United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2527
ENID MARRERO-GUTIERREZ; ALEJANDRO BOU SANTIAGO
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ESPERANZA MOLINA; IVAN VELEZ; ILEANA ECHEGOYEN; GABRIEL ALONSO;
NILSA ENID NEGRON; RAMONITA GARCIA; WANDA ROMAN; LUIS COSS; MYRNA
CRESPO-SAAVEDRA; HOUSING DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO
RICO
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Howard, Circuit Judge,
and Young,* District Judge.
Lixandra Osorio Felix and Liz Marie Cruz-Jimenez, on brief
for appellants.
Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, Susana I.
Penagaricano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, Mariana Negron-
Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General, and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodriguez,
Deputy Solicitor General, on brief for apellees.
June 20, 2007
*
Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
YOUNG, District Judge. Enid Marrero-Gutierrez
(“Marrero”) and Alejandro Bou Santiago (“Bou”) (collectively “the
Plaintiffs”) sued Esperanza Molina (“Molina”), Ivan Velez
(“Velez”), Luis Coss (“Coss”) a/k/a Tito, Gabriel Alonso
(“Alonso”), Ileana Echegoyen, Nilsa Enid Negron, Ramonita Garcia,
and Wanda Roman in their personal capacities; Myrna Crespo-Saavedra
in her official capacity; and the Housing Department of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Housing Department”) (collectively
“the Defendants”) for political discrimination and violations of
the Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs also
asserted various state-law claims. Acting on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, the district court granted judgment to the
Defendants on all claims. The Plaintiffs now appeal. After
careful consideration, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Housing
Department and active members of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”)
– a political party that campaigns for Puerto Rican statehood. In
2000, Puerto Rico held its general elections, and the Popular
Democratic Party (“PDP”) won control of the government. The PDP is
a political adversary of the NPP.
Bou worked in the Housing Department for ten years. In
May 2000, he received a promotion to the position of Administrative
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Director II and was appointed as the Director of the Office of
Security and Emergency Management of the Housing Department. As a
result of PDP’s winning the elections that year, Coss - a member of
the PDP - was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of the
Housing Department. Bou alleges that Coss gave instructions to the
Human Resources personnel of the Housing Department to find a way
to replace him with a PDP adherent. Specifically, Bou alleges that
Coss made this request to Angel Semidey (“Semidey”) who, despite
being a PDP adherent, refused to help Coss and subsequently
resigned. On March 7, 2001, Bou was demoted. On July 27, 2002,
Bou encountered Semidey at a celebration and, for the first time,
learned that his demotion resulted from his affiliation with NPP.
Marrero held a career position as Director of the Section
8 Program starting in 1994. Marrero alleges that her job
performance garnered only praise from her supervisors. Marrero
managed to receive such positive performance feedback despite
serving under different party administrations during her career at
the Housing Department.
Marrero alleges that after Molina retired in June 2002,
the Housing Department was reorganized without following federal
guidelines. As part of the reorganization, Alonso was brought in
to supervise the Section 8 Program. The reorganization amounted to
a constructive demotion of Marrero by reducing her responsibilities
and subjecting her to an abusive work environment. Specifically,
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her new responsibilities failed to include functions that she was
entitled to perform under the Housing Department’s prior
reclassification program. Marrero also alleges that her
subordinates often circumvented her, that her supervisors treated
her in a discourteous manner by harassing and intimidating her, and
that Molina openly disparaged the NPP in front of Marrero and her
personnel. Finally, Marrero suffered several humiliating events
arising out of her health status. Marrero was surgically treated
for cancer in her reproductive system. The Defendants allegedly
mocked her as a result of this condition, claiming that she was not
really sick and simply attempting to avoid returning to work by
faking her illness.
On or about May 3, 2002, while still on medical leave,
Marrero received a letter dated April 18, 2002, stating the
intention to remove her from office. This letter, and a subsequent
one, accused her of failing to perform job duties and of committing
illegal acts. These accusations mirrored ones levied against Velez
- a member of the PDP - who directly supervised Marrero during this
time. The Housing Department also notified Velez that it intended
to terminate him. Velez was initially demoted and later
terminated. In both letters, Marrero was summoned to an informal
hearing, which she alleges was a sham designed to tarnish her
reputation. Despite her characterization of the hearing, Marrero
was able to proffer evidence rebutting the accusations against her.
