Marcantel v. Louisiana, Department of Transportation & Development

                      United States Court of Appeals,

                                Fifth Circuit.

                                  No. 93-3717

                               Summary Calendar.

              Allen T. MARCANTEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                        v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.

                                 Nov. 3, 1994.

Appeal from the United          States       District    Court   for   the   Middle
District of Louisiana.

Before WISDOM, DAVIS and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

       WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

       This is an employment discrimination case that comes within

the    three-tiered    structure    established         in   McDonnell   Douglas,1

refined in Burdine,2 and recently reexamined in strong majority and

minority opinions in Hicks.3

       The plaintiff/appellant Allan Marcantel, a white male, filed

a     complaint     alleging     that    the      Louisiana      Department     of

Transportation (DOTD) discriminated against him in its employment

practices.        The district court disagreed and granted summary

judgment for the defendant.         We hold that even if we assume that


       1
      McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
       2
      Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
       3
      St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct.
2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

                                         1
the plaintiff presented a prima facie case, the DOTD articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.

Marcantel      failed     to     demonstrate       that     the    explanation      was

pretextual;     failed to carry his burden under any accepted theory

of Title VII relief.

                                           I.

      In October of 1989 the DOTD successfully settled a civil

service      complaint    with       Melvin      Villery,    an    African-American

employee, who alleged that he had been passed over for promotion to

a supervisory position in Evangeline parish because of his race.

In   accordance    with    the       written    settlement    agreement,       Villery

withdrew his complaint in return for $5,000 and DOTD's promise to

appoint him to the next available position of parish maintenance

supervisor. Shortly thereafter, DOTD appointed Villery to the then

vacant position of Maintenance Supervisor for St. Landry Parish.

      DOTD    submitted        the   affidavit     of     Joseph   L.   Wax,    Deputy

Secretary of the Department at the time of the settlement with

Villery.     Wax reviewed Villery's grievance and concluded that the

claim had merit and that filling the vacancy in St. Landry Parish

by appointment of Villery would be an appropriate remedy under the

approved settlement agreement between the Department and Villery.

Before executing the settlement agreement, Wax consulted the United

States Department        of     Justice    for    review    and    approval    of   the

settlement, including the fact that the anticipated St. Landry

vacancy would not be posted.              DOTD was operating then and at all

relevant times under a consent decree issued by the district court


                                           2
upon       motion   of   the    Department      of    Justice,   to     remedy    past

discriminatory racial practices.                The decree allows preferential

hiring of specified persons.              The Department of Justice approved

the settlement, waived the posting of the vacancy, and gave the

DOTD credit toward the number of "preferential hires" required by

the consent decree.           The settlement was also approved by the Civil

Service referee in accordance with the rules of the Civil Service

Commission.

       Marcantel contends that he was better qualified than Villery

and that the DOTD should have found a way to settle Villery's

grievance rather than deviating from established practices.                        It

must be said that his argument, "settle if you must, but not at my

expense," is appealing.            But it does not show that the DOTD had

racially discriminatory animus toward him.

       The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the DOTD had violated

the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981-

1983.4       The DOTD responded with a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that its good faith settlement with Villery could not be

considered an independent act of discrimination against Marcantel.

The    district      court     agreed    with   the    DOTD   and     dismissed   the

plaintiff's         action,    holding    that       the   "plaintiff    lacks    any

       4
      The McDonnell Douglas allocation of evidentiary burdens was
originally created for Title VII claims but has also been applied
by this Court to claims under sections 1981 and 1983. Lee v.
Conecuh County Bd. of Education, 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.1981);
Jenkins v. Caddo-Bossier Association for Retarded Children, 570
F.2d 1227 (5th Cir.1978); see also, Essary, The Dismantling of
McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the
Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21
Pepperdine L.Rev. 385, 389 (1994).

                                           3
significantly probative evidence to support his claim that he was

denied the opportunity to be considered for the vacancy because of

his race."

                                   II.

     We review de novo the district court's order to grant summary

judgment.5     Summary judgment is of course appropriate when there is

no disputed issue of material fact.6

     McDonnell     Douglas7   established   a   three-tiered   structured

analysis of disparate treatment cases brought by an employee

against an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964.     The aggrieved employee must present a prima facie case of

discrimination.8     This establishes a presumption that the employer

discriminated against the employee.         The burden of production of

evidence (and persuasion) then shifts to the employer to produce

evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for his treatment of the

employee.     If the employer fails to do so, or falls short of the

burden of persuasion, the plaintiff prevails.9          If the employer

successfully carries the burden, the plaintiff may show that the

employer's reasons "were a pretext for discrimination".10

     5
      Chauvin v. Tandy Corporation, 984 F.2d 695, 697 (5th
Cir.1993).
     6
      Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c); Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
     7
        411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
     8
        Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
     9
        Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094.
     10
          Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.

