United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1407
MICHAEL D. MARONI, as parent and next friend of MICHAEL M.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PEMI-BAKER REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant, Appellee.
No. 03-1700
MICHAEL D. MARONI, as parent and next friend of MICHAEL M.;
MARGARET A. MARONI, as parent and next friend of MICHAEL M.
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PLYMOUTH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
and Siler,* Senior Circuit Judge.
*
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Scott F. Johnson for appellants.
Diane M. Gorrow for appellees.
Colleen Cronin and Wendy Paget on brief for amici curiae
Disability Rights Center, Inc., and National Association of
Protection and Advocacy Systems, in support of appellants.
October 9, 2003
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Michael M. is a student with
disabilities within the meaning of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. That
Act grants rights intended to lead school districts to provide
disabled students with a free appropriate public education (FAPE).
Id. § 1412(a)(1). Michael and his parents brought two federal
lawsuits to assert rights under IDEA. Both suits were dismissed
sua sponte by the district court because the parents proceeded
without counsel. We hold that this was error and reverse.
I.
Michael M. was a middle school student in the Plymouth
School District from 1998 to 2001 and then became a high school
student in the Pemi-Baker Regional School District after 2001. In
both school systems, he and his parents sought due process hearings
under the Act regarding Michael's individualized education program
(IEP) and the procedures employed to develop and implement it.
Dissatisfied in each instance with the findings and decision
reached in the hearings, the Maronis then sought judicial review
under IDEA. They instituted suit in federal court, without
counsel, against Plymouth on December 18, 2001, and then against
Pemi-Baker on November 20, 2002. In the suit against Plymouth, the
caption of the complaint included Michael M. and his parents, and
in the suit against Pemi-Baker, it included Michael M. and his
father. In each suit, Michael M.'s parent(s) purportedly sued as
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his next friend. Neither school district objected to the parent(s)
bringing the cases on a pro se basis. Nonetheless, a magistrate
judge for the District of New Hampshire, performing a screening
function in pro se cases, concluded that Michael's father could not
sue pro se as next friend under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 in the Pemi-Baker
case. Michael's father then sought to amend their complaint to
assert what he claimed were his own rights under IDEA. Pemi-Baker
opposed the motion to amend, arguing that Michael's father had no
individual claim under IDEA. The magistrate judge denied the
motion to amend without discussion except a citation to Collinsgru
v. Palmyra Board of Education, 161 F.3d 225 (3rd Cir. 1998).1
Adopting the magistrate judge's reasoning, the district court then
dismissed the complaint without prejudice on January 23, 2003.
Michael's father filed a motion to reconsider on February
7, 2003. In the supporting affidavit, he admitted that the Maronis
did not meet the financial need criteria for court-appointed
counsel, but indicated that they had been unable to find a lawyer
who would take the case on a pro bono or contingency basis. The
court denied the motion on March 10, 2003.
On the same day, the same district court judge held that
Michael's parents also could not proceed pro se in the suit against
1
As explained later, Collinsgru would not justify denial of a
motion to amend inasmuch as that case permits parents to sue under
IDEA for procedural rights and the complaint here asserted such
claims.
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the Plymouth School District. The court stated that non-attorney
parents could not appear pro se for their children in IDEA cases
and that the case would be dismissed if Michael did not appear with
counsel by April 18, 2003. Michael's parents, acting on his behalf
as next friends, then filed a motion for the court to appoint
counsel based on Michael's lack of financial resources. The court
denied their motion without discussion. On April 28, 2003, the
court dismissed the case because "no appearance [had] been filed on
behalf of Michael M. by an attorney authorized to practice in this
court."
The Maronis appeal the dismissal of both cases, arguing
that the district court erred in prohibiting them from pursuing
claims for procedural and substantive violations of IDEA without an
attorney. In their brief, the Maronis also request that this court
reverse the denial of appointment of counsel if it finds that they
may not pursue their claims without a lawyer. This court
consolidated the two appeals.
II.
Michael M. is a minor, as are most children with IDEA
claims.2 Were Michael M. an adult, he could proceed pro se by
2
State law is used to determine the age of majority. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17(b). IDEA provides a free appropriate public education
to children aged three through twenty-one. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(1)(A). Claims are mooted after students turn twenty-two.
