Meister, Brenda G. v. Medical Engineering

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

       Argued October 2, 2001    Decided October 26, 2001 

                           No. 00-7241

                       Brenda G. Meister, 
                     Appellant/Cross-Appellee

                                v.

    Medical Engineering Corporation, a Wisconsin Corporation, 
                               and 
      Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, a Delaware Corporation, 
                    Appellees/Cross-Appellants

                        Consolidated with 
                           No. 00-7251

          Appeals from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                         (No. 92cv02660)

     Stephen L. Snyder argued the cause for appellant/cross-
appellee.  With him on the briefs was Sheldon N. Jacobs.  
Robert J. Weltchek entered an appearance.

     James T. Conlon, pro hac vice, argued the cause for 
appellees/cross-appellants.  With him on the briefs was Kim-
berly S. Penner.  Dino S. Sangiamo and James L. Shea 
entered appearances.

     Before:  Edwards, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

     Rogers, Circuit Judge:  Brenda Meister opted out of the 
omnibus settlement in the silicone breast implant products 
liability litigation and pursued her claims in federal court in 
the District of Columbia.  She now appeals the grant of 
judgment as a matter of law, or a new trial, on the ground 
that the district court overlooked a substantial portion of her 
scientific evidence and otherwise mischaracterized that evi-
dence, thereby impermissibly usurping the role of the jury.  
We hold that the district court properly applied Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in concluding 
that Meister failed to show causation and did not usurp the 
role of jury in granting judgment as a matter of law.  Accord-
ingly, we affirm.1

                                I.

     Nearly ten years after her breast implants in 1977, Meister 
developed symptoms that Dr. Brian Arling, and later Dr. 
David Borenstein, diagnosed as late diffuse scleroderma.2  In 

__________
     1  In light of our disposition, we do not reach the issue of 
personal jurisdiction conditionally presented by the defendants in 
their cross-appeal.  See Appellees' Brief at xii.

     2  Scleroderma is a chronic disease that causes sclerosis of the 
skin and certain organs;  "[t]he skin is taut, firm, and ... feels 
tough and leathery."  Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 1530 
(Clayton L. Thomas ed., 15th ed. 1985).  One of Meister's expert 
witnesses, Dr. Shanklin, testified that scleroderma "is the popular 
name given to a process by which this kind of scar tissue is laid 
down in the body but not seemingly in direct reaction to something 
at that site."  Meister described her condition of scleroderma as 
consisting of "severe skin tightening, muscle and joint pain, reduced 

1992, she filed a products liability lawsuit, alleging that she 
developed scleroderma as a result of exposure to silicone 
breast implants manufactured by Medical Engineering Cor-
poration ("MEC").  Meister sought punitive damages from 
MEC and Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, which became the 
sole shareholder of MEC in 1982.  In her complaint she pled 
strict liability in tort, negligence, breach of warranties, and 
misrepresentation, deceit or concealment.  Following a re-
mand from the consolidated breast implant litigation proceed-
ings in the Northern District of Alabama, the district court 
here denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint 
for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

     The defendants thereafter moved to exclude or limit the 
testimony of Meister's expert witnesses on causation, pursu-
ant to Daubert and Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.  
The district court denied the motion after argument, ruling 
that Meister's witnesses should be allowed to testify.  The 
defendants urged reconsideration of their motion a month 
later, in December of 1998, citing a recently published report 
of the Rule 706 National Academy of Sciences Panel that had 
found no association between breast implants and any of the 
individual connective tissue diseases or other autoim-
mune/rheumatic conditions.3  Again, following argument, the 
district court denied the defendants' motion, noting that the 
studies did not address the specific issues presented by 

__________
pulmonary function, esophageal strictures, hair loss, vision impair-
ment, kidney malfunction and chronic fatigue."