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Marrero was allowed to continue working at the Housing Department
pending the final disposition. The hearing officer submitted a
negative report. On March 10, 2002, the Housing Department
notified Marrero of her separation from employment and salary,
which constituted the last alleged act of discrimination by the
Defendants.
This action commenced in the district court on March 10,
2003. The Housing Department successfully moved to dismiss, on
Eleventh Amendment grounds, the claims against it for monetary
relief. Marrero does not appeal this ruling. Thereafter, upon
motions duly briefed by both sides, the district court granted the
Defendants judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c). The appeal of this order is before this
Court.
II. Analysis
The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same
as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Pasdon v.
City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 226 (1st Cir. 2005); Collier v. City
of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1998). Courts of appeals
review de novo a district court’s decision to allow a motion to
dismiss, taking as true the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2005).
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A. Statute of Limitations
Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983 creates
a private right of action for violations of federally protected
rights. Because it has no internal statute of limitations, section
1983 claims “borrow[] the appropriate state law governing
limitations unless contrary to federal law.” Poy v. Boutselis, 352
F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir. 2003).
The parties do not dispute that the relevant statute of
limitations for civil rights claims in Puerto Rico takes a one-year
limitation period from P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5298(2). Centro
Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2005); Benitez-Pons v. Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.
1998).
The parties do dispute, however, the date from which the
one-year statute of limitation ought accrue. Bou argues that the
injury occurred in July 2002, when Semidey revealed the wrongful
reasons for his demotion. The Defendants counter that the proper
accrual date is March 7, 2001, the date of the actual demotion.
Federal law determines the date on which the statute of
limitations begins running. Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d
172, 174 (1st Cir. 1997). The first step in such an inquiry is to
determine the actual injury on which the plaintiff rests the cause
of action. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir.
1994). Here, there is no dispute that the actual injury of which
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Bou complains is his demotion. Bou’s argument, and the dispositive
point on this issue faced by this Court, is thus properly framed as
whether the date of that injury ought be tolled until he learned of
the discriminatory animus that made his demotion wrongful.
As a general principle, section 1983 claims accrue “when
the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which
the action is based.” Id.; Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of
Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2004); Rodriguez Narvaez v.
Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41 n.5 (1st Cir. 1990). A claimant is deemed
to “know” or “learn” of a discriminatory act at the time of the act
itself and not at the point that the harmful consequences are felt.
See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981); Del. State Coll. v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).
In the employment discrimination context, this circuit
has rejected the contention that claims do not accrue until the
plaintiff knows of both the injury and the discriminatory animus.
Morris v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 749-50 (1st Cir.
1994); cf. Vistamar, Inc., 430 F.3d at 66 (holding that the statute
of limitations period for a section 1983 claim seeking to redress
an unlawful taking of property began to accrue on the date of the
wrongful appropriation). In Morris v. Government Development Bank
of Puerto Rico, we dismissed the identical theory proffered by Bou
when we rejected the appellant’s contention that “his cause of
action existed in what amounts to a state of suspended animation
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until he became aware of the racial and political motives behind
the adverse employment decision.” 27 F.3d at 749-750.
Following this clear precedent, the statute of
limitations period for Bou’s claim began to accrue at the first
discrete act of discrimination. See id.; cf. Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. __, 2007 WL 1528298, at *2 (May 29,
2007) (holding that the limitations period for a Title VII claim
for pay discrimination begins with the first discrete act). There
is simply no support for Bou’s argument that this date ought be
suspended until he learned the discriminatory motives behind the
discrete act. As a result, the limitations period for Bou’s claim
began on the date of his demotion. Since Bou did not file this
action until March 10, 2003, his claims are, as the district court
correctly ruled, time-barred.
