No, 84-559
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
MISSOULA COUPJTY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
AMERICAN ASPHALT, INC .,
Defendant and Respondent,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula,
Montana
For Respondent:
Snavely & Phillips, Missoula, Montana
Worden, Thane & Haines; Ronald Bender, Missoula,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 14, 1985
Decided: June 25, 1985
Filed:
-
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f the
Court.
M i s s o u l a County a p p e a l s from a judgment of t h e Fourth
Judicial District, Missoula County, holding that sections
76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA exempted American A s p h a l t ' s m i n i n g
o p e r a t i o n s from c o u n t y z o n i n g and p l a n n i n g . W e affirm.
The Department of State Lands issued a permit to
American Asphalt under the Montana Open Cut Mining Act,
section 82-4-401, et seq., MCA, on September 1, 1982 and
American A s p h a l t began excavating gravel. T h i s Department
required American Asphalt to create a visual and sound
b a r r i e r o f t o p s o i l ; t o p l a n t t r e e s t o r e d u c e v i s u a l and sound
impact; t o u s e d u s t s u p p r e s s a n t on t h e r o a d t o t h e p i t ; to
fence the area to protect children; and to drive trucks
entering or leaving the mine only on a specific route in
o r d e r t o a v o i d d r i v i n g by a n e l e m e n t a r y s c h o o l .
The Missoula Planning Office, in response to a
citizen's complaint, asked them t o c e a s e e x c a v a t i o n w i t h i n
t h e C l a r k Fork R i v e r F l o o d p l a i n a r e a u n t i l they obtained a
floodplain permit. When American Asphalt continued to
excavate gravel without a permit, Missoula County s o u g h t a
preliminary injunction t o h a l t t h e operation. On September
14, 1982, the District Court denied the request for an
injunction but ordered American Asphalt to apply for a
floodplain permit.
American A s p h a l t a p p l i e d f o r and r e c e i v e d a p e r m i t on
November 9 , 1982 from t h e Board o f County Commissioners. The
f l o o d p l a i n p e r m i t was l i m i t e d t o g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n u n l e s s t h e
c o u r t decided o t h e r proposed a c t i v i t i e s w e r e a l l o w a b l e under
the applicable zoning and comprehensive planning for the
area.
The subject property was zoned for single family
r e s i d e n t i a l u s e s w i t h a l i m i t o f one d w e l l i n g p e r a c r e p r i o r
to the grave1 extraction by American Asphalt. The uses
d e s i g n a t e d i n t h e M i s s o u l a Urban Area Comprehensive P l a n a r e
r u r a l low d e n s i t y r e s i d e n t i a l , p a r k s and open s p a c e . Gravel
extraction, gravel processing, and asphalt and concrete
p r o d u c t i o n a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d u s e s i n t h i s zone. The County
regulations currently allow gravel extraction only i n c e r t a i n
areas with a special exception permit. Processing, of
g r a v e l , such a s washing, s c r e e n i n g , c r u s h i n g and m i x i n g w i t h
a s p h a l t o i l o r cement i s a l l o w e d only i n industrial zones.
American Asphalt is currently extracting, washing,
crushing, and s o r t i n g gravel with s p e c i a l e q u i p m e n t on t h e
site. They i n t e n d t o l o c a t e a n a s p h a l t b a t c h p l a n t i n which
asphalt oil i s added t o t h e sorted gravel and a concrete
b a t c h p l a n t i n which cement i s added t o t h e s o r t e d g r a v e l on
the site as well. According to testimony presented by
American A s p h a l t a t t r i a l , t h e a s p h a l t and c o n c r e t e b a t c h i n g
a r e p a r t of t h e recovery process. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found
that these activities are contained within the terms
"mining", "use" and "recovery" as commonly used in the
industry.
M i s s o u l a County, i n a n amended c o m p l a i n t f i l e d O c t o b e r
12, 1982, s o u g h t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment on t h e i s s u e s t a t e d
above. The c a s e was h e a r d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , sitting
without a jury, on J u n e 28 and 29, 1984. On J u l y 3 1 , 1984,
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s s u e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f
law and judgment in favor of American Asphalt. Missoula
County a p p e a l s from t h a t p a r t o f t h e judgment holding t h a t
sections 76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA exempt all mining
operations from the zoning and comprehensive planning of
M i s s o u l a County.
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w a r e :
(1) Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t s e c t i o n s
76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA to exempt American Asphalt's
grave1 operations from M i s s o u l a County z o n i n g and p l a n n i n g
regulations?
(2) Did the District Court correctly find that the
a c t i v i t i e s o f American A s p h a l t were w i t h i n t h e " c o m p l e t e u s e ,
d e v e l o p m e n t and r e c o v e r y o f a m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e " p u r s u a n t t o
s e c t i o n 76-2-209, MCA?
