No. 13210
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF MONTANA
F
GEORGE D. MISKOVICH,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
CITY OF HELENA, MONTANA, a Municipal
C o r p o r a t i o n , JACK WILLIAMS, Chief o f
P o l i c e o f s a i d C i t y of Helena; THE
POLICE COMMISSION o f s a i d C i t y of
Helena and t h e members t h e r e o f i n t h e i r
o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y a s P o l i c e Commissioners,
e t al.,
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Na t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
C. W. L e a p h a r t , Jr. a r g u e d , Helena, Montana
F o r Respondent :
L o b l e , P i c o t t e and P a u l y , Helena, Montana
Gene A . P i c o t t e a r g u e d , Helena, Montana
Submitted: A p r i l 21, 1976
Decided : A I R 2 ,1 :976
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The City of Helena appeals from a judgment of the district
court, Lewis and Clark County, Hon. Nat Allen presiding, reversing
the Helena Police Commission's findings and adjudication and
restoring policeman George D. Miskovich to the rank of sergeant
with retroactive pay.
On April 25, 1974, Sergeant Miskovich an eight year veteran
of the Helena Police Department, with a spotless record and an
early appointment to the rank of sergeant, was charged by the
Chief of Police with three specific episodes, each alleged to con-
stitute "misconduct in office", "conduct unbecoming an officer1'
and conduct "such as to bring reproach upon the police force". The
charges were in writing:
1. Cameron arrest, February 3, 1974
(a) Striking arrestee Cameron in the face while
transporting him to police station, breaking Cameron's nose.
(b) Grabbing Cameron by the hair in the police
station and pounding his head upon the booking desk on two or
more occasions.
(c) Throwing Cameron to the floor and beating him
with fists after Cameron requested permission to take a breathylizer
test.
2. Coldwell arrest, March 4, 1973.
Putting a "full Nelson" upon an arrestee named Coldwell,
then releasing Coldwell, grabbing him with one hand and hitting
him in the face.
3. St.Marks arrest, June 23, 1973.
Arresting a woman named Mrs. St. Marks for public drunken-
n e s s , and when t h i s woman i n d i c a e d t h a t s h e d i d n o t d e s i r e t o
go i n t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , grabbing h e r , p u l l i n g h e r forward and
" h i t t i n g h e r i n t h e f a c e w i t h h e r purse", a t t h e same time s h o u t i n g
a c c u s a t i o n s a t h e r and holding h e r by t h e h a i r .
A l l t h r e e charges were contained i n one w r i t t e n document.
The f i r s t occurred about t h r e e months p r i o r t o c h a r g e s , t h e
remaining two approximately a year b e f o r e . It s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c i t e d
t h a t a l l charges were brought under s e c t i o n 11-1806(1), R.C.M.
1947, n o t i f y i n g Miskovich t h a t he would be t r i e d b e f o r e t h e
p o l i c e commission i n accordance w i t h t h e s t a t u t e . I n t h e same
paragraph Miskovich, on t h o s e i d e n t i c a l c h a r g e s , was suspended
without pay and without h e a r i n g , e f f e c t i v e immediately. T h i s suspen-
s i o n w i t h o u t n o t i c e o r h e a r i n g was e x p r e s s l y done by t h e Chief of
P o l i c e i n accordance w i t h s e c t i o n 11-1806(10), R.C .M. 1947.
Miskovich f i l e d a mandamus proceeding i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
Lewis and C l a r k County, s u c c e s s f u l l y o b t a i n i n g a w r i t of mandate
t o f o r b i d t h e summary suspension beyond t h e l a s t day of A p r i l 1974,
because t h e s t a t u t e provided a maximum suspension under s u b s e c t i o n
(10) of t e n days i n any one c a l e n d a r month, and he was suspended
on A p r i l 25. Miskovich appealed t h i s summary f i v e day suspension
t o t h e $ ' o l i c e commission, a s provided i n t h e s t a t u t e . That a p p e a l
was heard on t h e same evidence as were t h e charges under s u b s e c t i o n
(I). The p o l i c e Commission h e l d a g a i n s t Miskovich on t h e suspension
a p p e a l , and because t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t provide f o r a f u r t h e r
a p p e a l , t h e summary d i s c i p l i n e under s u b s e c t i o n (10) became f i n a l .
