F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 19 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
SARA W. McFALL, J.D.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-6122
JAMES D. BEDNAR, J.D., in his
individual capacity;
Defendant - Appellant,
and
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
ex rel., THE OKLAHOMA
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM, a
state agency,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CIV-03-0351-T)
Robert M. Anthony, (Robert S. Lafferrandre with him on the briefs) Pierce,
Couch, Hendrickson, Baysinger & Green, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for
Defendant-Appellant.
Scott F. Brockman, (Stanley M. Ward and Woodrow K. Glass with him on the
brief) Ward & Glass, L.L.P., Norman, Oklahoma for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR and HARTZ, Circuit Judges, and BRACK, District Judge. *
BRACK, District Judge.
Defendant-Appellant, Executive Director of the Oklahoma Indigent
Defense System (“OIDS”), appeals from the district court’s order denying his
motion for summary judgment on a claim of qualified immunity. Defendant-
Appellant (“Mr. Bednar”) claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity because
he did not violate clearly established law in terminating Plaintiff-Appellee Sara
McFall (“Ms. McFall”). Mr. Bednar argues that he did not violate clearly
established law in terminating Ms. McFall because i) she did not engage in
constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern; and ii) Mr.
Bednar’s interest in operating an efficient workplace outweighed Ms. McFall’s
interest in unprotected speech. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we AFFIRM.
Background
OIDS provides representation to indigent criminal defendants. OIDS
implemented a new procedure for the selection and retention of expert witnesses
The Honorable Robert C. Brack, United States District Judge for the District of
*
New Mexico, sitting by designation.
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shortly before Ms. McFall began working there. Under the new procedure, either
the Chief of Psychological Services, Dr. Kathy LaFortune (“Dr. LaFortune”), or
the Chief of Forensic Services, Laura Schile (“Ms. Schile”), had to approve
requests for experts. Dr. LaFortune was married to a prosecutor and was herself
an attorney. Ms. Schile had previously worked in law enforcement and was not
an attorney. James Bednar, Executive Director at OIDS, had final approval of the
expert requests. OIDS implemented the new procedure to upgrade the quality of
expert services for clients and reduce costs in the wake of state-wide budget cuts.
Under the previous system, any Chief could approve the retention of an expert for
up to $5,000.
On July 1, 2002, Ms. McFall began her six-week employment with OIDS.
Ms. McFall served as Chief of the Capital Trials Norman Division and supervised
a group of attorneys in their handling of the defense in capital cases.
On July 3, 2002, after meeting with her staff, Ms. McFall met with Mr.
Bednar to discuss the new expert approval process. Ms. McFall expressed to Mr.
Bednar concerns about: the amount of time it took to respond to requests for
experts; the potential for conflicts of interest with Dr. LaFortune; and the
competency of Dr. LaFortune and Ms. Schile to make trial strategy decisions and
evaluate the need for experts.
On July 10, 2002, Jim Rowan (“Mr. Rowan”), one of the attorneys under
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Ms. McFall’s supervision, submitted a request to Ms. Schile for approval of
expert witnesses in one of his cases (the Jackson case). Both Ms. Schile and Mr.
Bednar knew that Mr. Rowan had to disclose his list of witnesses to the court by
August 7, 2002. On July 31, 2002, Mr. Rowan and his co-counsel met with Ms.
Schile to discuss the pending request. After the meeting, Ms. Schile complained
to Mr. Bednar that Mr. Rowan had been rude to her and Mr. Bednar sent an email
to Mr. Rowan stating that “your continued lack of cooperation and refusal to
follow agency procedures will only result in a delay of your request for experts.”
On August 5, 2002, Ms. McFall and Mr. Rowan decided that Mr. Rowan
should approach the court in the Jackson case and make a record in order to
preserve the issue on appeal that an expert had not been retained in time to meet
the court imposed deadline due to a delay in OIDS’s internal expert witness
request process. On August 13, 2002, Ms. McFall and the other Chiefs met with
Mr. Bednar. Ms. McFall again raised the issue of making a record for appeal in
the Jackson case. Mr. Bednar prohibited Ms. McFall and all other attorneys from
making such a record despite Ms. McFall’s concerns that the quality of the legal
services OIDS provided to clients and the attorneys’ effectiveness would be
scrutinized on appeal in that case.
