IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN THE MATTER OF S.L.M., a Youth
IN THE MATTER OF S.T., a Youth
Appeals From: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
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I THE MATTER OF J.L.C., a Youth
N ( No. 96-220 --.
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Appeal From: District Court of the TweIfthk i d m
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In and for the County of Hill,
The Honorable J o b Warner, Judge presiding.
I THE MATTER OF J.A.T., a Youth
N No. 96-546
IN THE MATTER OF L.D., a Youth No. 96-547
Appeals From: District Court of the Thirteenth JudiciaI District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Diane G, Ban,Judge presiding,
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Daniel P. BuckIey (argued); Berg, Lilly, AndrioIo & TolIefsen, Bozeman, Montana (96-576)
D.E. Pomery (argued), Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana (96-337)
John Keith, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana (96-220)
Roberta A. Drew, YeIlowstone County Defender's Office, Billings, Montana (96-546 and -547)
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg W. Coughlin (argued), Helena, Montana
Argued: November 6, 1997
Submitted: November 14, 1997
. Decided: December 30, 1997
Filed:
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The appellants in these five appeals challenge the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution
Act, §§ 41-5-1601 through -1607, MCA, (EJPA) as being unconstitutional under the equal
protection, due process and double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Montana
constitutions, as well as under Article 11, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution. Although
there are some factual differences in how each prosecution evolved as well as differences in
the conclusions reached by the various District Courts, the constitutional issues presented
encompass each of the appeals. Accordingly, we consolidate these appeals for purposes of
an opinion. Since we determine that the EJPA violates Article 11, Section 4 (equal
protection) of the Montana Constitution and Article 11, Section 15 (rights of minors) of the
Montana Constitution, we need not address the double jeopardy and due process challenges.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF EACH APPEAL
I. In the Matter of S.L.M.. Cause No. 96-576. Gallatin County:
The Youth S.L.M. was charged with perjury and the criminal sale of dangerous drugs,
both punishable as felonies if committed by an adult. The State alleged that S.M. sold $150
worth of marijuana to an undercover agent. At the time of the offense, S.M. was under the
age of 18 years. The State requested extended jurisdiction under the EJPA. The District
Court held a hearing and granted extended jurisdiction over the charge of criminal sale of
dangerous drugs, but did not extend jurisdiction over the charge of pejury, an offense which
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is not enumerated for extended jurisdiction under the EJPA. At the disposition hearing, the
Youth argued that the EJPA violates the equal protection, double jeopardy, and due process
guarantees of the Montana and United States constitutions. The District Court rejected the
Youth's contentions and committed him to the Department of Corrections until he reaches
the age of 19. The District Court then entered and stayed a Sentence and Judgment of 10
years on the charge of criminal sale of dangerous drugs. The Youth filed a motion for
correction of sentence or reconsideration. That motion was denied, and the Youth appealed
to this Court.
11. In the Matter of J.L.C.. Cause No. 96-220. Hill County:
The Youth J.L.C. was charged with negligent homicide as the result of a car accident
in which J.L.C. was driving a vehicle while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. The
vehicle rolled, and one of the two passengers died from injuries received. J.L.C. was 17
years of age at the time of the incident. At the request of the county attorney, the District
Court granted extended jurisdiction over the charge of negligent homicide. The Youth pled
guilty to negligent homicide, and the court, by way of a juvenile disposition, placed the
Youth on formal probation until he reaches the age of 21. In addition, under the EJPA, the
court imposed an adult sentence committing the Youth to the Department of Corrections for
a period of 5 years, suspended. The Youth filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
111. In the Matter of S.T.. Cause No. 96-337. Gallatin County:
S.T. was charged in Youth Court with eight offenses, including two burglaries. He
admitted to having committed each of the offenses. The State filed a motion to have the case
designated an extended jurisdiction prosecution. S.T. challenged the EJPA as unconstitu-
tional under the double jeopardy clause, the due process clause and Article 11, Section 15 of
the Montana Constitution. The District Court rejected the constitutional challenges and
imposed a juvenile disposition (chemical dependency treatment, random urinalysis and
restitution) under 5 41-5-523, MCA, of the Youth Court Act as well as an adult sentence
under 5 46-1 8-201, MCA (ten years to the Department of Corrections, stayed).
