Matthews v. Morales

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-4907.

Kevin Deon MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Dan MORALES, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Defendant-
Appellant.

June 21, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, DAVIS and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kevin Deon Matthews appeals the district court's dismissal of

his suit alleging that § 32.22 of the Texas Family Code violates

his free exercise of religion. Because we find that § 32.22 is

logically connected to legitimate state penological concerns, we

affirm.

I.

Kevin Deon Matthews, an inmate incarcerated in the Texas state

penitentiary, filed a pro se civil rights suit in federal district

court. He argues that § 32.22 of the Texas Family Code1 infringes

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This section provides:

a) For good cause shown the court shall order a change
of name for any person other than a person finally
convicted of a felony as requested if it finds that the
change is in the interest or to the benefit of the
petitioner and in the interest of the public.

b) A court may order a change of name for a person
finally convicted of a felony if, in addition to the
requirements of Subsection (a), the person has:

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his freedom of religion, equal protection and due process by

restricting his ability to change his name. Matthews is an

African-American Muslim and contends that:

according to the Muslim religion, once you come under the
Islamic faith, you are required to have your name changed.
The reason you have your name changed is because it ties you
into the "attributes of God." It's symbolic of a spiritual
change. If I am unable to change my name, I am not practicing
my religion freely.

Matthews sought the grant of a petition for name change, and

declaratory and injunctive relief.

Morales filed a motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge

determined that the statute was religiously neutral and not

directed at any particular religious group. He concluded that the

statute was enacted for security reasons, namely so that a felon

could not change his name and evade detection, and concluded that

§ 32.22 was not unconstitutional "even though it may incidentally

burden plaintiff's right to freedom of religion." [Note—may want

to add a sentence here after read magistrate's report, which is not

in record excerpts] He also determined that Matthews failed to

state a claim under equal protection or due process.

Although Matthews' motion to enlarge time to file written

objections to the magistrate's report was granted, he failed to

1) received a certificate of discharge by the
pardons and paroles division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice or completed a
period of probation ordered by a court and at
least two calendar years have elapsed from the
date of the receipt of discharge or completion of
probation; or

2) been pardoned.

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file objections. The district court issued a final judgment,

adopting the magistrate's findings and recommendations, granting

Morales' motion to dismiss.

II.

Matthews argues that § 32.22 is unconstitutional because it

violates his right as a Muslim to the free exercise of religion.

He also argues that the statute is overly broad.

Matthews relies on this circuit's decision in Felix v. Rolan,

833 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.1987), in which this court affirmed the

district court's dismissal of a prisoner's § 1983 complaint. We

held that:

The adoption of Muslim names by inmates practicing that
religion is generally recognized to be an exercise of both
first amendment and religious freedom. Restrictions on these
rights pass constitutional muster only if they are no greater
than is necessary to further important or substantial state
interests.

Id. at 518-519 (citations omitted). This court went on to

determine that the state's legitimate interest of prison security

justified requiring the prisoner to sign in under both his

committed name and his legal Muslim name. See, also, Barrett v.

Virginia, 689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.1982) (a Virginia statute

prohibiting incarcerated persons from legally changing names is

overly broad and implicates an inmate's right to freedom of

religion).

In Felix, this court determined that prison regulations

implicating free exercise "pass[es] constitutional muster only if

they are no greater than is necessary to further important or

substantial state interests." However, in O'Lone v. Estate of

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Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 96 L.Ed.2d 282

(1987), the Supreme Court held that "prison regulations alleged to

infringe constitutional rights are judged under a "reasonableness'

test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged

infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."

In O'Lone, prisoners claimed that regulations barring them

from returning to the main prison building where Friday Jumu'ah

services were being held violated their free exercise. The Court

found that the policy was based on security because returning

prisoners had to pass through the main gate, which was a high

security risk area, and was also based on minimizing overcrowding.

The Court determined that the regulation was reasonable because its

terms had "a logical connection to legitimate governmental

interests" of security and minimizing overcrowding. Id. at 350,

107 S.Ct. at 2405.

The Court also considered whether "alternative means of

exercising that right ... remain open to prison inmates." Although

prisoners could not attend Jumu'ah services, they could attend

other Muslim religious ceremonies, were given a special diet, and

were entitled to special arrangements during Ramadan. Id. at 351,

107 S.Ct. at 2405.

Under the standard announced in O'Lone, we must determine

whether a statute barring name changes by prisoners and

probationers, like the regulation barring prisoners from returning

to the main building, has "a logical connection to legitimate

governmental interests." § 32.22 was enacted for security reasons.

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It is intended to protect the ability to identify persons sought on

warrant and detainer, and to preserve the criminal history of

felons. Matthews himself concedes in his brief that these are

"legitimate state penological concerns."

We find that the statute barring name changes by felons does

have a logical connection to legitimate governmental interest.

Moreover, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional

Division policy permits prisoners to use their committed name

followed by "a/k/a" and a Muslim name of choice. § 32.22 does not

violate Matthews' free exercise of religion.

AFFIRMED.

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