In another instance regarding the Jackson case, Ms. McFall and Mr. Rowan
expressed to Dr. LaFortune their concerns about a possible conflict of interest Dr.
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LaFortune had in the approval of expert witnesses because her husband was the
prosecutor who filed the original charges against Defendant Jackson. Thereafter,
in a separate matter (the Dobbs case), Ms. McFall and another attorney she
supervised expressed a conflict of interest concern with Dr. LaFortune because
the court listed Dr. LaFortune as a witness at the preliminary hearing for Mr.
Dobbs’s co-defendant. Dr. LaFortune later complained that Mr. Rowan was rude
to her in expressing his conflict of interest concerns. Mr. Bednar told the
attorneys that if they did not follow the appropriate procedure and seek approval
for their expert requests from Dr. LaFortune, he would deny their requests for
funding.
On August 14, 2002, Mr. Bednar met with Ms. McFall and Mr. Rowan. At
that meeting, Mr. Bednar terminated Mr. Rowan. One of the reasons he gave for
Mr. Rowan’s termination was Mr. Rowan’s alleged rudeness to Dr. LaFortune.
Mr. Bednar also told Ms. McFall “you didn’t rein him in.” He then offered her an
alternative position as a capital trial lawyer at a reduced salary. Ms. McFall
subsequently removed her personal belongings and received a letter of termination
shortly thereafter.
Ms. McFall sued Mr. Bednar and OIDS under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech and freedom of
association. Mr. Bednar moved for summary judgment on both claims and
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asserted a defense of qualified immunity. On March 3, 2004, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted Mr. Bednar’s
summary judgment motion with respect to Ms. McFall’s freedom of association
claim, but denied his motion on her free speech claim and rejected his assertion of
qualified immunity. Mr. Bednar appeals the district court’s ruling that he is not
entitled to qualified immunity because Ms. McFall’s speech was constitutionally
protected.
Discussion
A. Standard of review
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only when “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c). This Court has held that:
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.' " Muñoz v. St. Mary Corwin
Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10 th Cir. 2000) (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)).
When applying this standard, the Court examines the record and makes all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
A district court’s “denial of a summary judgment motion ordinarily is not
an appealable final order.” Bass v. Richards, 308 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir.
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2002). The denial of a summary judgment motion is subject to appeal, however,
when the defendant is a public official asserting a qualified immunity defense and
the issue on appeal is whether the defendant violated clearly established law. Id.
In other words, “the scope of interlocutory appeals to denials of qualified
immunity is limited to ‘purely legal’ challenges to the denial.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
In appealing the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, Mr. Bednar raises the issue of whether it was clearly
established that Ms. McFall’s speech constituted protected speech on a matter of
public concern. This is a “purely legal” issue and we have jurisdiction to address
it. Id. We, therefore, review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on
the basis of Mr. Bednar’s qualified immunity defense de novo. Finn v. New
Mexico, 249 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
B. Qualified immunity
Our courts recognize two kinds of immunity defenses: absolute immunity
and qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
The defense of absolute immunity is available to “officials whose special
functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit . . . .” Id.
For instance, legislators are entitled to absolute immunity in their legislative
functions and judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their
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judicial capacity. Id. For other government officials, however, “our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.” Id.
The qualified immunity defense attempts to strike a balance between “the
importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, [and] ‘the need
to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.’” Id.
(internal citations omitted). Without the qualified immunity defense, courts
would struggle to curtail the substantial social costs associated with harassing
litigation involving government officials, including the fear that personal
monetary liability would “unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”
Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
The doctrine of qualified immunity, therefore, shields government officials
performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages arising from
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities.
Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818. Moreover, the courts draw no distinction between 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suits against state officials and suits against federal officials under
the Constitution. Id. Because Mr. Bednar is a state official being sued in his
individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his assertion of the qualified
immunity defense is proper.
Individual government actors retain their immunity unless the plaintiff can
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show that they violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818. Mr.
Bednar is entitled to qualified immunity, therefore, unless he violated a clearly
established constitutional right. According to the Supreme Court, “[i]f the law at
that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected
to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.” Id.
at 819.