Based upon a report of probation violations, the State subsequently filed a request
with the court to impose the adult portion of the sentence. S.T. was arrested pursuant to a
bench warrant. After initially denying the violations, S.T. admitted the violations of
probation. The court then imposed the sentence of 10 years with the Department of
Corrections, suspended 5 years, and imposed conditions for the suspended portion of the
sentence. S.T. was credited with 91 days of incarceration served under the juvenile
disposition.
IV. In the Matter of J.A.T.. Cause No. 96-546. Yellowstone County and
In the Matter of L.D.. Cause No. 96-547, Yellowstone County:
J.A.T. was charged in Youth Court with assault with a dangerous weapon and
misdemeanor theft. The State requested extended jurisdiction for the charge of assault,
J.A.T. admitted the allegations in the petition and proceeded to challenge the constitutionality
of the EJPA. The court ordered J.A.T. committed to the Department of Corrections until the
age of 19. The court stayed the commitment on condition that J.A.T. continue to reside with
his grandfather and attend school. The court held the adult portion of the sentence in
abeyance pending a ruling on the Youth's motion challenging the constitutionality of the
EJPA.
Subsequently, the State filed a petition charging the Youth with possessing drug
paraphernalia and, on that basis, sought to revoke the prior suspension of commitment. J.A.T
admitted the allegations, and the court placed him on probation for one year.
In a separate matter, in November of 1995, the State charged L.D. with being a
delinquent youth for committing deliberate homicide. The State later amended its petition
to charge negligent homicide as an alternate charge. L.D. admitted to the charge of negligent
homicide, but challenged the constitutionality of the EJPA. The court declared L.D. a
delinquent youth and committed him to the Department of Corrections until age 19. The
court took the issue of whether to designate the case as one for extended jurisdiction under
advisement.
On July 19, 1996, the court issued a consolidated order in both L.D. and J.A.T.
declaring thc EJPA unconstitutional on double jeopardy, due process and equal protection
grounds. The State appeals from that decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Does the EJPA violate the equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution andor the Montana Constitution?
2. Does the EJPA violate the provisions of Article 11, Section 15 of the Montana
Constitution?
3. Does the EJPA violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States
Constitution and/or the Montana Constitution?
4. Does the EJPA violate the due process clauses of the United States Constitution
and/or the Montana Constitution?
DISCUSSION
I. Overview of the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act
In 1995, the legislature substantially revised the Montana Youth Court Act, including
amending the Declaration of Purpose to effectuate the following purpose:
to prevent and reduce youth delinquency through immediate, consistent,
enforceable, and avoidable consequences of youths' actions and to establish
a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, detention, competency
development, community protection, and, in appropriate cases, restitution as
ordered by the youth court[.]
Section 41-5-102(2), MCA (1995).
As part of the broad 1995 revision of the Youth Court Act, the EJPA was enacted.
The EJPA is now codified at Title 41, Chapter 5, Part 16, MCA. Although the youths herein
were all sentenced under the EJPA as it was enacted in 1995, the 1997 legislature amended
the EJPA to provide for more procedural due process in revocation of stay proceedings.
ij 41-5-1605, MCA. If the State were to initiate revocation of stay proceedings against any
of the appellants, the 1997 amendments would inure to their benefit. However, for purposes
of our equal protection analysis, the sentencing provisions of the Act remain the same in that
they still provide for imposition of an adult sentence in addition to a juvenile disposition.
Accordingly, we will refer to the Act as amended and codified at Title 45, Chapter 5, Part 16,
MCA.
A youth court case may be designated an "extendedjurisdiction juvenile prosecution"
when the offender is at least 14 years of age, the county attorney requests that the case be
designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution, a hearing is held, and the youth
court designates the case as such. Section 41-5-1602, MCA. If, after a hearing, the county
attorney has shown by clear and convincing evidence that designating the case an extended
jurisdiction prosecution serves the public safety, the youth court may so designate. Section
41-5-1603(3), MCA.
