; (6) rejecting Mr. Malicoat’s claim that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Finally, Mr. Malicoat argues
that (7) the cumulative effect of these errors also deprived him of a fair trial.
We are not convinced by these arguments. First, the display of the “EYE
FOR AN EYE” inscription on the carving in the courtroom did not constitute
structural error. Thus, Mr. Malicoat’s Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel was not violated by his attorney’s failure to challenge it on
direct appeal. Second, as to Mr. Malicoat’s Enmund/Tison argument, we
conclude that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in holding that,
in order to impose the death penalty, the prosecution was not required to prove
that Mr. Malicoat intended the death of the victim or acted in reckless disregard
of human life. As to Mr. Malicoat’s Beck claim, we similarly conclude that the
OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in holding that Mr. Malicoat was
not entitled to an instruction on second-degree depraved-mind murder. Mr.
Malicoat’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, admission of prejudicial evidence,
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and cumulative error also lack merit.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied Mr. Malicoat’s
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
-3-
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are set forth in the OCCA’s opinion on direct appeal.
See 992 P.2d at 391-92. As a result, we only briefly summarize them here.
At about 8:25 p.m. on February 21, 1997, Mr. Malicoat and his girlfriend,
Mary Ann Leadford, brought their thirteen-month-old daughter, Tessa Leadford,
to the county hospital emergency room. The hospital staff determined that Tessa
had been dead for several hours. Her face and body were covered with bruises.
She had a large mushy closed wound on her forehead and three human bite marks
on her body. A post-mortem examination revealed two subdural hematomas from
the head injury, and severe internal injuries, including broken ribs, internal
bruising and bleeding, and a torn mesentery. The medical examiner concluded the
death was caused by a combination of the head injury and internal bleeding from
the abdominal injuries.
Tessa and Mary Ann Leadford had begun living with Mr. Malicoat on
February 2, 1997. Mr. Malicoat worked a night shift on an oil rig and was
responsible for Tessa’s care during the day.
Mr. Malicoat admitted that he routinely poked Tessa hard in the chest area
and occasionally bit her, both as a disciplinary measure and in play. When
interviewed by police officers, Mr. Malicoat initially denied knowing how Tessa
had received the severe head injury. Subsequently, he suggested that she had
-4-
fallen and hit the edge of a waterbed frame. However, he eventually admitted that
he had hit her head on the bed frame one or two days before she died. He also
admitted that, at about 12:30 p.m. on February 21, while Ms. Leadford was at
work, he twice punched Tessa hard in the stomach. He stated that Tessa stopped
breathing and that he gave her CPR. According to Mr. Malicoat, when Tessa
began breathing again, he gave her a bottle containing a soft drink and went to
sleep next to her on the bed. When he awoke around 5:30 p.m., she was dead. He
put Tessa in her crib and covered her with a blanket, spoke briefly with Ms.
Leadford, and went back to sleep in the living room. Ms. Leadford eventually
discovered that Tessa was not moving, and the couple took her to the emergency
room.
Seeking to explain the events leading to Tessa’s death, Mr. Malicoat
reported that he had worked all night, had car trouble, took Ms. Leadford to work,
and was exhausted. He added that he had hit Tessa when she would not lie down
so he could sleep. He said he sometimes intended to hurt Tessa when he
disciplined her, but never meant to kill her. He told the officers that he had
suffered through extreme abuse as a child that he did not realize his actions would
seriously hurt or kill Tessa.
The state charged Mr. Malicoat with first-degree felony murder by child
abuse under O KLA . S TAT . tit. 21, § 701.7(C). A first trial ended with a mistrial
-5-
during jury selection. After the second trial, the jury convicted Mr. Malicoat of
the murder charge. Then, upon hearing additional evidence at sentencing, the jury
found two aggravating factors: (1) that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel and (2) that there existed a probability that Mr. Malicoat
would commit criminal acts of violence that constituted a continuing threat to
society. See O KLA S TAT . tit. 21, § 701.12(4) and (7). Following the jury’s
recommendation, the trial court imposed the death penalty.
The OCCA affirmed Mr. Malicoat’s conviction and sentence on direct
appeal and then rejected his petition for post-conviction relief. Subsequently, the
federal district court denied Mr. Malicoat’s federal habeas petition.
II. DISCUSSION
We begin by addressing the standard of review. Then, we proceed to the
merits of Mr. Malicoat’s claims.
A. Standard of Review
Because Mr. Malicoat filed his § 2254 habeas corpus petition after the
effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
its provisions apply to this appeal. See Smallwood v. Gibson , 191 F.3d 1257,
1264 (10th Cir. 1999). Under AEDPA, a federal court may only grant habeas
-6-
relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court if the state court
proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). In addition, AEDPA directs federal
courts to presume that the factual findings of the state court are correct unless the
petitioner can rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. §
2254(e)(1); Smith v. Mullin , 379 F.3d 919, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004).
In Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court provided
guidance as to when a state court decision may be deemed “contrary to” or “an
unreasonable application of” established Supreme Court precedent pursuant to
section 2254(d)(1). As to the former term, the Court explained that a state court
decision is “contrary to” the Court’s clearly established precedent in two
circumstances: (1) when “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” and (2) when “the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from” the result reached
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 405-06. As to the latter term, the Court explained
that a state court decision constitutes “an unreasonable application” of Supreme
-7-
Court precedent if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. Thus, “[u]nder § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable
application’ clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply
because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411; see
also Thomas v. Gibson , 218 F.3d 1213, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing
Williams ).
As we discuss more fully below, with regard to Mr. Malicoat’s claims
regarding ineffective assistance of appellate and trial counsel, the OCCA applied
state law standards that differ from the federal standard. We therefore engage in
de novo review of those claims. In contrast, the OCCA based its rejection of Mr.
Malicoat’ s Beck, Enmond-Tison , prosecutorial misconduct, and evidentiary
claims on its reading of federal law. Therefore, as to those claims, we apply
AEDPA’s standard of review and consider whether the OCCA’s decision was
unreasonable. Finally, as to Mr. Malicoat’s claim for cumulative error, it is not
clear that the OCCA applied the federal standard. Accordingly, we afford Mr.
Malicoat the benefit of the doubt and engage in de novo review of that claim as
well.
-8-
B. Merits
1. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
(in failing to challenge the “EYE FOR AN EYE” inscription)
Mr. Malicoat first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct appeal. His claim is based upon a wooden carving on the wall directly
behind the judge’s bench in the Grady County, Oklahoma courtroom in which he
was tried. The carving depicts a man and a woman holding a sword bearing the
inscription “AN EYE FOR AN EYE AND A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH.” 1
Mr. Malicoat objected to the inscription during jury selection in his first
trial, and the judge responded by covering it up. However, a different judge
1
Mr. Malicoat attached two photographs of the carving to his state court
application for post-conviction relief, and they are attached as an exhibit to this
opinion.