The Court, therefore, must first determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged
a deprivation of a [statutory or] constitutional right at all” and only if the answer
to that question is yes does the Court consider whether that right was clearly
established at the time so that reasonable officials would have understood that
their conduct violated that right. County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833,
841, n.5 (1998); Trotter v. The Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 219 F.3d
1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000). We have previously held that when “a government
official raises the defense of qualified immunity in a motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff must produce facts sufficient to show both that the
defendant’s alleged conduct violated the law and that [the] law was clearly
established when the alleged violation occurred.” Bruning v. Pixler , 949 F.2d
352, 356 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). Only after the plaintiff
has met this burden “must the defendant bear the usual summary judgment
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movant’s burden of showing that no material issues of fact remain that would
defeat his or her claim of qualified immunity.” Id.
In order for the law to be clearly established there must have been a
Supreme Court or other Tenth Circuit decision on point so that “the contours of
the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.” Finn, 249 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
C. Whether Ms. McFall’s termination violated clearly established law
Mr. Bednar violated clearly established law, and thus is not entitled to
qualified immunity, if he terminated Ms. McFall for exercising her free speech
rights. The Supreme Court outlined the test for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 free speech
claim in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and its progeny. The
Court must first determine whether the employee’s speech touches on a matter of
public concern. Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998). If
it does, the Court must balance the employee’s interest, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern against “the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through it’s employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
If the first two prerequisites are met, the speech is protected and the
plaintiff must show that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor behind
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the adverse employment decision. See Belcher v. City of McAlester, Oklahoma ,
324 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2003); Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811
(10th Cir. 1996). If the plaintiff satisfies all these factors then the burden shifts
to the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have
acted in the same way toward the employee in the absence of the protected
speech. Belcher v. City of McAlester, Oklahoma , 324 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (10th
Cir. 2003); Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996).
We have previously held that “[w]hether speech involves a matter of public
concern and whether the employee’s interest outweighs the employer’s are
questions of law for the court; whether speech was a substantial motivating factor
and whether the employer would have made the same employment decision in the
absence of the speech are questions of fact for the jury.” Bass, 308 F.3d at 1088.
Mr. Bednar’s appeal relating to Ms. McFall’s Pickering claim therefore raises two
issues: whether Ms. McFall spoke on a matter of public concern and whether
OIDS’s interest in maintaining an efficient work environment outweighs Ms.
McFall’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern. Therefore, we will
address only these questions with respect to the Pickering analysis. Bass, 308
F.3d at 1088.
First, Ms. McFall must establish that she engaged in protected speech on a
matter of public concern. The threshold inquiry “in assessing the free speech
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claim of a discharged government employee,” therefore, is “whether the employee
has spoken ‘as a citizen upon matters of public concern’ or merely ‘as an
employee upon matters only of personal interest.’” Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247
(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). Whether an employee’s
speech addresses a matter of public concern depends on the content, form, and
context of the statements and whether the speech can “be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”
Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983); see also Belcher , 324 F.3d at
1207-08 (finding that firefighter’s expression of concern to city council members
over the purchase of a new fire truck with city tax dollars involved a matter of
public concern); Dill , 155 F.3d at 1202 (finding police officer’s comments that
exculpatory evidence was withheld in a murder investigation involved a matter of
public concern); but see Koch v. City of Huchinson , 847 F.3d 1436, 1443-44 (10th
Cir. 1988) (holding that fire marshal’s report concerning the cause of a fire did
not involve a matter of public concern).
The district court held that Ms. McFall’s speech touched on a matter of
public concern because it dealt with “the proper investigation of criminal cases
and provision of effective assistance of counsel to indigent defendants accused of
capital crimes.” McFall v. Bednar, et al., No. 03-351, slip op. at 12 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 3, 2004). Mr. Bednar correctly argues that “speech pertaining to internal
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personnel disputes and working conditions ordinarily will not involve public
concern.” Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247; see also Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202. The district
court, however, correctly reasoned that Ms. McFall’s speech about the expert
approval process “went beyond her concern that the process was internally
cumbersome and time consuming . . . [r]ather, Plaintiff’s expressed concern
centered on the fact that the inability to secure the services of expert witnesses in
death penalty cases could deprive the indigent defendants of their constitutionally
guaranteed right to effective assistance of trial counsel.” McFall v. Bednar, et
al., No. 03-351, slip op. at 11-12 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2004).
Ms. McFall’s speech did not involve mere internal personnel disputes over
OIDS’s procedures for approving experts. Indeed, there is no indication that Ms.
McFall refused to follow the appropriate procedures in requesting experts on
behalf of the attorneys she supervised or in any way attempted to subvert the
expert approval process. Rather, her speech related to the qualifications of Dr.