B. Marrero’s Threshold Arguments
Marrero advances three threshold, procedural challenges
to the dismissal of her section 1983 claims. She argues that the
district court erred in allowing the Defendants’ motion for a
judgment on the pleadings because the Defendants had waived the
grounds upon which the district judge relied by failing to
consolidate their defenses and raise them in the first motion to
dismiss. Second, Marrero contends that the district judge
improperly converted the Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. Finally, Marrero
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raises the argument that the district court ought not have
dismissed the ancillary state law claims after finding no
cognizable section 1983 claim. These threshold issues are easily
dispensed with before addressing the arguments on the merits.
1. Failure to Consolidate Defenses
The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims by
allowing a narrow motion to dismiss and then subsequently allowing
a broader motion for judgment on the pleadings. Marrero attacks
the district court’s allowance of the second motion by parroting
the general rule for consolidation of defenses found in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g). According to Marrero, the
Defendants waived the grounds upon which the district court relied
in the second motion by failing to raise them when the Housing
Department moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) provides that:
A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it any other motions herein provided
for and then available to the party. If a
party makes a motion under this rule but omits
therefrom any defense or objection then
available to the party which this rule permits
to be raised by motion, the party shall not
thereafter make a motion based on the defense
or objection so omitted, except a motion as
provided in subdivision (h)(2) hereof on any
of the grounds there stated.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) (emphasis added).
Marrero ignores the rule’s express exception that cross-
references subdivision (h)(2) and permits a “defense of failure to
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state a claim upon which relief can be granted” to be raised “by
motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2);
see Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387-88
(1st Cir. 2001).
Here, the district court entertained and allowed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings that raised a defense of failure to
state a claim. The district court’s action thus squarely meets the
exception to the general rule expressed in Rule 12(g) and
undermines Marrero’s argument.
2. Improper Conversion
Marrero also argues that the district court improperly
converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion
for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s
contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section
1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual
issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have
converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion
for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is,
however, no support that such a conversion occurred.
The record shows that the district court properly
considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside
their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties
to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (holding
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that such a conversion is proper in order to consider materials
outside the pleadings).
Of course, the implication of this holding is that we
will review, as we do below, Marrero’s arguments as to why factual
issues remained as to her section 1983 claims under the standard
for a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which requires the
plaintiff to meet only a deferential, notice-pleading requirement
to survive dismissal. Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50,
54-55 (1st Cir. 2006).
3. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Finally, Marrero raises, though weakly pursues, an
argument that the district court failed to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her ancillary state law claims. Marrero concedes
in her brief that the jurisdictional power of the district court
rested solely on federal question jurisdiction. As a result, the
district court would have needed to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in order to adjudicate claims that arose under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
A district court retains the discretion, however, to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3); see Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage
Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995) (“As a general principle,
the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff's federal claims at the
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early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will
trigger the dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental
state-law claims.”).
Here, the district court, after dismissing the section
1983 claim, exercised the discretion to dismiss the supplemental
state-law claims. We will not disturb this proper exercise of
discretion. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1987).
C. Marrero’s Merits Arguments
After dispensing with the threshold, procedural
arguments, we must carefully review the district court’s dismissal
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings of Marrero’s section 1983
claim. Such a review must be conducted by considering the adequacy
of Marrero’s complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition
that there can be no “heightened pleading standard” or a “more
demanding rule for pleading a complaint under § 1983 than for
pleading other kinds of claims for relief.” Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
167-68 (1993). We consider each of Marrero’s theories in turn.
1. Procedural Due Process Claim
In order to establish a procedural due process claim
under section 1983, a plaintiff “must allege first that it has a
property interest as defined by state law and, second, that the
defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived it of that
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property interest without constitutionally adequate process.” PFZ
Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1991).
To establish a constitutionally protected property
interest in employment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has
a legally-recognized expectation that she will retain her position.
Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2003). A legitimate
expectation of continued employment may derive from a statute, a
contract, or an officially sanctioned rule of the workplace. Id.;
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972). Here, it is
undisputed that under the laws of Puerto Rico, career or tenured
employees have property rights in their continued employment.
Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family Dep’t, 377 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir.
2004); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2000); Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.
1988).