The Helena P o l i c e Commission, a t h r e e man body, was o f f i c i a l l y
c h a i r e d by Commissioner P f e i f f e r , who became ill and l e f t t h e h e a r i n g .
A t h i s d e p a r t u r e i t was a p p a r e n t l y s t i p u l a t e d by a l l p a r t i e s t h a t
P f e i f f e r would be excused and would n o t p a r t i c i p a t e f u r t h e r
i n the case. The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h e r e was a s t i p u l a t i o n b u t t h e
s p e c i f i c terms a r e i n doubt. P f e i f f e r missed t h e testimony of
s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s , p l u s most of t h e d i r e c t examination of M i s -
kovich. He r e t u r n e d t o t h e h e a r i n g i n t h e c o u r s e of Miskovich's
d i r e c t examination, and proceeded t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e tommission's
f i n d i n g s and d e c i s i o n , s i g n i n g a s Chairman of t h e p o l i c e Commission.
The p o l i c e commission found t h e charges a r i s i n g o u t of t h e
Coldwell a r r e s t of March 1973 were n o t proven. Those a r i s i n g out
of t h e St.Marks a r r e s t of June 1973, were found proven i n t h e i r
entirety. Those a r i s i n g from t h e Cameron i n c i d e n t of February
1974 were found proven i n p a r t , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e u s e of e x c e s s i v e
f o r c e i n backhanding Cameron and slamming h i s f a c e i n t o t h e booking
counter. I n accordance w i t h t h e s e f i n d i n g s , t h e commission suspended
Miskovich an a d d i t i o n a l t h i r t y days and permanently reduced h i s
rank from s e r g e a n t t o patrolman.
These p e n a l t i e s were approved by t h e c i t y manager. The
s t a t u t o r y a c t i o n f o r review i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t by Miskovich
ensued. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t reviewed t h e r e c o r d i n t h e manner
d i r e c t e d by t h e d e c i s i o n of t h i s Court i n a p r i o r proceeding
by t h e C i t y of Helena i n s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , ( C i t y of Helena
v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 5 2 . ) ,
r e v e r s e d t h e p o l i c e commission d e c i s i o n and r e s t o r e d Miskovich
r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o h i s pay, emoluments and rank. This a p p e a l by
t h e C i t y of Helena followed.
The C i t y p r e s e n t s f o u r i s s u e s f o r review:
(1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t exceeded i t s scope
of review i n r e v e r s i n g t h e p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s on t h e weight
of t h e evidence.
(2) Whether a policeman subject to charges under
section 11-1806 (I), R.C.M. 1947, can also be suspended on the
same charges under section 11-1806 ( o , R.C.M. 1947.
l)
(3) Whether the district court erred in concluding
the police commission findings were nul'lified by the absence of
Commissioner Pfeiffer.
( ) Whether certain evidentiary rulings of the p'olice
4
oommission materially prejudiced Sergeant Miskovich.
The City contends the district court exceeded its scope
of review of the police comtrkion proceedings. In support of its
position the City relies on the Montana Administrative Procedure
Act, specifically section 82-4216 ( ) R.C .M. 1947, which states
7,
in pertinent part:
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that
of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. * * *I1
First, the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, Title
82, Chapter 42, is not applicable to the administrative functions
of metropolitan police commissions. The full title of the Montana
Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 2, Laws of Montana 1971,
Extraordinary Session, reads in pertinent part:
"An act prescribing .uniform procedures for state
administrative agencies * * *'.I (Emphasis supplied.)
The Montana Administrative Procedure Act defines "agency" at section
82-4202 ( ) R.C.M. 1947, as:
I,
"* * * any board, bureau, commission, department,
authority or officer of the state government
authorized by law to make rules and to determine
contested cases * * *.I1 (Emphasis supplied.)