Section 76-2-209, MCA, part of the zoning enabling
legislation, provides: "No resolution or rule adopted
pursuant t o the provisions of t h i s p a r t . . . shall prevent
the complete u s e , development, o r recovery of any m i n e r a l ,
f o r e s t , o r a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s o u r c e s by t h e owner t h e r e o f . " The
chapter on p l a n n i n g c o n t a i n s a n e a r l y identical provision,
s e c t i o n 76-1-113, MCA which s t a t e s : "Nothing i n t h i s c h a p t e r
shall be deemed to authorize an ordinance, resolution, or
r u l e which would p r e v e n t t h e c o m p l e t e u s e , development, or
r e c o v e r y o f any m i n e r a l , f o r e s t , o r a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s o u r c e s by
t h e owner t h e r e o f . "
Missoula County contends that these statutes do n o t
prohibit the regulation of the location and manner of
p e r f o r m a n c e o f g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g a c t i v i t i e s ;
the legislature did not intend to prohibit counties from
exercising any form o f planning and zoning over mineral
r e s o u r c e s ; and the phrase "complete use, development, or
recovery'' does n o t i n c l u d e t h e range o f a c t i v i t i e s proposed
by American Asphalt. American Asphalt contends that the
statutes prohibit any rule or regulation under zoning and
planning law which would interfere with a property owner's
complete use, development and recovery of a mineral resource
and Missoula County's interpretation would render the
statutes a nullity.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that
the intention of the legislature controls. Section 1-2-102,
MCA; Montana Department of Revenue v. American Smelting and
Refining Co. (1977), 173 Mont. 316, 324, 567 P.2d 901, 906,
appeal dismissed 434 U.S. 985, 98 S.Ct. 884, 54 L.Ed.2d 793,
and Haker v. Southwestern Railway Co. (1978), 178 Mont. 364,
578 P.2d 724. The intention of the legislature must first be
determined from the plain meaning of the words used. Haker,
578 P.2d at 727; State ex rel. Sol v. Bakker (Mont. 1982),
649 P.2d 456, 39 St.Rep. 1471; and Tongue River Electric
Co-op, Inc. v. Montana Power Co. (1981), 636 P.2d 862, 864,
38 St.Rep. 2032. If the intent of the statute cannot be
determined from the plain meaning, the court then may resort
to other rules of statutory construction. State --- Sol,
ex rel.
649 P.2d at 459. The District Court concluded that the
statutes in question were not of doubtful meaning and that
the statutes ex~mpted all mining operations from Missoula
County's zoning and planning authority. However, neither
statute expressly prohibits regulation of mineral processing
or extraction. The statutes only say that no regulation
shall prevent the complete use, development or recovery of
certain natural resources.
An illustration of plain language expressly prohibiting
regulation of particular land uses is found in section
76-2-109, MCA. That section states: "No planning district or
recommendations adopted under this part shall regulate lands
used f o r grazing, horticulture, agriculture, o r t h e growing
of timber. " Section 76-1-113 and 76-2-209, MCA, by
c o m p a r i s o n , d o n o t p r o h i b i t r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e named r e s o u r c e s
by their plain language, they merely say any regulations
imposed by the county cannot result in preventing the
c o m p l e t e u s e , development o r r e c o v e r y o f t h e named r e s o u r c e s .
Part of the l e g i s l a t i v e purpose o f these statutes is
clear and unambiguous. They d e m o n s t r a t e the legislature's
awareness t h a t a range o f a c t i v i t i e s must o c c u r on s i t e i n
order for the owner of mineral, timber, or agricultural
r e s o u r c e s t o b e n e f i t and t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e n d
for counties to have the power to prevent the owner from
having t h a t b e n e f i t . However, what t h e r a n g e o f a c t i v i t i e s
are that cannot be prevented, is by no means clear and
unambiguous.
There is ambiguity in the interpretation and con-
struction of the phrase "complete use, development, or
recovery of any m i n e r a l . . . resource" and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n
t o g r a v e l e x t r a c t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g . In order t o interpret
t h i s p h r a s e w i t h i n t h e p l a i n meaning r u l e " t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d
must be reasonably and logically interpreted, g i v i n g words
t h e i r u s u a l and o r d i n a r y meaning." I n re M a t t e r o f McCabe
(1975), 168 Mont. 334, 339, 544 P.2d 825, 828. If the
s t a t u t e s p l a i n l y expressed l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t without s t r a i n -
ing interpretation, no e x t e n s i o n beyond that plain popular
meaning would be r e q u i r e d . Adams v . Morton (C.A.Mont. 1978),
581 F.2d 1314, 1320, c e r t . d e n i e d . Gros V e n t r e T r i b e o f F o r t
Belknap I n d i a n R e s e r v a t i o n v . U.S. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 440 U.S. 958, 99
S.Ct. 1498, 59 L.Ed.2d 771. If we resort to technical
meanings or other related statutes in order to ascertain
legislative intent, t h e n w e a r e no l o n g e r w i t h i n t h e p l a i n
meaning rule. The District Court here relied on the
technical meanings of the words within the gravel industry in
order to interpret and apply the statutes.
A reasonable construction of these broad statutes
depends, to an extent, on the circumstances in which they are
applied. Therefore, we must look to industry practices to
discern the extent to which the legislature authorized the
regulation of "use, development or recovery." Considering the
legislative intent to not prevent the owner of the resource
from benefiting, a county must at least allow the activities
necessary to develop the resource to a point at which it can
be effectively utilized. In the case at bar, the District
Court found that processing occurs at the site of gravel
extraction because the cost of transporting the material
elsewhere for processing would render the mining economically
infeasible. The District Court also found that gravel
processing on site includes washing, crushing, screening, and
concrete and asphalt batching and that these activities are
part of the recovery of gravel resources. Missoula County
argues that if gravel mining industry practices are relevant
to this case, American Asphalt did not produce sufficient
evidence to show that industry practices include the full
range of processing on site. We will not reverse a District
Court's findings of fact unless the record as a whole lacks
substantial, credible evidence to support the findings.
Wallace v. Wallace (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 455, 457, 40
St.Rep. 430, 433. We hold that the record supports the
District Court's findings noted above and that the District
Court properly applied the statutes involved.
Missoula County has urged this Court to construe the
meaning of these statutes in a broader context applicable to
a l l mineral, agricultural, and t i m b e r r e s o u r c e s . The r e c o r d
b e f o r e u s concerns g r a v e l mining i n a p a r t i c u l a r geographic
1o c a t i o n . We decline to announce a broad, sweeping
interpretation on such a narrow record and restrict the
holding o f t h i s opinion accordingly.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment i s
4.
W e concur: - /