See, e.g., St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 168-69 (2d
Cir. 2001).
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virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which provides that "[i]n all courts of
the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."
Because of his minority, he is disqualified from representing
himself. Here, his parents seek to do what Michael's age prevents
him from doing.
The Maronis advance two themes as to why they should be
permitted to proceed pro se. The first theme, which we will call
a statutory joint rights theory, is that IDEA itself grants
"parties aggrieved" the right to bring suit in federal court
asserting statutory violations and that parents are "parties
aggrieved." If parents are indeed parties under IDEA, they may
then proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The second theme, the
common law next-friend theory, is that courts should create an
exception exempting IDEA cases from the usual common law rule
preventing non-attorney parents from proceeding pro se on behalf of
their minor child.3
The issue is one of first impression for this court.
Without addressing the issue before us, this court has referred to
3
Two circuits have created a similar exception in cases
contesting the denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits to
children, and have held that parents may sue pro se as next friends
on behalf of their child in such cases. See Machadio v. Apfel, 276
F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2002); Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417
(5th Cir. 2000).
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parents as "aggrieved parties" entitled to judicial review under
IDEA. In Providence School Dep't v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997), we stated that "[u]nder the provisions of the IDEA, all
aggrieved parties, school committees and parents alike, are
entitled to judicial review." Id. at 4; see also Rafferty v.
Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[After
a due process hearing, a]ny aggrieved party can appeal the findings
and decision of the hearing officer to the state educational
agency. If the parent remains dissatisfied, she can bring a civil
action in federal district court." (citations omitted) (emphasis
added)). This court has also treated parents as having rights
under IDEA. See Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R.,
on their own behalf and on behalf of their son, S.R., 321 F.3d 9,
18 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[P]arents ordinarily must exhaust their
administrative remedies before appealing to a federal court . . .
."); Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding parents' claims to be within the zone of interests
protected under IDEA and citing IDEA's statement of statutory
purpose, which specifies the statute's mission "to ensure that the
rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children
are protected"); Kathleen H. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 154 F.3d 8,
13 (1st Cir. 1998) (assuming without discussion that parents can be
named plaintiffs in their individual capacity in an IDEA suit).
These rights have included not only procedural but also substantive
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rights. See Maine Sch. Dist., 321 F.3d at 17-18 (referring to
parents' rights in the context of a compensatory education claim,
which entitles a child to further special education services under
IDEA to compensate for past deprivations); Kathleen H., 154 F.3d at
13 (involving judicial review of substantive claims raised in a due
process hearing).
Although this court has not directly considered the issue
before us, the legal landscape is not empty on this question. Two
circuits have interpreted IDEA as granting parents the right to sue
pro se for procedural violations. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 233
("[IDEA] clearly grants parents specific procedural rights, which
they may enforce in administrative proceedings, as well as in
federal court."); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d
123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("[The parent of a child with
special needs] is, of course, entitled to represent himself on his
claims that his own rights as a parent under the IDEA were violated
by the [school district's] failure to follow appropriate
procedures."). Collinsgru further held, over a strong dissent,
that parents could not sue pro se for "substantive" claims (i.e.,
denial of FAPE). We read Wenger as not discussing this latter
issue, although it does prohibit parents from proceeding pro se on
behalf of their children as next friends. See Wenger, 146 F.3d at
124 (relying on the common-law rule against non-attorney parents
representing their children pro se in civil suits). In addition,
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two other circuits have held without analysis that parents may not
sue pro se on behalf of their children under IDEA. See Navin v.
Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing without further explanation cases in other circuits);
Devine v. Indian Ridge County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581-82 (11th
Cir. 1997) (stating without explanation that "there is no
indication that Congress intended to [allow parental representation
in] federal court" for IDEA claims). Conversely, one circuit has
assumed, without discussion, that parents may bring their own
substantive claims in district court. Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County
Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 2000) (treating parents
as within the "parties aggrieved" requirement of IDEA because 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) provides that "[a] party that is unsatisfied
with the state review officer's decision has further recourse in
either federal or state court" and the parents were "dissatisfied"
with the officer's decision regarding their claims that their
daughter was denied FAPE).4
Courts have also, without discussion, almost uniformly
permitted parents to sue pro se under the predecessor statute to
IDEA, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), 20
4
But see Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d
260, 263-64 (4th Cir. 1998) (in the context of determining whether
attorney-parents may recover attorneys' fees for representing their
children in IDEA cases, stating that "we do not believe that the
IDEA's provision of rights to parents means that an attorney-parent
actually represents himself when he pursues IDEA services for his
child").