Though city police commissions are creations of state
statute, they are obviously entities of municipal government.
It is the mayor or city manager who appoints the police commissioners
w i t h t h e consent of t h e c i t y c o u n c i l o r commission. The c i t y
c o u n c i l o r c i t y commission determines t h e compensation of p o l i c e
commissioners, s e c t i o n 11-1804, R.C.M. 1947. I t i s t h e d u t y of
t h e p o l i c e commission t o o v e r s e e t h e h i r i n g and d i s c i p l i n e of
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s being municipal employees,
s e c t i o n s 11-1805, 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947. See S t a t e of Montana v .
District, Mont . Y P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 464.
S i n c e t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o l i c e commission i s n o t a s t a t e adminis-
t r a t i v e agency a s d e f i n e d i n t h e Montana A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedure
A c t , t h e a c t i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e scope of
d i s t r i c t c o u r t review of p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s .
The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Law,
T i t l e 11, Chapter 18. S e c t i o n 11-1806 ( 7 ) , R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s :
"When a charge a g a i n s t a member of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e i s
found proven by t h e board, and i s n o t vetoed by t h e
mayor, t h e mayor must make an o r d e r e n f o r c i n g t h e d e c i -
s i o n of t h e b o a r d , o r i f modified by t h e mayor, t h e n such
d e c i s i o n a s modified, and such d e c i s i o n o r o r d e r s h a l l
be s u b j e c t t o review by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e p r o p e r
county on a l l q u e s t i o n s of f a c t and a l l q u e s t i o n s of law."
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
This Court i n d i s p o s i t i o n of a p r e v i o u s a p p l i c a t i o n by
t h e C i t y of Helena f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l d i r e c t e d t o
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ( C i t y of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont.
74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 5 2 , 5 4 ) , i n t e r p r e t e d d i s t r i c t c o u r t
review of p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s i n t h i s manner:
"* * *However, t o review t h e law i s t o a s c e r t a i n whether
t h e r u l i n g s t h e r e o n were c o r r e c t , t o review t h e f a c t s i s
t o determine whether t h e evidence s u p p o r t s t h e p o l i c e
commission f i n d i n g s . T h i s would be s i m i l a r t o t h e review
of law and f a c t s a s i n an e q u i t y c a s e . See s e c t i o n 93-
216, R.C.M. 1947."
I t has long been h e l d by t h i s Court t h a t review of f a c t s i n
an e q u i t y c a s e i s based on t h e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t e s t . White v.
Nollmeyer, 151 Mont. 387, 443 P.2d 873; Bender v. Bender, 144
Mont. 470, 397 P.2d 957; Kyser v. Hiebert, 142 Mont. 466, 385
P.2d 90. Thus t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s power t o make i t s own d e t e r -
mination a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence r e s u l t i n g from t h e
p o l i c e commission hearings i s analogous t o t h i s Court's power
t o do t h e same i n e q u i t y cases. Here, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e t e r -
mined t h e r e was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o warrant t h e p o l i c e
commission f i n d i n g s .
Upon review of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e p o l i c e commission
hearing, we agree w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s determination a s t o
t h e weight of t h e evidence bearing i n mind t h e two b a s i c p r i n c i -
p l e s espoused by t h i s Court i n S t a t e ex r e l . Wentworth v. Baker,
101 Mont. 226, 53 P.2d 440. I n t h a t c a s e , t h e c i t y council and
mayor suspended a policeman. A f t e r i s s u i n g a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i
and holding a hearing, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s e t a s i d e t h e suspension and
ordered t h e policeman r e i n s t a t e d . I n reviewing t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
a c t i o n , t h i s Court f i r s t s a i d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judgment i s presumed
t o be c o r r e c t and t h e r e f o r e t h e burden i s on t h e p a r t y challenging
it. Second, i n determining whether t h e challenging p a r t y has met
i t s burden, t h i s Court has t h e duty of determining whether o r n o t
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence e x i s t s i n t h e record t o support t h e charge.