     3  The Rule 706 National Academy of Sciences Panel, appointed 
by Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., was instructed to "review and 
critique the scientific literature pertaining to the possibility of a 
causal association between silicone breast implants and connective 
tissue diseases, related signs and symptoms, and immune system 
dysfunction."  Judge Pointer was the coordinating judge for the 
federal breast implant multi-district litigation.  The Panel published 
a report, dated November 17, 1998, which is entitled Silicone Breast 
Implants in Relation to Connective Tissue Diseases and Immuno-
logic Dysfunction.

Meister's complaint, such as gel bleed.4

     At trial, Meister presented two medical experts.  The first 
was Dr. Borenstein, her treating physician and a specialist in 
rheumatology and internal medicine.  He had published sev-
eral peer-reviewed articles and medical textbook chapters on 
scleroderma and had also written a paper on silicone-related 
disorders.  However, he disclaimed expertise in scleroderma 
and stated that he "didn't know too much about breast 
implants" before treating Meister.5  Meister's other expert 
was Dr. Douglas Shanklin, a pathologist tenured as a Profes-
sor at the University of Tennessee who had authored several 
hundred peer-reviewed medical articles, made numerous pre-
sentations to the medical community regarding the effects of 
silicone, and testified in several other breast implant cases.  
However, he had no particular training or expertise in rheu-
matic diseases or immunology and until 1996 had never 
treated a scleroderma patient.  Nor had he published on 
scleroderma.

     After Meister had finished presenting her evidence, the 
defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), on the ground that 
Meister's case was barren of any reliable scientific evidence 
on causation.  The district court reiterated its concern that 
the Panel Report had not addressed gel bleed, stated that it 
had yet to read the entire report, and determined that it was 
not comfortable granting the motion "at this time."  Upon 
renewal of defendants' Rule 50(a) motion at the close of all 
the evidence, the district court denied the motion, observing 
that one of Meister's proposed expert witnesses "has a theory 
that may or may not be viable, but he has testified in other 

__________
     4  According to Dr. Thomas Fawell, who performed the surgery 
implanting Meister's breast implants, gel bleed is a phenomenon 
common to all silicone breast implants in which microscopic 
amounts of the silicone gel inside the implant seep through the 
silicone envelope to the outer surface of the implant.

     5  Dr. Borenstein had not received funding to study scleroderma 
and had never been affiliated with any organization that devotes 
itself to the study of scleroderma.

cases that have no more evidence than we have here."  The 
jury returned a verdict for Meister, awarding her $10 million 
in damages.

     The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or alterna-
tively for a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(b), and to alter or amend the judgment, pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).  The district 
court granted the motion for judgment as a matter or law, or 
a new trial.  The district court ruled that, standing alone, the 
testimony of Meister's experts failed to carry her burden.  
The court found that the reliance of one of her experts "on 
the case reports is demonstratively unacceptable as a valid 
basis for his opinion [on causation]," and that the "ipse dixit" 
testimony of Meister's only other expert did not fill the void.  
Further, the court found, "any credence that might be attrib-
uted to their testimony falls in the face of what courts have 
referred to as a 'solid body of epidemiological data.' "6  The 
district court referred to a June 1999 report of the Institute 
of Medicine, commissioned by the National Academy of Sci-
ences, that concluded, after a general review of the known 
research on silicone breast implants, that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support any association of the silicone breast 
implants with defined connective tissue disease, with any 
atypical connective tissue disease, or any new disease in 
women that is associated with implants.7  Given this record, 
the district court concluded that there was "no valid basis" for 
the jury's verdict.

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     6  The district court cited Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 
F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 1994), and the Bendectin cases of Raynor 
v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997);  Richardson 
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).

     7  See "Safety of Silicone Breast Implants," Committee on the 
Safety of Silicone Breast Implants, Division of Health Promotion 
and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine, Safety of Silicone 
Breast Implants, (Stuart Bondurant, Virginia Ernster & Roger 
Herdman eds. 1999) ("IOM Report").

                               II.