                                    4
     Burdine clarified the standard of proof for the second tier of

the McDonnell Douglas tripartite analysis. In a unanimous decision

the Supreme Court held that the employer bears only the burden of

producing evidence which explains clearly that the employment

decision was not pretextual but was motivated by a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, for example, a business judgment.              This

burden of production "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading

the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional

discrimination".11       The Burdine Court added that "the plaintiff may

succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory        reason   more   likely   motivated   the   employer   or

indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is

unworthy of credence".12         The language is clear on its face and

would     seem   to    allow   the    plaintiff   to   prevail   by   proving

discrimination or by proving pretext.

     Whether this language was meaningful or "inadvertent,"13 after

a decade of holdings that a finding of pretext was, in itself,




     11
          Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.
     12
          Id.
     13
      In Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2753, Justice
Scalia characterizes this as "dictum ... [which] must be regarded
as an inadvertence, to the extent that it describes disproof of
the defendant's reason as a totally independent, rather than an
ancillary, means of proving unlawful intent". Justice Scalia
relies on Burdine's "repeated assurance (indeed in its holding)
... [that] the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff".

                                        5
proof of discrimination,14 a number of courts began to hold that

"the pretext only" view of Burdine was not sufficient to prove

discrimination.    This Court has been of two minds on the issue.15

      In Hicks, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, has

settled the issue as of this date:16    the "pretext-only" doctrine


     14
      Hicks, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2756-57
(Justice Souter dissenting).
     15
      Compare Thornbrough v. Columbos & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633,
639-640, 646-647 (5th Cir.1985) with Bienkowski v. American
Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 & n. 6 (5th Cir.1988). See
generally, Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses:
the Fallacy of the "Pretext Plus" Rule in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 43 Hastings L.J. 59 (1991); Essary, The
Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court
Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination
Cases, 21 Pepperdine L.Rev. 385, 402-406 (1994).
     16
      A bill amending Title VII on this issue and, thereby,
altering the treatment of disparate treatment cases outlined by
the Supreme Court in Hicks was introduced but not passed in the
1993 session and will presumably be reintroduced in the 1994
session. H.R. 2867, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill,
titled the "Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination
Amendment of 1993," provides:

          (1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
          treatment is established if—

                  (A) the complaining party, by a preponderance of
                  the evidence, proves a prima facie case

                                                            ... and


                  (B) either—

                  (i) the respondent fails to produce any evidence
                  to rebut such case; or

                  (ii) the respondent clearly articulates ... one or
                  more legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the
                  conduct alleged ... and the complaining party
                  demonstrates that each of such reasons is not
                  true, but a pretext for discrimination....

                                   6
is not enough;       even if the employee proves that the employer's

nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual, the plaintiff must prove

that an unlawful discriminatory intent motivated the employer's

action.       Under Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence the

presumption created by the plaintiff's presentation of a prima

facie case does not shift the burden of proof, the ultimate burden

of persuasion which a Title VII plaintiff bears at all times.

                                      III.

        Hicks may make the problem of proof more difficult for many

Title VII plaintiffs, but in this case the evidence that the

employer proffers to show DOTD's action was not pretextual merges

with    proof   that   there    was     no   discriminatory     animus   toward

Marcantel.

       Specifically, the DOTD has offered undisputed evidence that

Villery's promotion was a good faith attempt to settle his claim

and remedy past discrimination.              Marcantel, in response, argues

that he, as a qualified applicant for the job, should not be

deprived of an opportunity for promotion because of discrimination

perpetrated against Villery.          As an innocent employee, he should

not    bear   the   negative   impact    from    the   DOTD's   discriminatory

treatment of another employee. The core issue then becomes whether

the DOTD, or any employer, can rely on the good faith settlement of

a discrimination claim as a legitimate business reason for certain

hiring and promotional decisions.

       The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in an




                                         7
analogous case, Carey v. U.S. Postal Service.17              In Carey, a white

postal worker, David Carey, alleged racial discrimination when a

black postal worker, Omar Nix, was promoted to a supervisory

position that was not advertised or publicly announced.18                    The

promotion was part of settlement of an EEOC claim by Nix that he

was   discriminated       against   in    an    earlier   promotional   decision

because of his race.19          The court concluded that the good faith

settlement was a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision to

promote Nix and held that agreements which settle Title VII claims:

      may not be considered independent acts of discrimination,
      [against those not benefited by the agreement] as a matter of
      law, unless there are allegations of bad faith in making the
      agreement, that is, allegations that the agreement was not a
      bona fide attempt to conciliate a claim but rather an attempt
      to bestow unequal employment benefits under the guise of
      remedying discrimination.20

The Carey       court    also   noted    that   characterizing   a   good   faith

conciliation agreement as an act of discrimination would subject

employers to conflicting obligations.              Any attempt by an employer

to redress valid claims of discrimination would expose the employer

to liability to other employees who are necessarily impacted by the

remedy.21

      A decision by the Sixth Circuit Court in EEOC v. McCall


      17
           812 F.2d 621 (10th Cir.1987).
      18
           Id. at 622-23.
      19
           Id. at 623.
      20
           Id. at 624 (citations omitted).
      21
      Id. at 625 (citing Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dept.
of Water and Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1981)).

