United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-9202.
Christopher Todd MAYFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PATTERSON PUMP COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Dec. 20, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 2:94-CV-0005-WCO), William C. O'Kelley,
Judge.
Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, FAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
ALDRICH*, Senior District Judge.
FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), Appellant,
Christopher Todd Mayfield ("Mayfield"), an African-American
employee of Appellee, Patterson Pump Company ("Patterson") filed
suit against Patterson alleging that he was discriminated against
on the basis of race.1 Patterson moved for summary judgment
contending, among other reasons, that Mayfield was fired for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Patterson on all counts. Mayfield
appeals only the district court's determination that no issue of
fact exists as to whether he was unlawfully terminated on the basis
*
Honorable Ann Aldrich, Senior U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
More specifically, Mayfield contends he was unlawfully
terminated on the basis of race, subjected to a racially hostile
environment, and subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of
race.
of his race. Because we find that Mayfield was fired for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and that Mayfield has failed
to present any evidence of pretext, we agree with the district
court and affirm its order granting summary judgment.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 6, 1989, Mayfield was hired by Patterson, a
manufacturer of fire pumps as a Pump Test Mechanic. Approximately
one month after being hired, Mayfield was promoted to Test
Technician on the recommendation of his supervisor Rod Pelot
("Pelot"). Pelot, pleased with Mayfield's performance as a Test
Technician, and the company, believing he had the potential to
advance in management, recommended that Mayfield be sent to
Patterson's supervisory development training program.
On April 1, 1992, after Mayfield's completion of the
supervisory development training program and upon another
recommendation from Pelot, Mayfield was promoted to Senior Test
Technician, a newly created supervisory position. In this
capacity, Mayfield supervised other employees in the cleaning room
and test pit. As Senior Test Technician, instead of receiving an
hourly wage, Mayfield was paid an annual salary. Pelot further
encouraged Mayfield to attend school in order to obtain future
promotions, and Mayfield was also allowed to arrange his work
schedule to accommodate his school schedule.
According to Pelot, upon Mayfield's promotion to Senior Test
Technician his performance began to decline. Noting this decline,
Pelot talked with Mayfield about his poor performance. On
September 25, 1992, Pelot terminated Mayfield. The written reason
for the termination was "[i]ncompetence or failure to meet
reasonable standards of efficiency and repeated failure to meet
production standards which results in loss of earnings to an entire
group of employees." In particular, Pelot pointed to three
incidents that resulted in Mayfield's dismissal. The parties
disagree on some of the circumstances surrounding the three
incidents. Because we are legally obligated to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will resolve
all inferences in Mayfield's favor.
The first incident involved an unexcused absence that occurred
in August of 1992. On August 20, 1992, a Thursday, Mayfield asked
Pelot if he could be excused from work on Saturday, August 22,
1992, in order to help a local church put a roof on his father's
house. Pelot granted the request. The parties agree that it
rained on Saturday, making it difficult to put a roof on Mayfield's
father's house. On Friday, August 21, 1992, Mayfield asked to be
excused from work that day because of an Internal Revenue Service
audit taking place in Atlanta. Again, Pelot gave Mayfield
permission to miss work. On Monday, August 24, 1992, Mayfield had
a friend notify Pelot that he was stranded in Indianapolis, Indiana
and would not be able to make work. At this point, Pelot asserts
that he realized Mayfield had lied about his plans for the
weekend.2 Based on Mayfield's unexcused absence on August 24th,
2
Mayfield contends that since Patterson and Pelot did not
know the IRS excuse was a lie until after he was terminated, they
are precluded from using this "after acquired" evidence as a
reason to terminate him. While Mayfield may be correct that
Pelot at the time did not know the IRS excuse was a lie, Mayfield
offers no evidence to contradict Pelot's belief that Mayfield had
given him some false information. It is also clear that prior to
Pelot issued him a written warning. In part the warning states
that the absence on August 24th, "will be considered an unexcused
absence because he failed to call me personally, of his absence.
Todd is well aware of policy that either myself or Jack Claxton be
notified of any absences." Mayfield contends that the reason he
did not personally call Pelot on August 24th was because he did not
find it necessary to wake up at 5:00 a.m. and place a call through
two or three long distance carriers, when a friend could more
easily take care of it. Furthermore, upon his return, Mayfield
stated he was in Indianapolis interviewing with a competitor of
Patterson.
The second incident involved the approval and shipment of a
fire pump. Prior to its shipment, Pelot discovered that the test
data of this pump, which had been approved by Mayfield for
shipment, did not meet the owner's specifications. Pelot had
further work done on the pump to meet the owner's approval.
Mayfield affirms that the problem with the pump lay with the pump
containing an erroneous number for the impeller pattern. As a
result of this incident, Pelot issued Mayfield a second
disciplinary reprimand.
