UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-20756
RAMON MATA, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
GARY JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
April 17, 2000
Before WIENER, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner, Ramon Mata, Jr. (“Mata”) appeals the dismissal of
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. We reverse and remand.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1986, Mata, a Texas prison inmate, was convicted of capital
murder for killing a female prison guard with whom he claimed to be
romantically involved. He was sentenced to death. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1992.
See Mata v. State, No. 69,632 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4,
1
1992)(unpublished). After exhausting his state remedies, Mata
filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 18,
1995. The district court denied relief. This court reversed and
remanded Mata’s Sixth Amendment fair trial claim for an evidentiary
hearing. See Mata v. Johnson, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997). In
July, 1998, as the parties were preparing for the evidentiary
hearing on the merits of the fair trial claim, Mata wrote a letter
advising the district court that he wished to abandon his
collateral attack on his conviction and sentence and have an
execution date set.1 After Mata confirmed his decision in a second
letter, the district court dismissed the habeas petition without
ruling on the question of Mata’s competency. Mata’s attorneys
appealed on his behalf, raising the issue of Mata’s competence to
waive his appeal, and this court remanded the case for a
retrospective determination of Mata’s competency. On August 3,
1999, the district court entered Further Findings of Fact,
concluding that Mata was competent on July 16, 1998 when he
confirmed his decision to waive collateral review, on December 17,
1998, when he asked to reinstate collateral review and on July 25,
1999, when he advised the court that he had again decided to
abandon his appeal. We granted Mata a Certificate of Probable
Cause to appeal a single issue: whether the district court
conducted a constitutionally adequate fact-finding inquiry to make
1
Although Mata’s July 1998 decision to drop his appeal is the
focus of this appeal, Mata has written letters to the court, his
lawyers and the state dropping and later reinstating his appeals on
no fewer than eight separate occasions since his conviction in
1986. See infra, pp. 13-14.
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a reliable determination of Mata’s competency to abandon collateral
review of his capital murder conviction and sentence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
In considering a federal habeas corpus petition presented by
a petitioner in state custody, we review the adequacy of the fact-
finding procedure, an issue of law, de novo. See Clark v. Scott,
70 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1995). The accuracy of the district
court’s factual conclusion concerning Mata’s competence is not
before us in this appeal.
B. Competency Determinations that Courts Have Found Adequate
We begin our analysis by examining the Supreme Court’s
guidance provided by Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
In Rees, a petitioner directed his counsel to withdraw his
petition for certiorari and forgo any further attacks on his
conviction and death sentence. Id. at 313. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the district court to make a determination as
to Rees’s mental competence, noting that it would be appropriate to
subject Rees to psychiatric and other medical examinations. Id. at
314. The Supreme Court instructed the district court to “hold such
hearings as it deems suitable, allowing the State and all other
interested parties to participate should they so desire[.]” Id.
The question presented to the district court was whether Rees has
the “capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice
with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on
the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease,
3
disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in
the premises.” Id.
We glean two conclusions from the Supreme Court’s Rees
opinion. First, the directive to hold “such hearings as it deems
suitable,” Rees, 384 U.S. at 314, clearly affords the district
court a measure of discretion in determining the type and extent of
procedures necessary to decide the issue of competency. Second,
there is a presumption that psychiatric and other medical
examinations will be included in the decision making process.
Following Rees, this circuit affirmed a district court’s
determination that a petitioner was competent to abandon collateral
review of his Texas capital murder conviction and death sentence.
See Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 396 (5th Cir. 1985).
Applying Rees, Rumbaugh set out a three part test directing the
district court to determine (1) whether that person suffers from a
mental disease, disorder, or defect; (2) whether a mental disease,
disorder, or defect prevents that person from understanding his
legal position and the options available to him; and (3) whether a
mental disease, disorder, or defect prevents that person from
making a rational choice among his options. See Rumbaugh, at 398.