A case may also fall under the EJPA if the youth is alleged to have committed one or
more of the offenses listed under i j 41-5-206, MCA, and the county attorney designates the
case as an extended jurisdiction prosecution. Section 41-5-1602(1)(b), MCA. The casc may
also fall under the EJPA if the youth was at least 12 years of age, allegedly committed an
offense which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable as a felony, and allegedly used
a firearm in the commission of the offense. Section 41-5-1602(I)(b), MCA. Additionally,
the case may be designated an extended jurisdiction prosecution if, after a hearing on the
motion to transfer the case for prosecution in district court under 3 41-5-206, MCA, the
youth court designates the case an extended jurisdiction prosecution. Section 41-5-
1602(l)(c), MCA.
After the case is designated an extended jurisdiction prosecution, the case proceeds
to an adjudicatory hearing as provided in $ 41-5-1502, MCA. If the youth admits to
committing, or is adjudicated to have committed, an offense which would be a felony if
committed by an adult, the youth court must impose one or more of the juvenile dispositions
under $ 41-5-1512, MCA, and any sentence which could be imposed on an adult offender
of the same offense. The statute expressly provides that execution of the sentence imposed
"must be stayed on the condition that the youth not violate the provisions of the disposition
order and not commit a new offense." Section 41-5-1604(1)(b), MCA.
If the court is subsequently informed that any condition of the disposition has been
violated, or if it is alleged that the youth has committed a new offense, the court may, without
notice, order the youth be taken into custody. Section 41-5-1605(1), MCA. The district
court must then notify the youth, in writing, of the reasons alleged for revocation of the stay.
Section 41-5-1605(1), MCA.
If the youth challenges the reasons for the revocation, the court must hold a hearing
at which the youth is entitled to notice, an opportunity to be heard, right to counsel, and the
right to cross-examine witnesses. Section 41-5- l605(2), MCA. If, after the hearing, the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions of the stay have been
violated or that the youth has committed a new offense, the court shall provide a written
statement of the reasons for the revocation and shall: 1) continue the stay and place the
youth on probation; 2) impose one or more dispositions under $5 4 1-5-15 12 or - 1513, MCA,
if the youth is under age 18; or 3) subject to $5 4 1-5-206(6) and (7),MCA, order execution
of the sentence imposed under 5 41-5-1 6O4(l)(b), MCA. Section 41 -5- l6OS(2)(b), MCA,
Upon revocation and disposition, the youth court shall transfer the case to the district
court. Section 4 1-5-l605(3), MCA. Upon transfer, the offender's extended jurisdiction
juvenile status is terminated, and the youth court jurisdiction is terminated, Section 41-5-
1605(3), MCA. Ongoing supervision of the offender is with the Department of Corrections
rather than with the youth court's juvenile probation services. Section 4 1-5-1605(3), MCA.
11. Standine
The State contends that certain of the youths lack standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the EJPA. The youths contend that the EJPA violates equal protection
by subjecting them to a Ionger period of incarceration than that permitted for an adult
offender, The State points out, however, that the aduIt portion of the sentence is only
tiggered if the youth violates the terms of his juvenile disposition and the stay of the adult
sentence is revoked. Those youths who have not had the stay revoked have not been
adversely affected by imposition of an adult sentence and thus, the State contends, lack
standing.
We conclude that the youths, each of whom have been sentenced under the EJPA,
have standing to challenge its provisions. We recently addressed the question of standing
in Gryczan v. State (Mont. 1997), 942 P.2d 112, 54 St.Rep. 699. We reiterated the criteria
for determining standing: 1) the complaining party must clearly allege past, present or
threatened injury to a property or civil right; and 2) the alkged injury must be distinguishable
fiorn the injury to the public generally, but need not be exclusive to the compIaining party.
Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 117. Gryczan involved a constitutional challenge by six homosexuals
(the respondents) to the statutory prohibition on deviate sexual conduct, &g 5 45-5-505,
MCA. The State contended that because the statute had never been enforced against
consenting adults, there was no "threatened injury" and, thus, no standing. Fryczan, 942
P.2d at 116.
This Court, despite the fact that the respondents had not been arrested or prosecuted,
held that they were precisely the individuak the statute was designed to impact. Gyczan,
942 P.2d at 119, Furthermore, we noted that nothing prevented a county attorney from
exercising his or her discretion and choosing to prosecute. Since the legislature had not
disavowed the statute, we concluded that the respondents "suffer a legitimate and realistic
fear of criminal prosecution along with other psychological harms. Respondents are
precisely the individuals against whom the statute is intended to operate. This is sufficient
to give Respondents standing to challenge the constitutionafity of the statute." Gryczan, 942
P.2d at 120.
