Massey v. Selensky

                                 NO. 83-363
                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                      1984




EDPJARD MASSEY and .LUCILLE MASSEY,
his wife l

                                 Plaintiffs and Appellants,
           -vs-
RAY SELENSKY,
                                 Defendant and Respondent.




APPEAL FROM:      District Court of the Third Judicial District,
                  In and for the County of Deer Lodge,
                  The Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

         For Appellants:
                  Knight, Dahood, McLean & Everett; Bernard Everett
                  argued, Anaconda, Montana

         For Respondents :
                  Poore, Roth & Robinson; Donald C. Robinson argued,
                  Butte, Montana



                                 Submitted:   June 5 , 1984
                                   ~ecided: August 17, 1984


Filed:
           i 4 ~ G !i$84'
                 .L




                                 Clerk
4 .   J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d         t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.


          T h i s c a s e a r i s e s o u t of an a c c i d e n t i n which a p p e l l a n t

Edward Massey was i n j u r e d a f t e r b e i n g s t r u c k by r e s p o n d e n t
Roy S e l e n s k y l s p i c k u p .        S i n c e Masseyls i n j u r i e s were covered

under      the provisions               of     t h e Montana W o r k e r s 1 C o m p e n s a t i o n

Act,      the District              Court        granted         S e l e n s k y l s motion     for

summary judgment and d i s m i s s e d t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n .                   Massey

a p p e a l s from t h i s r u l i n g .

          At    t h e t i m e of        t h e a c c i d e n t which g a v e r i s e t o t h i s

action,        both     Massey          and     Selensky         were    employees       of     the
Anaconda Company and worked a t t h e s m e l t e r                          i n t h e C i t y of

Anaconda.          A s t h e y were neighbors,                Massey and S e l e n s k y made

a p r a c t i c e o f r i d i n g t o work t o g e t h e r i n S e l e n s k y l s p i c k u p .

T h i s p r a c t i c e had begun l o n g b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d .

Typically,         t h e two would              l e a v e home a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6:40

a.m.     and     arrive       at    the        smelter      at     approximately        6:50        to

"punch i n " on t h e company t i m e c l o c k .                    Their s h i f t s did not

b e g i n u n t i l 7:30 a.m.

          When t h e y a r r i v e d a t t h e s m e l t e r , S e l e n s k y would p a r k

h i s p i c k u p on a        h i l l where         t h e b u i l d i n g which h o u s e d     the
time     clock       was     located.             This     building        is   located        well

i n s i d e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e Anaconda Company p r o p e r t y .               The
two would t h e n l e a v e t h e p i c k u p t o punch i n .                     After doing

s o , Massey would walk t o t h e "machine s h o p " w h e r e h e c h a n g e d

c l o t h e s and v i s i t e d w i t h c o - w o r k e r s u n t i l h i s s h i f t b e g a n .

          On    January        8,       1980,      the   parties'        d a y began      in    the
above d e s c r i b e d manner;               t h e men d r o v e t o work,        parked       the

p i c k u p and e n t e r e d t h e b u i l d i n g w h i c h h o u s e d t h e t i m e c l o c k .
Massey punched i n , e x i t e d t h e b u i l d i n g a n d b e g a n w a l k i n g t o
the machine shop.         While he was en route, the pickup either
slid or rolled down the hill and struck Massey causing the
injuries complained of.          The pickup was unoccupied at the
time, and as yet what caused the pickup to move remains
unknown.
         On February 7,     1980, Massey filed a claim with the
Workers' Compensation Division, seeking compensation for the
injuries.       An investigation was conducted by Harry McKernan,
who is the personnel representative in charge of benefits
for Anaconda Minerals Company.          McKernan found the facts as
set     forth    above,   and   initiated    the    claim   on   behalf   of
Massey.         The Division    recognized    and   allowed      the claim.
Massey has been receiving disability benefits since the date
of the accident, and his related medical bills and expenses
have all been paid.
         This action was commenced on December 1 5 ,               1980, by
Massey and his wife Lucille seeking damages from Selensky.
The complaint alleged negligence on the part of Selensky
which caused his injuries.             After a period of discovery,
Selensky moved for summary judgment, alleging that since the
injury was compensable under the Workers ' Compensation Act,
Selensky was immune from suit.              The issue was briefed and
oral    arguments were      heard.     The motion was granted             and
judgment for Selensky was entered.            From this ruling Massey
appeals.
         In reviewing      an appeal    from summary        judgment, the

function of the Supreme Court is to determine whether the
moving party is entitled to judgment in light of the law
applicable to the facts of the case.               Jordon v. Elizabethan
Manor    (1979), 181 Mont. 424, 593 P.2d            1049.   As this case
was e s s e n t i a l l y s u b m i t t e d on a g r e e d f a c t s , on a p p e a l w e a r e

only     concerned           with        questions         of     law.           State     v.    North

American        Car    Corporation           (1945),            1 1 8 Mont.        183,    1 6 4 P.2d

161.       A    corollary           of    these     rules         is     that      we    first   must

d e c i d e what t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w i s .