A 1976 article from the Chickasha Daily Express reports that the carving
was made by Derald Swineford in 1934. The article states that the carving is
entitled “Justice Tempered by Mercy.” Fed. Ct. Rec. doc. 23, Ex. A (Response to
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed Dec. 4, 2001).
According to the Daily Express , “the sword with the harsh inscription ‘An
Eye for an Eye and a Tooth for a Tooth’ carving on the blade and the winged
lions at the bottom represents the early Babylonian code.” Id. “The male figure .
. . represents the [Grecian] practice which was the same as that of Hammurabi, as
he is grasping the sword of justice.” Id.
The female figure represents Mercy. “[She] represents the Roman element
since it seems the Romans were the first to really try a case and decide it not on
the belief that the party guilty of the misdeed should suffer in the same manner as
the recipient but that a group of men should weigh the causes of the misdeed and
decide in what manner the guilty party should be punished or whether he was
deserving of any punishment.” Id.
There is no indication in the record that the title appears anywhere on the
carving, and the parties do not so suggest.
-9-
presided over the second trial, and he overruled Mr. Malicoat’s objection. On
direct appeal, Mr. Malicoat’s counsel did not argue that the inscription deprived
him of a fair trial.
Mr. Malicoat now maintains that the failure to advance this argument was
constitutionally deficient. In particular, he argues that the trial judge’s failure to
cover the inscription constituted “a structural error,” the kind of error that
“necessarily render[ed] [his] trial fundamentally unfair,” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 577 (1986) and that “def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,”
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). As a result, he asserts, there is
a reasonable probability that, if his appellate counsel had challenged the “EYE
FOR AN EYE” inscription, Mr. Malicoat’s capital sentence would have been
overturned.
In assessing this argument, we begin by examining the OCCA’s
adjudication of this claim in order to determine the appropriate standard of
review. Then, we outline the framework for evaluating claims alleging
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Finally, we turn to the particular error
alleged here, the failure to challenge the “EYE FOR AN EYE” inscription as an
improper invocation of religious principle in a capital case, and we consider
whether the inscription constituted a structural error, which, if argued by counsel,
would have led the OCCA to overturn Mr. Malicoat’s sentence.
-10-
A. The OCCA’s decision
Mr. Malicoat first raised this claim in post-conviction proceedings in the
OCCA. There, he argued that the inscription constituted a structural error
because it “creat[ed] an establishment of religion at his public trial; and it denied
him a reliable sentencing free from arbitrary, capricious, and unreliable state
action, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Original
Application for Post-Conviction Relief in a Death Penalty Case, at 34 (filed Nov.
19, 1999). Mr. Malicoat submitted photographs of the carving and the
inscription, but he offered no evidence that the jury could see the inscription
given its vantage point. He argued that his counsel’s failure to challenge the
inscription on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.
In rejecting this argument, the OCCA applied the three-part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in its prior decisions. See Order
Denying Application for Post-Conviction Relief and Application for Exercise of
Original Jurisdiction, filed Feb. 1, 2000, at 3 (citing Walker v. State, 933 P.2d
327, 333 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997)). 2 Under that standard, “omission of
2
Notably, Judge Chapel vigorously dissented. He concluded that:
the sign over the Grady Courthouse bench, reading “AN EYE FOR AN
EYE & A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH,” [is] inappropriate in any criminal
(continued...)
-11-
meritorious claims [from an appellate brief] will ‘rarely, if ever,’ constitute
deficient performance.” Id. at 3 (quoting Bryan v. State, 948 P.3d 1230, 1233
(Okla. Crim. App. 1997)).
This circuit has held that the OCCA’s three-part standard does not comport
with the established federal standard for evaluating Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that the OCCA’s decisions appeared to require a petitioner asserting
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to establish not only that counsel had
omitted an issue from an appeal “but also an improper motive or cause behind
counsel’s omission of the issue” and that this approach “appears to involve the
very inquiry that the Supreme Court specifically repudiated”). Accordingly, we
will not defer to the OCCA’s conclusion. See id. at 1205 (“Because the OCCA’s
2
(...continued)
trial. As I have previously said, in the context of a capital trial I
believe that sign is outrageous and unconstitutional. This violates Art.
I, § 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution and the 1st, 5th, and 14th
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Order Denying Application for Post-Conviction Relief and Application for Exercise
of Original Jurisdiction, filed Feb. 1, 2000 (Chapel, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). In a prior case, Judge Chapel also dissented on the same grounds. See
Anderson v. Oklahoma, No. PC-99-818 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2000) (Chapel,
J., dissenting).
-12-
analysis of petitioner’s appellate ineffectiveness allegations deviated from the
controlling federal standard, . . . it is not entitled to deference.”). Instead, we
examine Mr. Malicoat’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel de
novo, applying the familiar standard established by Strickland. Id.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
In order to prevail, Mr. Malicoat must first demonstrate that his appellate
counsel’s performance was deficient. Secondly, Mr. Malicoat must demonstrate
that his counsel’s performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687.
Deficient performance entails an error so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. Counsel’s representation must fall below “an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 688. As to prejudice, Mr. Malicoat must show that “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The Supreme
Court has defined “[a] reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Id.
When, as here, a habeas petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim is based upon
appellate counsel’s failure to raise a particular issue, the Supreme Court has
-13-
recognized that “appellate counsel who filed a merits brief need not (and should
not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in
order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 528
U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)). Indeed, the
winnowing out of weaker arguments so that counsel may focus the court’s
attention on those more likely to prevail “is the hallmark of effective advocacy.”
Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (10th Cir. 1991).
Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, appellate counsel’s omission of an
issue may constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland. In analyzing such
claims, the court must consider the merits of the omitted issue. Smith, 528 U.S.
at 288; Cargle, 317 F.3d 1202. “If the omitted issue is so plainly meritorious that
it would have been unreasonable to winnow it out even from an otherwise strong
appeal, its omission may directly establish deficient performance.” Cargle, 317
F.3d at 1202 (discussing Smith, 528 U.S. at 288). On the other hand, if the
omitted issue has merit but is not so compelling, we must examine the issue in
relation to the rest of the appeal. Id. Habeas relief is warranted only if the
petitioner establishes a reasonable probability of a favorable result had his
appellate counsel raised the omitted issue. Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057
n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
-14-
C. Alleged Structural Error
Here, the issue omitted from Mr. Malicoat’s counsel’s brief on direct
appeal involves his right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and his Eighth Amendment right to an individualized jury
determination as to whether the death penalty should be imposed. Mr. Malicoat
notes that the phrase “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” occurs in three
chapters of the Old Testament. See Aplt’s Br. at 10-11 (citing L EVITICUS 24:19-
21; E XODUS 21:24; and D EUTEROMONY 19:21). He thus maintains that the
inscription on the carving in the Grady County courtroom constituted a “specific
Biblical exhortation[] demanding a sentence of death that [was] part of the
official government facility.” Aplt’s Br. at 10. In his view, the inscription “told
the jury if it found Mr. Malicoat guilty it should sentence him to death,” it
“prevent[ed] the jury from making the specific findings required to determine the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” and it “announc[ed] to
the jurors [that] the State chooses the death penalty for murderers, regardless of
what the instructions say.” Id. at 11-12.
In the state post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Malicoat characterized the
trial court’s refusal to cover the “EYE FOR AN EYE” inscription as a structural
error. See Original Application For Post-Conviction Relief in a Death Penalty
Case, at 9-34 (filed Nov. 19, 1999). He argued that the display of the inscription
-15-
throughout the trial violated the Establishment Clause and rendered his death
sentence reversible per se. Although, in his brief to this court, Mr. Malicoat does
not use the term “structural error,” he advances essentially the same argument that
he did in the state post-conviction proceedings. See Aplt’s Br. at 11 (stating that
the inscription on the carving “undermined every aspect of the Constitutional
framework mandated for capital trials”).
In advancing this argument, Mr. Malicoat faces a high hurdle. As the
Supreme Court has often observed, structural errors occur in only a “very limited
class of cases.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). Errors
deemed to be “structural” have included the total deprivation of the right to
counsel at trial, a biased presiding judge, the systematic exclusion of members of
the defendant’s own race from a grand jury, the denial of the right to
self-representation at trial, the denial of the right to a public trial, the denial of
the right to have a district judge (rather than a magistrate judge) preside over jury
selection, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction. See United States v.
Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). In contrast
to these fundamental deficiencies in the trial process, most errors can be harmless.
“If the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a
strong presumption that any other constitutional errors that may have occurred are
subject to harmless-error analysis.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
-16-
Here, Mr. Malicoat cites no decision holding that a jury’s viewing of
extraneous material analogous to the “EYE FOR AN EYE” constitutes a structural
error. We too have found none.
Moreover, Mr. Malicoat’s structural error argument is undermined by our
decisions concerning jurors’ exposure to particular items of extraneous
information about pending matters. See, e.g., United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d
1270, 1279-81 (10th Cir.) (considering juror’s exposure to an inaccurate report of
attorney-juror contact), cert. denied sub nom., Bono v. United States, 540 U.S.
804 (2003); Vigil v. Zavares, 298 F.3d 935, 940-43 (10th Cir. 2002) (considering
jurors’ exposure to fellow juror’s personal account of how long it took to drive a
certain route—a matter relevant to the prosecution’s alleged time line and the
defendant’s alibi). On direct appeal, “[w]hen members of a jury are exposed to
extraneous information about a matter pending before the jury[,] a presumption of
prejudice arises.” Scull, 321 F.3d at 1280 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. 227, 229 (1954)). “The presumption of prejudice weighs heavily in favor of
the defendant but is not insurmountable” and “the government can seek to prove
the exposure to extraneous information was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
In habeas corpus proceedings, this presumption generally does not apply.
Vigil, 298 F.3d at 940 n.6 (applying Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637
-17-
(1993)). Thus, the court may grant relief only if the extraneous information “‘had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”
Id. at 940 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). In deciding whether such
information substantially influenced the jury’s verdict the court may consider a
number of factors, such as: (1) the degree to which the jury discussed and
considered the extrinsic information; (2) the extent to which the jury had
difficulty reaching a verdict prior to receiving the improper evidence; (3) the
degree to which the information related to a material fact in the case; (4) when the
jury received the extrinsic evidence; (5) the strength of the legitimate evidence;
and (6) whether the extrinsic evidence merely duplicates evidence properly before
the jury. See id. at 941 (collecting cases). This case-specific, record-intensive
approach is inconsistent with Mr. Malicoat’s assertion of structural error.
Additionally, we have found no federal cases involving prosecutors’ use of
religious material in closing arguments that have characterized such misconduct
as structural error. For example, in Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 775-776
(9th Cir. 2001), the prosecutor told the jury in closing argument that God
approved of the death penalty for people like the defendant, whom he
characterized as evil and as defying the authority of the state. He explained that,
by imposing the death penalty, the jury would be “doing what God says.” Id. at
776. Although the court overturned the defendant’s conviction on the grounds of
-18-
prosecutorial misconduct, it did not apply the doctrine of structural error.
Instead, it concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks had actually prejudiced the
defendant. In support of that conclusion, the Sandoval court examined “the likely
effect of the statements in the context in which they were made.” Id. at 778. The
court considered the fact that “this was not a case in which the evidence
overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict” and that, after three days of
deliberation, the jury had informed the judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked.
Id. at 779.
Confronting a similar argument by the prosecutor, the Eleventh Circuit also
examined actual prejudice. See Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1368-71 (11th
Cir. 2001). The court inquired whether, absent the improper argument, there was
a reasonable probability that the result would not have been a death sentence. In
answering that question affirmatively, the court considered the fact that the trial
was “saturated with evidence relating to religion,” that “there was nothing
ambiguous or unintentional about the prosecutor’s improper argument,” that the
court did not give a curative instruction, that at least two members of the jury had
discussed the prosecutor’s interpretation of the Bible, that one juror “cared
enough about the argument to check one of the scriptures that the prosecutor had
used to ensure that he had quoted it correctly,” 3 and the relative strength of the
3
The jurors had testified about their deliberations at an evidentiary hearing in the
(continued...)
-19-
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the murder. Id. at 1369-
70; see also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 351 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
prosecutor’s invoking the Bible, which included using the phrase “[w]hosoever
sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed,” did not “so taint[] the
proceedings that they constitute[d] reversible error”); Hill, 952 P.2d at 692-700
(concluding that prosecutorial misconduct, including invoking the Bible and using
the phrase “an eye for an eye” during closing argument, along with other errors,
“created a negative synergistic effect” that deprived the defendant of a fair trial);
Long, 883 P.2d at 177 (“Given the strong evidence against the [defendant-
]appellant, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s improper
appeal to religious bias in the jurors was harmless.”); State v. Shurm, 866 S.W.2d
447, 464 (Mo. 1993) (concluding that the prosecutor’s statement in closing
argument that “I’m asking you to take an eye for an eye” was an “isolated
reference” that did “not rise to the level of plain error”). But see State v.
Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991) (not using the term “structural error” but
vacating a death sentence and holding that the “reliance in any manner upon the
Bible or any other religious writing in support of a penalty of death is reversible
error per se and may subject violators to disciplinary action”).
3
(...continued)
state post-conviction proceedings. See 253 F.3d at 1362-63.
-20-
These decisions convince us that the trial judge’s refusal to cover the “EYE
FOR AN EYE” inscription was not a structural error. Here, in contrast to the
cases involving the use of religious authority in closing argument, the jury was
not directly told to apply the “eye for an eye” maxim. Although the inscription
was displayed behind the judge’s bench, there is no evidence that the inscription
caused the jurors to bring Bibles into deliberation. Nor is there any evidence that
any of the jurors invoked the “eye for an eye” maxim in their discussions.
Moreover, although the inscription directly quotes a portion of a biblical passage,
it did not explicitly inform the jury that it should apply religious principles in
arriving at its decision. Indeed, it is possible that the jury understood the carving
to suggest that mercy should trump retaliation (although there is no evidence to
support that proposition either). Finally, the jury was properly instructed on the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to
impose the death penalty. See State Ct. Rec. at 350-365 (sentencing phase
instructions). As a result, unlike the cases involving prosecutorial references to
the Bible in closing argument, the integrity of the sentencing proceeding was not
threatened in a fundamental way.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge’s refusal to cover the
inscription was not a structural error, and that, as a result, Mr. Malicoat’s
-21-
counsel’s failure to advance a structural error argument on direct appeal did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Thus, Mr. Malicoat is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
2. Lesser-Included Offense Instruction
Mr. Malicoat argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on the offense of second-degree “depraved mind” murder. See Willingham v.
State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (discussing the elements of
that offense), overruled on other grounds by Shrum v. State, 991 P.2d 1032, 1034
(Okla. Crim. App. 1999). He contends that the evidence was sufficient to support
such an instruction, invoking his lack of sleep on the day of the killing, his
statement that he did not hit Tessa on purpose, and the other stresses that he
suffered then. He adds that the district court denied his request to present
evidence of the abuse that he suffered as a child. According to Mr. Malicoat, this
personal history led him to act abusively when under stress, and, if the jury had
considered this evidence, it could have convicted him of “depraved mind” murder.
In rejecting this argument, the OCCA relied on evidence indicating that the
killing was “part of a pattern of intentional abuse . . . rather than an impulsive
outburst.” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 396. The court thus concluded that “[t]aken as a
-22-
whole, [the evidence] does not support a lesser included instruction on depraved
mind murder.” Id.
Mr. Malicoat’s argument is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures that “a sentence of death [may not] . . . be
imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not
permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense,
and when the evidence would have supported such a verdict.” Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980). Due process does not require the jury to be instructed
on every non-capital lesser-included offense supported by the evidence. Schad v.
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 646 (1991). However, a jury may not be placed in “an
all-or-nothing position” when the evidence supports a third option. Id.
Whether one state offense is a lesser-included offense of another offense is
a question of state law. See Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 96-98 & n.6 (1998);
Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968
(2003). Under Oklahoma law, “[i]t is the trial court’s duty to instruct the jury on
all lesser [] offenses that are supported by the evidence, even absent a request
from a defendant.” Grant v. State, 58 P.3d 783, 795 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)
(citing Shrum, 991 P.2d at 1034), vacated on other grounds, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
The OCCA has adopted an “evidence test [that] considers not only the elements,
but [also] looks to the crimes the trial evidence tends to prove.” Shrum, 991 P.2d
-23-
at 1036. Thus, “the court is only required to instruct on lesser offenses that are
reasonably supported by the evidence.” Grant, 58 P.3d at 795. The jury is not
required “to consider a lesser offense if no jury could rationally find both that the
lesser offense was committed and that the greater offense was not.” Frederick v.
State, 37 P.3d 908, 943-44 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). In other words, “[o]nly if
there is evidence which tends to negate an element of [the greater offense], which
would reduce the charge,” should instructions on a lesser included offense be
given. Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 627 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (emphasis
added)
We must thus consider both the elements of first-degree murder by child
abuse and second-degree “depraved mind” and the evidence offered at trial. The
elements of the former offense are: (1) the death of a child under the age of
eighteen; (2) resulting from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, or using
of unreasonable force; (3) by the defendant and/or another engaged with the
defendant. Gilson v. State, 8 P.3d 883, 910 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (discussing
O KLA . S TAT tit. 21, § 701.7(C)). 4 The OCCA has held that first degree child-
4
O KLA . S TAT . tit. 21, § 701.7(C) provides:
A person commits murder in the first degree when the death of a child
results from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or
using of unreasonable force by said person . . . . It is sufficient for the
crime of murder in the first degree that the person either willfully
tortured or used unreasonable force upon the child or maliciously
(continued...)
-24-
abuse murder is a general intent crime. See Fairchild, 998 P.2d at 619. Thus, in
order to prove the second element—the “‘willful or malicious injuring, torturing,
or us[e] of unreasonable force,” the prosecution need only prove “a general intent
. . . to commit the act which causes the injury.” Id. at 622-23; see also Workman
v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1110 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing first-degree murder
by child abuse under Oklahoma law and concluding that “the jury need not find
that the defendant intended to kill the child . . . but rather the crime is a type of
felony murder”).
In contrast, the elements of second-degree depraved mind murder in
Oklahoma are “(1) [the] death of a human; (2) caused by conduct which was
imminently dangerous to another person; (3) the conduct was that of the
defendant; (4) the conduct evinced a depraved mind in extreme disregard of
human life; (5) the conduct is not done with the intention of taking the life of any
particular individual.” Willingham, 947 P.2d at 1081 (emphasis added).
The fourth element–the extreme disregard of human life–actually places a higher
burden on the prosecution than does the general intent element of first-degree
murder by child abuse, which only requires the intent to commit the act of abuse.
As a result, the evidence that Mr. Malicoat invokes to support a second-
degree depraved mind murder instruction (his fatigue, stress, and past abuse) does
4
(...continued)
injured or maimed the child.
-25-
not “tend[] to negate an element . . . of the First-Degree [child abuse] Murder
statute.” Fairchild, 998 P.2d at 627. Although that evidence might be read to
suggest that Mr. Malicoat’s conduct did not evince a depraved mind in extreme
disregard of human life, the evidence does not support the inference that Mr.
Malicoat lacked the general intent to assault Tessa—as required to establish first-
degree murder by child abuse. Thus, the trial court was not required to instruct
the jury on second-degree depraved-mind murder.