-8-
U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. See Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist.,
642 F.2d 687, 690 & n.4 (3rd Cir. 1981) (parents may proceed pro se
under the EHA, with the court noting without further explanation
that the statute allows any "party aggrieved" by a due process
hearing to sue in federal district court); Susan R.M. v. N.E.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 818 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1987) (pro se parent may
bring suit under the EHA, without discussion); Gregory K. v.
Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (same);
Schreiber v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 952 F. Supp. 205 (D.N.J. 1997)
(same); Muth v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.
1988) (parent may proceed with pro se appeal under the EHA, without
discussion), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223 (1989); Rettig v. Kent City Sch. Dist., 788 F.2d 328 (6th
Cir. 1986) (same). IDEA employs the same "party aggrieved"
language as the EHA regarding who may bring suit. Compare 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994) (superseded 1997), with 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A).
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that parents are
"parties aggrieved" within the meaning of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A), and thus may sue pro se. We also conclude that they
are "parties aggrieved" regardless of whether the rights asserted
are procedural or substantive. In so holding, we acknowledge the
legitimate interests of the school districts, which never sought
the dismissal of these actions but chose to defend those dismissals
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on appeal. The school districts take the position that parents may
not sue pro se for either procedural or substantive rights under
IDEA. They are concerned that permitting parents to proceed pro se
will mean more meritless IDEA suits will be brought, requiring
school districts to hire counsel and placing a considerable burden
on their already stretched budgets. The concern is real; still,
there are ways to lessen the risk, discussed later. In the end, it
is Congress that makes these policy judgments. Our view is that
Congress, in enacting IDEA, thought that risk an acceptable price
to pay to vindicate the aims of the statute, which seeks "to ensure
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare
them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. §
1400(d)(1).
A. Statutory Text of IDEA
The right-to-sue provision of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A), provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings
and decision made [in a due process hearing] under subsection (f)
or (k) . . . , and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
[regarding attorneys' fees] under this subsection, shall have the
right to bring a civil action . . . in a district court of the
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United States."5 The initial question is whether the term "party
aggrieved" includes parents. We view this as a pure issue of
statutory construction. If Congress included parents within the
term "parties aggrieved," then the issue of whether parents as next
friends under the common law may be parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1654
is irrelevant.
On a plain reading of the statute, we conclude that
parents are "parties aggrieved." In IDEA cases, federal courts
review the outcome of due process hearings. IDEA grants parents
the right to invoke those due process hearings under subsections
(f) and (k): "Whenever a complaint has been received . . ., the
parents involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for an
impartial due process hearing . . . ." Id. § 1415(f)(1). "If the
child's parent disagrees with a determination that the child's
behavior was not a manifestation of the child's disability or with
any decision regarding placement, the parent may request a
hearing." Id. § 1415(k)(6)(A)(i). Other sections of IDEA also
refer to parents' right to a due process hearing. See id. §
1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that mediation not be used to "deny or
delay a parent's right to a due process hearing"). Under IDEA,
5
The language in the first set of ellipses is "who does not
have the right to an appeal [to the state educational agency] under
subsection (g)." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). This is an exhaustion
requirement. There is a right to sue from state educational agency
hearings, which are themselves subsection (f) hearings. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f).
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states may permit parents to transfer this right to a due process
hearing to their child only after their child reaches the age of
majority. See id. § 1415(m)(1)(B). Because the statute enables
parents to request due process hearings, they are parties to such
hearings and thus are logically within the group of "parties
aggrieved" given the right to sue.