     On appeal, Meister contends that in granting judgment as a 
matter of law, or a new trial, the district court impermissibly 
usurped the role of the jury by overlooking a substantial 
portion of her scientific evidence, mischaracterizing it, and 
ignoring the fact that her counsel poked numerous holes in 
the defendants' "supposed 'fortress' of epidemiological and 
other scientific evidence."  Specifically, Meister maintains, 
first, that there is real doubt as to the validity of any 
epidemiological study because no study has ever indicated 
whether any of the subjects had implants containing industri-
al use silicone as was contained in Meister's implants.8  Sec-
ond, she maintains, in urging the probativeness of her causa-
tion evidence, that her expert rheumatologist was also her 
primary treating physician for approximately ten years, un-
like the experts in most toxic tort cases who make their living 
from forensic testimony and lack the benefit of experience "in 
the trenches."  Further, Meister stresses that her treating 
physician used a traditional method of "differential diagnosis" 
hypothesis to determine the cause of her scleroderma.  More-
over, she maintains, the district court, pursuant to Daubert, 
repeatedly denied defendants' motions to preclude her scienti-
fic evidence, each time confirming that her scientific evidence 
was reliable, relevant, and entitled to be heard by the jury.  
Finally, Meister maintains that the district court erred in 
relying on the June 1999 Report of the Institute of Medicine 
because it was not in existence at the time of trial.  For these 
reasons, Meister contends this court should find no difficulty 
in reinstating the verdict.  It is not to be so.

     Under Daubert, the district court is required to address 
two questions, first whether the expert's testimony is based 
on "scientific knowledge," and second, whether the testimony 
"will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact 

__________
     8  Dr. Fawell had used implants containing industrial grade 
silicone from General Electric, although appellees dispute whether 
the term "industrial" referred to its grade or merely the fact that it 
was being supplied to a manufacturer as opposed to a consumer.  
See Appellee's Brief at 30 n.31.

in issue."  509 U.S. at 592.  The first inquiry forces the court 
to focus on "principles and methodology, not on the conclu-
sions that they generate," id. at 595, and thus demands a 
grounding in the methods and procedures of science, rather 
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.  Id. at 590;  
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
While rejecting a requirement of scientific certainty, the 
Supreme Court instructed that "in order to qualify as 'scienti-
fic knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by 
the scientific method.  Proposed testimony must be sup-
ported by appropriate validation--i.e., 'good grounds,' based 
on what is known."  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  The Court 
identified four factors for courts to consider in evaluating 
scientific validity, focusing on whether the theory or tech-
nique had been tested, whether it had been subjected to peer 
review and publication, the method's known or potential error 
rate, and the method's general acceptance in the scientific 
community.  Id. at 593-94.  Meister fails to demonstrate that 
her expert medical evidence passes muster under any of these 
factors, and thus fails to show error by the district court in 
applying Daubert.9

     Both case reports and epidemiological studies may be used 
in the study of silicone breast implants, the former identifying 
a temporal relationship, and the latter taking the first steps 
toward establishing a casual relationship.  See, e.g., Richard-
son v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).  However, as one of 
Meister's medical experts acknowledged at trial, testing the 
case reports through epidemiological studies--the methodolo-
gy that calls for checking controlled population studies to see 
if they confirm the hypotheses suggested in individual case 
reports--is "an important scientific" approach.  Federal Rule 
of Evidence 703 provides that "an opinion refuting ... scien-

__________
     9  The admissibility of expert testimony and the qualification of 
an expert witness are preliminary questions to be determined by 
the district court, see Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), and Meister had the 
burden of establishing these matters by a "preponderance of proof."  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.10 (1993) 
(citing Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175-176 (1987)).

tific consensus is inadmissible for lack of an adequate founda-
tion, in the absence of other substantial probative evidence on 
which to base [the] opinion."  Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  In the instant 
case, the overwhelming evidence from the epidemiological 
studies is that there is no causal connection between silicone 
breast implants and scleroderma.  Meister thus faced the 
burden of overcoming the conclusions of the epidemiological 
evidence referred to by her own experts and offered by the 
defendants that there is insufficient evidence of a casual 
relationship between breast implants and scleroderma.10

