Means v. Montana Power Co.

No. 80-266
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

JOHN R. MEANS and MARY MEANS,
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF OF NATURAL
RESOURCES and CONSERVATION, an
agency of the State,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY, A
Montana Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula, Montana
Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:

Donald D. MacIntyre, Dept. of Natural Resources, argued,
Helena, Montana
b ~ '
Williams Law Firm, Missoula, Montana
Richard Ranney argued, Missoula, Montana

Submitted: January 13, 1981
Decided: m 4 - 1981
R
Filed :
4vlkl4 4 - 79!37
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
This appeal a r i s e s from an o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g respon-

dent's attorney lead counsel and p r o v i d i n g for reasonable

c o m p e n s a t i o n and a n o r d e r f i x i n g t h a t compensation e n t e r e d

by the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District,

M i s s o u l a C o u n t y , t h e H o n o r a b l e J o h n S. Henson p r e s i d i n g .

T h e r e o c c u r r e d on J u l y 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 , a f i r e i n t h e P a t t e e

Canyon a r e a o f M i s s o u l a C o u n t y , Montana. The f i r e c a u s e d

e x t e n s i v e damage t o b o t h homes and l a n d i n t h e a r e a . The

Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation

(DNRC) f o u g h t t h e b l a z e and made a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r a n i n v e s -

t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e causes of t h e f i r e . I t was l a t e r d e t e r -

mined t h a t power l i n e s of t h e Montana Power Company c o u l d

h a v e b e e n t h e c a u s e o f t h e P a t t e e Canyon f i r e .

A complaint f o r damages t o t h e i r p r o p e r t y c a u s e d by

t h e f i r e was f i l e d by J o h n and Mary Means on March 1 4 , 1 9 7 8 .

F i l i n g of t h e c o m p l a i n t had f o l l o w e d e x t e n s i v e d i s c o v e r y by

S h e l t o n C . W i l l i a m s , a t t o r n e y f o r Mr. and Mrs. Means.

On December 21, 1 9 7 8 , DNRC filed i t s own c o m p l a i n t

s e e k i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 5 3 2 , 0 0 0 f o r damages t o s t a t e l a n d and

costs for extinguishing the f i r e .

On March 3 0 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e Means c a s e and t h e DNRC c a s e

were consolidated by s t i p u l a t i o n . Subsequently, other

parties who had suffered l o s s e s c a u s e d by the fire filed

additional complaints against the Montana Power Company.

Altogether t h e r e were t h i r t y - o n e cases filed in t h e Fourth

Judicial District Court, Missoula County, except for one

which Williams filed in the Federal District Court for

Montana. T h e r e were a p p r o x i m a t e l y ten attorneys or firms

who u l t i m a t e l y became i n v o l v e d i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n f o r t h e
various plaintiffs.

The Montana Power Company, by m o t i o n on May 23, 1 9 7 9 ,

sought c o n s o l i d a t i o n of a l l c a s e s pending i n D i s t r i c t Court.

Shortly afterwards, on July 27, 1979, Williams filed a

motion s e e k i n g an a p p o i n t m e n t of l e a d c o u n s e l .

The motion for consolidation for the purpose of

d e t e r m i n i n g l i a b i l i t y was g r a n t e d on A u g u s t 8, 1979. The

order provided, however, that the damage aspect of the

a c t i o n s be b i f u r c a t e d w i t h s e p a r a t e t r i a l s b e i n g e n v i s i o n e d ,

i f necessary, i n t h i s regard.

On O c t o b e r 30, 1979, Williams filed a stipulation

whereby c o u n s e l f o r a l l p a r t i e s , e x c e p t DNRC, agreed t o h i s

b e i n g l e a d c o u n s e l and t o h i s c o m p e n s a t i o n t h e r e f o r . As a

result of the stipulation, Williams represented t h i r t y of

thirty-one parties for claims t o t a l i n g $2,242,875.75. On

November 1, 1 9 7 9 , the District Court, without a hearing,

ordered t h e appointment of Williams a s l e a d counsel in a l l

c o n s o l i d a t e d c a s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e a c t i o n f i l e d by DNRC. The

o r d e r a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e W i l l i a m s Law F i r m be r e a s o n a b l y

compensated for services heretofore or hereafter rendered.