         It    i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t a co-employee                          is

immune        from     liability           for     negligent             acts       resulting       in

injuries         which          are       compensable              under           the     Workers'

Compensation A c t .             Madison v. P i e r c e ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 156 Mont.                   209,

478 P.2d       860.         The b a s i s of t h i s r u l e i s s e c t i o n 39-71-412,

MCA,     which        allows        an    injured      worker          to      bring      an    action

against        one     "other       than    his      employer            or     the     servants    or

e m p l o y e e s o f h i s e m p l o y e r " which s u c h p e r s o n ' s a c t s may h a v e

caused a compensable i n j u r y .                  However,           the simple f a c t t h a t

two    persons        have      the      same    employer          would        not      necessarily

cause t h i s r u l e t o apply.                W e m u s t t h e r e f o r e d e t e r m i n e when

a co-worker          i s an "employee" a s t h a t t e r m is used i n s e c t i o n
39
w-71-412,            MCA,     for     purposes        of        applying         the     co-employee

immunity r u l e .

         W e n o t e t h a t t h i s is a q u e s t i o n o f f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n

Montana.         Though w e h a v e             applied         t h e co-employee           immunity

rule    on     several         occasions,         under         the    prevailing          facts    of

those c a s e s t h e r u l e obviously a p p l i e d a s t h e workers were

on s h i f t and d o i n g t h e i r e m p l o y e r ' s          business.             S e e Madison

v.    Pierce,        supra,      and B a i r d v.          Chokatos           ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 6 Mont.

3 2 , 473 P.2d        547.       Under t h e f a c t s o f t h e p r e s e n t c a s e it i s

not c l e a r t h a t the rule applies.                     N e i t h e r man had begun work

yet,    though t h e y were i n t h e m i d s t o f                    preparing          f o r work.

O b v i o u s l y t h e r e m u s t b e some c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e a c t s o f

t h e employee and h i s work f o r t h e immunity t o a p p l y .                               There
rnust be a test which can be applied by                  trial courts to
determine whether an employee's actions were so work related
so as to make him immune from suit under section 39-71-412.
        We hold that the proper test is whether the co-worker
was acting within the course and scope of his employment at
the time the negligent acts occurred.                If the allegedly
negligent co-worker was acting within the course and scope
of his employment at the time he engaged in the purported
negligent acts, then he is an "employee of his employer,"
and immune from suit by the injured claimant.                 There is a
wealth of case law in Montana to aid trial courts in their
application of this test as it is the same used to determine
whether a claimant's injuries are work related.              See section
39-71-407, MCA.
        We   note   that   the   often    quoted    rule     of   liberal
construction in favor of claimants is inapplicable here.
The Workers1 Compensation Act should not be liberally
construed to extinguish the right to maintain a third party
cause of action, nor should it be liberally construed to
allow a third party cause of action if it has been expressly
abolished.      The statutory provision of the Act and               this
Court's interpretations of the same have been slanted away
from    insurers in    favor of    the    injured    claimant.       This
inequity has no place in determining the apportionment of
liability between fellow workers.
        However, courts should bear         in mind       the theory of
Workers1 Compensation.       It is recognized that injuries will
occur   in the workplace, and will be              the    fault of both
employers and fellow workers.        In return for immediate and
assured      compensation    for   work    or   employment        related
injuries,           the      injured       claimant       gives       up    his        right     to

maintain        an a c t i o n a g a i n s t    t h e employee o r          f e l l o w worker.
See Vol.        2A,       L a r s o n ' s FJorkmenls C o m p e n s a t i o n Law,        section
72.22.

         The        test        adopted        by     this       opinion          should         be
a d m i n i s t e r e d w i t h t h e a b o v e i n mind.         An i n j u r e d c l a i m a n t
has     given       up h i s      right      t o maintain        an   action          against     a

f e l l o w worker           f o r work o r employment r e l a t e d i n j u r i e s ,           if
t h e f e l l o w worker was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f
h i s employment.              A s noted above,         t h i s t e s t h a s been t a c i t l y
a p p l i e d by t r i a l      c o u r t s many times w h e r e        they have          found
co-employees              immune     from     suit.       See,    Madison         v.    Pierce,
s u p r a , and B a i r d v. C h o k a t o s , s u p r a .     However, t h e f a c t s o f

t h i s c a s e a r e much c l o s e r t h a n a n y p r i o r c a s e and t h e t r i a l
c o u r t must e x p r e s s l y a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e f e l l o w

worker        was     a     co-employee         for     purposes       of       the     immunity
statute.         It       is n o t o u r i n t e n t t o c r e a t e any e x c e p t i o n t o
t h e co-employee            immunity s t a t u t e , b u t s i m p l y t o e x p r e s s t h e
test     which       has      been     and     should    be    used        to    answer        this
question.