That conclusion is supported by our interpretation of the federal murder
statutes. In Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1257-59, we held that second-degree
murder under federal law was not a lesser-included offense of first-degree felony
murder under 18 U.S.C § 1111(a). We reasoned that second-degree murder
required proof of malice as to the homicide whereas first-degree felony murder
only required commission of felonies listed in the statute. Significantly, we relied
on a prior decision, Franks v. Alford, 820 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1987), in
which we held that “‘depraved mind’ murder [under Oklahoma law] is not a lesser
included offense of felony murder because it requires proof of a mental state that
felony murder does not.”
Accordingly, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting
Mr. Malicoat’s Beck claim.
-26-
3. Enmund-Tison challenge
Mr. Malicoat argues that because the jury did not find that he intended to
kill Tessa, the imposition of the death penalty violated his Eighth Amendment
rights under the principles set forth in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). The OCCA rejected this argument on
direct appeal, holding that Enmund and Tison are not applicable “when the
defendant himself ‘personally, willfully, commits an act which produces an injury
upon a child resulting in the death of the child, or uses unreasonable force upon a
child resulting in the death of the child.’” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 396 (quoting
Fairchild v. State, 992 P.2d 350, 370, opinion on rehearing, 998 P.2d 611 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1999)).
The central concern of Enmund and Tison is whether a conviction for
felony murder contains an adequate determination of defendants’ culpability such
that imposition of the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In Enmund, the Supreme
Court reversed the death sentence of a defendant who waited outside while his
accomplices committed a murder during an armed robbery of a home and
subsequently drove the getaway car. The Supreme Court held that because the
defendant had not himself killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the victims
his “degree of participation in the murders was so tangential that it could not be
-27-
said to justify a sentence of death.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 148 (describing
Enmund’s ruling) (emphasis in original). The Court has subsequently clarified
that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless
indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability
requirement.” Id. at 158.
This circuit has recently rejected an Enmund-Tison challenge arising out
of an Oklahoma conviction for first-degree child abuse murder. In Workman, we
held that “the constitutional check that Enmund, and certainly that Tison,
represent is satisfied in felony murder cases in which the defendant actually
killed his victim.” 342 F.3d at 1114. Examining the record before us, we noted
that the petitioner “was convicted of child abuse murder in which a jury
determined that he had actually killed [the victim] . . . [and] was found to have
purposefully inflicted the[] blows.” Id. at 1114-15.
Workman is applicable here. Like the jury in that case, the jury here found
that Mr. Malicoat willfully committed child abuse and that he actually killed
Tessa. These findings are sufficient to comport with the Enmund-Tison Eighth
Amendment limitations on the application of capital punishment. Accordingly,
the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting Mr. Malicoat’s
challenge, and he is thus not entitled to relief on this claim.
-28-
4. Prosecutorial misconduct
Mr. Malicoat next argues that several of the prosecutor’s remarks deprived
him of a fair trial. The OCCA rejected this claim, concluding that “[a]lthough
certain comments were error, and others approached the limits of impermissible
argument, we cannot say that the arguments taken as a whole deprived Malicoat
of a substantial right or went to the foundation of his defense.” Malicoat, 992
P.2d at 401. The court also noted that Mr. Malicoat had not objected to most of
the comments, and it thus reviewed those comments for plain error only.
In a habeas corpus action, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed
only for a violation of due process. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
181 (1986). “[N]ot every trial error or infirmity which might call for application
of supervisory powers correspondingly constitutes a failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.” Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (citations and quotations omitted). In
order to be entitled to relief, Mr. Malicoat must establish that the prosecutor’s
conduct or remarks “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 643. This determination may be made
only after considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the
strength of the state’s case. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82.
-29-
Applying those standards, we consider the individual instances of alleged
misconduct invoked by Mr. Malicoat.
a. Conducting arguments in the voice of Tessa
The prosecutor conducted a substantial portion of his rebuttal argument in
the guilt phase as if he were Tessa. For example, he started the argument by
stating “today I want to take you back to February, 1997, because today I’m
Tessa Leadford and I live here in Chickasha. That’s the man with Mrs. Leadford
who gave me life. And that’s who I live with.” See Tr. Trans. vol. IV, at 42.
Mr. Malicoat objected to this approach, but the trial court overruled the
objection. On appeal, the OCCA explained that “[w]hile theatrical, we do not
find this argument overly prejudicial.” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 401. The court
added that “[t]he argument very nearly constitutes an improper solicitation of
sympathy for the victim, but is largely based upon the evidence presented.” Id.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the OCCA did not
unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the prosecutor’s argument was not
sufficiently prejudicial to deprive Mr. Malicoat of a fair trial. As the court
observed, the statements made by the prosecutor as to Mr. Malicoat’s abusive
conduct and the extent of Tessa’s injuries are supported by evidence in the record.
The prosecution’s case was compelling. Thus, Mr. Malicoat is not entitled to
relief on this claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
-30-
b. Arguing that it was the jury’s civic duty to convict Mr. Malicoat:
Next, Mr. Malicoat challenges the following statements about the jurors’
duty:
You know, you have a great responsibility here.
You’re doing a civic duty as jurors here, but you’re justice
in this community. We told you starting out if you think
he’s not guilty turn him loose. That’s your duty. If we
haven’t proved these material elements to you, turn Mr.
Malicoat loose.
By God, that’s not what the evidence showed you.
The evidence showed you beyond any doubt whatsoever he
committed those elements. And your duty is a double-
pronged sword, like we also told you. It’s a double-
pronged sword. You have a duty to convict him if we’ve
proven those elements.
Tr. Trans. vol. IV, at 39-40. Mr. Malicoat did not object to this line of argument.
Mr. Malicoat correctly observes that “[i]t is error for a prosecutor to exhort
a jury to reach a guilty verdict based ‘on the grounds of civic duty.’” Spears v.
Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1247 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Viereck v. United States,
318 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1943)), cert denied sub nom., Powell v. Mullin, 541 U.S.
909 (2004). However, here, the prosecutor’s argument referred to the evidence,
stating to the jury that it had a duty to convict if the prosecution had proven the
elements. This is not the same as baldly telling the jury that it had a civic duty to
-31-
convict. Cf. Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that
it was not fundamental error for the prosecutor to tell the jury that it should “do
its business”), abrogated on other grounds by Neil v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057
n.5 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus the OCCA was not unreasonable in concluding that
this argument did not render Mr. Malicoat’s trial fundamentally unfair.
c. Calling Mr. Malicoat “a monster”
Mr. Malicoat also challenges the prosecutor’s denigrating and degrading
comments, particularly his calling Mr. Malicoat “evil” and “a monster.” Tr.