     Meister's first medical expert was Dr. Borenstein, who 
began treating Meister in 1987 as a result of color changes in 
her hands that indicated to him that she might have a 
connective tissue disease or autoimmune disease.  He per-
formed a battery of tests that led him to conclude that 
Meister was suffering from systemic sclerosis--the disease 
complex of which scleroderma is a component--in its diffuse 
form.  Over the course of the next year, Meister developed 
some difficulty with her esophagus, something Dr. Borenstein 
thought was probably related to her scleroderma.  She also 
was experiencing chest pains and difficulty in breathing.  In 
addition, she was suffering from calcinosis--a condition of 
misplaced internal calcium deposits--as a result of her sclero-
derma.  Lung function tests over the next three years re-
vealed abnormal functioning capacity at roughly the fifty-five 
percent level.  Because lung function below the forty percent 
level can be fatal, and because he had read in the literature 
that a patient under similar circumstances had improved after 
her breast implants were removed, Dr. Borenstein referred 
Meister to a plastic surgeon, who was a member of a Federal 
Drug Administration committee examining the possible con-

__________
     10  To the extent that Meister contends on appeal that a judg-
ment as a matter of law may not be based on evidentiary error, the 
contention is waived as she did not raise it in the district court.  See 
Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc. 104 F.3d 1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 
1997).  In any event, such a contention is meritless as that issue has 
been resolved by the Supreme Court.  See Weisgram v. Marley, 
528 U.S. 440, 457 (2000).

nection between silicone implants and systemic disease;  the 
surgeon advised Meister that there was no connection be-
tween her scleroderma and silicone implants.  After initially 
deciding to keep the implants, because her condition was not 
improving and because of the lack of any therapy for her 
worsening lung condition, Meister had the implants removed 
on May 23, 1991.

     In response to the question whether he had an opinion to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the cause of 
Meister's scleroderma and accompanying symptoms, Dr. Bor-
enstein testified that they were "related to" her silicone gel 
breast implants.  He arrived at his conclusion, he explained, 
based on an extensive review of case reports and the medical 
literature, Meister's improved lung function following explan-
tation,11 and his view that she had an "atypical" form of the 
disease, that is, "the manifestations don't match up with the 
disease she has."12  Although the "trigger" for classical scler-
oderma is unknown, Dr. Borenstein testified that since the 
1960s it has been known that "there are environmental fac-
tors that have been associated with the onset and the perpet-
uation of [systemic sclerosis]."  He explained that "at the 
time when [he] was investigating," the literature reflected 
that "there were patients who had silicone implants who were 
described with scleroderma."  He referred to various case 
reports in several medical journals that suggested some 
connection between silica dust and scleroderma in miners, for 
example, and between silicone and scleroderma.  For exam-
ple, Dr. Borenstein cited an article by two Japanese physi-
cians on women who received silicone injections directly into 

__________
     11  Meister's lung function improved, from a fifty-five percent 
level to a seventy-seven percent level during the two and a half year 
period following Meister's explantation.  Explantation refers to the 
removal of tissue from the body, the opposite of implantation.  See 
Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 588 (Clayton L. Thomas 
ed., 15th ed. 1985).

     12  More precisely, Meister has calcifications but does not have 
an anticentromere antibody, and that is unusual. There was no 
fibrosis and scarring, for example, in her lungs;  her force vital 
capacity was normal.

their breasts and subsequently developed systemic sclerosis.  
He also reviewed literature linking various environmental 
exposures, such as cancer medications but not including 
breast implants, to scleroderma.  On cross-examination, Dr. 
Borenstein acknowledged that there is no proof that silicone 
breast implants cause scleroderma, and that he did not per-
sonally know what caused classic scleroderma.  Although 
earlier testifying that Meister's scleroderma was "atypical," 
he revealed that this conclusion was not reflected in his 
professional records, and he conceded that each of Meister's 
symptoms was within the constellation of symptoms making 
up classic scleroderma.  Nevertheless, although he produced 
no epidemiology associating breast implants to the particular 
"atypical" condition he had diagnosed for Meister, Dr. Boren-
stein believed that her condition was related to her silicone 
gel breast implants.