The record showed that prior to finding Rumbaugh competent, the
district court held a preliminary hearing to decide the necessary
proceedings under the circumstances. See id. at 397. The district
court then ordered that Rumbaugh be examined by a team of
psychiatrists and psychologists. See id. These mental health
professionals submitted written reports to the court and the
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parties. See id. The court held a two-day evidentiary hearing, at
which four mental health experts testified. See id. Rumbaugh also
testified about his desire to abandon his appeals. See id. Only
after this full opportunity to develop the facts regarding
Rumbaugh’s competence, did the district court make its ruling.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s
grant of a habeas petitioner’s request to dismiss his attorney and
to dismiss his collateral attack on his death sentence with
prejudice. See Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1999).
Before acting on Ford’s pro se request, the magistrate judge held
two evidentiary hearings. Id. at 611. At the first hearing, the
petitioner appeared in person and the magistrate judge inquired
into the petitioner’s decision and observed his mental condition.
See id. After the hearing, the magistrate judge examined the
petitioner’s prison medical records and appointed a psychiatric
expert suggested by petitioner’s counsel. See id. After the
expert evaluated the petitioner and filed a written report, the
magistrate judge appointed, at the request of petitioner’s counsel,
a neurologist to examine the petitioner. See id. at 612. At the
second evidentiary hearing, both the psychiatrist and the
petitioner testified. See id. Portions of the petitioner’s
testimony raised concerns which prompted the psychiatrist to
request a second opportunity to examine the petitioner. See id. at
613. The magistrate judge granted the request, and the
psychiatrist filed a supplement to his earlier written evaluation.
See id. In response to the psychiatrist’s conclusion that the
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petitioner was competent to abandon collateral review, petitioner’s
counsel submitted the mental health evaluation of the neurologist,
who concluded that Ford was not competent to abandon his appeal.
See id. at 614. The magistrate judge spoke once more with the
petitioner by telephone. See id. The magistrate judge then made
a report and recommendation to the district court, concluding that
Ford was competent to dismiss his appeal. The district court
adopted that recommendation after an independent review of the
evidence. Id. at 614-15.
While Rumbaugh and Ford afford two examples of
constitutionally adequate fact-finding inquiry into the competency
of a petitioner to abandon collateral review in a capital case,
they do not directly answer the question presented to us. In this
case, we must first ascertain the boundaries of the district
court’s discretion in fashioning procedures constitutionally
adequate to be used in such a competency proceeding and second we
must determine whether the district court acted within those
boundaries in this case.
C. Constitutionally adequate procedures
Although we have located no controlling precedent, we find
that jurisprudence developed in the context of waiver of due
process safeguards and related competency questions in criminal
trial proceedings instructive. We start from the proposition that
the conviction of a legally incompetent2 defendant violates
2
The competency standard for pleading guilty or for standing
trial is “whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
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constitutional due process. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
378 (1966). A habeas petitioner may, on collateral review of his
state conviction, obtain relief if he can show that the state
procedures were inadequate to ensure that he was competent to stand
trial, for example if the trial court failed to conduct a
competency hearing. See Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 459 n.10
(5th Cir. 1997)(citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375). A state
court must conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s mental capacity
sua sponte if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to
competency. See id. In determining whether there is a “bona fide
doubt” as to the defendant’s competence, the court considers: (1)
any history of irrational behavior, (2) the defendant’s demeanor at
trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on competency. See Davis
v. Alabama, 545 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 1977). If the trial court
received evidence, viewed objectively, that should have raised a
reasonable doubt as to competency, yet failed to make further
inquiry, the defendant has been denied a fair trial. See Carter,
131 F.3d at 459 n.10.
Assuming, arguendo, that a court has not received evidence
understanding’ and a ‘rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him[.]’” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389,
396 (1993)(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960)). While that standard differs from the Rees competency
standard at issue in this case (“capacity to appreciate his
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation”), both standards inquire about the
discrete capacity to understand and make rational decisions
concerning the proceedings at issue, and the presence or absence of
mental illness or brain disorder is not dispositive. Compare
Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 398 with Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176
(1975).