This inquiry, therefore, narrows to whether Marrero
received constitutionally adequate process. See PFZ Props., Inc.,
928 F.2d at 30. Such a standard naturally requires us to consider
what process was provided to Marrero and whether it was
constitutionally adequate. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126
(1990). In this case, we must decide whether the pre-termination
hearing provided to Marrero satisfies this standard.
Due process requires only that the pre-termination
hearing fulfill the purpose of “an initial check against mistaken
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decisions - essentially, a determination of whether there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee
are true and support the proposed action.” Cepero-Rivera v.
Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 135 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985)). This initial
check requires the employee to receive notice of the charges, an
explanation of the evidence that supports those charges, and the
ability to refute that evidence. See id. at 134. Any standard
that would require more process than this would unduly impede the
government in removing poorly performing employees. See id.
Marrero concedes in her amended complaint that on May 3,
2002, she received a letter informing her of the Housing
Department’s intention to remove her from office. This letter,
along with a second letter, required her to appear at an informal
meeting to discuss the removal proceedings. She attended the
meeting and was given a full opportunity to respond to each of the
allegations. Even drawing all inferences in Marrero’s favor, the
process provided her in this pre-termination hearing comported with
due process guarantees by providing her notice and an opportunity
to be heard. As a result, the pre-termination hearing provided
constitutionally adequate process without necessitating a post-
termination hearing. See Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d
40, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that due process requires no
irreducible combination of pre- and post-termination hearings).
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2. Equal Protection Claim
Under the Equal Protection Clause, persons similarly
situated must be accorded similar governmental treatment. See City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985);
Barrington Cove Ltd. P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mtg. Fin. Corp., 246
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001). In order to establish this claim,
Marrero needs to allege facts indicating that, “compared with
others similarly situated, [she] was selectively treated . . .
based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion,
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights,
or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.” Rubinovitz
v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995).
The formula for determining whether individuals or
entities are “similarly situated” for equal protection purposes is
not always susceptible to precise demarcation. See Coyne v. City
of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444-45 (1st Cir. 1992). Instead, the
test is whether an objective person would see two people similarly
situated based upon the incident and context in question. See
Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 21 (1st
Cir. 1999).
Here, Marrero fails even to implicate this test by
failing to make any allegation that persons similarly situated were
treated more favorably. In fact, the complaint includes
allegations to the contrary by admitting that Velez, despite his
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PDP membership, was accused of similar charges, accorded similar
process, and eventually received a similar reprimand. Accordingly,
Marrero’s equal protection claim was correctly dismissed.
3. Political Discrimination
Finally, we address Marrero’s claim of political
discrimination. The First Amendment protects non-policymaking
public employees from adverse employment actions based on their
political opinions. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
U.S. 62, 75-76 (1990); Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212
F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case, a
plaintiff must show that party affiliation was a substantial or
motivating factor behind a challenged employment action. See
Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 74; Angulo-Alvarez v. Aponte de la
Torre, 170 F.3d 246, 249 (1st Cir. 1999). “While plaintiffs are
not held to higher pleading standards in § 1983 actions, they must
plead enough for a necessary inference to be reasonably drawn.”
Torres-Viera v. Laboy-Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2002)
(citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-68); see also, Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)(rephrasing the standards
under Rule 12 (b)(6)).
Here, Marrero’s allegations are limited to stating that
she was badly treated at work and that her political party was
mocked. Thus, Marrero has failed to set forth any sort of causal
connection between her demotion and the political animus that she
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alleges prompted it. Merely juxtaposing that she is an active
member of the NPP and that the defendants are affiliated with the
PDP is insufficient, standing alone, to create a causal link. See
Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1966; Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at
74. True, such a connection is one among a myriad of possible
inferences. Yet even drawing all reasonable inferences in
Marrero’s favor, it would be speculative to draw the forbidden
inference from the range of possibilities. See Bell Atlantic Corp.,
127 S.Ct. at 1966 (stating that a naked assertion of conspiracy
gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but “without some
further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief”).
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that her
complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could
be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Each of the Plaintiff’s arguments fails to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, the district
court’s ruling ought be, and hereby is, affirmed.
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