     Contrary to Meister's contention, Dr. Borenstein's testimo-
ny on causation is not as probative as scientific evidence in 
Daubert terms as she would have it.  In discussing the case 
reports purporting to show a link between scleroderma and 
silicone implants, Dr. Borenstein recognized the limits of case 
reports to show causation, acknowledging, for example, that 
they were not controlled studies.  Insofar as he relied on 
"differential analysis" to eliminate alternative causes, Dr. 
Borenstein's reliance was misplaced.  That methodology rests 
on the assumption that whatever factors remain after other 
alternative causes have been eliminated is at least capable of 
causing the disease in question.  See Raynor v. Merrell 
Pharm., Inc. 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  Whether 
Meister's condition was atypical or not, Dr. Borenstein failed 
to show any nexus between her atypical symptoms and her 
breast implants;  the mere simultaneous existence of the two 
clearly is not an appropriate methodology.  His reliance on 
case reports, temporal methodology, and Meister's atypical 
symptoms are not sufficient to show that silicone breast 
implants are capable of causing scleroderma, and therefore 
his reliance on differential analysis does not meet Daubert 
standards.  Regarding the literature that he reviewed, Dr. 
Borenstein did not testify that any of the studies had actually 

concluded that scleroderma was caused by silicone breast 
implants.  At most, his testimony revealed that the authors 
indicated that their observations support or "suggest" a role 
for silicone in the etiology of scleroderma.  Additionally, Dr. 
Borenstein admitted that the persons with whom he con-
ferred were unable to advise him of a causal nexus between 
silicone breast implants and Meister's scleroderma, and that 
the published epidemiology did not indicate a causal nexus.

     Meister's other expert medical witness, Dr. Shanklin, ac-
cepted Dr. Borenstein's diagnosis of scleroderma (while re-
jecting the view that Meister's scleroderma was atypical) and 
testified that in his opinion, with a reasonable degree of 
medical probability, Meister's scleroderma "is a consequence 
of silicone device implantation in 1977."  Dr. Shanklin based 
his opinion on an examination of slides of Meister's breast 
tissue.  As he explained, after implantation silicone particles 
begin to come out of the shell of the implant device, causing 
cells in the body to respond and "try to fight off the presence 
of this foreign material."  He went on to testify to the 
presence of silica13 in Meister's breast tissue, explaining that 
the silica resulted from "a chemical transformation back to 
the point of origin" of the silicone that was in Meister's 
system.  After citing case studies in which miners and stone-
masons exposed to silica develop scleroderma in a high fre-
quency of cases, Dr. Shanklin concluded that silicone device 
implantation caused Meister's scleroderma.

     Dr. Shanklin's testimony is problematic as well.  He ac-
knowledged that ongoing research investigating the cause of 
scleroderma has merely given rise to ideas about an associa-
tion between certain environmental factors and scleroderma 
and has not yet shown a causal relationship.  Instead, jump-

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     13  Silicone is defined as "[a]n organic compound in which carbon 
has been replaced by silicon," which is a nonmetallic element found 
in the soil that comprises approximately 25% of the earth's crust.  
See Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary at 1561.  Dr. Shanklin 
testified that silica is a less complex substance from which silicone is 
made.

ing from an observation of a local tissue reaction to causation 
of a systemic disease, Dr. Shanklin identified as the basis for 
his causation opinion studies linking silica with scleroderma.  
Still, he admitted that, although there are "some associations" 
between silica and scleroderma, he was not saying these 
environmental factors were causing Meister's scleroderma.  
In short, then, the substance of Dr. Shanklin's theory was, to 
use his words, first, "[Meister's] tissues were still trying their 
best to get rid of this stuff [i.e., silicone] 14 years later;"  
second, "after 14 years, it is possible the [immune] system is 
beginning to make mistakes;"  and third, "Somewhere along 
the line she developed clinically diagnosable scleroderma."  
Such an approach will not do;  "chemical, in vitro, and in vivo 
... [s]tudies ... singly or in combination, are not capable of 
proving causation in human beings in the face of the over-
whelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence."  
Raynor, 104 F.3d at 1374.