LaFortune and Ms. Schile to approve experts in capital cases and her concerns
about the inability to get timely decisions. Ms. McFall expressed her concerns
that under the new expert approval system, the indigent defendants OIDS
represented were not receiving effective assistance of counsel, which prevented
them from receiving a fair trial. The right to effective assistance of counsel and
the right to a fair trial are rights granted to all criminal defendants by the Sixth
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Amendment. U.S. C ONST . amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984); Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2002).
A government employee’s “[s]peech that seeks to expose improper
operations of the government or questions the integrity of government officials
clearly concerns vital public interests.” Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Conaway
v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202
(internal citations omitted) (holding that “speech which discloses any evidence of
corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of city officials . . .
clearly concerns matters of public import.”) Because Ms. McFall’s speech related
to matters of “political, social, or other concern to the community,” that is, the
integrity and qualifications of public officials, the operations of government, and
the right of a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel, it touched on
matters of public concern. Conaway, 853 F.3d at 797. Viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Ms. McFall, she has satisfied the first prong of the
Pickering analysis.
Under the second prong of the Pickering test, the Court must weigh Ms.
McFall’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern against OIDS’s
interest in maintaining an efficient work environment. We “balance the
employee’s interest in commenting upon matters of public concern ‘against the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
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services it performs through its employees.’” Dill, 155 F.3d at 1201 (quoting
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)). Moreover, “[i]n evaluating the employer’s interest,
we consider ‘whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony
among co-workers . . . or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or
interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.’” Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249
(quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). In other words, the
employer must show that the employee’s speech caused some disruption in the
workplace. Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1208-09 (holding that although the government
employer need not “wait for speech actually to disrupt core operations before
taking action,” it can not restrict the employee’s speech unless it shows the
restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions); see also
Dill, 155 F.3d at 1203. In determining whether an employee disrupted the
workplace, the Court can consider whether the employee used internal rather than
external channels to exercise their free speech rights. Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1208.
In this case, Mr. Bednar concedes that Ms. McFall’s speech did not cause
any actual disruption at OIDS. Mr. Bednar never argues that Ms. McFall refused
to follow the new expert approval procedure or that she could have expressed
herself through less disruptive internal channels. Viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Ms. McFall, she expressed her concerns over the new expert
approval process without any resultant disruption at OIDS. Ms. McFall,
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therefore, has satisfied this prong of the analysis for purposes of Mr. Bednar’s
qualified immunity defense. Because Ms. McFall satisfied the first two prongs of
Pickering, her speech was constitutionally protected.
Having determined that Ms. McFall’s speech was protected the final inquiry
for the Court is whether the law was clearly established on and before August 14,
2002, that Mr. Bednar could not terminate Ms. McFall’s employment for engaging
in such speech. Our decision in Finn v. New Mexico is directly on point and was
issued in May 2001, before Ms. McFall was terminated. In Finn, we held that
“pre-September 1995 case law clearly established that the defendant’s decision to
terminate plaintiff in retaliation for his protected speech was actionable. Hence
the district court properly rejected the qualified immunity defense . . . .” Id.
Furthermore, “[a] public employer cannot retaliate against an employee for
exercising his constitutionally protected right of free speech.” See Dill , 155 F.3d
at 1201 (citing Connick , 461 U.S. at 142).
It was clearly established on and before August 14, 2002, therefore, that a
government employee could not be terminated for speaking out on matters of
public concern. Mr. Bednar, himself an attorney and former judge, and any other
reasonable official, would understand that firing an employee for exercising her
free speech rights violated clearly established law and that such a termination was
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court, therefore, properly rejected
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Mr. Bednar’s qualified immunity defense.
Conclusion
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. McFall, she engaged in
constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern. In addition, Mr.
Bednar’s interest in running an efficient workplace did not outweigh Ms.
McFall’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech. Because it was
clearly established during Ms. McFall’s employment with OIDS that a
government employee cannot be terminated for exercising her constitutionally
protected free speech rights, the district court properly rejected Mr. Bednar’s
qualified immunity defense. Accordingly, the district court’s order denying
summary judgment based on Mr. Bednar’s assertion of qualified immunity is
hereby AFFIRMED.
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McFall v. Bednar
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-04-19
Citations: 407 F.3d 1081
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