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raising a bona fide doubt as to competency, Supreme Court
jurisprudence nonetheless mandates that courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights. See Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1982). Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the classic case delineating the
standard for measuring an effective waiver of a constitutional
right, requires that a waiver be an “intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.” The Supreme Court refined the
Johnson standard in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), by
requiring that valid waivers be not only voluntary but also
“knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 748. The
cases draw no distinction between waiver of the right to remain
silent during interrogation, the right to confer with counsel, the
right to representation by competent counsel at trial, the right to
contest accusations of criminality through a plea of not guilty,
the right to trial by jury and the right to be present at trial.
See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
From the courts’ applications of these constraints to the waiver of
a wide range of constitutional protections, we infer that similar
constraints are appropriate in the case at bar.
Applying the rationale employed in Pate and Carter to the
question of whether a death row inmate is competent to drop his
collateral attack on his conviction and sentence, we conclude that
a habeas court must conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s mental
capacity, either sua sponte or in response to a motion by
8
petitioner’s counsel, if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as
to his competency. See id. The extent and severity of the
petitioner’s history of mental health problems which have been
brought to the court’s attention influence the breadth and depth of
the competency inquiry required. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162 (1975), a criminal defendant claimed that he had been deprived
of due process of law by the failure of the trial court to order a
psychiatric examination to determine his competence to stand trial
for forcible rape of his wife, a capital offense. Drope’s attorney
moved for a continuance of the trial “in order that petitioner
might be examined and receive psychiatric treatment.” Id. at 164.
Treatment had been suggested by a psychiatrist who had examined
petitioner at his counsel’s request and whose report was attached
to the motion. See id. at 165. The trial court denied the
continuance. At trial, Drope’s wife testified that Drope had tried
to choke her the night before the trial commenced. The second
morning of trial, Drope attempted suicide by shooting himself in
the abdomen. The trial judge denied Drope’s counsel’s motion for
mistrial, finding that Drope had waived his right to be present at
his capital trial, because his absence “was due to his own
voluntary act in shooting himself.” Id. at 902. The Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that “when considered together with the
information available prior to trial and the testimony of
petitioner’s wife at trial, the . . . suicide attempt created a
sufficient doubt of his competence to stand trial to require
further inquiry on the question.” Id. at 180. Drope teaches that,
9
in order to adequately protect the petitioner’s due process rights,
“the correct course was to suspend the trial until [a psychiatric]
evaluation could be made.” Id.
Following Drope, the Fifth Circuit has held that a suicide
attempt, by itself, is not necessarily sufficient to create
“reasonable cause” for a competency hearing. State v. Davis, 61
F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995). Instead, that evidence must be
weighed in conjunction with all other evidence presented with
respect to a defendant’s mental stability and competence. See id.
The opportunity for face-to-face dialogue between the court
and the petitioner and the ability of the court to personally
observe the petitioner is likewise important to the equation. The
Supreme Court held that Drope’s absence from trial after the
suicide attempt bore on its analysis, in that “the trial judge and
defense counsel were no longer able to observe him in the context
of the trial and to gauge from his demeanor whether he was able to
cooperate with his attorney and to understand the nature and object
of the proceedings against him.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 181. The Fifth
Circuit has instructed that a district court, faced with a criminal
defendant who wishes to waive his right to a conflict-free defense
attorney, should “follow a procedure akin to that promulgated in
rule 11 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] whereby the
defendant’s voluntariness and knowledge of the consequences of a
guilty plea will be manifest on the face of the record.” United
States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975). The trial
court was directed to “scrupulously” and “carefully” evaluate the
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defendant’s effort to waive his constitutional rights and to
“actively participate in the waiver decision.” Id. at 277. “As in
Rule 11 procedures, the district court should address each
defendant personally and forthrightly advise him of the potential
dangers of representation by counsel with a conflict of interest.
The defendant must be at liberty to question the district court as
to the nature and consequences of his legal representation.” Id.
at 278. The court should seek to elicit a narrative response from
the defendant that he has been advised of his rights, that he
understands the details and has discussed the matter with his
attorney, and that he wishes to waive his constitutional
protections. See id.
