Mangieri v. Mangieri

              United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit
                        ____________________

No. 00-1084

                        ROBERT W. MANGIERI,

                       Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                  v.

                  PAUL MANGIERI, AS EXECUTOR OF
                THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH F. MANGIERI,

                        Defendant, Appellee.

                        ____________________

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

          [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

                        ____________________

                                Before

                      Torruella, Chief Judge,

                  Wallace,* Senior Circuit Judge,

                     and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

                       _____________________

     Peter D. Prevett for appellant.
     Pamela E. Terry, with whom Forman, Terry, Hickey & Garrahan L.L.P.
was on brief, for appellee.


                        ____________________


*   Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 September 11, 2000
____________________




        -2-
          TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. This case arises from a will contest

between plaintiff-appellant Robert W. Mangieri and defendant-appellee

Paul Mangieri, who are, respectively, the only son and a nephew of the

now deceased Joseph F. Mangieri. The case was filed on August 31,

1999.   The complaint alleges two claims:       first, a claim under

Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 191 § 20, the omitted child statute;

and second, a breach of fiduciary duty claim against appellee Paul

Mangieri based on his actions as executor of the estate of Joseph W.

Mangieri. The district court granted summary judgment for appellee on

November 4, 1999.    For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

          The essential facts are as follows: On November 2, 1984,

Joseph F. Mangieri executed a will in which he divided his estate

between his brothers, Robert L. and Sal Mangieri, his sister-in-law,

Josephine Mangieri, and other beneficiaries. The 1984 will contained

a clause stating that any children not provided for in the will were

intentionally omitted from the will. The 1984 will made no provision

for decedent's son, Robert W. Mangieri. On February 12, 1987, Joseph

executed a second will. The 1987 will did not make any provision for

Robert; however, in contrast to the 1984 will, it did not expressly

state that this omission was intentional. The 1987 will left the

entire estate to testator's nephew, Paul Mangieri. Paul Mangieri was

also named executor of the 1987 will. On May 28, 1997, Joseph directed

his attorney to draw up a new will, which, if executed, would have left


                                 -3-
the bulk of his estate to his son Robert. Joseph died on June 10, 1997

without having signed the new will.

           A trial ensued in the Massachusetts Probate Court. On April

12, 1999, the probate court issued detailed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. For our purposes, it is only relevant that (1) the

court explicitly found that testator-decedent had deliberately left his

son Robert out of the 1987 will, and (2) the court admitted the 1987

will to probate as the Last Will and Testament of the Decedent. Robert

Mangieri neither filed a motion to amend the probate court's findings

of fact nor appealed the court's judgment.

           On August 31, 1999, appellant filed suit against Paul

Mangieri, as executor of the estate of Joseph F. Mangieri, in the

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. As

indicated, the complaint alleges (1) a claim under Massachusetts

General Laws Chapter 191 § 20, the omitted child statute, and (2) that

Paul Mangieri committed a breach of his fiduciary duty as executor of

Joseph F. Mangieri's estate by failing to consider Robert's claim as an

omitted child and thus failing to protect Robert's interest as one of

the testator's heirs. Appellant alleges that jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the federal diversity of citizenship

statute.

           At the time appellant filed his complaint in federal court,

he simultaneously filed a motion for an ex parte temporary restraining


                                 -4-
order. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on

September 2, 1999. After notice to opposing counsel was provided, the

court held a second hearing on September 8, 1999.      At that time,

appellee filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court construed

as a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, on September 15th,

appellant renewed his motion for a preliminary injunction. On November

4, 1999, the district court issued an order granting appellee's motion

to dismiss, denying appellant's motion for preliminary injunction, and

entering judgment for appellee, Paul Mangieri. The court reasoned, in

part, that:

          The core issues that require dismissal of this
          case in the view of this court are that (1) this
          court lacks authority to hear and resolve this
          case on the merits because this controversy is
          within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court of
          the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that court
          has taken jurisdiction and issued findings and
          conclusions that preclude plaintiff's claim, and
          (2) this court either lacks jurisdiction . . . or
          in the exercise of discretion should not exercise
          jurisdiction to make any order that would be
          inconsistent with or otherwise impede completion
          of proceedings in that court before it has
          reached a final disposition.

Mangieri v. Mangieri, No. 99-11812, slip op. at 7 (D. Mass. Nov. 4,

1999).

          We believe that the district court's ruling in this case is

amply supported by both the record and the law and needs little

analysis. Under the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction, "a



                                 -5-
federal court may not probate a will, administer an estate, or

entertain an action that would interfere with pending probate

proceedings in a state court or with a state court's control of

property in its custody." Ashton v. Josephine Bay Paul & C. Michael

Paul Found., Inc., 918 F.2d 1065, 1071 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Markham

v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946)). While "[t]he precise scope of the

probate exception has not been clearly established," it is clear that

"[a]s a general matter, courts tend to view the probate exception as

extending to all suits 'ancillary' to the probate of a will." Georges

v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Dragan v. Miller,

679 F.2d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1982)).        In this Circuit, we have

previously stated:

          It is obvious that insofar as the complaint
          requests the district court to order the
          defendants to turn over to the plaintiff property
          which they received in their capacity as
          fiduciaries, and for which they are accountable
          to the probate court, the federal district court
          had no jurisdiction.

Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F.2d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 1942). Against this

background, it is clear that this case falls squarely within the

probate exception to the diversity jurisdiction of the district court.



          First, appellant's claim is within the jurisdiction of the

Massachusetts Probate Court. Second, as appellant concedes, the relief

he requests would require the district court to set aside the ruling of


                                 -6-
the probate court that appellant Robert was deliberately omitted from

the 1987 will and that the 1987 will must be admitted to probate as the

Last Will and Testament of the Decedent.      In fact, the complaint

"demands that [the district court] find Plaintiff is an omitted child,

is entitled to an intestate share of the testator-decedent, Joseph F.

Mangieri's estate, and order Paul Mangieri, as executor, to distribute

the estate accordingly." In our view, the district court correctly

declined to do so on the ground that this would improperly interfere

with a probate proceeding currently pending before the Massachusetts

State Probate Court.1

          For the reasons stated, the decision of the district court

is affirmed.




1 In light of our conclusion that the probate exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction applies to this case, we need not address the
district court's alternative holding that abstention is proper
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Mangieri, No. 99-11812,
slip op. at 8 (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923)).

                                 -7-