     The defendants presented such contradictory evidence in 
the form of epidemiological studies that found insufficient 
evidence of an association between silicone breast implants 
and connective tissue disease.  In addition to the testimony of 
three experts--Dr. Alan Shons, a plastic surgeon who was a 
member of the American Medical Association committee that 
studied the question raised by the case reports;  Dr. Kenneth 
Kulig, a toxicologist, who reviewed 50 years of safety data on 
silicone;  and Dr. Virginia Steen, a rheumatologist who has 
treated numerous patients, including those with scleroderma, 
for over twenty-five years--the defendants brought to the 
district court's attention two recent major epidemiological 
studies.  In support of their motions to exclude or limit the 
testimony of Meister's experts on causation, the defendants 
referred to the Rule 706 Panel Report, published November 
30, 1998, which reported that there was "[n]o association ... 
between breast implants and any of the individual connective 
tissue diseases, all definite connective diseases combined, or 
the other autoimmune/rheumatic conditions."  Although the 
district court had expressed concern about whether the Re-
port addressed gel bleed, the Report addressed gel bleed to 
the extent that all silicone breast implants bleed and silicone 

breast implants were the object of study in the report.  
Additionally, while their post-verdict motions were pending, 
the defendants informed the district court of the June 1999 
IOM Report, entitled "Safety of Silicone Breast Implants."14  
See supra note 7.  The IOM Report, commissioned by the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
concluded that:

     The evidence for an atypical disease or a novel syndrome 
     is insufficient or flawed.  It consists of selected case 
     series, few of which describe a consistent and reproduci-
     ble syndrome.  The controlled epidemiological studies 
     cited provide stronger, contrary evidence.  In view of the 
     paucity, weakness, and conflicting nature of the evidence, 
     the committee concludes that there is no rigorous, con-
     vincing scientific support for atypical connective tissue or 
     any new disease in women that is associated with silicone 
     breast implants.  In fact, epidemiological evidence sug-
     gests there is no novel syndrome.
     
The IOM Report was based on "a general review of past and 
ongoing research on silicone breast implants."  With regard 
to connective tissue disease, including scleroderma, the com-
mittee reviewed 17 epidemiological studies, nine of which had 
been reviewed by Dr. Borenstein, and at least 12 of which 
were discussed by defendants' experts.  The committee found 
"no convincing evidence for atypical connective tissue or 
rheumatic disease or a novel constellation of signs and symp-
toms in women with silicone breast implants."

     The district court was thus presented with a classic Dau-
bert case.  The scientific method is based on testing to 
determine if the questions raised by case studies can be 
determined to have a causative relationship.  See Daubert, 
508 U.S. at 593.  The considerable epidemiological evidence 
all pointed in one direction.  Moreover, the defendants 

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     14  There is no indication in the record that Meister objected to 
submission of the IOM Report.  Hence, her attempt to object on 
appeal to the district court's consideration of the June 1999 IOM 
Report is not properly preserved for appeal.  See Willoughby v. 
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

brought to the district court's attention a landscape of litiga-
tion in other federal districts in which judges were unanimous 
in rejecting as lacking in scientific basis and contrary to the 
overwhelming medical literature the type of testimony offered 
by Drs. Borenstein and Shanklin.15  Affording Meister leeway 
to counter this evidence, the district court let the jury hear 
her expert evidence.  See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 827 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1988).16  Dr. Boren-
stein had a causal hypothesis based on treating Meister and 
suggestions he found in the medical literature;  Dr. Shanklin 
had merely a theory.  Dr. Borenstein's conclusion is suspect 
for two main reasons.  "Temporal methodology" may some-
times provide the basis for reliable scientific hypotheses, but 
not in the case of scleroderma, which typically waxes and 
wanes, or where the focus is on the disappearance of only one 
symptom following explantation as proving causation.  Even 
more crucially, no reasonable scientist would rely on this 
methodology in the face of voluminous epidemiological evi-
dence to the contrary.  See Raynor, 104 F.3d at 1374.  Dr. 