This reading is buttressed by the provisions of IDEA that
allow appeals to the state educational agency. When a due process
hearing is conducted before a local educational agency, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(g) permits "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
rendered in such a hearing [to] appeal such findings and decision
to the State educational agency." In interpreting section 1415(g),
this court has treated parents as "parties aggrieved" who may bring
appeals to the state educational agency. See Frazier v. Fairhaven
Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing section
1415(g) as providing that "if the [due process] hearing is
conducted at the local level, the parent may then appeal to the
state agency"). Other circuits have done the same. See, e.g.,
Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1064 (10th Cir.
2002); Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E. ex rel. Nancy E., 207 F.3d 931, 935
(7th Cir. 2000). If parents are "parties aggrieved" by due process
hearings when seeking to appeal to a state administrative agency,
then, logically, they are also parties aggrieved by due process
hearings when seeking judicial review. We see no reason that the
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term "party aggrieved" should have a different meaning in section
1415(i) than in section 1415(g).
This interpretation is further supported by the
requirement of administrative exhaustion. Generally, the right to
bring an IDEA action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) is subject to
the condition precedent that an "aggrieved party" must exhaust
administrative remedies, although there are exceptions. Frazier,
276 F.3d at 59. By statute, it is the parents who may invoke those
administrative remedies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1). It would
make little sense if the parents who are explicitly permitted to
invoke those administrative remedies and to exhaust them could not
be parties for purposes of bringing suit.
The school districts argue that if Congress had intended
the term "party aggrieved" under IDEA to mean parents, it would
have explicitly said so. Congress did explicitly say that parents
could bring due process hearings, and so, the argument is made, the
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that Congress
did not intend parents to be able to sue. This rule has no
application here. Congress needed to include several categories of
plaintiffs and so used a collective term. The statute does not
refer to "child aggrieved" as it easily could if only the child
could sue. Nor does § 1415(i)(2)(A) refer to school districts,
even though they may seek review under it. See Manchester Sch.
Dist. v. Crisman, 306 F.3d 1, 4 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2002) (reviewing a
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federal civil suit by a school district under § 1415(i)(2)(A));
Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 321 F.3d at 16 (noting that the school
district "could have appealed [the due process hearing] as part and
parcel of judicial review [provided under] 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A)"). The more likely explanation for IDEA's use of the
term "party aggrieved" instead of "parents" is that Congress sought
to confer the right to judicial review of due process hearings upon
all parties involved in such hearings: school districts, parents,
and children.
The school districts also argue that the term "party
aggrieved" does not include parents because the attorneys' fees
provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), refers to the child as the
"prevailing party." To put the phrase in context, the award is
expressly made "to the parents of a child with a disability who is
the prevailing party."6 Id. If anything, that language suggests
parents are aggrieved parties who bear the costs and benefits of a
successful suit. Indeed, IDEA's attorneys' fees provision also
uses the phrase "prevailing party" to refer to parents. See id. §
1415(i)(3)(E) (providing that "an award of attorneys' fees and
related costs may be made to a parent who is a prevailing party" in
certain circumstances). This dual usage undercuts any argument
6
This case does not involve the question of whether attorney
parents proceeding pro se may recover attorneys' fees. Contrast
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263.
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that the attorneys' fees provision requires the term "party
aggrieved" to exclude parents.
The more significant argument raised by the school
district is that because Congress provided a means for prevailing
children and their parents to recover attorneys' fees, Congress
wanted to preclude pro se pursuit of IDEA cases. While plausible,
this interpretation of Congress's intent would lead to perverse
results. It is one thing to say Congress intended to encourage
attorneys to represent plaintiffs in IDEA claims by allowing for
attorneys' fees. It is entirely another to say that Congress
intended to preclude plaintiffs' suits from going forward pro se
without counsel. That Congress tried to remove one impediment to
the bringing of IDEA suits hardly means Congress intended, sub
silentio, to erect another impediment by forbidding pro se suits by
parents. That is not how attorneys' fees provisions in the other
civil rights statutes have been viewed. Although many civil rights
statutes provide for attorneys' fees, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12205
(Americans with Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (28 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983, Title VI, and Title IX); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (Title
II); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b)
(Rehabilitation Act), none of these provisions has been interpreted
as indicating a legislative intent to prohibit pro se suits. For
these reasons, as well as the larger statutory scheme of IDEA
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discussed below, we reject the school districts' position that
parents are not "parties aggrieved" under IDEA for any purpose.
