UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
97-41242
__________________
TIMOTHY P. MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice; TEXAS BOARD OF
CORRECTIONS; TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
______________________________________________
September 23, 1998
Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The plaintiff, Timothy P. Martin, is a Texas prisoner in
administrative segregation. In his section 1983 suit against the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), the Texas Board of
Corrections, and TDCJ Director Wayne Scott, Martin challenges the
conditions of his administrative segregation on due process, equal
protection, and Eighth Amendment grounds.1 The magistrate
1
Specifically, Martin contends that his constitutional rights
have been violated because the prison has limited his recreation
and visitation time, restricted his ability to possess certain
reviewing Martin’s complaint determined that it was frivolous and
dismissed it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
On appeal, Martin claims that section 1915A does not apply to
prisoners who are not suing in forma pauperis (IFP). In addition,
Martin asserts that his complaint is not frivolous and that the
magistrate abused her discretion by denying his motion to amend his
complaint. We affirm.
Martin first contends that section 1915A does not apply to
prisoners who are not proceeding IFP. The plain language of this
section, however, indicates that it applies to any suit by a
prisoner against certain government officials or entities
regardless of whether that prisoner is or is not proceeding IFP.
In pertinent part, section 1915A provides:
(a) Screening.—The court shall review, before
docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
government entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court
shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
personal property, required him to wear a jumpsuit, denied him the
right to buy certain commissary items, denied him dessert with his
meals, required him to be handcuffed every time he left his cell,
and fed him Vita-Pro.
2
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 Thus, as a suit by a prisoner against state
agencies and officers, Martin’s complaint is clearly within the
ambit of section 1915A and we join the Sixth and Tenth Circuits in
holding that this section applies even when a prisoner has paid the
required filing fee. See, e.g., Ricks v. Mackey, No. 97-3181, 1998
WL 133828 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 1998); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the magistrate did not
err by reviewing Martin’s complaint under section 1915A.
We now turn to the question of whether Martin’s complaint was
frivolous. In his complaint, Martin contends that the additional
restrictions imposed on those in administrative segregation violate
his due process and equal protection rights and constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. We review the magistrate’s determination
that Martin’s complaint is frivolous for an abuse of discretion.
Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). A
2
Martin also appears to argue that section 1915A
unconstitutionally restricts his access to the federal courts. A
cursory review of this provision, however, reveals that it does not
restrict a prisoner’s access to the federal courts. Instead,
section 1915A merely institutes certain screening procedures once
a complaint is received by a district court. In this regard,
section 1915A is analogous to the version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
that was in effect before Congress enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995. In its prior form, section 1915(d) provided
that in an IFP case, a court “may dismiss the case if . . . [the
court is] satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.”
The function of section 1915A is also quite similar to the roles
played by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 12(b)(6). Thus,
because these related screening devices are, or were, of
unquestionable constitutionality, Martin’s contention that section
1915A is unconstitutional is without merit.
3
complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact, such as when a prisoner alleges the violation of a legal
interest that does not exist. Id.
Martin’s due process claim is frivolous. In Pichardo v.
Kinker, 73 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1996), we held that “absent
extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such,
being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be
a ground for a constitutional claim” because it “simply does not
constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest.” Id. at 612-13. Because Martin complains about
conditions that are far from “extraordinary,” he has not alleged
the violation of an existing due process interest.
Martin’s equal protection claim is also frivolous.
Significantly, Martin is not claiming that he is treated
differently than others in his level of administrative segregation.
Rather, he claims that he is treated differently than inmates in
other levels of administrative segregation. The comparison made by
Martin dooms his equal protection claim at the outset, for he does
not take the position, which would likely be frivolous, that
prisoners in different levels of administrative segregation are
similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection analysis.
Consequently, his complaint fails to implicate the Equal Protection
Clause.
Like the other allegations in his complaint, Martin’s claim
4
that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment is frivolous.
The conditions complained of by Martin, including his contention
that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when he
became ill after being fed Vita-Pro—a soy-based meat substitute—
simply do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (holding that the
inmate must show that the risk of which he complains is “so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk”).
Finally, Martin contends that the magistrate abused her
discretion when denying his motion to amend his complaint. This
motion, however, was filed after the magistrate had dismissed
Martin’s complaint and entered final judgment. Accordingly, the
magistrate lacked the power to grant this request and Martin could
only move for reconsideration of the judgment or appeal. Whitaker
v. City of Houston, 963 F.2d 831, 834 (5th Cir. 1992).
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Martin’s
complaint as frivolous.
5