F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 12 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHNNIE LOUIS McALPINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-6124
RON THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CIV-94-1406-L)
John J. Carwile (Ronald W. Little with him on the briefs), Doerner, Saunders,
Daniel and Anderson Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Kay Sewell, Assistant United States Attorney (Patrick M. Ryan, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-
Appellee.
Before EBEL, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
In August 1994, while incarcerated in a federal facility, Johnnie Louis
McAlpine (“McAlpine”), a member of the Native American Church, brought a pro
se action in federal court under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), seeking to compel Warden Ron Thompson
(“Thompson” or “Warden”) to provide him with peyote and other “necessary
items” to conduct Native American Church ceremonies. The district court
reached the merits of McAlpine’s claims and granted the Warden’s motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. McAlpine appeals. We
hold that McAlpine’s subsequent release from federal prison on supervised
release moots his claims, thereby depriving us of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND with instructions to DISMISS.
BACKGROUND
According to the pleadings, McAlpine is a restricted Osage Indian and a
member of the Native American Church. At the time he filed this action, on
August 24, 1994, in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, he was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in El Reno, Oklahoma
(“El Reno”), serving a forty-six month sentence for mail fraud. McAlpine’s
petition for mandamus, the denial of which is the subject of the present appeal,
alleged that Warden Thompson’s refusal to provide peyote for Native American
Church services violated his rights under the First Amendment and the RFRA, and
prayed for the following prospective mandamus relief: “1) . . . the Court to order
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Warden Thompson to provide peyote for the Native American Church
Ceremonies. 2) . . . plaintiff requests that the Court orders the Warden to provide
the necessary items needed for the Native American Churches [sic] evening
through noon services once a month (to include meals, peyote, tipi, and outside,
visiting, roadmen, firemen and singers).”
The magistrate judge considered the merits of McAlpine’s claim and found
that the Warden’s denial of peyote and other ceremonial items to McAlpine did
not violate the First Amendment or RFRA, and thus recommended that the district
court grant Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment. On March 25, 1996, the district court adopted the
magistrate’s findings and recommendation, and granted Thompson’s motion.
McAlpine filed his timely notice of appeal on April 1, 1996.
Thereafter, on November 1, 1996, McAlpine completed his term of
incarceration and was released from El Reno Prison Camp. Arguing that
McAlpine sought relief regarding only the conditions of his confinement, and his
ability to practice his religion while incarcerated, the Warden now claims that
McAlpine’s claims have been mooted. 1 We agree. Accordingly, we VACATE the
1
Because he was incarcerated at the time he filed this action, McAlpine
made no claim that supervised release guidelines prohibit use of peyote, or, if so,
that such a prohibition violates the First Amendment or RFRA. His claim related
solely to the conditions of his confinement at El Reno.
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district court’s order and REMAND to the district court with instructions to
DISMISS McAlpine’s petition as moot.
DISCUSSION
Mootness
Before reaching the merits of McAlpine’s First Amendment and RFRA
claims, we must consider the jurisdictional question of mootness. Warden
Thompson argues that McAlpine’s claims are moot because the only relief sought
by McAlpine “deal[s] with desires during his incarceration,” and he is no longer
incarcerated. McAlpine responds that because he “remains on supervised release
(parole) through November 1, 1999” and “he is subject to revocation of his parole
and reincarceration,” the acts he complains of are capable of repetition, yet
evading review. Thus, the issue before us is whether the claim of a prison inmate
seeking prospective mandamus relief solely related to conditions of confinement
becomes mooted by that inmate’s subsequent release on parole or supervised
release. We answer that question in the affirmative.
Upon previous consideration of this question, this court has issued
potentially conflicting decisions. Compare White v. State of Colo., 82 F.3d 364,
366 (10th Cir. 1996) (claims for prospective injunctive relief mooted by inmate-
plaintiff’s release on parole because possibility of parole revocation “is too
speculative” to come under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
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exception), with McKinney v. Maynard, 952 F.2d 350, 351 (10th Cir. 1991)
(inmate-plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief to allow him to engage in certain
religious practices in prison not mooted by his transfer to pre-parole status
because “[e]ven as a parolee, circumstances may result in Mr. McKinney’s
reinstitutionalization. Thus, the acts of which he now complains are subject to
reoccurrence, and the issues he raises are not moot.”); cf. Green v. Bronson, 108
F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) (inmate-plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief mooted
by his release from prison where there was no indication that plaintiff was still on
parole or supervised release following release). Today, we hold that when an
inmate’s claim for prospective injunctive relief regarding conditions of
confinement becomes moot due to the inmate-plaintiff’s release from
confinement, the inmate’s parole or supervised release status does not, absent
some exceptional showing, bring that claim under the narrow “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.