The threat of injury to the youths herein is even more apparent than that to the
respondents in Gryczan. There is no question but that the youths are among the individuals
against whom the EJPA is directed. Further, the youths have not only been prosecuted, but
have also been sentenced under the EJPA. Although the adult sentences of some of the
youths may be presently stayed on the condition that they comply with their juvenile
dispositions, they suffer a "legitimate and realistic" fear that the adult sentence will be
imposed should they violate the disposition. We conclude that the youths, regardless of
whether their stays have been lifted, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
EJPA on equal protection grounds.
111. Does the EJPA violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution
andlor the Montana Constitution and the rights of minors under Article 11, Section 15 of the
Montana Constitution?
Resolution of this issue involves a question of constitutional law. Accordingly, we
review to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. State v.
Schnittgen (19961,277 Mont. 291,295,922 P.2d 500, 503.
Equal protection challenges to legislation are reviewed under one of three different
levels of scrutiny. When the legislation in question infringes upon a fundamental right or
discriminates against a suspect class, we employ the most stringent standard, strict scrutiny.
"Strict scrutiny has been limited to those instances when either a fundamental right has been
infringed or a suspect classification has been established. Strict scrutiny requires the
government to show a compelling state interest for its action." Davis v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co. (Mont. 1997), 937 P.2d 27, 3 1, 54 %.Rep. 328, 331.
If the right in question has its origin in the Montana Constitution, but is not found in
the Declaration of Rights, we employ a middle-tier scrutiny. Butte Community Union v.
Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426,434,712 P.2d 1309, 1313. Middle-tier scrutiny requires the
State to demonstrate that its classification is reasonable and that its interest in the
classification is greater than that of the individual's interest in the right infringed. Lewis,712
P.2d at 1314.
If the right in question is not hndamental and does not warrant middle-tier scrutiny,
we review under a rational basis test. This test requires the government to show that the
objective of the statute is legitimate and bears a rational relationship to the classification used
by the legislature. Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service (1987), 229 Mont. 40, 744 P.2d 895.
In addressing an equal protection challenge, we first identify the classes involved and
determine whether they are similarly situated. The two classes involved in the present
appeals are: 1)juveniles who are sentenced as adults under the EJPA; and 2) adults who are
sentenced for committing the same offense as the juveniles. Since both classes are composed
of persons who have committed the same act and who are sentenced "as adults," the classes
are similarly situated for equal protection purposes.
We next determine whether a suspect classification is involved. A suspect class is one
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposchl unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 41 1 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16,40.
A classification between juvenile and adult offenders is a distinction based upon age. We
have followed the United States Supreme Court in holding that a sentencing distinction based
upon age is not a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny. Matter of Wood (1989), 236
Mont. 118, 125, 768 P.2d 1370, 1375.
We then defme the nature of the individual interest affected; is it a fundamental right
triggering a strict scrutiny analysis? The youths argue that imposition of an adult sentence
in addition to a juvenile disposition is an infringement upon their physical liberty and that
physical liberty is a fimdamental right. This question was answered in Matter of C.H.
(1984), 210 Mont. 184,683 P.2d 93 1. C.H. contended that placing a truant status offender
in an institution for a 45-day predispositional evaluation was an infringement upon the
fundamental right of physical liberty, a right which must be protected absent a compelling
state interest. Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 938. She also contended that 3 41-5-103(12),
MCA, is unconstitutional in that it authorizes the youth court to reclassify a youth in need
of supervision who has violated a court order as a delinquent youth. Matter of C.H., 683
P.2d at 938. She contended that this classification violated equal protection guarantees by
allowing the court to treat youths in the same class, i.e., youthful conternnors, differently.
While physical liberty is not specifically guaranteed under either the United States
Constitution or the Montana Constitution, we noted in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 940, that
the concept of "liberty" is very much a part of our state constitution. The preamble to the
Montana Constitution states in part: "We the people of Montana . . . desiring. . . to secure
the blessings of liberty . . . do ordain and establish this constitution." Further, Article 11,
Section 3 states in part: "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They
include . . . the rights o f . . . enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . ." Article 11,
Section 17, the due process clause, states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
In Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 940, we concluded: "Reading the preamble and these
sections of our constitution together, we hold that under the Montana Constitution physical
liberty is a fundamental right, without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would
have little meaning." We then analyzed the interplay between the guarantee of equal
protection and Article 11, Section 15's guarantee to minors of all the fundamental rights of
Article I1 unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons. We held that "a juvenile's right to physical liberty must bc balanced against her
right to be supervised, cared for and rehabilitated." Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941.
