RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0273-19T2
M.H.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.B.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued telephonically July 15, 2020 –
Decided July 27, 2020
Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
On Appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FV-07-3706-19.
Kelly T. McGriff, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
1
We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of court records concerning
domestic violence. R. 1:38-3(d)(9).
Defendant appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against
her pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 2 (the Act). Because
we find the record inadequate to establish jurisdiction under the Act, or a
predicate act of domestic violence, and the judge failed to find that a restraining
order was necessary to protect the victim from immediate danger or further acts
of domestic violence, we reverse.
Plaintiff and defendant apparently never lived together. Plaintiff is
married to defendant's brother. At the hearing on the FRO, both parties appeared
without lawyers. We derive the following facts from the trial record.
On June 18, 2019, the parties had a disagreement through text messaging
that lasted for several hours. The incident began when defendant tried calling
plaintiff several times regarding a surprise birthday party defendant was
planning for her nephew (plaintiff's son). After plaintiff failed to answer her
telephone calls, at 4:08 p.m. defendant sent plaintiff a text, "[What the hell] is
your problem??? . . . [W]hen I call I'll appreciate [it] if you answer my call."
Plaintiff immediately responded, "Fuck you. Like that."
2
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.
A-0273-19T2
2
Defendant sent a text message to plaintiff at 4:22 pm, which contained a
picture of a message plaintiff had sent defendant earlier, with laughing faces.
That was the end of all communication between the parties until 6:45 p.m., when
plaintiff re-initiated the conversation. Defendant responded to plaintiff's text
messages saying, among other things, "please stop harassing me and my family."
There was no communication between the parties until almost two hours later ,
at 8:47 p.m., when plaintiff re-initiated the conversation for a second time. In
six separate messages, defendant asked plaintiff to stop texting her:
4:22 p.m. – "liar please stop texting me."
6:56 p.m. – "please stop harassing me and my family."
8:50 p.m. – "why are you so upset? Stop texting me if you don't
want to be an adult and communicate …"
9:02 p.m. – "stop texting me …"
9:27 p.m. – "stop texting me."
9:51 p.m. – "stop texting me and bring your [proof] to court"
The next day, each party filed a domestic violence complaint alleging
harassment against the other party, and each party was granted a temporary
restraining order against the other. Each party's complaint alleged the other
party was a former member of the same household of the complaining party.
A-0273-19T2
3
Following a trial, the court found that it was defendant who continued
contacting plaintiff after plaintiff told her to stop. Although plaintiff did send
text messages to defendant asking her to stop contacting her as well, at two
different times, it was plaintiff who sent the next communication after a two-
hour lapse. The court also found defendant responsible for actions committed
by a third party on three occasions, concluding "the defendant or someone
associated with the defendant attempted to contact the plaintiff repeatedly."
Finally, the court determined that a FRO was necessary "to protect the welfare
and safety of the victim," citing the "bad blood between the parties" and
plaintiff's impending "very contentious" divorce from defendant's brother . The
court made this determination, despite finding there had been no prior history of
domestic violence, and plaintiff’s only allegation of "fear" was that the
defendant, and her family, would continue contacting her.
A FRO may issue only if the judge finds that the parties have a relationship
bringing the complained of conduct within the Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); that
a party committed an act designated as domestic violence, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a);
and the "restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an
immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super.
A-0273-19T2
4
112, 127 (App. Div. 2006). Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that
plaintiff failed to satisfy any of these requirements.
On the facts presented, the only basis for jurisdiction was that the parties
were former household members. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). While defendant's
testimony suggested the parties may have previously lived together ("[plaintiff]
was living at my mother's house"), plaintiff's testimony was clear and emphatic
that she never lived in the same household at the same time with defendant.
In determining whether former qualifying relationships provide
jurisdiction under the Act, we have focused on whether the "perpetrator's past
domestic relationship with the alleged victim provides a special opportunity for
'abusive and controlling behavior.'" Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 283 N.J. Super. 17,
20 (App. Div. 1995); accord Coleman v. Romano, 388 N.J. Super. 342, 351-52
(Ch. Div. 2006) (setting forth a six-factor test to determine whether jurisdiction
exists based on the parties' status as former household members). Although the
nature of the parties' relationship as alleged by both parties in their respective
complaints may have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, the
record lacks any convincing evidence to support a finding that they are former
household members. In addition, the judge's failure to apply the factors
A-0273-19T2
5
identified in the case law, or undertake any jurisdictional analysis on the record,
prevents us from endorsing his conclusion.
We have similar reservations regarding the court's determination that
defendant committed an act of domestic violence. We acknowledge the
deference owed to the determinations made by family judges hearing domestic
violence cases. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (l998). Findings by the
trial court "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence." Id. at 412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins.
Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (l974)). Here, we do not view the text messages sent by
defendant as constituting harassment, especially since plaintiff was the party
who twice continued the email exchange after receiving no texts from defendant
for over two hours.
Notwithstanding our doubt as to whether the judge's finding of a predicate
act was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, the entry of the
FRO must be reversed for a completely independent reason. A judge's finding
of an act of domestic violence is only the first of a two-step process; the second
step requires a finding that a restraining order "is necessary . . . to protect the
victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 387 N.J.
Super. at 127. Here, the judge made no finding that the entry of a restraining
A-0273-19T2
6
order was necessary to protect plaintiff. Significantly, there was no prior
history of domestic violence between the parties, who agreed they had a good
relationship prior to the June 17, 2019 incident. There was no testimony
regarding the existence of immediate danger to plaintiff. Plaintiff did not claim
she was in physical fear of defendant. Her only allegation of "fear" was that
defendant, and her family, who are plaintiff's in-laws, would continue contacting
her. We are satisfied the record does not support a separate finding that final
restraints were necessary to protect plaintiff from an immediate danger or to
prevent further abuse. See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 488 (2011). We
therefore reverse the order granting the FRO.
Reversed.
A-0273-19T2
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M.H. VS. J.B. (FV-07-3706-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
Combined Opinion