While our holding comports with the teachings of Green and White, we are
aware that McKinney, which involved a somewhat similar factual scenario to the
present case, supports a different result. In McKinney, the appellant was a Sioux
Indian seeking damages as well as injunctive relief to (1) “prohibit Oklahoma
prison authorities from enforcing a prison grooming code against him,” and (2)
“require prison officials to return his medicine bag[] and to permit the
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construction of a sweat lodge at the correctional facility.” 952 F.2d at 351. The
state claimed that McKinney’s case was mooted by his release from prison and his
status as a pre-parolee 2. This court disagreed, holding that McKinney’s injunctive
claims as well as his damages claims survived his change in status from prisoner
to pre-parolee, because “circumstances may result in Mr. McKinney’s
reinstitutionalization. Thus, the acts of which he now complains are subject to
reoccurrence, and the issues he raises are not moot.” Id. at 351.
We perceive some tension between McKinney and our subsequent cases of
Green and White, and to the extent that there is a conflict, the en banc court now
overrules McKinney and adopts the rule articulated in Green and White. 3
2
Nothing in McKinney indicates whether “pre-parole” status was equivalent
to the “supervised release” status of McAlpine or whether it involved a greater
degree of prison supervision or likelihood of reincarceration. However, four
years after McKinney, we observed that “pre-parole” is a statutory program in
Oklahoma which “releases qualified inmates into society on a conditional basis.”
Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1995). Typical conditions include
pre-parolee agreement to: random searches or visits from law enforcement
officers; report to probation officer at frequent intervals; travel limitations and
curfews; drug and alcohol prohibitions; random urine testing; maintain
employment or enrollment in a full-time educational program. See id. at 565 n.5.
In short, since 1995, this court has recognized that pre-parole is the functional
equivalent of parole. See id. at 567.
3
We have circulated this opinion to the entire court and have received the
concurrence of all its active judges for our holding overruling McKinney to the
extent that McKinney held that the pre-parole, parole, or supervised release status
of a former inmate seeking injunctive relief relating only to prison conditions
saves that claim from dismissal on mootness grounds.
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A number of factors support departure from McKinney. First, under well-
established Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit law, when a favorable decision will
not afford plaintiff relief, and plaintiff’s case is not capable of repetition yet
evading review, we have no jurisdiction under Article III. The Tenth Circuit has
said that “Article III’s requirement that federal courts adjudicate only cases and
controversies necessitates that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where the
award of any requested relief would be moot — i.e., where the controversy is no
longer live and ongoing.” Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th
Cir. 1994). A claim will be deemed moot unless a “‘proper judicial resolution’”
settles “‘some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)). Cox
continued: “[T]his court has explained that a ‘plaintiff cannot maintain a
declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can demonstrate a good chance of
being likewise injured [by the defendant] in the future.’” Id. at 1349 (quoting
Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original); see
also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he capable-of-
repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only
where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be
subjected to the alleged illegality.”).
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As the Supreme Court explained in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-
96 (1974), “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present
case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.” The O’Shea Court held that the chance that
individuals would violate criminal statutes and be tried for their offenses was not
“sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy.” Id. at 496.
The Court concluded that it is to be assumed that “[plaintiffs] will conduct their
activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction.” Id. at 497.
Moreover, the narrow capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness
doctrine applies only “where the following two circumstances [are]
simultaneously present: ‘(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action
again.’” Spencer v. Kemna, 118 S.Ct. 978, 988 (1998) (alterations in original)
(quotations and citations omitted). In a mootness issue similar to the one
presented here, the Spencer Court held:
Petitioner’s case satisfies neither of these conditions. He has not
shown (and we doubt that he could) that the time between parole
revocation and expiration of sentence is always so short as to evade
review. Nor has he demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that he will
once again be paroled and have that parole revoked.
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Id. Finally, in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988), the Court emphasized
that “for purposes of assessing the likelihood that state authorities will reinflict a
given injury, we generally have been unwilling to assume that the party seeking
relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at
risk of that injury.” See also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1982) (no
reason to believe that party challenging denial of pre-trial bail will once again be
in a position to demand bail).
Applying these principles to McAlpine’s case demonstrates why the
hypothetical possibility that McAlpine, a former inmate on supervised release,
will violate the terms of that supervised release and be returned to the same
prison and same conditions of confinement cannot save an otherwise moot claim
for prospective injunctive relief relating to prison conditions. First, since
McAlpine is currently on supervised release and no longer confined at El Reno,
even a favorable ruling from this court could not in his present condition provide
the prospective injunctive relief he seeks — i.e., an order compelling Warden
Thompson to provide him with peyote and other Native American Church
ceremonial items. Second, McAlpine has failed to establish either of the two
requirements necessary to qualify for the exception to mootness for cases capable
of repetition, yet evading review: Even (1) if McAlpine violates the conditions of
his supervised release, and (2) if he has his supervised release revoked, and (3) if
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he is reassigned to El Reno Prison Camp, 4 and (4) if Warden Thompson is still
warden there, and (5) if Warden Thompson still denies McAlpine peyote,
McAlpine has failed to demonstrate that there will be insufficient time in that
event for him to obtain review in federal court of renewed First Amendment and
RFRA claims to require the warden to provide him with peyote and other
ceremonial religious items. As such, McAlpine’s case is moot and it does not fall
into the exceptional class of cases capable of repetition, yet evading review. We
believe McAlpine’s situation is typical, and thus we conclude that the controlling
mootness cases counsel against McKinney.