The district court, of course, retains discretion to determine
the best course of action in each particular case. For instance,
in some cases an expert report already in the record may be
sufficiently current that a new examination is not necessary, or a
court may be able to decide the issue on documents without taking
live testimony. In any event, the procedures employed must satisfy
basic due process concerns. In sum, if the evidence before the
district court raises a bona fide issue of petitioner’s competency
to waive collateral review of a capital conviction and death
sentence, the court can afford such petitioner adequate due process
by ordering and reviewing a current examination by a qualified
medical or mental health expert, allowing the parties to present
any other evidence relevant to the question of competency and, on
the record and in open court, questioning the petitioner concerning
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the knowing and voluntary nature of his decision to waive further
proceedings.
D. Adequacy of the Procedures Employed in Mata’s Case
1. Details of the procedures employed by the district court
We now turn to the issue of whether the district court acted
within these due process boundaries in resolving the question of
Mata’s competency. Mata wrote letters to the court, to his lawyers
and to the prosecutor dropping, then later reinstating, his appeals
in state court in 1991 and in February and May of 1994. In 1994,
the state judge set a competency hearing and appointed Dr. Allen
Childs, M.D., a psychiatrist, and Dr. Murphey, a psychologist, to
evaluate Mata. After the evaluations were completed, but before
the hearing in state court, Mata again changed his mind and decided
to continue his appeals, whereupon the state judge canceled the
competency hearing. After his state habeas petition was denied in
January 1995, Mata continued to vacillate between pursuing post
conviction relief in federal court and dropping his appeals. In
1996, the district court initially denied Mata’s first federal
habeas petition. In 1997, we reversed that decision in part and
remanded Mata’s Sixth Amendment fair trial claim for an evidentiary
hearing. See Mata v. Johnson, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997). As
the parties were preparing for the evidentiary hearing on the
merits of the remanded claim, Mata wrote a letter to the district
court abandoning his collateral attack. On July 10, 1998, Mata’s
attorney filed a Motion to Declare Petitioner Incompetent or, in
the Alternative, to Hold a Competency Hearing. The motion related
12
that Mata had thirty years of documented mental health problems,
had made repeated suicide attempts and had engaged in numerous
hunger strikes while incarcerated on death row. The motion
requested that the district court declare Mata incompetent based on
reports of the mental health experts appointed by the state court
in 1994 who had concluded that Mata was not competent to drop his
appeals, as well as extensive medical records from the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. The motion requested, in the
alternative, that the district court hold a hearing to determine
Mata’s competency. The district court allowed oral argument on the
motion, at which the district court characterized Mata’s attorney’s
position as “trendy and trashy psycho-analytical analysis.” The
district court then entered an order informing Mata that if he did
not desire to abandon his habeas action, he must inform the court
by July 24, 1998, and had it delivered directly to Mata, who had
not been present at the hearing. On July 16, 1998, Mata filed a
second letter with the court asking that his habeas action be
dismissed. On July 22, 1998, the district court dismissed Mata’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus without ruling on the competency
motion.
Mata’s attorneys appealed on his behalf. On December 17,
1998, Mata indicated his desire to reinstate his federal collateral
review. On February 3, 1999, we remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of Mata’s competence on July 16, 1998 and
December 17, 1998, requiring the district court “to set forth not
just its conclusion but its findings and reasoning in sufficient
13
detail to allow meaningful review by this court.” Mata v. Johnson,
No. 98-20756 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished). On remand, the
Respondent filed a motion requesting that the court appoint a
disinterested expert to evaluate Mata’s competency (1) at the
present time, (2) in December 1998, and (3) in July 1998. Although
Respondent advised the court that the motion was opposed, Mata’s
attorneys filed nothing further on the issue. Mata again wrote to
the district court on July 25, 1999, urging the court grant the
Respondent’s motion for a competency exam, but stating that he did
not want to continue with his appeals and wished to be executed as
soon as possible.
On August 3, 1999, the district court entered findings of
fact, without benefit of an expert examination of Mata or any
further evidence or hearings. The district court found that Mata
was competent on July 16, 1998, based on the 1985 expert reports
finding him legally competent to stand trial for capital murder.