The amount o f c o m p e n s a t i o n was t o be d e t e r m i n e d by a g r e e m e n t

of the parties o r by the court after t e r m i n a t i o n of lead

counsel's responsibilities.

The m a t t e r p r o c e e d e d t o w a r d t h e s c h e d u l e d t r i a l d a t e

o f December 3 , 1 9 7 9 , w i t h d i s c o v e r y p r o c e e d i n g and numerous

p r e l i m i n a r y motions with Williams a s l e a d counsel. Prior t o

trial s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s began w i t h DNRC and v a r i o u s

home o w n e r s s e t t l i n g t h e i r claims for $1,215,000 of which

$425,000 was for DNRC. A group referred to as the raw

l a n d o w n e r s f a i l e d t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t and p r e p a r a t i o n on
t h e i r behalf continued for the scheduled t r i a l date.

On December 3, 1979, the presiding judge withdrew
from t h e c a s e , and t h e t r i a l d a t e was v a c a t e d . A new j u d g e

and t r i a l d a t e w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y s e t , and t h e raw l a n d o w n e r s
proceeded t o t r i a l .
On December 28, 1979, Williams, as lead counsel,

a f t e r f a i l i n g t o r e a c h a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h D N R C , moved f o r a

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of compensation. Af t e r a s e r i e s o f h e a r i n g s
the District Court entered an order on March 14, 1980,

granting t h e W i l l i a m s Law Firm $47,222.22 to be paid by
DNRC .
DNRC appeals both the order of November 1, 1979,

appointing lead counsel and the order of March 1 4 , 1980,
determining compensation.
The following issues have been presented to this

Court f o r review:
1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o h o l d a n
evidentiary hearing p r i o r t o entering its findings of f a c t ,

c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w and o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g l e a d c o u n s e l ?
2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a p p o i n t i n g a l e a d

counsel?
3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n o r d e r i n g DNRC t o
pay c o m p e n s a t i o n t o l e a d c o u n s e l ?
4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n

a w a r d i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n i n t h e amount o f $ 4 7 , 2 2 2 . 2 2 ?
A s t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e on a p p e a l , DNRC would h a v e t h i s

C o u r t remand t h i s a c t i o n t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d u e t o i t s
f a i l u r e t o hold an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g t h e
November 1, 1 9 7 9 , o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g l e a d c o u n s e l . The b a s i s
of this contention is that since there i s no record to
review, t h i s Court is unable t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e r e is s u f f i -

c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s made. W e must d i s -

agree.

The o r d e r of November 1, 1 9 7 9 , was entered in re-
s p o n s e t o a m o t i o n u n d e r R u l e 4 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. (consolida-
tion). R u l e 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., i n pertinent part, provides
that, " [ f l i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w a r e un-
n e c e s s a r y on d e c i s i o n s o f m o t i o n s u n d e r R u l e s 12 o r 56 o r
any o t h e r motion . . ." Findings of f a c t being unnecessary

f o r a r u l i n g on s a i d m o t i o n s , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is u n d e r no

o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , however, though
u n d e r no o b l i g a t i o n t o do s o , c h o s e t o make f i n d i n g s o f f a c t
upon which i t b a s e d i t s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w and o r d e r . This
C o u r t now b e i n g p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e o r d e r f o r e x a m i n a t i o n , it

i s i n c u m b e n t upon t h i s C o u r t t o r e v i e w t h e f i n d i n g s a s w e l l

a s t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. S e e Timmerman v . G a b r i e l ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5
Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528; section 3-2-204(5), MCA; Upper

