In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, and for a judgment declaring that the contract remained in full force and effect, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), dated September 26, 2005, which denied his motion, in effect, for summary judgment on his causes of action for a declaratory judgment and specific performance of the contract.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion, in effect, for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the entry of a judgment, among other things, declaring that the contract is in fiill force and effect and directing the defendant to specifically perform the contract.
The subdivision approval process progressed slowly. The nine-month period for filing the subdivision map lapsed. Notwithstanding this, in numerous letters to the defendant’s attorney, the plaintiff indicated his eagerness to close the transaction. On May 10, 2004 preliminary subdivision approval was obtained. Sixteen days later, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he was cancelling the contract and returning the down payment. Ultimately, final subdivision approval was received on June 15, 2004 and the subdivision map was filed on July 13, 2004.
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter aha, for a judgment declaring that the contract remained in full force and effect, and for specific performance of the contract. Contending that there were no triable issues of fact as to the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract, the plaintiff moved, in effect, for summary judgment on the first two causes of action. The Supreme Court denied the motion, determining that the words “or Sellers” which were added to the subdivision approval paragraph of the contract by the defendant were ambiguous.
Before specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property may be granted, a buyer must demonstrate that he or she was ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract regardless of any alleged anticipatory breach by the defendant (see Internet Homes, Inc. v Vitulli, 8 AD3d 438, 439 [2004]; Johnson v Phelan, 281 AD2d 394, 395 [2001]). Additionally, “ ‘[W]hen interpreting a contract, the court should arrive at a construction which will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties, to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized’ ” (T.M. Bier & Assoc., Inc. v Piraino, 16 AD3d 578, 579 [2005], quoting Matter of John E. Andrus Mem. Home v DeBuono, 260 AD2d 635, 636 [1999]). “ ‘A contract
Assuming that the defendant had the right to cancel the contract if the subdivision map was not filed within nine months of the date of the contract, this right was not absolute as the defendant contends. It was subject to the plaintiffs accompanying right to extend the nine-month period. This contract language is clear and unambiguous. The defendant’s construction of this provision whereby his cancellation right vested once the nine-month period lapsed and could be exercised even if the plaintiff extended the period renders the plaintiffs accompanying extension clause meaningless and without force and effect. This is to be avoided (see T.M. Bier & Assoc. v Piraino, supra). The defendant’s contention that this clause should not be given effect because it would give the plaintiff the discretion to perpetually extend the nine-month period and hence operate to render his cancellation right meaningless is without merit. First, it is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Gammal v La Casita Milta, 5 AD3d 630, 631 [2004]; Sandoval v Juodzevich, 293 AD2d 595, 595-596 [2002]; Mourounas v Shahin, 291 AD2d 537 [2002]). Second, if the subdivision approval process was abandoned or otherwise terminated, the plaintiff’s right to extend the contract also necessarily terminated. However, where, as here, the approval process was progressing, albeit slowly, the contract unambiguously gave the plaintiff the option to extend the nine-month period. It was uncontroverted that the plaintiff did just that through his attorney’s letters to the defendant’s attorney. Accordingly, the defendant had no right to cancel the contract and the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of his bargain.
The defendant’s remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Gammal v La Casita Milta, supra; Sandoval v Juodzevich, supra; Mourounas v Shahin, supra).