Trans. vol. V, at 202. Although Mr. Malicoat did not object to these comments at
trial, the OCCA concluded that they constituted misconduct under its precedent.
See Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 401 (stating that “[t]his Court has repeatedly looked
with disfavor on this sort of name-calling and stated prosecutors should refrain
from airing their personal opinions”). Nevertheless, the OCCA reasoned, the
comments did not constitute plain error.
Here too, the OCCA’s analysis was not an unreasonable application of
federal law. A prosecutor may not use closing argument to inflame the passions
and prejudices of the jury. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 n.5 (1985)
(discussing ABA S TANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE 3-5.8 (2d ed. 1980)); United
States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that a
-32-
prosecutor’s argument was improper because “it was calculated to inflame the
jury's passions” by implying that the defendant had committed another crime).
The prosecutor’s name-calling was an attempt to do so. Nevertheless, the
OCCA’s conclusion is supported by the strength of the state’s case and the fact
that the majority of the prosecutor’s argument was based upon evidence in the
record. See Young, 470 U.S. at 16 (concluding that “the prosecutor’s statements,
although inappropriate and amounting to error, were not such as to undermine the
fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice”); see
also Rojem v. Gibson, 245 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
“[i]n light of the considerable evidence supporting guilt and the aggravating
factors, the prosecutor’s comments did not influence the jury’s verdict”).
d. Demeaning the mitigating evidence offered by Mr. Malicoat
Mr. Malicoat argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to demean the
mitigating evidence that he presented. He notes that, in closing argument, the
prosecutor stated that “[Mr. Malicoat’s attorney] told you in his opening we’re not
here to talk about excuses. He said no excuses. These mitigators—that’s what
these mitigators are. They’re excuses.” Tr. Trans. vol. V, at 206.
Mr. Malicoat did not object at trial. On direct appeal, the OCCA concluded
that this line of argument was not improper. The court reasoned that the
-33-
“characterization of Malicoat’s mitigating evidence as an attempt to blame his
family for the cycle of child abuse, which resulted in Tessa’s death, is a
reasonable inference from the evidence.” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 401-02.
Again, we conclude that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law.
A prosecutor may present an argument to the jury regarding the appropriate
weight to afford the mitigating factors offered by the defendant. See Buchanan v.
Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (stating that “the extensive arguments of
both defense counsel and the prosecutor on the mitigating evidence and the effect
it should be given in the sentencing determination” indicated that the jury had
considered that evidence); see also Walker, 228 F.3d at 1243 (“[A] prosecutor is
permitted to comment upon and to argue the appropriate weight to be given
mitigating factors.”) Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1300 (10th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting an allegation of misconduct when “the prosecutor merely commented
on the weight that should be accorded to the mitigating factors” and “did not
suggest that the jury was not permitted to consider the factors”).
e. Expressing a personal opinion about the death penalty
Mr. Malicoat argues that the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal
beliefs about the death penalty. Mr. Malicoat cites the prosecutor’s statements
that “[t]here’s a place in our system for the death penalty,” “[i]t is proper
punishment,” “[t]his is the time,” “[t]he only just verdict this case warrants the
-34-
death penalty,” and that “[w]e need you to do it for Tessa.” Tr. Trans. vol. V, at
203, 211. He points out that the prosecutor also asked “What kind of crime
besides the torture of a 13-month-old is a proper crime for the death penalty?
What justifies it more than this crime?” Id. at 203.
Mr. Malicoat did not object to this line of argument at trial. On direct
appeal, the OCCA noted that it had “repeatedly warned prosecutors not to engage
in these specific arguments or express personal opinions about the
appropriateness of the death penalty.” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 402. However, the
court further concluded, these “‘improper and reprehensible comments’ did not
deprive Malicoat of a substantial right or go to the foundation of his defense.” Id.
(quoting Harjo v. State, 882 P.2d at 1067, 1076 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)).
Again, the OCCA’s ruling was not unreasonable. “‘Expressions of personal
opinion by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony and tend to
exploit the influence of the prosecutor’s office and undermine the objective
detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued.’” Young,
470 U.S. at 8 n.5 (quoting ABA S TANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE 3-5.8); see
also Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1021 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a
prosecutor’s statement that the jury “could only do justice in this case by bringing
in a verdict of death” constituted misconduct) (internal quotation marks and
alternations omitted). However, we have further concluded that, in light of
-35-
overwhelming evidence of a defendant’s guilt, evidence of aggravating factors
supporting a death sentence, and the general content of the instructions to the
jury, such comments do not necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair trial. See
Le, 311 F.3d at 1021. Here, these factors support the OCCA’s conclusion that the
prosecutor’s improper comments did not deprive Mr. Malicoat of a fair trial.
f. Arguing facts not in evidence to play to the jury’s sympathy
Finally, Mr. Malicoat challenges the prosecutor’s argument that Tessa was
named after a character in the television show “Touched by an Angel.” He points
out that this fact was not put into evidence. Again, Mr. Malicoat did not object to
this argument at trial. On direct appeal, the OCCA concluded that the argument
did not deprive Mr. Malicoat of a substantial right or go to the foundation of his
defense. Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 402.
Again, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law. “‘It is
unprofessional conduct for a lawyer intentionally to misstate the evidence or
mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.’” Young, 470 U.S. at 9 n.7
(quoting ABA S TANDARD FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE 4-7.8); see also Jones, 194 F.3d
at 1181 (“A prosecutor engages in misconduct when he refers to matters outside
the record.”). The state does not dispute that the prosecutor engaged in such
misconduct here, since there was no testimony in the record about the origin of
-36-
Tessa’s name. However, we note that the trial court instructed the jury to decide
the case on the basis of the evidence presented. See State Ct. Rec. vol. I, at 329
(informing the jury that it “should consider only the evidence introduced while
the Court is in session”). The strength of the prosecution’s case and the fact that
the jury was properly instructed support the OCCA’s decision. Cf. United States
v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937, 944-45 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that prosecutorial
misconduct did not warrant reversal because, inter alia, the court instructed the
jury to decide the case based on the evidence presented).
g. Cumulative effect of prosecutor’s statements
Finally, we have also considered the cumulative effect of the incidents of
misconduct set forth above. See Walker, 228 F.3d at 1243 (considering
prosecutor’s comments, individually and cumulatively). Again, the strength of
the prosecution’s case, presented to a properly instructed jury, establishes that the
cumulative effect of this misconduct did not deprive Mr. Malicoat of a fair trial.