Missouri G & T E l e c t r i c C o o p e r a t i v e , I n c . v . McCone E l e c t r i c
Cooperative, Inc. ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 239, 484 P.2d 741. It

is n o t n e c e s s a r y , however, t h a t t h i s a c t i o n be remanded f o r

an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g .
Here, t h e f i n d i n g s i n d i s p u t e a r e : (1) t h a t t h e s i z e

and c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e c a s e demands t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a l e a d

c o u n s e l ; and ( 2 ) t h a t a l m o s t a l l o f t h e d i s c o v e r y and t r i a l
p r e p a r a t i o n h a s b e e n d o n e by W i l l i a m s w i t h t h e i m p l i e d con-
sent of DNRC. An examination of the submitted District
C o u r t f i l e ( a s t o t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e c a s e ) and a r e v i e w
o f t h e h e a r i n g s h e l d i n r e g a r d t o t h e o r d e r s e t t i n g compen-
sation ( a s t o t h e work d o n e by W i l l i a m s w i t h t h e i m p l i e d
c o n s e n t o f DNRC) p r o v i d e s a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r r e v i e w .

The s e c o n d i s s u e on a p p e a l i n v o l v e s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n

o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s a c t i o n was a n a p p r o p r i a t e o n e f o r a

l e a d c o u n s e l t o be a p p o i n t e d .

As t h e c a s e s c i t e d by b o t h DNRC and W i l l i a m s indi-

cate, t h e appointment of lead counsel i s made i n c o n j u n c -

t i o n w i t h a m o t i o n and o r d e r f o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n and h a s b e e n

p r i m a r i l y used i n f e d e r a l c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s i n v o l v i n g m u l t i -

party litigation. S e e I n Re A i r C r a s h D i s a s t e r a t F l o r i d a

E v e r g l a d e s ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 549 F.2d 1 0 0 6 ; V i n c e n t v . Hughes

A i r West, I n c . ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 557 F.2d 759.

I n the present case, thirty-one separate plaintiffs

a l l b r o u g h t s u i t a g a i n s t t h e Montana Power Company c l a i m i n g

damages o c c a s i o n e d by a single disaster. The thirty-one

plaintiffs were represented by ten different attorneys.

Clearly, t h i s c a s e d o e s n o t a p p e a r a s complex a s t h a t s e e n

in Vincent (sixty separate actions brought in state and

federal courts i n Washington, Utah and California) or in

Florida Everglades (150 c l a i m s in both federal and state

courts). However, i t c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ,

in exercising its managerial power over this proceeding,

c l e a r l y abused its discretion a s a matter of law i n pro-

v i d i n g f o r t h e appointment of a l e a d c o u n s e l .

The p u r p o s e o f c o n s o l i d a t i o n and a p p o i n t m e n t o f l e a d

counsel is to permit trial convenience and economy in

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by avoiding unnecessary costs or delay.
M a c A l i s t e r v . Guterma ( 2 n d C i r . 1 9 5 8 ) , 263 F.2d 65. Absent

a l e a d c o u n s e l t h e r e was no g u a r a n t e e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t
that all the parties t o t h i s proceeding would not become

a c t i v e l y involved i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , had t h e
D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o formally o r d e r appointment of l e a d

counsel, i t c o u l d h a v e been faced with t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
t e n d i f f e r e n t attorneys pursuing t e n d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s of
attack. I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t s u c h an a r r a n g e m e n t would f o s t e r

undue d e l a y , c o s t and i n c o n v e n i e n c e .
F u r t h e r m o r e , and m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , i n l i g h t o f D N R C ' s

p a s t conduct, t h i s Court s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n s t h e p r o p r i e t y
of allowing DNRC to avoid the application of the lead
counsel order. A f t e r t h e o r d e r was e n t e r e d a t no t i m e d i d
DNRC move f o r a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , n o r d i d i t seek a n a p p e a l

o r w r i t t o have t h e o r d e r r e v i e w e d by t h i s C o u r t p r i o r to