We determined that two compelling state interests justified classifying a youth as a
delinquent youth or a youth in need of supervision, depending upon the circumstances. The
two compelling state purposes were: 1) to rehabilitate youthful offenders by providing for
their care, protection and wholesome mental development before they become adult
criminals; and 2) to substitute a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation and remove
the element of retribution from the punishment of a youth who has violated the law. m r
of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941. "The youth court's statutory authority to classify contempt of court,
depending upon the circumstances of the case, permits the court to fashion an appropriate,
individual rehabilitation plan for each youthful contemn[o]r." Matterof P.2d at
683
941.
In the present appeals, the EJPA's imposition of an adult sentence in addition to a
juvenile disposition infringes on the juvenile's physical liberty, which is a fundamental right.
As in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941, we must therefore apply a strict scrutiny analysis and
determine whether there is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify such an
infringement and whether such an infringement is consistent with the mandates of Article 11,
Section 15 of the Montana Constitution.
Article 11, Section 15 provides:
Rights of persons not adults. The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protections of such persons.
This section must be read in conjunction with the guarantee of equal protection found in
Article 11, Section 4. The report of the Bill of Rights Committee of the Constitutional
Convention indicates that one of the primary purposes of Article 11, Section 15 was to
remedy the fact that minors had not been accorded full recognition under the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. The Bill of Rights Committee's Comments are as
follows:
The committee took this action in recognition of the fact that young people
have not been held to possess basic civil rights. Although it has been held that
they are "persons" under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court has not ruled in their favor under the equal protection
clause of that same amendment. What this means is that persons under the age
of majority have been accorded certain specific rights which are felt to be a
part of due process. However, the broad outline of the kinds of rights young
people possess does not yet exist. This is the crux of the committee proposal:
to recognize that persons under the age of majority have the same protections
from governmental and majoritarian abuses as do adults. In such cases where
the protection of the special status of minors demands it, exceptions can be
made on clear showing that such protection is being enhanced.
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. I1 at 635-36.
Clearly under Article 1 , Section 15, minors are afforded full recognition under the
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equal protection clause and enjoy all the fundamental rights of an adult under Article 11.
Furthermore, if the legislature seeks to carve exceptions to this guarantee, it must not only
show a compelling state interest but must also show that the exception is designed to enhance
the rights of minors.
In Matter of C.H,, 683 P.2d at 941, we held that the state had a compelling interest in
removing the element of retribution and instead rehabilitating youths before they became
adult offenders. At the time Matter was decided, the stated purpose of the Youth
Court Act was "to remove from youth committing violations of the law the element of
retribution and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, and, in
appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the youth court." Section 41-5-102(2), MCA
(1983). However, the purposes of the Youth Court Act have since been considerably
broadened. As of the 1995 amendments, the Declaration of Purpose now states the following
goals:
[T]o prevent and reduce youth delinquency through an immediate, consistent,
enforceable, and avoidable consequences of youths' actions and to establish a
program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, detention, competency
development, communityprotection, and, in appropriate cases, restitution as
ordered by the youth court[.]
Section 41-5-102(2), MCA (1995) (emphasis added).
As compared to the pre-1995 Declaration of Purpose, the Act now espouses much
more preventative, if not punitive, goals; that is, the Act now seeks to prevent delinquency
through imposition of enforceable and immediate consequences and to establish programs
of detention and community protection. The State asserts that the EJPA was designed by the
legislature to address the rising tide of juvenile criminal conduct in Montana and dispel the
notion held by some juveniles that their criminal conduct holds no consequences for them.
The EJPA, as noted by the State, gives the courts "a bigger stick to help keep kids in line--to
let them know their crimes are serious and this is their last chance to cooperate." Obviously,
it is no longer accurate to reason, as we did in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941, that Youth
Court Act infringements upon a juvenile's physical liberty are legitimate nieans of enhancing
their protection. Indeed, in requiring the court to impose an adult sentence in addition to the
juvenile disposition, the EJPA goes beyond mere rehabilitation and injects the specter of
retribution. Our holding in Matter of C.H. is thus distinguishable on that basis.