4
At oral argument, counsel for Warden Thompson informed this court that
if McAlpine violated any conditions of his supervised release and was returned to
incarceration it is unlikely that he would be returned to El Reno because that
facility is an honor camp.
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Second, other than (arguably) the Seventh Circuit, 5 our research indicates
that every circuit to consider the issue has decided that release to parole moots a
claim regarding prison conditions and regulations, as opposed to parole
procedures or conditions and regulations that affect parole. See Hickman v.
Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1141-43 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Because plaintiffs have been
5
The Seventh Circuit has issued somewhat conflicting opinions on this
issue. In Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1974), the Seventh Circuit
held that appellant’s claim for an injunction prohibiting Wisconsin state officials
from restricting correspondence between Morales and his wife’s sister was not
moot even though Morales achieved parole status after filing his suit because: (1)
as a parolee, Morales was still in the custody of the Wisconsin correctional
system and still subject to conditions imposed by the state, which admitted that it
could and would continue to impose a restriction on communication between
Morales and his sister-in-law even during his parole in the absence of a court
order; and (2) “there is always the possibility that Morales during his period of
parole will violate the terms of his conditional release and thus be returned to
prison.” Id. at 1336. The Morales court focused most of its discussion of the
mootness issue on the former reason. In Morales, unlike the present case, the
restriction complained of would have directly affected Morales’ then-current
parole status. By contrast, here, since McAlpine is no longer incarcerated at El
Reno, no order from this court could presently provide McAlpine with the relief
sought, i.e., an order enjoining Warden Thompson to provide McAlpine with
peyote and other ceremonial items. Warden Thompson presently has no custody
over McAlpine. Thus, to the extent that Morales additionally referenced the
possibility of the parolee being reincarcerated, that rationale was necessarily
subsumed in the more immediate relief Morales sought. Seventh Circuit opinions
since Morales have held that inmate claims against prison officials for prospective
injunctive relief are mooted by the inmate’s transfer to another facility in the
absence of a demonstration of the likelihood of retransfer (which may not be
based on “mere speculation.”). See Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th
Cir. 1995); see also Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d 1405, 1412-15 (7th Cir. 1993)
(prisoner failed to establish “real and immediate” threat of being returned to
segregation unit, and hence his suit complaining of segregation practices is
moot.).
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released on parole and are no longer confined at WMCC, their claims [for
equitable relief] are moot.” (citing Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th
Cir. 1985) (ordinarily claim “to improve prison conditions is moot if [plaintiff is
no longer subject to those conditions]”)); Black v. Parke, 4 F.3d 442, 444 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1993) (“Black was paroled. Therefore, his request for preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief is moot.”); Dorman v. Thornburgh, 955 F.2d 57, 58
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Dorman has been paroled since noting this appeal.
Consequently, his plea for injunctive relief is now moot.”); Gillespie v. Crawford,
858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“Gillespie too has now been
paroled and his claims for equitable and declaratory relief for himself have
become moot.”); Garcia v. De Batista, 642 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1981)
(“Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief became moot when he was released on
parole.”); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(“Winsett’s demand for injunctive relief is now moot. . . . Because Winsett has
now received a conditional parole, is no longer subject to Delaware’s jurisdiction,
and shows no interest in returning . . . .”); see also Freeman v. Johnson, No. 91-
7194, 1992 WL 90276, at **1 (4th Cir. May 4, 1992) (unpublished disposition)
(“Where a party seeks solely equitable relief concerning prison conditions or
regulations, and is subsequently paroled, the claims are moot.”); McKinnon v.
Talladega County, Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The general rule
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is that a prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief.”).
Third, and related to the O’Shea Court’s assumption that citizens “will
conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction,”
we are not inclined to speculate that McAlpine will break the law or otherwise
violate the conditions of their release agreement. See Knox, 998 F.3d at 1413
(“Presumably, Knox would be returned to segregation [and the conditions he sued
to remedy] only if he were to violate a prison rule, such as the one prohibiting the
possession of dangerous contraband. Although that may be a very real possibility
given that contraband was found in Knox’ cell twice in four years, we must
assume that Knox will abide by prison rules and thereby avoid a return to
segregation status.”) Such speculation would undermine the presumption of
innocence in our criminal justice system, and the rehabilitative focus of the parole
system.
Applying traditional principles of the mootness doctrine, we hold that
McAlpine’s case is moot.
CONCLUSION
We VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND with instructions that
the district court DISMISS this case as moot.
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