                                          8
Printing Corp.22 echoes the concerns of the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals.      In McCall Printing, the EEOC, on behalf of a group of

black male employees, brought a claim under Title VII based on a

conciliation agreement entered into by their employer and a group

of female employees which granted the female employees increased

seniority rights.23        The plaintiff characterized the conciliation

agreement as an independent act of discrimination against the black

male employees.24        The Sixth Circuit Court, while noting that the

agreement conflicted with "the economic interests" of the black

male employees, held that the negative impact on other employees

was not sufficient to convert a good faith attempt to settle a

claim into an act of discrimination.25 Further, the court noted the

consequences if it did consider a good faith settlement violative

of Title VII:

     This Court is convinced that the consideration of a
     conciliation agreement which results in a consent decree as an
     act of discrimination against employees not benefitted by that
     agreement would create a situation in which each settlement
     would spark new rounds of litigation, settlement of claims
     would be discouraged, and the courts would be continually
     faced with stale claims.26

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, therefore, in accord with the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, refused to allow a Title VII

plaintiff to base a claim of disparate treatment on a good faith

     22
          633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir.1980).
     23
          Id. at 1234-35.
     24
          Id. at 1235.
     25
          Id. at 1237.
     26
          Id. at 1238.

                                      9
conciliation agreement.

       We conclude that a good faith attempt by an employer to remedy

past discrimination by entering a settlement agreement not only

successfully meets the challenge of a prima facie case but is not

an independent discriminatory act against employees not parties to

the agreement but adversely affected by it.               Any other decision

would discourage settlement and hamper employers in their attempts

to redress past discrimination. The settlement with Villery was an

attempt by the DOTD to correct discriminatory treatment that

Villery, and others, had endured.            As such, "the settlement of the

complaint and the resultant impact were inherently race neutral."27

       This decision is further supported by the policies underlying

Title VII.       The Supreme Court has noted that:        "In enacting Title

VII,    Congress     expressed   a    strong    preference    for   encouraging

voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims."28                 In

making       these   settlements,    the     interests   of   other   employees

unavoidably will be affected.           However, "[i]f relief under Title

VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees,

who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it,

there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act

is directed."29


       27
            Carey, 812 F.2d at 625.
       28
      Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n. 14,
101 S.Ct. 993, 998 n. 14, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).
       29
      Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775, 96
S.Ct. 1251, 1269, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir.1971)).

                                        10
     This Court has noted previously that some latitude should be

given to courts and employers attempting to correct past acts of

discrimination.     "The law is well settled that relief under Title

VII cannot be denied simply because the interests of some employees

will be negatively affected...."30      Rather, "[a]dequate protection

of ... rights under Title VII may necessitate ... some adjustment

of the rights of ... [other] employees.      The Court must be free to

deal equitably with conflicting interests of ... employees in order

to shape remedies that will most effectively protect and redress

the rights of the ... victims of discrimination."31

     Finally, the plaintiff attempts to rely on the Supreme Court's

decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke32 to

make out his claim of reverse discrimination. The Bakke case dealt

with an affirmative action program that set aside a specific number

of positions for African-Americans.33 Thus, applicants who were not

African-Americans were wholly precluded from competing for those

positions, solely on the basis of race.          The case before us is

distinguishable from the Bakke decision:         here Marcantel was not

precluded from applying for the Highway Maintenance Superintendent

position because he was not a member of a specified race.           All



     30
      EEOC v. International Longshoremen's Association, 623 F.2d
1054, 1060 (5th Cir.1980), certiorari denied, 451 U.S. 917, 101
S.Ct. 1997, 68 L.Ed.2d 310 (1981).
     31
          Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir.1971).
     32
          438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978).
     33
          Id. at 272-276, 98 S.Ct. at 2738-40.

                                   11
potential applicants were affected regardless of their race.34

       We hold today that a good faith settlement of a claim of past

discrimination constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for making employment decisions.            The DOTD has come forth with

undisputed evidence that the promotion of Villery was a result of

such    a   good   faith   settlement.      Wax,     acting    for   DOTD,   after

evaluating      Villery's    discrimination     claim,        decided   that   the

resulting settlement was a fair and equitable solution.                        The

plaintiff, as noted by the district court, has offered no evidence

that the agreement was not made in good faith, that is, that the

settlement was simply a pretext to hide discriminatory treatment of

the plaintiff, Marcantel.35 Moreover, the plaintiff has been unable

to   shoulder      the   inescapable   burden   of    proof     borne   by   every

plaintiff.      The grant of summary judgment in favor of the DOTD was

correct.     We AFFIRM.




       34
      See Carey, 812 F.2d at 625, distinguishing the Bakke
decision on the same basis.
       35
      Marcantel v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development, No. 91-1174-A (M.D.La. Sept. 24, 1993). The only
allegation made by the plaintiff regarding the settlement is that
the DOTD violated an existing consent decree when it promoted Mr.
Villery without statewide posting. As noted by the district
court, however, the DOTD sought and received approval of the
settlement from the Department of Justice (DOJ), who originally
moved for the consent decree, and the Civil Service Commission.
Id. at 2. The DOJ specifically "waived the posting of the
vacancy, and defendant [the DOTD] was given credit towards the
number of preferential hires required by the consent decree."
Id. at 2-3.

                                       12