the scheduled trial date. Moreover, during the initial
settlement negotiations, DNRC failed t o accept a proposal
made by t h e Montana Power Company t o s e g r e g a t e t h e c l a i m s o f
DNRC, which would h a v e a l l o w e d t h e D e p a r t m e n t t o p r o c e e d on

i t s own and t o a v o i d f u r t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e l e a d c o u n s e l
order. Even prior to the lead counsel order, during

e x t e n s i v e d i s c o v e r y e n g a g e d i n by t h e p a r t i e s , DNRC a l l o w e d
Williams t o a c t a s lead counsel, h a v i n g him t a k e a great
b u l k of t h e d e p o s i t i o n needed f o r t r i a l , w h i l e c h o o s i n g n o t
t o a t t e n d and m e r e l y p a y i n g i t s own p r o r a t a s h a r e o f the

costs. DNRC a l s o a l l o w e d W i l l i a m s t o do t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e

work i n p r e p a r i n g i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s .

DNRC c o n t e n d s it was bound by t h e l e a d c o u n s e l o r d e r

and u n a b l e t o a p p e a l u n t i l t h e March 14, 1980, o r d e r was
e n t e r e d allowing Williams compensation. A f i n a l determina-

t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s , a r g u e s DNRC, o n l y o c c u r r e d when
t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d i t t o p a y c o m p e n s a t i o n and t h e m a t t e r was
deemed c o n c l u d e d . DNRC b a s e s t h i s a r g u m e n t on l a n g u a g e i n
t h e l e a d c o u n s e l o r d e r t h a t t h e c o u r t was t o r e t a i n c o n t i n -
uing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e matter t o review t h e a c t s of l e a d

c o u n s e l t o e n f o r c e and i n t e r p r e t t h e c o u r t a s e n t e r e d . "

W disagree with DNRC1s p o s i t i o n
e in failing t o see
why t h e l a n g u a g e n o t e d s h o u l d make t h e o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g l e a d
counsel any less final than the March 14, 1980, order

s e t t i n g compensation. The November 1, 1 9 7 9 , o r d e r speci-

f i c a l l y appointed Williams lead counsel, s u b j e c t t o reason-
a b l e compensation. The o n l y r e a s o n t h e c o u r t was r e t a i n i n g

a "continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e matter" was t o a s s u r e
t h a t Williams acted i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e p l a i n t i f f s
and t o s e t t h e a l r e a d y o r d e r e d r e a s o n a b l e c o m p e n s a t i o n . If

DNRC d i s p u t e d t h i s a p p o i n t m e n t and t h e t e r m s t h e r e u n d e r , it

s h o u l d ha.ve made i t s f e e l i n g s known.
I t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t DNRC was more t h a n w i l l i n g t o a l -

low W i l l i a m s t o a c t a s l e a d c o u n s e l ; t o a c c e p t h i s a p p o i n t -
ment a s such; and t o a c c e p t t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e $425,000
s e t t l e m e n t acquired under the order. DNRC having alrea-dy

consented t o an a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e lead counsel order, it

s h o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d t o a v o i d t h e same on a p p e a l t o t h i s
Court.
A s t o t h e o r d e r determining compensation f o r Williams

a s l e a d c o u n s e l , DNRC f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t d u e t o t h e a b s e n c e

of any contractual agreement between the parties or any
s t a t u t o r y authority, attorney f e e s a r e not recoverable. See
Winder v. J o n a l Corp. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 247, 545 P.2d 1094.
Williams acknowledges t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e b u t contends t h a t i n
situations where attorney fees are paid from a "common
f u n d , " i t i s a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e s e f e e s c a n b e awarded e v e n i n
absenc e of s t a t u t e o r an e x p r e s s agreement.
The "common fund1' c o n c e p t p r o v i d e s t h a t when a p a r t y
through a c t i v e l i t i g a t i o n c r e a t e s , reserves or increases a

f u n d , o t h e r s s h a r i n g i n t h e fund must b e a r a p o r t i o n of t h e
litigation costs including reasonable attorney fees. The

d o c t r i n e i s employed t o s p r e a d t h e c o s t o f l i t i g a t i o n among
all beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary is not

forced t o bear t h e b u r d e n a l o n e and t h e " s t r a n g e r " (i.e.,
p a s s i v e ) b e n e f i c i a r i e s do n o t r e c e i v e t h e i r b e n e f i t s a t no
c o s t t o themselves. S e e V i n c e n t , s u p r a , 557 F.2d a t 769.