A s a f i n a l statement on t h i s C o u r t ' s r o l e i n reviewing a proceeding
such a s t h i s and by way of i n t r o d u c t i o n t o discussion of t h e
evidence i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , we n o t e t h e p o l i c e d i s c i p l i n e case
Bailey v. Examining & T r i a l Board, 42 Mont. 216,218, 112 P. 69,
where t h e Court s a i d :
"The e f f e c t of t h i s provision i s t h a t a d e c i s i o n
of t h e examining and t r i a l board on questions of f a c t
i s f i n a l and conclusive on a l l c o u r t s i f t h e r e i s any
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support i t . Whether t h e r e i s
o r not i s a question i n the f i r s t instance f o r a
d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o d e c i d e . A charge w i t h o u t s u b s t a n c e
i s no c h a r g e , and a f i n d i n g w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence a s i t s b a s i s i s no f i n d i n g . One of t h e
e s s e n t i a l requirements of law i s t h a t a charge s h a l l
be brought a g a i n s t t h e o f f i c e r and t h a t such c h a r g e
s h a l l embody f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a c a u s e
of a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e Act. Another i s
t h a t , b e f o r e t h e charge can be s u s t a i n e d , some
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence must be g i v e n i n s u p p o r t of i t .
9
: * *"
Turning t o t h e testimony p r e s e n t e d a t t h e p o l i c e commission
h e a r i n g , w e n o t e t h i s testimony i n s u p p o r t of t h e h o l d i n g t h a t
t h e r e was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e p o l i c e commission
findings :
(1) A s t o t h e charges stemming from t h e Cameron i n c i d e n t ,
Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t e n r o u t e t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n Miskovich
engaged i n an unprovoked a t t a c k a g a i n s t him a t a time when he was
handcuffed. Cameron claimed Miskovich's a t t a c k broke h i s nose.
However o t h e r testimony r e v e a l s t h e i n c i d e n t may n o t have been
q u i t e a s Cameron p i c t u r e d i t . Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had s p e n t
t h r e e t o f o u r hours i n a l o c a l b a r p r i o r t o h i s a r r e s t . Officer
Sebens, p r e s e n t a t t h e time of Cameron's a r r e s t , t e s t i f i e d Cameron
r e s i s t e d a r r e s t b u t t h a t Miskovich engaged i n no p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y
a t t h a t time. O f f i c e r Crawford, a l s o p r e s e n t a t t h e time of
Cameron's a r r e s t , v e r i f i e d O f f i c e r Sebens' testimony. Miskovich
t e s t i f i e d Cameron was a b u s i v e , u n r u l y , and r e s i s t e d a r r e s t and d u r i n g
t h e d r i v e t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , Cameron kicked him i n t h e c h e s t ,
momentarily s t u n n i n g him, s o t h a t he f e l t compelled t o backhand
Cameron i n t h e f a c e t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f .
Upon h i s a r r i v a l a t t h e s t a t i o n , Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t
Miskovich continued t o abuse him, a t one p o i n t grabbing him by
t h e h a i r and slamming h i s f a c e i n t o t h e booking c o u n t e r . Officers
Valiton and S t r a d l e y confirmed Cameron's s t o r y on t h i s p o i n t .
However, once again o t h e r testimony would tend t o c a s t s u b s t a n t i a l
doubt on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r version of t h e i n c i d e n t . Bonnie Goltz,
working a s a d i s p a t c h e r near t h e booking counter a t t h e time of
t h e a l l e g e d face slamming i n c i d e n t , d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e
testimony of t h e s e two o f f i c e r s , s t a t i n g Cameron was s o unruly
t h a t Miskovich held h i s head t o t h e booking counter t o calm him
down. She e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t h a t a t no time d i d Miskovich slam
Cameron's head a g a i n s t t h e counter.