         We     note       that      the    trial     court    dismissed          the     action
based     on a f i n d i n g t h a t S e l e n s k y was w i t h i n t h e s c o p e a n d
c o u r s e o f h i s employment a t t h e t i m e o f                injury.          The c a s e
m u s t t h e r e f o r e be r e t u r n e d t o a d j u d g e w h e t h e r h e was a c t i n g
w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e a n d s c o p e o f h i s employment a t t h e t i m e o f
the alleged negligence.

         Reversed             and     remanded         for     further          proceedings
c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinon.
W concur:
 e



                --
Chief J u s t i c e




              -
justices
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, dissenting:
      I respectfully dissent.      I would affirm the District
Court's   summary   judgment dismissing    the   Masseys'   action
against Selensky on the ground that it is barred by the
Montana Workers' Compensation Act.
      Massey has been accorded full benefits under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act.       He   now   seeks damages from his
co-employee, Selensky.    In declining to affirm the dismissal
of the damage action by the District Court, the majority have
ignored the fundamental purpose and structure of Montana's
Workers' Compensation Act.
     We have previously expressed that purpose and structure
in this language:
            "The foregoing purposes a.nd structure of
            the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act
            demonstrate its foundation of enterprise
            liability for injury to its employees,
            paid directly by the employer in the
            first instance and ultimately passed on
            to the public in the price of its prod-
            uct.   To permit an injured employee to
            collect compensation for injury from his
            employer under the Act and additionally
            sue a negligent coemployee of the same
            enterprise for the same injury, with the
            employer   recouping  his    compensation
            payments, destroys the purposes and
            structure of the entire Act.   We do not
            believe the legislature intended such
            result.
            "If section 9 2 - 2 0 4 were construed to
            withhold immunity to a coemployee from a
            negligence action, the cost of injury to
            an employee of the business would be
            shifted from the employer, where the Act
            places it, to a fellow employee, where
            the Act does not place it. It also would
            defeat the ultimate payment of injury
            cost by the public purchasing the prod-
            uct. This result would follow if section
            92-204   were interpreted as urged by
            plaintiff because of the suit rights,
            subrogation rights, and       lien rights
            granted the employer by this section. We
            cannot believe the legislature intended
            to permit the ultimate costs of employee
            injury to be borne by fellow employees,
            whether negligent or not. It would be a
            sad. spectacle, indeed, for a workman to
            find his home taken and his future earn-
            ings subjected to payment of a judgment
            in such a suit; nor did the legislature
            intend to permit any such action.
               "The purposes and provisions of the Act
               can be fully effectuated by permitting
               negligence actions, in addition to com-
               pensation, only against strangers to the
               business enterprise. There is no reason
               why negligent strangers to the business
               should not pay the cost of injury to
               employees of the enterprise.    The suit
               rights, subrogation rights, and lien
               rights granted to the employer under the
               Act, together with the compensation
               rights and suit rights granted the em-
               ployee, permit ultimate collection of
               injury costs from a negligent stranger to
               the business enterprise.    The Act does
               not cover strangers, only employees.
               There is no substitution of rights under
               the Act for common law remedies as be-
               tween strangers on the one hand and
               employers and employees of the business
               on the other." Madison v. Pierce (1970),
               156 Mont. 209, 215-216, 478 P.2d 860,
               864.
          Although the Act has been amended twice since Madison,
the amendments are irrelevant to the foregoing principles and
analysis.      Ch. 550, Laws of Montana (1977); Ch. 397, Laws of
Montana (1979). Additionally, section 92-204, R.C.M.        1947,
has been recodified as sections 39-71-411 through 39-71-414,
MCA   .
          The District Court found that Selensky was acting in
the course and. scope of       his employment at the time of
Massey's injury.      This makes him a co-employee immune from a
damage action by Massey by statute (sections 39-71-411 and
39-71-412, MCA) and case law (Madison v. Pierce, supra).      No
hair splitting and remand should render a co-employee liable
in a damage action.


                                   a          ~
                                       Chief JCTStic&
                                                        ~       $   L
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber:
      I concur in the foregoing dissent of Mr. Chief Justice
Haswell.