The d o c t r i n e i s w e l l r e c o g n i z e d and h a s b e e n q u o t e d
i n s e v e r a l Montana c a s e s . S e e I n Re B a x t e r ' s E s t a t e ( 1 9 3 3 ) ,
94 Mont. 257, 22 P.2d 1 8 2 ; Hardware M u t u a l C a s u a l t y Co. v.

Butler (1944), 116 Mont. 73, 148 P.2d 563; Tuttle v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 166, 580 P.2d
1379. See also C i t y of Klawock v. Gustafson (9th Cir.
1 9 7 8 ) , 585 F.2d 428. The b a s i s o f t h e d o c t r i n e b e i n g r o o t e d

i n the equitable concepts of quasi-contract, r e s t i t u t i o n and
r e c a p t u r e of unjust enrichment, t h e common f u n d t h e o r y o f
a w a r d i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n t o a l e a d c o u n s e l m u s t be a l l o w e d a s
a n e x p a n s i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l r u l e p r o v i d e d i n Winder.
DNRC a r g u e s t h a t e v e n i f t h e common f u n d c o n c e p t i s

recognized in Montana it should not be applied in this
instance. DNRC b a s e s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n on a n a c t i v e l i t i g a n t

versus passive l i t i g a n t distinction.
It is s t a t e d t h a t o n l y i n a c t i v e o r p a s s i v e b e n e f i -
c i a r i e s s h o u l d be forced t o bear the c o s t s of litigation
u n d e r t h e common f u n d d o c t r i n e . An i n a c t i v e member i n t h i s
r e g a r d h a s b e e n d e f i n e d a s a b e n e f i c i a r y who m e r e l y f a i l s t o
retain counsel or one who r e t a i n s l e g a l c o u n s e l b u t s a i d
counsel f a i l s , i n any d e g r e e , t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any l a b o r s
leading t o the c r e a t i o n of t h e fund. S e e I n Re E s t a t e o f
K o r t h e ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 88 C a l . R p t r . 465, 9 Cal.App.3d 572; see also

plumbing fixture anti-trust cases: Philadelphia Housing

A u t h o r i t y v. American R a d i a t o r and S t a n d a r d S a n i t a r y C o r p .

(E.D. Pa. 1971), 322 F.Supp. 834, modified s u b nom., Ace

H e a t i n g and Plumbing Co. v . C r a n e Co. (3rd Cir. 1 9 7 1 ) , 453

F.2d 30; P h i l a d e l p h i a H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y v . American R a d i a t o r

and Standard S a n i t a r y Corp. (E.D. Pa. 1 9 7 0 ) , 323 F.Supp.

364; Note, Reimbursement f o r A t t o r n e y s ' F e e s from B e n e f i c i -

a r i e s of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e L i t i g a t i o n , 58 Minn. L. R. a t 947-

948 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e c o u r t s have r e c o g n i z e d an e x c e p t i o n

t o t h i s general rule. See Vincent, 557 F.2d a t 772. The

exception provides t h a t s o long a s c o n t r i b u t i o n s of active

counsel were unequal ( e l greater) when compared with

t h o s e of a l e s s a c t i v e counsel, compensation can s t i l l be

ordered paid under the common fund d o c t r i n e by the less

active party. S e e a l s o D o h e r t y v. Bress (D.C. Cir. 1958),

262 F.2d 20, cert. denied 359 U.S. 934, 79 S . C t . 649, 3

L.Ed.2d 636. The p u r p o s e o f t h i s e x c e p t i o n is s i m i l a r to

that of the common fund doctrine itself--to avoid unjust

enrichment.