I n a d d i t i o n , one of t h e o f f i c e r s who t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e C i t y ,
O f f i c e r S t r a d l e y , was under i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n connection with an
a l l e g e d felony i n Broadwater County. The v i c t i m of t h a t felony
t e s t i f i e d t h a t no p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n was t o
be taken a g a i n s t O f f i c e r S t r a d l e y u n t i l 'I* * * a f t e r t h e Miskovich
c a s e was taken c a r e of ** *'I. The v i c t i m t e s t i f i e d f u r t h e r t h a t
t h i s was t h e r e a c t i o n , even though he informed t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of
a signed confession by O f f i c e r S t r a d l e y on t h e matter. O f f i c e r
Eielena
S t r a d l e y has s i n c e been removed from t h e l p o l i c e department.
F i n a l l y , :in view of t h e a l l e g e d charge of excessive violence
i n f l i c t e d on Cameron by Miskovich, evidence a s t o Cameron's a c t u a l
physical condition subsequent t o t h e a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t i s of t h e
utmost importance. O f f i c e r Grant ~ o h n s o n ,a witness f o r t h e c i t y
and t h e o f f i c e r i n charge of t h e s h i f t on t h e day of t h e a r r e s t ,
s t a t e d on cross-examination t h a t he t o l d Miskovich on t h e day of
t h e a r r e s t t h a t Cameron d i d n o t appear t o be i n j u r e d . A close
examination of t h e photo of Cameron taken t h e day of h i s a r r e s t
and marked Miskovich Exhibit 2 , shows no marks on t h e p r i s o n e r
compatible with t h e a l l e g e d violence purportedly i n f l i c t e d on
Cameron's head and face.
In view of the foregoing evidence, we hold the findings of
the police commission as to charges against Miskovich stemming
from the Cameron arrest are not supported by substantial evidence,
(2) The police commission findings as to the St. Marks
arrest of June 1973. Officer Bryson who assisted Miskovich in
arresting the St. Marks woman testified that upon arriving at the
police station, Miskovich proceeded to grab the woman by the
hair and pull her down an entrance ramp, at the same time striking
her in the face with her purse. Miskovich testified he felt com-
pelled to strike her once with her purse because she was kicking
and biting and had taken his thumb in her mouth and refused to
let go.
Further scrutiny of Officer Bryson's testimony reveals
(1) he admitted the woman had been drinking, (2) it was necessary
for both officers to exert force to accomplish the arrest and
place her in the patrol car, and (3) the woman attempted to jump
out of the patrol car on the way to the station.
Mrs. St. Marks plead guilty to a charge of resisting arrest,
paid a $50 fine, and was given a suspended jail sentence. She also
plead guilty to a charge of drunkenness and paid a fine of $25.
Further, she failed to appear at the commission hearing. On the
basis of this evidence the police commission findings as to the
St. Marks incident were not supported by substantial evidence.
This type of case should properly be decided on the merits
if a t all possible. This we have done and consequently an in depth
discussion of the procedural due process issues raised is not
necessary to the disposition of this matter--but we will comment
briefly for clarification of these issues.
Appellant City's second issue seeks a clarification of
section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947 as to subsections (1) and ( 0 .
1)
Miskovich was suspended pursuant to subsection (10) of
section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947. Utilizing the same charges used
to justify his suspension, he was then subjected to a police
commission hearing pursuant to subsection (1) of section 11-1806.
The City contends subsection (10) is a proper means of suspending
a policeman pending charges brought under subsection (I), it argues
that the power of suspension is incident to the power of removal.
Miskovich, on the other hand, contends the applicable subsections
are mutually exclusive, and thereforeace charges were brought
under subsection (lo), those same charges could not be used to
institute proceedings under subsection ( )
1.
The City contends that suspension pending hearing on the
charges is a perfectly legitimate administrative exercise. We
agree. However, that principle is not dispositive of the issue.
The question here is the mode of such suspension, considering
the applicable statute.