Finally, the last event Patterson proffers as specific
evidence of Mayfield's incompetence is the warranty completion of
the "Sandario 2 Pump." The Sandario 2 Pump was one pump out of
approximately ten that had been returned to Patterson for repairs.
As Senior Test Technician, Mayfield was in charge of the cleaning
September 25, 1992, (the day Mayfield was terminated) Pelot knew
Mayfield had lied about his plans for the weekend.
and testing of the pump. Mayfield's primary responsibility was to
polish and grind the Sandario 2 Pump's impeller in a timely
fashion.
The final completion date for the Sandario 2 Pump was set for
September 21, 1992. The impeller, a part of the pump, needed to be
individually tested and installed in the pump prior to September
21, 1992, the date the entire pump would be tested. As supervisor
of the cleaning room and test pit, it was Mayfield's responsibility
to ensure the project was completed on time.
On Thursday, September 17, 1992, the Sandario 2 Pump's
impeller was received in the cleaning room. Two of Patterson's
more experienced employees were unavailable to grind and polish the
impeller. Terry Metcalfe ("Metcalfe") was assigned by Pelot to
perform the task. Mayfield asserts that Pelot placed Metcalfe on
the job, despite Mayfield's opposition because Mayfield wanted
Lewis Curry ("Curry") to clean the impeller.
Metcalfe proceeded to work on the impeller on September 17th.
According to Mayfield, whenever he checked on Metcalfe's progress,
everything was proceeding satisfactorily. Pelot, however, asserts
that when he reviewed the impeller's progress, Metcalfe seemed to
be having difficulties. Metcalfe continued to work on the impeller
during Friday, September 18, 1992. Curry worked on the impeller
Friday night. Mayfield was not required to work on Friday night
and he did not. He previously had informed Pelot that he would be
attending a wedding in Atlanta on Saturday, September 19, 1992, and
would be unable to work all day Saturday. However, Mayfield told
Pelot that he would check on the progress of the impeller on
Saturday morning.
Sometime between four and six in the morning of Saturday,
September 19, 1992, Mayfield inspected the impeller. Mayfield did
not see anybody else at the plant that morning. Metcalfe
apparently arrived at work at five in the morning on Saturday, but
never saw Mayfield. Following his early Saturday morning
inspection, Mayfield concluded the work could be completed that
day.
Upon Pelot's arrival at Patterson on Saturday morning (he also
never saw Mayfield), Pelot discovered that the supply of polishing
pads to clean the impeller was running low, and he had to implement
another procedure in order to complete the polishing on time. In
sum, Pelot avers that he was required to perform Mayfield's job in
order to ensure timely completion of the Sandario 2 Pump's
impeller. Mayfield returned to Patterson on Sunday, September 20,
1992. Based primarily on these three incidents, Mayfield was
dismissed by Pelot on September 25, 1992.
Mayfield, believing he was dismissed due to racial reasons
filed the instant suit against Patterson. In support of his
allegation of a discriminatory dismissal, Mayfield offers three
incidents which he claims show racial animus.
The first incident occurred in July, 1991, when Gibbs Crumpton
("Crumpton"), a Patterson supervisor, used the word "nigger" in
Mayfield's presence. Mayfield reported the incident to Pelot, who
filed a written complaint about the episode. Jim Davis, Crumpton's
supervisor, verbally reprimanded Crumpton and informed him that if
it were to happen again, he would be terminated.
The next incident took place in June, 1992. Roger Poole, a
Patterson employee, told Pelot to "keep his nigger [Mayfield] away
from him." Pelot relayed this statement to Mayfield. Poole was
issued a written warning and told if it were to happen again he
would be fired.
The last episode occurred at the end of July 1992. Mayfield,
while on vacation, learned from other employees that the words
"Mayfield Nigger" were written on a Patterson bathroom wall.
Initially, Reese Mayfield, a Patterson employee (no relation to
Appellant Mayfield), informed Pelot and Al Huber, the President of
Patterson, about the writing on the wall. After Reese Mayfield
told Pelot and Huber, Appellant Mayfield, while on vacation, called
Pelot and Huber inquiring about what was being done. Huber told
Mayfield that the words had been immediately removed and he was
scheduling a meeting with the company's supervisors to advise them
about the company's policy concerning racial slurs. At the
scheduled meeting, Huber stated that anyone caught using racial
slurs would face immediate disciplinary action.
Notwithstanding these three isolated incidents, Mayfield at
his deposition stated that Pelot, the person who terminated him,
was not racist and did not evaluate him on the basis of race.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court "reviews grants of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard employed by the district court in
the first instance." Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d
913, 918 (11th Cir.1993), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denied, 16
F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Augusta Iron & Steel
Works, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th
Cir.1988).