That leaves the question whether parents are "parties
aggrieved" under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) only for purposes of
pursuing claims of procedural violations, but not claims of
substantive violations. This is the view of one circuit, see
Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 233, and perhaps another, see Wenger, 146
F.3d at 125, and is certainly plausible. The core reasoning is
that parents are "aggrieved" only to the extent that they have
rights under the statute and the only rights they expressly have
are procedural. The school districts, notably, do not adopt this
view -- the problems created for them by permitting pro se suits do
not go away by creating a distinction between procedural and
substantive claims. Further, the school districts are likely
mindful that the distinction is often far from clear; they probably
do not wish to spend their defense dollars litigating the issue of
what is procedural and what is substantive, or what consequences
follow from that determination.
Again, this is an issue of statutory interpretation: are
parents "parties aggrieved" for purposes of asserting substantive
claims of denial of a free appropriate public education under IDEA?
The statute, we conclude, leads to the interpretation that they
are.
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First, the "parties aggrieved" provision does not make a
distinction between procedural and substantive claims. As a
general rule of administrative law, parties can be "aggrieved" by
both substantive and procedural injuries. See Cella v. Togum
Constructeur Ensemleier En Industrie Alimentaire, 173 F.3d 909, 911
(3rd Cir. 1999); cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) ("History
associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast
the standing net broadly . . . ."). In determining whether a party
is "aggrieved" by an administrative decision and may thus seek
judicial review, the issue is usually not whether the injuries are
substantive or procedural.
Rather, the issue is usually whether the party satisfies
the constitutional and prudential standing requirements. See,
e.g., Kan. City S. Indus., Inc. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir.
1990) ("To determine whether a petitioner is aggrieved under 28
U.S.C. § 2344 [a statute permitting 'parties aggrieved' to seek
judicial review of final orders by specified agencies], we
generally incorporate traditional article III and prudential
standing analysis."). To satisfy Article III standing, parties
must show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
McInnis-Misenor v. Maine Medical Center, 319 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir.
2003). To meet the prudential standing restrictions, parties must
show that the harm asserted is to themselves and not a generalized
grievance pervasively shared by a large class of citizens, and in
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statutory cases, that the claim is within the "zone of interests"
protected by the statute. Id. at 68.
As to constitutional standing, parental IDEA suits meet
the causation and redressability requirements. The primary issue
is injury-in-fact. Parents whose children are denied FAPE suffer
the injury-in-fact of either paying for private educational
services or risking that their children's education will not fully
prepare their children for employment and independent living. See
Ores v. Willow West Condo. Ass'n, 15 A.D.D. 275 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(finding that parents suffered injury-in-fact when their disabled
adult sons were denied housing on a discriminatory basis under the
Fair Housing Act, because their sons lost the opportunity to live
independently and the parents thus faced the financial and
emotional burden of continuing to support them). That this injury
to parents is based on harm that their child also suffers does not
serve as a basis for distinguishing procedural and substantive IDEA
claims. When parents raise procedural claims, their injuries are
likewise based on harm to their child; they cannot recover unless
there is "some rational basis to believe that procedural
inadequacies compromised the pupil's right to an appropriate
education, seriously hampered the parents' opportunity to
participate in the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of
educational benefits." Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d
983, 994-95 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Kings Local School Dist., Bd.
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of Educ. v. Zelazny, 325 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating
that a serious infringement on a parent's opportunity to
participate in the formulation of his or her child's IEP is
actionable because it causes "substantive harm ... and thus
constitute[s] a denial of the child's right to a FAPE").
As to prudential standing requirements, this court has
found that parental IDEA claims satisfy the zone-of-interests test
when they are "related to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of [the claimant's] child . . . , [or] the
provision of a free appropriate public education." Weber, 212 F.3d
at 51 (finding the test satisfied when the parent raised a
retaliation claim under IDEA). Substantive IDEA claims, by
definition, meet this standard. Parental IDEA suits also satisfy
the other two prudential standing restrictions. Such suits assert
parents' own right to seek judicial review under 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A). And the claimed harm to their child's education is
not a generalized grievance.