While subsections (1) through (9) and subsection (lo), of
section 11-1806, all deal with matters of police discipline, it
is apparent the procedure and remedies available under subsections
(1) through (9) are more detailed in their due process protections
than those under subsection ( 0 .
1) In particular, contrary to sub-
sections (1) through ( ) subsection (10) does not provide for
9,
written notice of charges or a hearing prior to suspension, rather
the only action required is a notice of suspension given by the
mayor or the chief of police, with the approval of the mayor. In
addition, suspension under subsection (10) can only be for ten days
in any one month, with the only appeal of that suspension being to
the police commission since subsection (10) does not provide
for judicial review.
In construing a statutory situation such as exists here,
this Court in Adair v. Schnack, 117 Mont. 377, 386, 161 P.2d
641, quoted with approval from the California case People v.
Campbell, 110 Cal.App. 783, 291 P. 161, 162:
"'It is a settled rule of statutory construction
that, where different language is used in the same con-
nection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed
the legislature intended a different meaning and effect. "I
In State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 20, 195 P.
2d 989, the Court said:
"A fundamental rule of construction is that, if
possible, effect shall be given to all parts of a statute.
* * * And each part of a statute must be given a rea-
sonable construction which will enable it to be har-
monized with other provisions * * * and give it vitality
and make operative all of its provisions. * * * Statutes
I
should be so construed as to give a sensible and in-
telligent meaning to every part and avoid absurd and
unjust consequences. Section 516, Lewis' Sutherland
Stat.Const. (2d ~d.)' * * * . I ' (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, in view of provisions in section 11-1806,
subsections (1) through (9) and subsection (lp), R.C.M. 1947,
we hold they are mutually exclusive with subsection (10) intended
to deal with minor disciplinary matters capable of being handled
within the police department and subsections (1) through (9)
intended for charges of a more serious nature, charges which could,
if proven, lead to discharge from the police force. Therefore,
a policeman charged under section 11-1806, subsection (lo), cannot
also be subject to identical charges under section 11-1806, subsec-
tion ( )
1. To construe this statute otherwise would be to hold
the legislature intended to subject the policeman, on one set of
charges, to two proceedings before the police commission, one with
v a r i o u s procedural safeguards and t h e r i g h t t o j u d i c i a l review,
and t h e o t h e r of a more summary n a t u r e w i t h no r i g h t of j u d i c i a l
review. It i s such "absurd and u n j u s t consequences" a l l u d e d
t o i n S t a t e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. Cole, s u p r a , t h a t t h i s
Court s t r i v e s t o avoid. However, we emphasize t h i s holding does
n o t mean a p o l i c e o f f i c e r cannot be suspended pending a h e a r i n g
on charges b u t only t h a t t h e same charges may n o t be used t o
e f f e c t both suspension under s u b s e c t i o n ( l o ) , and t h e i n i t i a t i o n
of t h e formal h e a r i n g process under s u b s e c t i o n (1).
W a g r e e w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t a member of an a d m i n i s t r a -
e
t i v e t r i b u n a l who was a b s e n t from a p o r t i o n of t h e a d j u d i c a t i v e
proceedings b e f o r e t h a t t r i b u n a l should n o t be allowed t o p a r t i -
cipate i n i t s f i n a l decision. This would be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m -
p o r t a n t as i t p e r t a i n s t o a p o l i c e commission. Here, t h e r e was
a t r a n s c r i p t r e c o r d of t h e proceedings b e f o r e t h e commission b u t
t h i s may n o t always be t r u e as t h e s t a t u t e does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t
a r e c o r d be k e p t . C i t y of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74,
530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 52.
Finding no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n and s u f f i c i e n t s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , we a f f i r m t h e judgment
t o r e i n s t a t e respondent p o l i c e o f f i c e r t o s e r g e a n t ' s rank w i t h
retroact i v e and o t h e r .
We concur:
Justices
dlu!
/
'
i
JI.'
f,JA
fi611." Robert Nelson, District
g for chief Justice
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting:
n
I dissent.
1