All juveniles subject to the EJPA are at risk of serving an adult sentence in addition
to their juvenile disposition. Thus, the EJPA, on its face, violates the equal protection clause
of Article 11, Section 10 by treating EJPA offenders more harshly than their adult
counterparts. The EJPA aIso violates Article 11, Section 15 by reducing, rather than
enhancing, a juvenile's rights as compared to an adult's. The State, relying solely on its
contention that age is not a suspect classification, does not address the fundamental right
analysis and has not suggested any compelling state interest to justify the EJPA's
infringement on the fundamental right of physical liberty. While the State has a clear interest
in deterring serious juvenile crime and while it can, within the limits of equal protection,
further this interest by increasing the sanctions imposed upon juveniles, it has no compelling
state interest in treating them as adults and restricting their physical liberty beyond the
restrictions which are imposed upon an adult for the same offense.
As an example, one of the appeals before us, Matter of J.L.C., Cause No. 96-220, Hill
County, involves a 17-year-old youth who pled guilty to one count of negligent homicide,
a violation of $45-5-104, MCA. Pursuant to the EJPA, J.L.C. received a juvenile disposition
committing him to formal probation until age 21 plus an adult sentence of 5 years with the
Department of Corrections, suspended on the condition that he comply with the probation
until age 21. Thus, while the "adult" portion of his sentence is only 5 years, the total
sentence with both juvenile and adult aspects combined could equal 9 years, nearly twice as
long as the 5-year adult sentence under similar circun~stances. Clearly, although the law
purports to treat J.L.C. as an "adult," he is treated differently than an adult and in such a
manner that his rights are lessened rather than enhanced, as mandated by Article 11, Section
15. Thus, the EJPA, both on its face and as applied to J.L.C., violates equal protection under
Article 11, Section 4 and a minor's rights to enhanced protection under Article 11, Section 15
of the Montana Constitution.
In addition to Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 931, discussed above, we have twice
addressed equal protection challenges to the different treatment of offenders based upon age.
As the following analysis indicates, we find both of these decisions distinguishable.
A. Our Decision in Matter of Wood:
In Matter of Wood (1989), 236 Mont. 118,768 P.2d 1370, we addressed an equal
protection challenge by a 16-year-old youth to the process whereby jurisdiction over his
homicide case was mandatorily transferred from youth court to district court. The Youth
Court Act, 4 41-5-206(l)(a)(i), MCA, provided that a youth aged 12 years or older who had
committed deliberate homicide or mitigated deliberate homicide may be transferred, after a
hearing, to district court. Wood contended that, as a 16-year-old,he was entitled to the same
due process (i.e., a hearing) as a younger person and that 4 41-5-206(3), MCA, denied equal
protection when it provided that youths I6 years or older who have allegedly committed
deliberate homicide must be transferred to district court, without any requirement of a
hearing. Matter of Wood, 768 P.2d at 1372. We held that procedural due process is not a
hndamental right nor is age a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny. Matter of Wood, 768
P.2d at 1375. We applied the rational basis test and concluded that treatment as a juvenile
is not an inherent right, that the legislature may restrict or qualify that right, and that the
legislative classification based upon age and gravity of the offense was rationally related to
the legitimate state objective of detening homicides committed by teenagers and protecting
society from these violent offenders. Matter of Wood, 768 P.2d at 1376.
Matterof at 1370, is distinguishable from the case subjudice. Matter
768 P.2d
of Wood involves the right to procedural due process, which we held is not a hndamental
right. In this case, the appellants are challenging the actual loss of physical liberty, in
addition to challenging the process by which sentence is imposed. As we stated earlier,
physical liberty is a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny. Also, Matter of Wood, 768
P.2d at 1374-76, involved the transfer statute, $41-5-206, MCA, and an alleged right to be
treated as a juvenile. The present appeals involve the EJPA, which while purporting to treat
juveniles as adults in fact treats them more harshly than adults under similar circumstances.
Our decision in Matter of Wood is thus not controlling of the issues presented herein.
B. Our Decision in Matter of C.S.:
We addressed an equal protection challenge to the disparate application of sentencing
laws to minors as compared to adults in Matter of C.S. (1984), 210 Mont. 144, 687 P.2d 57.