Second, none of the provisions of IDEA regarding the
right of parents to seek relief in administrative or judicial
hearings draws a distinction between substantive and procedural
rights.7 Due process hearings address both procedural and
7
In drawing such a distinction, the Third Circuit in
Collinsgru relied, inter alia, on a presumption against allowing
parents to seek review regarding substantive claims, based on two
rationales: (1) that implied rights of action are disfavored, and
that allowing parents to proceed pro se on substantive claims is
analogous to creating an implied right of action, and (2) that
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substantive issues. A party to an IDEA due process hearing has
rights to present evidence, confront and cross examine witnesses,
and compel testimony. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h). IDEA's complaint
provision affords parents the "opportunity to present complaints
with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision
of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). If the parents may pursue
substantive claims of denial of FAPE at due process hearings, they
should be able to pursue substantive claims when they are aggrieved
by the outcome of the due process hearings at which they presented
those claims.8
Congress legislates against the background of the common law, and
that at common law, a non-lawyer may not represent another person
in court. See Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231-34. As to the first
rationale, Congress has already created an express right of action
to seek review of administrative determinations under 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A). The issue is one of ordinary statutory
interpretation: whether the term "parties aggrieved" in §
1415(i)(2)(A) applies to parents as well as children. No right of
action is being implied and, hence, no presumption need be made
concerning Congress's likely intent. Cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (treating the issue as
one of ordinary statutory interpretation where Congress has
expressly created a remedy but the scope of the remedy is
disputed). As to the second rationale, it is precisely because
common law rules present barriers to parental representation that
Congress chose to make parents partners to due process hearings and
to give the right to sue to "parties aggrieved" by those hearings.
If we are wrong in our interpretation or if our interpretation
leads to too many difficulties, Congress may remedy the situation.
8
It is true that IDEA does not have a broad enforcement
provision granting standing to any person aggrieved by any
violation of the Act. See Weber, 212 F.3d at 50. That is
irrelevant here because these federal court actions are to review
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Similarly, the attorneys' fees provision does not
distinguish between procedural and substantive claims. If parents
reject settlement offers that meet certain criteria, they cannot
recover attorneys' fees under IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D).
This is true regardless of whether the parents reject settlements
for procedural or substantive claims.
Third, procedural and substantive rights under IDEA are
inextricably intertwined. The Supreme Court stated as much in
rejecting the argument that courts have the authority only to
review for compliance by states with IDEA's procedural requirements
and not for the "substance of the state program." See Bd. of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 (1982) (finding that the procedural
protections of IDEA are based on "the legislative conviction that
adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most
cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of
substantive content"). "IDEA's procedural guarantees . . . serve
not only to guarantee the substantive rights accorded by the Act;
the procedural rights, in and of themselves, form the substance of
IDEA. Congress addressed the problem of how to guarantee
substantive rights to a diverse group by relying on a process-based
solution." Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1992); see
also Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1990) (basing the
the outcome of due process hearings. Indeed, in Weber, we found
that a parent asserting a separate retaliation claim had standing
under IDEA in light of the central role played by parents in
advancing their child's interests. Id. at 51.
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conclusion that parties may be "aggrieved" under the Education of
the Handicapped Act by the denial of their procedural claims on the
argument that parties may be aggrieved by the denial of their
substantive claims and that the two types of violations are
intertwined).
B. Statutory Structure of IDEA
The interpretation of parents as "parties aggrieved" for
both procedural and substantive claims is further confirmed by the
structure of IDEA, which relies upon "the central role played by
parents in assuring that their disabled child receives a free
appropriate public education." Weber, 212 F.3d at 51 (quotation
marks omitted). IDEA's procedural protections are designed to
encourage parental involvement in the ultimate goal of having the
child receive a free appropriate public education. The IDEA
statement of purpose explicitly recognizes the statute's mission
"to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and
parents of such children are protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B)
(emphasis added).
IDEA provides for extensive parental involvement in the
"centerpiece" of the statute: the individualized education program,
which "describes the disabled child's academic goals and special
education services." Weber, 212 F.3d at 51. IDEA designates
parents as part of the IEP team, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i),
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mandates revision of the IEP to address information provided either
by or to parents regarding the child's educational needs and
services, id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii)(III), and requires parents to be
members of any group making decisions regarding the educational
placement of their child, see id. § 1414(f).