5. Admission of Tessa’s photograph
Mr. Malicoat argues that the state trial court erred in admitting a
photograph of Tessa taken approximately two months before her murder. The
-37-
trial court admitted the photograph in the sentencing phase, during the
prosecutor’s cross-examination of Mr. Malicoat’s brother Hugh. The prosecutor
then referred to the photograph in closing argument, stating that “Tessa Leadford
went from being a beautiful, blonde-haired girl with beautiful blue eyes, puppy
dog eyes, as [Mr. Malicoat] called it.” Tr. Trans. vol. V, at 210.
Mr. Malicoat objected to admission of the photograph, but the trial court
overruled his objection. On direct appeal, the OCCA noted that “[p]hotographs of
live victims are generally inadmissible, as they are irrelevant to any issues at
trial.” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 404. The court held that the photograph of Tessa
was irrelevant and should not have been admitted and that the prosecution’s
reference to it in closing argument compounded the error. Nevertheless, the
OCCA concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the picture did not contribute to
Mr. Malicoat’s death sentence.
Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), a constitutional error
is harmless if it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Here, in light of the evidence offered
by the prosecution in support of the aggravating circumstances, we conclude that
the OCCA’s holding was not an unreasonable application of Chapman’s federal
harmless error standard. See Spears, 343 F.3d at 1233 n.14 (stating that when
“there is a state-court-Chapman determination to defer to under 28 U.S.C. §
-38-
2254(d),” the court must decide “whether the state court’s finding of harmless
error was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Chapman”).
The jury heard ample evidence in support of the aggravating circumstances
urged by the prosecution in support of the death penalty. The OCCA’s conclusion
that the single living photograph of Tessa “did not contribute to Malicoat’s death
sentence,” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 404, is a plausible reading of the record. Thus,
Mr. Malicoat is not entitled to relief on this claim.
6. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
Mr. Malicoat next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at trial. According to Mr. Malicoat, his trial counsel was ineffective because he:
(1) did not give an opening statement in the guilt phase; (2) failed to present
evidence from a psychologist, Dr. Phillip Murphy, that Mr. Malicoat did not have
the intent to injure or kill; (3) failed to conduct an adequate mental health
investigation by failing to ask Mr. Malicoat’s family about his history of seizures.
The first of these alleged deficiencies resulted in part from the trial court’s
ruling that Mr. Malicoat’s counsel would not be allowed to present an opening
statement until the close of the prosecution’s case. Mr. Malicoat’s counsel
objected to this restriction, but his objection was overruled. Then, when the time
-39-
came for the defense’s opening statement, Mr. Malicoat’s counsel did not give
one. He also chose not to put on any defense evidence during the guilt phase.
As to testimony from the psychologist, the record indicates that, at the close
of the prosecution’s case, Mr. Malicoat’s counsel informed the trial judge that he
intended to call Dr. Murphy on the following day as the first witness for the
defense. According to Mr. Malicoat’s trial counsel, Dr. Murphy had written a
report that stated that Mr. Malicoat was “misreading the reality of [his punches to
Tessa’s stomach] and the effect that [they] would have on someone so small
which led to the homicide.” Tr. Trans. vol. III, at 285. Thus, “Dr. Murphy’s
report indicated Mr. Malicoat was intending to discipline his daughter and not
kill her.” Aplt’s Br. at 54-55. However, on the following day, Mr. Malicoat’s
counsel announced that he would be presenting no evidence during the guilt
phase.
As to the third alleged instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr.
Malicoat reports that interviews with his family members indicated that he had a
long history of seizures. According to Mr. Malicoat, this information would have
supported a conviction on the lesser offense of second-degree depraved-mind
murder and would also have been powerful mitigating evidence if it had been
presented at sentencing. Mr. Malicoat asserts that trial counsel was deficient for
failing to unearth this mental health evidence and that there is a reasonable
-40-
probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different had this evidence
been presented. Id. at 59. He adds that the federal district court should have
granted his request for an evidentiary hearing because there are factual disputes as
to his mental health history and its effect on the offense.
On direct appeal, the OCCA rejected Mr. Malicoat’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. As to the failure to present an opening statement, the
OCCA characterized Mr. Malicoat’s counsel’s action as a strategic decision. As
to Dr. Murphy’s testimony, the OCCA noted that first-degree child abuse murder
is a general intent crime and that, as a result, the testimony about Mr. Malicoat’s
lack of intent to kill or injure would have been irrelevant in the guilt phase of the
trial. Thus, Mr. Malicoat’s attorney was not ineffective for declining to present
it. Finally, as to Mr. Malicoat’s history of seizures, the OCCA observed that his
counsel had presented at sentencing “a thorough and comprehensive picture of
Malicoat’s personal and family history, concentrating on his experience of severe
abuse and resulting personality transformation.” Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 406. In
light of all of this evidence, Mr. Malicoat had not shown that the additional
evidence that he suffered from seizures “would have led the jury to conclude
[that] the balance of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors did not
support death.” Id.
-41-
In rejecting Mr. Malicoat’s claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
the OCCA relied in part on the standard set forth in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). The OCCA stated that “[t]he question [in determining
whether Mr. Malicoat was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s errors] is not whether
the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s actions but whether the
result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Malicoat, 992
P.2d at 405. As Mr. Malicoat argues, this is not the correct standard. In
particular, as the Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
392-93 (2000), the Lockhart “fundamentally unfair” inquiry is used to supplement
the ordinary prejudice inquiry under Strickland only when the law has changed
after counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. See also Lockhart, 506 U.S. at
373 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the majority opinion “will, in the vast
majority of cases, have no effect on the prejudice inquiry under [Strickland]”).
Because the OCCA applied the incorrect standard, we do not defer to its
analysis of this claim. See Spears, 343 F.3d at 1248 (concluding that, because the
OCCA had “applied Strickland, but as further restricted by Lockhart,” the
OCCA’s ruling was not entitled to deference under AEDPA). Instead, we
examine the claim de novo, applying the familiar two-part standard set forth in
Strickland and asking whether Mr. Malicoat’s counsel’s performance was
deficient, and if so, whether counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced
-42-
Mr. Malicoat’s defense. United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.
2004) (discussing Strickland).
a. Failure to give an opening statement
As to Mr. Malicoat’s counsel’s failure to give an opening statement during
the guilt phase, we note that, under the first Strickland inquiry—whether counsel
engaged in deficient performance—we must “impose a heavy presumption that
‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, . . . the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’” United States v.
Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1284 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Here, affording Mr. Malicoat’s counsel the benefit of that presumption, his
decision to waive his opening statement appears sound. During the guilt phase,
the prosecution’s evidence was overwhelming, and there was little dispute as to
the relevant facts. Moreover, because first-degree murder by child abuse is a
general intent crime in Oklahoma, there is little indication that Mr. Malicoat had a
plausible defense to offer. Thus, his counsel might reasonably have concluded
that, in order be more persuasive to the jury at sentencing, it was preferable to
refrain from making a fruitless opening statement during the guilt phase. See
Fox, 200 F.3d at 1296 (“While opening and closing statements are not to be
-43-
lightly waived in a capital case, it is well-settled that the decision to waive an
opening or closing statement is a commonly adopted strategy, and without more,
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d
831, 840 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding reasonable a state court’s conclusion that
counsel’s concession during the guilt phase closing argument was “a strategic
decision made . . . in order to maintain credibility with the jury for sentencing
purposes”). Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Malicoat’s counsel’s waiver of
opening statement did not constitute deficient performance.
b. Failure to introduce psychological testimony during the guilt phase
As to counsel’s failure to introduce testimony from Dr. Murphy during the
guilt phase, we agree with the OCCA that Mr. Malicoat’s argument is undermined
by the fact that, in Oklahoma, first-degree murder by child abuse is a general
intent crime. Accordingly, the prosecution was not required to prove that Mr.
Malicoat intended to kill or injure Tessa but only that he intended to commit the
abusive act. See Fairchild, 998 P.2d at 622-23. Thus, Dr. Murphy’s statement
about the effects that Mr. Malicoat anticipated from his abuse of Tessa (i.e., that
Mr. Malicoat “was misreading the reality of [his] punches to the stomach and the
effect that such would have on someone so small,” Tr. Trans. vol. III, at 285),
could not have provided a colorable defense to the first-degree murder charge.
-44-
Accordingly, Mr. Malicoat’s counsel did not provide deficient performance by
failing to offer Dr. Murphy’s testimony during the guilt phase.
c. Failure to investigate Mr. Malicoat’s history of seizures
As to the failure to investigate Mr. Malicoat’s history of seizures, we
conclude that Mr. Malicoat has failed to establish that this evidence, if discovered
by his counsel and presented to the jury, “might well have influenced the jury’s
appraisal of [his] culpability.” Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The record does indicate that
Mr. Malicoat’s attorney did present to the jury at sentencing fairly extensive
evidence about the abuse that Mr. Malicoat had suffered as a child. There is no
indication that additional evidence of Mr. Malicoat’s mental health history would
have affected the jury’s imposition of the death penalty.
Accordingly, as to this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr.
Malicoat has failed to establish the required element of prejudice.
7. Cumulative error
Finally, Mr. Malicoat argues that the cumulative effect of various errors
deprived him of a fair trial: (1) the admission of the photograph taken of Tessa
-45-
when she was alive; (2) the testimony of Mr. Malicoat’s estranged wife that he
failed to pay child support; (3) the testimony of a social worker that the social
worker believed that Mr. Malicoat had intentionally abused Tessa; (4) the
prosecutor’s statement in closing argument that Tessa was named after an angel in
a television show; and (5) testimony that Mr. Malicoat’s home was unclean and
that the refrigerator was not stocked with food appropriate for a thirteen-month
old child. Mr. Malicoat notes that the OCCA found error in the first four
instances but further concluded that the errors were not sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a new trial. He now asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors
establishes that his conviction and sentence should be overturned.
As to this claim, the parties disagree regarding the proper standard of
review. According to Mr. Malicoat, the OCCA did not apply the controlling
federal standard regarding cumulative error and, as a result, the OCCA’s rejection
of his cumulative error claim is entitled to no deference. In support of this
contention, Mr. Malicoat notes that the OCCA rejected his cumulative error
argument in fairly cursory terms:
Malicoat claims he is entitled to relief due to the accumulation of error
in the case. Malicoat has raised no issue which individually or in
accumulation requires relief. We have determined that any individual
errors were either cured or did not affect a substantial right or go to the
foundation of Malicoat’s defense. There is no cumulative error, and this
proposition is denied.
-46-
Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 406. As Mr. Malicoat reads this passage, the OCCA
concluded that because none of the individual errors was prejudicial, the
cumulative effect of these individual errors was necessarily not prejudicial either.
Mr. Malicoat notes that this reading of the cumulative error doctrine is incorrect.
See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “to
deny cumulative-error consideration of claims unless they have first satisfied their
individual substantive standards for actionable prejudice would render the
cumulative error inquiry meaningless, since it [would] . . . be predicated
predicated only upon individual error already requiring reversal”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In response, the state contests this reading of the OCCA’s opinion. The
state contends that the OCCA’s application of the cumulative error doctrine
comported with the federal standard and that the OCCA did assess the collective
impact of the individual errors. It invokes this court’s decision in Miller v.
Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1301 (10th Cir. 2004). There, we applied the deferential
AEDPA standard of review to the OCCA’s ruling on the petitioner’s cumulative
error claim. See id. (discussing the OCCA’s ruling in Miller v. State, 977 P.2d
1099, 1114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)). According to the state, the OCCA’s ruling
on the cumulative error claim in Miller resembles its ruling on the cumulative
-47-
error claim at issue here, and, as a result, AEDPA deference is warranted in this
case as well.
Unlike the state, we see an arguable difference between the OCCA’s
rulings in Miller and in Mr. Malicoat’s case. In Miller, the OCCA identified four
individual errors that it had found and then concluded that the individual errors
“gather no force in aggregate” and “gain no weight in aggregate.” 977 P.2d at
1114. That language establishes that the OCCA independently considered the
aggregate effect of the individual errors, as required by federal law. In contrast,
the OCCA’s opinion in Mr. Malicoat’s case can be reasonably read to suggest
that, because “any individual errors were either cured or did not affect a
substantial right or go to the foundation of Malicoat’s defense,” Malicoat, 992
P.2d at 405, there was necessarily no cumulative error. Thus, the OCCA’s
opinion does not clearly indicate that it considered, in the aggregate, the
prejudicial effect of the individual errors. Accordingly, as to the standard of
review, we afford Mr. Malicoat the benefit of the doubt and review his
cumulative error claim de novo.
Nevertheless, even under the de novo standard, we conclude that Mr.
Malicoat has not demonstrated that the cumulative effect of the individual errors
deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution’s evidence during the guilt phase
was overwhelming, and, in light of that evidence, we see no indication that the
-48-
evidentiary errors and instances of prosecutorial misconduct affected the jury’s
decision. The evidence offered by the prosecution at sentencing was also quite
strong. Given the extent of Tessa’s injuries, her young age, the pattern of abuse,
and Mr. Malicoat’s conduct after inflicting the fatal blows, Mr. Malicoat has
failed to establish that these errors had a “substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district
court’s decision denying Mr. Malicoat’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.