At the age of 15, C.S. was adjudged a delinquent youth for having committed the offense of
violation of privacy in communication, a misdemeanor as provided in 5 45-8-2 13, MCA.
Matter of C.S., 687 P:2d at 58. At the dispositional hearing, C.S. was committed to the
Department of Institutions until age 21, unless the Department deemed an earlier release
appropriate. Thus, the maximum amount of time C.S. could have spent in the custody of the
Department was six years. Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 58. This was considerably longer
than the six-month maximum to which an adult could be sentenced for committing the same
offense. For that reason, C.S. argued that her term of commitment vioIated the equal
protection clause. Matter of C.S., 687 P,2d at 58. We concluded that adults and minors are
not similarly situated with respect to Montana's sentencing laws for three reasons. Matter
of C.S., 687 P.2d at 59.
The three reasons propounded were: 1) a juvenile commitment is different from a
criminal conviction because, given the stated policy of the Youth Court Act in 1984, a
juvenile commitment is strictly for rehabilitation, not retribution; 2) in contrast to an adult,
the liberty interests of a minor are subject to reasonable regulation by the State under the
doctrine of parens patriae; and 3) other jurisdictions have employed the parens patriae
doctrine under similar youth court acts. Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 59.
Our decision in Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 57, predates the adoption of the EJPA.
After review of the EJPA and the revised Youth Court Act, we conclude that the three
distinctions drawn in Matter of C.S. between minors and adults do not apply in the context
of these acts. As stated above in our discussion of Matter of C.H., given the new breadth of
purpose of the Youth Court Act and the adult sentencing provisions of the EJPA, it is no
longer accurate to state, as we did in Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 59, that a Youth Court
disposition is "strictly for rehabilitation, not retribution." Our holding in Matter of C.S. is
thus distinguishable on that basis.
Furthermore, where the offender is sanctioned with an "adult" sentence, as under the
EJF'A, we cannot rely on the doctrine ofparenspatriae to distinguish between the treatment
of juveniles and adults. Parens patriae traditionally refers to the role of the State as
sovereign or guardian of persons who are under a legal disability, such as juveniles--"the
principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as
minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990). Where, as under the EJPA, the offender is no longer sentenced solely
as a juvenile, but as an adult as well, the doctrine's paternalistic rationale no longer applies.
Finally, the doctrine ofparens patriae must be applied consistently with Article 1 ,
1
Section 15 of the Montana Constitution which provides: "The rights of persons under 18
years of age shall include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article
unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons."
(Emphasis added.) In light of this clear constitutional guarantee, a juvenile enjoys all the
rights and privileges of an adult unless the law at issue affords more, not less, protection to
the juvenile. Our decision in Matter of C.S., 687 P.2d at 57, did not address the provisions
of Article 11, Section 15 and does not conflict with our conclusion that infringement of an
EJPA offender's liberty for a longer period of time than an adult under like circumstances
does not enhance the juvenile's rights.
CONCLUSION
Under the framework of the EJPA, a juvenile receives a juvenile disposition plus an
adult sentence. If the juvenile violates the terms of the juvenile disposition, it is possible for
the youth to serve a longer term of detention or imprisonment than an adult who has
committed the same offense. The State has not shown a compelling interest to be advanced
by this unequal treatment of similarly situated persons, nor has it shown that the EJPA
provides juveniles with increased, rather than decreased, protection under the law.
Therefore, we hold that the EJPA violates Article 11, Section 4 (equal protection) and Article
11, Section 15 (rights of minors).
Although the Youth Court Act, including the EJPA, is subject to a severability clause,
our holding that the EJPA violates Article 11, Sections 4 and 15 of the Montana Constitution
goes to the heart of the E P A . That is, thc EJPA's imposition of an adult scntcncc in addition
to the juvenile disposition is necessary to the integrity of the EJPA and was the inducement
to its enactment. Accordingly, the remaining provisions of the EJPA cannot be saved
through application of the severability clause. & Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely (1981),
193 Mont. 378, 399,632 P.2d 300, 3 11.
Although our equal protection analysis differs considerably from that of the Thirteenth
Judicial District Court in Matter of L.D. and Matter of J.A.T., that court nonetheless reached
the right result. We affirm district court decisions which are correct regardless of the court's
reasoning in reaching the decision. Clark v. Eagle Systems, Inc. (1996), 279 Mont. 279,927
P.2d 995. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision that the EJPA is
unconstitutional. The Hill County Matter of J.L.C., the Gallatin County Matter of S.L.M.
and the Gallatin County Matter of S.T. are remanded to those District Courts for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We concur:
A
Justices
24
Justice Teny N. Trieweiler specially concurring.