In general, IDEA requires that state educational agencies
"establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children
with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of [FAPE]." Id. § 1415(a)
(emphasis added). Under IDEA, school districts must obtain
parental consent for educational evaluations, id. §§
1414(a)(1)(C)(i) & 1414(c)(3), and must provide written prior
notice to parents of any proposed changes to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of their child, id. §
1415(b)(3). They must also provide "an opportunity for the parents
of a child with a disability to examine all records relating to
such child and to participate in meetings with respect to the
identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child,
and the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child, and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the
child." Id. § 1415(b)(1).
IDEA expressly contemplates that parents will act as
advocates for their children at every stage of the administrative
process, from initial IEP meetings to administrative due process
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hearings. IDEA regulations actually discourage parents and school
districts from bringing attorneys to IEP meetings. See 34 C.F.R.
Part 300, App. A ("The presence of the agency's attorney could
contribute to a potentially adversarial atmosphere at the meeting.
The same is true with regard to the presence of an attorney
accompanying the parents at an IEP meeting.") (answer to question
29). Similarly, at due process hearings, parents have the option
of proceeding pro se or being accompanied by non-attorney
"individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the
problems of children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1).
Although IDEA grants parents the right to be accompanied by counsel
at due process hearings, the presence of counsel is not required.
See id. IDEA also authorizes the establishment of parent training
centers to improve parents' effectiveness as advocates for their
children. See id. § 1482. These provisions for parental
involvement are so central to IDEA's statutory scheme that when a
child's parents are not known or cannot be located, IDEA provides
for a surrogate to be assigned to "protect the rights of the
child." Id. § 1415(b)(2). It would be odd for Congress to exclude
parents from the definition of "parties aggrieved" as to
substantive claims, and thus force them to find attorney
representation at the federal court level, after giving parents
such a strong role at every other stage of the process.
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C. Congressional Intent and Legislative History
The statutory language and structure of IDEA resolve the
issue of whether parents may proceed pro se on both procedural and
substantive IDEA claims. Still, we check our conclusions against
the legislative history to be sure there are no strong indications
that the statute should be read otherwise. Nothing in the
legislative history of IDEA suggests that Congress intended that
IDEA cases as a whole or substantive IDEA claims alone could be
brought in federal court only by lawyers. Far from demonstrating
an intent to circumscribe parental involvement, the legislative
history indicates Congress's commitment to encouraging parental
involvement at every step of IDEA's enforcement process. The
Senate Committee report recommending passage of IDEA's predecessor
statute expressed its intention "to provide parent involvement and
protection to assure that appropriate services are provided to a
handicapped child." See Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 237-38 (Roth, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the EHA, S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 11-12 (1975)).
A rule prohibiting pro se representation would subvert
Congress's intent by denying many children with special needs their
day in court.9 Where parents could not obtain representation or
9
The amici brief submitted by the Disability Rights Center
(DRC) and National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems
(NAPAS) sets forth the scarcity of representation available to
families seeking assistance with special education matters. The
DRC, which is New Hampshire's Protection and Advocacy Agency (P&A),
reported that it could provide full representation in only 35 of
390 special education inquiries in 2002. Other P&As report similar
shortages nationwide. Since 2000, Alaska's P&A provided
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chose not to pay for counsel,10 many children with special needs
would be precluded from exercising their statutory right to
judicial review of their administrative due process hearings. It
is insufficient to answer that district courts can solve the
problem by soliciting counsel to undertake a case or by encouraging
outside representation through the award of attorneys' fees to
prevailing parties under section 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA. It may be
difficult for the court to locate counsel willing to act pro bono
in complicated, record-intensive cases; there is no constitutional
right to appointed counsel in a civil case, Andrews v. Bechtel
Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 137 (1st Cir. 1985). And attorneys'
representation in only 183 of 1,092 requests for help in special
education matters, and Arizona's P&A did so in only 300 of 4,800
cases. Since October 1999, Michigan's P&A handled only 840 out of
6,015 education-related requests. Massachusetts's P&A provides
representation in less than 10% of special education cases, and
Wisconsin's P&A does so in about 25% of cases that it deems
meritorious. In New York, one full-time and one part-time attorney
handle over 2,000 requests for help in special education cases.