The district court stated that [s]ince that time, nothing indicates
that he has become incompetent. The psychological reports in the
record support Mata’s competence.” The district court made no
mention of Dr. Childs’s report and conclusion to the contrary. The
district court went on to find Mata competent on December 17, 1998,
when he asked to reinstate his appeal, and July 25, 1999, when he
again wrote the district court abandoning his legal attacks on his
sentence.
2. Evidence raising bona fide question of Mata’s competence
The record contains evidence that Mata suffers from an organic
14
brain disorder resulting from closed head injuries and has a
history of mental health problems both before and after his capital
murder trial. Since 1986, physicians at the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice have prescribed numerous psychotherapeutic and
antidepressant medications to alleviate the symptoms of mental
illness.3 He has made numerous suicide attempts and engaged in
several hunger strikes. There is a report from Dr. Allen Childs
detailing his findings in 1994 that Mata suffers from delusional
disorder with paranoid and erotomanic features and borderline
personality organization. Dr. Childs opined that Mata’s efforts at
suicide as well as his delusions of seeing and talking with his
murder victim are genuine. Dr. Childs also wrote a letter in
1998, based on his examination of Mata in 1994, stating that Mata
was not competent to drop his appeals. We conclude that all the
evidence presented with respect to Mata’s mental stability and
competence is sufficient to create “reasonable cause” for a
competency hearing. See State v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir.
1995).
3. Current examination by an expert
The district court based his fact finding on the expert
examination performed twelve years earlier in conjunction with
Mata’s original trial. The lapse of time, coupled with extensive
evidence of change in Mata’s condition, lead us to conclude that
3
The medical records attached to the original motion for
competency examination note prescriptions for Asendin, Sinequan,
Triavil, Mallaril, Haldol, Tofranil, Triavil, Elavil, Desyrel, and
Zoloft. See generally PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (Medical Economics
Data Production Co. 48th ed. 1994).
15
the district court did not base its decision on a current
examination by an expert.
4. Opportunity for the parties to present other evidence
Except for the attachments to the original motion, no evidence
was presented to the court on the issue of Mata’s competence. The
court never afforded the parties the opportunity to present
testimony or documentary evidence. The court’s statement that
nothing indicates that Mata had become incompetent since his trial
in 1985 is meaningless in the absence of a hearing or even a
summary judgment-type procedure in which the parties could develop
the record. We therefore find that the district court did not
afford the parties a meaningful opportunity to present evidence
relevant to the question of Mata’s competency to discontinue his
appeals.
5. District court dialogue with Mata
Mata has not personally appeared before the district court
since the question of his competency to drop his appeal arose. The
district court received some hand written notes from Mata, but
there has been no face-to-face dialogue between the court and the
petitioner and no opportunity for the court to personally observe
Mata.
6. Proceedings inadequate
Because the evidence submitted by Mata raised a bona fide
question that he lacked competency to drop his appeal, and because
there is no current evaluation of Mata’s competence by a medical
expert, no opportunity for the parties to present evidence, and no
16
appearance by Mata in open court, we conclude that the proceedings
in this case failed to afford the minimum due process guaranteed by
the Constitution.
III. CONCLUSION
We do not imply that a petitioner is free to manipulate the
collateral review process by endlessly vacillating between dropping
and reinstating his capital appeal. We are sympathetic to the
district court’s frustration over the length of the appeals
process, frustration that was heightened by the district court’s
perception that Mata was playing for time and his attorneys were
maximizing their fees in this case. Nevertheless, the answer is
not to eviscerate the constitutional protections for state habeas
petitioners, but to promptly afford the parties the opportunity to
procure and present evidence on the question of competency, resolve
the factual questions presented and allow the petitioner, if found
competent, to choose his course of action. Once a reliable,
constitutionally adequate competency determination is made, a
district court would certainly be justified in presuming that a
petitioner continues to be competent. However, such a presumption
cannot survive a twelve year gap, coupled with the extensive
evidence of incompetency in this record.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s order
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Further, we direct that
this case be reassigned to a different judge, to avoid the
appearance of bias arising from the district court’s remarks in
17
this record. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1333 (5th Cir.
1997).
REVERSED and REMANDED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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