Here the record indicates that DNRC accrued 1,680

hours i n l e g a l services. This t o t a l included t h e s e r v i c e s

o f D N R C ' s l e g a l s t a f f , l e g a l i n t e r n s and n o n l e g a l p e r s o n n e l .

W i l l i a m s Law F i r m ' s t i m e r e c o r d s r e f l e c t e d 3 , 9 0 9 . 2 5 h o u r s on

the case to the time of settlement. This total also

included work by attorneys, interns and secretaries.

Williams also testified that his time records understated

t h e a c t u a l time s p e n t on t h e c a s e by 1 0 t o 20 p e r c e n t . The

disparity in efforts between lead counsel and DNRC being
evident, the District Court was proper in ordering compensa-
tion.
DNRC's final arguments concerning its efforts to
avoid paying lead counsel are twofold. First, DNRC main-
tains that as a state agency, it should be treated dif-
ferently with respect to an obligation to compensate lead
counsel in that it can only retain counsel by an exclusive
procedure set forth in Executive Order No. 15-78. Second,
DNRC contends that DR2-107, "Division of Fees Among Law-
yers," of the Canons of Professional Ethics, will be
violated should this Court grant Williams the ordered
compensation.
In rejecting DNRC's contention that it should be
treated different from other beneficiaries to a common fund,
we need only note that payment for litigation costs by the
various beneficiaries is founded upon principles of equity.
In enforcing this doctrine, equity demands that all parties
receiving a benefit from the common fund be included in its
application.
Furthermore, there is no basis for applying DR2-107
of the Canons of Professional Ethics as submitted by DNRC.
This rule is concerned solely with the question of two
lawyers dividing fees. It has no application to a situa-
tion where there is a court-appointed lead counsel to whom
others may be required to pay compensation, all under the
strict supervision and authority of the court.
In regard to the final issue on appeal, in deter-
mining a reasonable fee in a given case, this Court has
established the following guidelines:
". . . The circumstances to be considered in
determining compensation to be recovered are
 t h e amount and t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s e r v i c e s
rendered, the labor, t i m e and t r o u b l e
i n v o l v e d , t h e c h a r a c t e r and i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e
l i t i g a t i o n i n which s e r v i c e s a r e r e n d e r e d ,
t h e amount o f money o r t h e v a l u e o f p r o p e r t y
t o be a f f e c t e d , t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l and
e x p e r i e n c e c a l l e d f o r , t h e c h a r a c t e r and
standing i n t h e i r profession of t h e attorneys
.. . The r e s u l t s e c u r e d by t h e s e r v i c e s o f
t h e a t t o r n e y s may b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a n
important element i n determining t h e i r
value." F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank v . T h o l k e s
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 4 2 2 , 429-430, 547 P.2d
1 3 2 8 , 1 3 3 2 ; a c c o r d , C a r k e e k v . Ayer ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont. , 613 P.2d 1 0 1 3 , 1 0 1 5 , 37
S t . R e p . 1 2 7 4 , 1275-1276.

The f e e awarded i n t h i s i n s t a n c e was 11.1 p e r c e n t o f
DNRC's r e c o v e r y under the lead counsel order. T h i s amount
was g r a n t e d o n l y a f t e r e x t e n s i v e t e s t i m o n y r e l a t i n g t o t h e

above f a c t o r s . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s award e x c e e d s t h e com-

p e n s a t i o n p a i d by t h e o t h e r p l a i n t i f f s r e p r e s e n t e d by l e a d
counsel; but, it s h o u l d be n o t e d that these other parties
a g r e e d t o a s e t amount w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o i n v o k e t h e a i d o f
the t r i a l court. W c a n f i n d no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n .
e
The judgment of the District Court appointing

Williams as lead counsel and granting compensation is
af f irmed.

W concur:
e

Chief J u s t i c e I

&. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n
d i s s e n t later.