III. ANALYSIS
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in a variety of employment
practices. See Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548,
1555 (11th Cir.1995).3 In an employment discrimination case, the
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
Because direct evidence of discrimination can be difficult to
produce, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), created a framework
on the burden of production and order of presentation of proof to
analyze circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184, reh'g denied, 747
3
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) provides: "It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."
F.2d 710 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that McDonnell Douglas framework
is valuable tool for analyzing disparate treatment cases). To
prove discriminatory treatment through circumstantial evidence:
(1) a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case, (2) then
the burden shifts to the defendant to produce legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, and
(3) then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that
these reasons are pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-
04, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-25.
Under the first part of the McDonnell Douglas test, a
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that:
(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for
the job, (3) he was terminated despite his qualifications, and (4)
after his termination the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants of similar qualifications. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The parties seem to
agree that Mayfield can demonstrate a prima facie case through the
four-part test in McDonnell Douglas. Although Patterson "does not
concede" that Mayfield can establish a prima facie case, Patterson
does not argue against it. Accordingly, because we believe
Mayfield can establish a prima facie case and because Patterson
implicitly agrees, we will not address this part of the McDonnell
Douglas test.
Under the second part of the McDonnell Douglas test, the
burden shifts to Patterson to produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Mayfield's discharge. Pelot, in his affidavit, stated
that he fired Mayfield because he "viewed [Mayfield's] conduct as
intentional neglect of his job responsibilities and felt that the
only appropriate way to respond to such failure to perform was to
terminate [Mayfield's] employment with Patterson Pump Company."
The written reason for the termination was Mayfield's
"[i]ncompetence or failure to meet reasonable standards of
efficiency and repeated failure to meet production standards which
results in loss of earnings to an entire group of employees." In
support of its employment decision, Patterson offered three
specific incidents as evidence of Mayfield's incompetence. The
three incidents proffered by Patterson and Pelot are as discussed
earlier: (1) Pelot's belief that Mayfield lied concerning his
whereabouts the weekend of August 22, 1992, (2) Mayfield's approval
of a pump for shipment despite its failure to meet the owner's
specifications, and (3) Mayfield's performance or lack thereof on
the timely completion of the Sandario 2 Pump's impeller.
These are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate
Mayfield. We believe that Patterson has met its burden under the
second part of the McDonnell Douglas test. Thus, we must now turn
to the third part of the McDonnell Douglas test, which requires
Mayfield to establish that Patterson's reasons for his discharge
are pretextual. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the Supreme
Court elaborated on the third part of the McDonnell Douglas test:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
Burdine, U.S. 450 at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (citing McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-26).
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct.
2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), the Supreme Court again attempted to
clarify the McDonnell Douglas test. Addressing the third part of
the test, the Supreme Court stated that if "the defendant has
succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell
Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer
relevant." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Instead,
"the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question:
whether plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against [him]' because of his race." Id. at 511, 113
S.Ct. at 2749 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-
94 (alteration not in original).4
4
Unfortunately, Hicks has not clarified the issue among the
circuit courts of what proof must be presented by the plaintiff
to avoid summary judgment based upon a contention that the
employer's explanation was false. See generally Waldron v. SL
Industries, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 996, 1004 n. 11 (D.N.J.1994)
(discussing circuit split), rev'd, 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir.1995). In
fact, an apparent conflict exists within this circuit on the
issue. See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97
F.3d 436 (11th Cir.1996) (noting and discussing conflict in this
circuit); Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548,
1560-65 (11th Cir.1995) (J. Johnson's specially concurring
opinion discussing conflict). As stated in more detail in
Isenbergh and NationsBank, the disagreement stems mainly from
some language used in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hicks, the
procedural setting of Hicks—a bench trial, and some opinions in
this circuit which have held that the fact finder's rejection of
defendant's proffered reasons is enough to defeat judgment for
the employer. See Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 527 (11th
Cir.1994) ("fact finder's rejection of defendant's proffered
reasons is sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which to base
a judgment for the plaintiff.") (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-
11, 113 S.Ct. at 2748-49); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ.
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 920-21 (11th Cir.1993), reh'g denied and reh'g
In any event, for purposes of the case before us, we need not
resolve the apparent conflict within this circuit on whether a fact
finder's possible disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons is
sufficient to defeat judgment for the defendant or whether a
plaintiff must show both that the employer's reason for the
decision was false and that discrimination was the real reason,
because Mayfield has failed to produce any evidence that
Patterson's explanation is false or unworthy of credence.
In this case, Mayfield had to produce evidence that
Patterson's reasons for his discharge were a pretext for
discrimination. A plaintiff may prove pretext "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. "[B]ecause the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing pretext [for discrimination], he must
present "significant probative' evidence on the issue to avoid
summary judgment." See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales,
Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Young v. General
Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir.1988)) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-
11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "Conclusory allegations of
en banc denied, 16 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.1994) (plaintiff can
establish pretext by showing that proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence). Contrary to Howard and Hairston, the
Isenbergh panel interprets Hicks as requiring a plaintiff to show
"that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse employment
decision was false and that discrimination was the real reason."
Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436,
440 (11th Cir.1996) (emphasis added).
discrimination, without more, are not sufficient to raise an
inference of pretext or intentional discrimination where [an
employer] has offered ... extensive evidence of legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions." Isenbergh v. Knight-
Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44 (11th Cir.1996)
(quoting Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 830 (11th
Cir.1988)) (quoting Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590,
597 (11th Cir.1987)).
Mayfield makes the following arguments to establish that
Patterson's explanation for his discharge was a pretext for
discrimination: (1) the reasons are filled with inconsistencies,
(2) the reasons are not worthy of belief, and (3) a discriminatory
reason was more likely the real motivation for Patterson. However,
none of Mayfield's arguments are supported in the record.
First, Mayfield asserts that the written reason for his
termination which states that "[i]ncompetence or failure to meet
reasonable standards of efficiency and repeated failure to meet
production standards which results in loss of earnings to an entire
group of employees" is inconsistent with the three specific
examples proffered by Patterson. Instead, Mayfield contends that
Patterson changed the reason it terminated him. The district court
found that "[t]he consistent reason offered for [Mayfield's]
termination is failure to perform his job duties adequately.
Pelot's later statements simply offer more details regarding
perceived inadequacies in plaintiff's job performance." We agree
with the district court. There is nothing inconsistent between the
written reason and the more specific reasons justifying Mayfield's
termination. The gravamen of Mayfield's termination was his
failure to adequately perform his duty as Senior Test Technician.
The more particular reasons given by Pelot are just specific
examples of how Mayfield was incompetent and failed to meet
reasonable standards of efficiency.
Next, Mayfield attempts to show that Patterson's reasons for
his discharge are not worthy of belief. Mayfield, in his affidavit
and depositions asserts that there are questions of fact
surrounding the three incidents which indicate that the incidents
were false or, at the very least, raise issues of fact that
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Although there may be some
questions concerning some of the details, Mayfield fails to offer
evidence that the reasons for his discharge are false. He also
refutes totally any suggestion that Pelot was motivated by race.
For example, Mayfield attempts to create an issue of fact
regarding his approval of the pump for shipment. Mayfield concedes
he approved the shipment of the pump, despite test data that
revealed the failure of the pump to meet its owner's
specifications. Rather, Mayfield offers as an explanation for this
mishap that the pump had a wrong number for the impeller pattern.
Even if we were to accept Mayfield's explanation as true, it does
not explain how he would have approved shipment of the pump even
though it did not satisfy the owner's specifications.
Another example concerns the Sandario 2 Pump's impeller. All
that Mayfield asserts on this example is that he disagreed with the
person who Pelot assigned to do the work. Mayfield does not
disagree or raise a question of fact that it was his responsibility
to oversee the timely completion of the project nor that it was
Pelot and not Mayfield who oversaw the cleaning and grinding of the
impeller.
Finally, Mayfield alleges that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated Patterson and Pelot's decision to terminate him.
In support of this pretextual argument, Mayfield proffers the three
racial incidents and his unexcused absence on August 24, 1992.
Mayfield proffers the unexcused absence as additional evidence
that discrimination was the true reason he was terminated. On
August 24, 1992, Mayfield was issued a written reprimand for
failing to call Pelot or Jack Claxton personally about being absent
on August 24th. Mayfield does not contest that he was absent,
instead Mayfield argues this incident depicts he was treated
differently than white supervisors at Patterson. According to
Mayfield, white supervisors did not have to call Pelot or Claxton
personally when they were going to be absent. There is simply
nothing offered in support of this statement.
It is uncontroverted that Pelot recommended Mayfield for each
of his promotions. It is also undisputed that Pelot immediately
took corrective action following the three racist incidents
referred to him by Mayfield. It is also uncontested that Pelot
made the decision to fire Mayfield. Furthermore, Mayfield during
his deposition stated that Pelot was not racist and did not
evaluate him on the basis of race.5 In sum, Mayfield has failed to
5
A: [Pelot] didn't understand the racism down here. He was
from California, so he didn't understand that.
Q: Did, did, uh, did you detect any, uh, or perceive
any racism on his part?
offer any evidence to show that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated Pelot's decision to terminate him or that Pelot treated
Mayfield differently from other white supervisors. Rather, the
evidence shows that Pelot was not racist and that Mayfield was
fired for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there are no
genuine issues of material fact and that the district court
properly granted Patterson's motion for summary judgment. The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
A: No, I did not.
Q: Do you think that he, uh, evaluated you based upon
you as an individual, rather than you—than your race?
A: Yes, he did.