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act,
found at $9 41-5-1 101 to -1 105, MCA (1995), is unconstitutional. However, I conclude that
it violates the prohibition against double jeopardy found at Article 11, Section 25, of the
Montana Constitution, by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. Therefore,
I would not reach the issue of whether it violates the youths' constitutional right to equal
protection pursuant to Article 11, Sections 4 and 15, of the Montana Constitution.
Section 41-5-1 104, MCA (1995), clearly provides for multiple punishments for the
same offense. That section specifies that:
If a youth in an extended jurisdiction prosecution pleads guilty to or is
found guilty of an offense described in 41-5-1 102(1)(b), the court shall:
(a) Impose one or more juvenile dispositions under 41-5-523; and
(b) Impose an adult criminal sentence, the execution of which must
be stayed on the condition that the youth not violate the provisions of the
disposition order and not commit a new offense. If the youth violates the
conditions of the stay or commits a new offense, the adult criminal sentence
must be executed as provided in 41-5-1 105.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 41-5-1 104(a), MCA (1995), provides for imposition of those punishments
established by the Youth Court Act. Subsection (b) provides for the concurrent imposition
of an adult sentence which, although stayed, can be enforced at a later date.
The State contends that pursuant to our decision in State v. Zabawa (1996), 279 Mont.
307, 928 P.2d 151, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Hunter
(1983), 459 U.S. 359, 103 S. Ct. 673,74 L. Ed. 2d 535, cumulative punishments for a single
offense do not violate the double jeopardy clauses of either the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, or Article 11, Section 25, of the Montana Constitution. While that
may be the interpretation attached to the Federal Constitution by the United States Supreme
Court, I would not follow that reasoning when applying our own constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy for the reasons stated in Justice Leaphart's dissent to the Zabawa
decision.
As this Court noted in State v. Johnson (1986), 22 1 Mont. 503, 5 13, 719 P.2d 1248,
1254, "states may interpret their own constitutions to afford greater protections than the
Supreme Court of the United States has recognized in its interpretations of the federal
counterparts to state constitutions." Furthermore, as stated by Justice Leaphart in his dissent
to this Court's Zabawa decision:
I would decline to adopt the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the "multiple punishment" element of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Missouri
v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535. Instead, I
interpret the double jeopardy clause of Article 11, Section 25 of the Montana
Constitution, as providing substantive protection against multiple punishments
irrespective of any legislative enactments.
. .. [W]e do a grave disservice to the framers of the Montana
Constitution when we hold that a constitutional provision means nothing more
than what the legislative branch intends it to mean. Constitutional guarantees
are not mere vessels to be left empty or filled at the whim of the legislative
branch. Rather, they have intrinsic meaning which is independent of any
legislative intent. Contrary to this Court's characterization of the issue, the
question is not whether Article 11, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution
provides "greater protection" from double punishment than does the Fifth
Amendment, the question is whether it provides any protection independently
of what the legislature chooses to provide.
. . . The double jeopardy clause in Article 11, Section 25, limits the
power of all branches of government, including the legislature. Whether the
legislature intends multiple punishments or not, as a matter of state
constitutional law, such cumulative punishment is proscribed under the double
jeopardy clause.
Zabawa, 279 Mont. at 323-26, 928 P.2d at 161-63 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
We have previously recognized that the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, and that Montana's
corresponding right provides the same protection. See State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86,
90,910 P.2d 247,250. The Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act clearly provides multiple
punishments for the same offense. It defies all principles of a constitutional system of
government to suggest that the Legislature defines it own constitutional parameters.
Therefore, based on the reasoning in the dissent to Zabawa, I would conclude that the
Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act violates the prohibition against double jeopardy in the
Montana Constitution and is unenforceable.
For these reasons, I concur with the result of the majority opinion, but express no view
regarding the reasoning for the majority opinion.
Matter of SLM
Combined Opinion