When parents cannot obtain representation from P&As, they face
the even more difficult task of finding private representation. In
the amici brief, P&As testify to the shortage of such private
attorneys on their referral lists: Michigan has eight, Rhode Island
has six, Wisconsin has fewer than ten, Texas has twenty-nine, and
Arizona has only one. P&As note that most lawyers are reluctant to
accept cases from families seeking judicial review of IDEA due
process hearings because such cases require review of extensive
administrative records. P&As observe that most lawyers will refuse
to take such cases unless they represented the family in the due
process hearing.
10
Parents already have to spend family resources on litigation
even to proceed pro se in court. The filing fee in district court
is $150. An appeal to a court of appeals requires an additional
$105 filing fee.
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fees are a partial incentive at best, as they are awarded only to
prevailing parties.
Furthermore, holding that parents are not "parties
aggrieved" -- either for all claims or for substantive claims --
would create another anomaly that we think Congress did not intend.
IDEA gives both state and federal courts jurisdiction to hear
claims under the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Where state
statutes permit parents to proceed pro se in state court as next
friend of their children,11 school districts could remove the cases
to federal court, which would have original jurisdiction under
federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the IDEA right
to sue provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). See Breuer v. Jim's
Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1882, 1885-86 (2003) (removal
is permissible where jurisdiction expressly lies in both federal
and state court, even if it interferes with the plaintiff's choice
of forum). If the parents did not obtain representation in federal
court, it is likely that the case would be remanded to state court,
thus causing further cost and delay. See Maine Ass'n of
Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Human
Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989); Mills v. Harmon Law
Offices, 2003 WL 22111105, No. 03-1091, at *3 (1st Cir. Sept. 12,
2003).
11
New Hampshire, for example, permits parents to sue on a pro
se basis in state court as long as they are deemed "person[s] of
good character." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311:1.
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School districts are usually represented by counsel and
have, in that sense, a built-in advantage over other IDEA
litigants.12 We find it unlikely that Congress intended to put
parents who attempt to proceed pro se at the even greater
disadvantage of preventing their suits from going forward at all.
Such an outcome subverts "Congress's original intent [in the
precursor statute to IDEA] . . . that due process procedures,
including the right to litigation if that became necessary, be
available to all parents." Handicapped Children's Protection Act
of 1986, S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 2 (1986) (emphasis added).
There are, as Collinsgru expresses, some practical
concerns about recognizing parents as "aggrieved parties."
Children whose interests are advanced by parents who sue pro se may
not have the best advocates. Parents may be emotionally involved
and not exercise rational and independent judgment. See Doe v. Bd.
of Educ., 165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998). But that is better
for the child than having no advocate at all. Pro se litigants
also impose unusual burdens on courts, and there is a desire to
save courts and school districts from "poorly drafted,
inarticulate, or vexatious claims." Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231.
These are risks of the outcome we reach, but risks that can be
dealt with as other pro se problems are. Important interests are
12
Amici report that school districts are not represented by
counsel in approximately 8% of cases before the First Circuit and
the courts of New York and Texas that were reported in the
Education Law Reporter.
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at stake in IDEA, and permitting pro se litigation may make it more
likely that those interests will be successfully vindicated. By
contrast, the rule we have rejected guarantees that many claims
that should be vindicated will never receive a full hearing in
court.13
III.
Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the judgment of
dismissal in both actions. We remand and direct that the motion to
amend be allowed in Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School District
and the parents be given a reasonable time to amend in the Maroni
v. Plymouth School District action, in accordance with our opinion.
No costs are awarded. So ordered.
13
Because IDEA grants parents the right to sue, we do not reach
the question of whether the parent or the child is the real party
in interest in a parent's IDEA suit. Congress has granted parents
a right of action under IDEA regardless of whether their IDEA suits
present procedural or substantive claims. Given our resolution of
the issue, we need not reach the common law next-friend theory
either. Finally, because we find that the Maronis may proceed
without counsel, we need not reach their request for reversal of
the district court's denial of appointment of counsel.
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