__________
     15  See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. 
Colo. 1998);  Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 
873 (W.D. Tex. 1997);  Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 
F. Supp. 1387, 1414 (D. Or. 1996);  In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 
F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996).  The defendants also cited cases 
from state courts in Texas and California.  See Minnesota Mining 
and Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App. 1998);  
Johnson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. CV-92-07501 (Tr. Ct. 
N.M. Feb. 23, 1998);  Dinerman v. McGhan Med. Corp., No. BC 
065884 (Super. Ct. Calif. Aug. 12, 1997);  Bailey v. Dow Corning 
Corp., 1996 WL 937659, at *1, (Tex. D. Ct. Sept. 6, 1996).

     16  Contrary to Meister's contention at oral argument that this 
court should review the district court's initial rulings, they are 
merged when the district court grants judgment.  Thus, "[i]t is of 
no moment that the district court granted judgment [as a matter of 
law] instead of taking the case from the jury earlier by directing a 
verdict for [the defendants].  The court has counseled that the 
better practice is to let the case go to the jury and, if it finds 
liability, to set the verdict aside."  Richardson, 857 F.2d at 827 n.27 
(citations omitted).

Shanklin's causation testimony was deficient perhaps most 
tellingly insofar as his theory relied on case reports suggest-
ing a connection between silica and scleroderma, even though 
he did not purport to find support for such a connection in the 
epidemiological studies, thus creating an analytical gap be-
tween the data and his opinion that "is simply too great."17  
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).18

     Ultimately, it is Meister's experts' heavy reliance on case 
reports that is her undoing.  Although case reports may 
suffice under some circumstances, the defendants introduced 
expert testimony that was supported by a uniform body of 
evidence including epidemiological studies failing to establish 
a causal link between silicone breast implants and connective 
tissue disease.  The IOM Report was right on point.  Case 
reports were presenting hypotheses that needed to be evalu-
ated through the epidemiological method.  The National 
Academy of Science evaluated the hypotheses being devel-
oped in the case studies and concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show a causal relationship between silicone 
breast implant and scleroderma.  Hence, the district court 
could reasonably conclude that reasonable people could not 
differ as to the import of the epidemiological evidence.

__________
     17  Meister's attempt to rely, for the first time on appeal, on the 
testimony of the implanting physician, Dr. Thomas Fawell, is not 
properly before the court.  See Marymount Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 
19 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994);  Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Neumours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

     18  Meister's reliance on Carmichael v. Samyang, Tire, Inc., 131 
F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), which was overruled sub nom. Kumho 
Tire Co, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), is misplaced.  Her 
reliance on Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307 (11th 
Cir. 2000), is also misplaced because Dr. Shanklin did not testify on 
causation directly but merely described a disease process.  Id. at 
1312.  Her reliance on Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 14 
P.3d 596 (Or. 2000), is to no avail because in that case the expert 
evidence addressed correlations, not causation, and the Oregon 
court was not confronted with overwhelming epidemiological evi-
dence contrary to the new theory based on preliminary work that 
was at issue.  Id. at 601-02, 608.

     Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the district 
court in excising Meister's expert medical testimony, see 
Raynor, 104 F.3d at 1374, and, in light of the insufficient 
remaining evidence to support the jury's verdict, no imper-
missible usurpation of the jury's function, see Weisgram v. 
Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 454 n.10 (2000);  Richardson, 857 
F.2d at 833, in granting judgment as a matter of law, and we 
affirm.