Matthews v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judge Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

DAVID D. MATTHEWS, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0408-98-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
AUGUST 3, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY
William Shore Robertson, Judge

Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender
(Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
appellant.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.

On appeal from his conviction for capital murder, in

violation of Code § 18.2-31, and abduction with the intent to

defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-48, David D. Matthews, Jr.,

contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence

obtained by the police in violation of his Fourth Amendment

rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the afternoon of September 25, 1995, Matthews arrived at

the home of Shirley Ashbury, a distant relative, and requested

permission to hunt on her family's land. While at her home, he

offered to take her twelve-year-old daughter, Aleasha,

"four-wheeling" in his truck. Aleasha left with Matthews. That

evening, Ashbury saw Matthews drive away from the property at a
high speed and realized that Aleasha had not come home. She

reported Aleasha missing.

That same evening, a volunteer fireman responded to a

single vehicle accident involving Matthews' truck, which had

flipped over an embankment. Fire and rescue squad personnel

transported Matthews to the Fauquier hospital, where he was

treated by doctors in the emergency ward. The doctors initially

planned to admit him to the hospital overnight for observation,

but decided instead to transfer him to the University of

Virginia Hospital. At Fauquier Hospital, Matthews was placed in

a treatment room within the emergency ward so that intravenous

fluids could be administered. Police investigating Aleasha's

disappearance came into the room, read Matthews his Miranda

rights, and questioned him. With his consent, they seized his

clothing and personal effects and took PERK samples.

Aleasha's body was recovered the next morning.

A jury convicted Matthews of capital murder, in violation

of Code § 18.2-31, and of abduction with intent to defile, in

violation of Code § 18.2-48. He was sentenced to life

imprisonment.

Matthews contends that the police violated his Fourth

Amendment rights when they entered the emergency ward treatment

room. He argues that because the police entry into the room was

illegal, all evidence subsequently seized from the room was

illegally obtained and should have been suppressed. To
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determine the legality of the entry, we consider whether

Matthews had an expectation of privacy in the emergency ward

treatment room. 1

The treatment room was described as having four walls and a

door, which was open. It contained a bed, on which Matthews was

lying. Members of Matthews' family were in the room with him.

Emergency ward personnel entered and left the room to administer

treatment. The room was not dedicated to long-term care of

admitted patients. It was a part of the emergency ward and was

used for the provision of emergency ward treatment.

Matthews contends that he had the same expectation of

privacy in the treatment room that he would have enjoyed in a

private room in the hospital. Relying on Morris v.

Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331, 157 S.E.2d 191 (1967), he argues that

the police could not enter his room lawfully without a warrant.

See id. at 333-34, 157 S.E.2d at 193-94. In Morris, police

seized clothing from a private hospital room, paid for by

Morris, while he was under sedation and without his consent.

The Supreme Court held that the seizure was illegal, because a

private hospital room that "has been assigned to and paid for by

the defendant" is analogous to a hotel room, which "may not

lawfully be entered without a search warrant." Id. at 334, 157

1
Because we hold that Matthews enjoyed no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the room, we do not reach the issue of
the effect, if any, of his consent to the seizure of his
property and the taking of PERK samples.
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S.E.2d at 194. See also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,

51 (1951).

Matthews, however, was not in a private hospital room. He

was merely being medicated in a treatment room within the

emergency ward. The trial court found that there was "no

specific rental of a hospital room." Although the treatment

room had a door, the door was open when the police arrived.

Emergency ward staff and Matthews' family were entering and

exiting the room on a regular basis. He had been assigned no

private patient room. His stay at the hospital lasted but five

hours.

This case is controlled by Craft v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.

258, 269 S.E.2d 797 (1980). Relying on Morris, Craft sought

suppression of a bullet delivered to the police after it was

removed from his body by doctors in an emergency ward.

Rejecting Craft's contention that Morris applied, the Supreme

Court said:

Here defendant was in the emergency room of
a hospital, a place frequented not only by
doctors, nurses, patients, hospital
personnel, and police officers, but also by
friends and relatives of persons being
treated. A person admitting himself to an
emergency room has little expectation of
privacy.

Id. at 262, 269 S.E.2d at 799-800.

Matthews' family testified that they had been sitting in

the room with him and had entered and exited the room several

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times in the course of the evening. They, and the investigating

officers, testified that medical personnel were trafficking

through the room to administer medication and to monitor

Matthews' injuries. No evidence suggested that the treatment

room was separate and distinct from the emergency ward.

Matthews' contention that the room was separate from the

emergency ward and was private is without evidentiary support.

The room was a part of the emergency ward and, as such, afforded

Matthews no expectation of privacy.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

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