MOGARRABI

Interim Decision *3028

MATTER OF MOGHARRABI

In Deportation Proceedings

A-23267920
A-2685037e

Decided by Board June 12, 1987

(1) In INS v. aurloza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (198'7), the United States Supreme Court
held that the "clear probability" of persecution standard employed for withhold-
ing of deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8
U.S.C- § 1205(h) (19132), doco not converge with, and may not be equated with, the
"well-founded fear" of persecution standard used for asylum under section 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), is therefore
overruled insofar as it held that the two standards were not meaningfully differ-
ent, and in practical application converged
(2) The well-founded fear of persecution standard used in section 208 of the Act is
significantly different from the clear probability standard used in section 243(h).
(3) An applicant for asylum under section 208 of the Act has established a well
fear if a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.
(4) A reasonable person may well fear persecution even where its likelihood is sig-
nificantly less than clearly probable.
(5) An alien's own testimony in an asylum case may be sufficient, without corrobora-
tive evidence, to prove a well-founded fear of persecution where that testimony is
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent
account of the basis for his fear.
(6) Matter of Acosta§ requirement that an applicant for asylum show, inter gin,
that the potential persecutor "could easily become aware" that the applicant pos-
sesses a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks to overcome by some punish-
ment is changed by omitting the word "easily."
CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2) [8 U.S.C. §1251(aX2)1--Nonimmigrant—re-
mained longer than permitted (both respondents)

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Mark Raymond Quinn, Esquire Arthur H. Gottlieb
Bragar & Quinn General Attorney
1200 pith Street, N.W., Suite 210
Washington, D.C. 20036

BY: Zfilhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vslrea, and Heilman, Board Members

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In a decision dated August 16, 1985, an immigration judge found
the respondents deportable as charged and denied their application
for asylum and withholding of deportation. Three months' volun-
tary departure was granted in lieu of deportation. The respondents
appealed from the denial of asylum and withholding of deportation.
The respondents' appeal will be sustained, and the application for
asylum will be granted. Oral argument before the Board is denied.
The respondents, husband and wife, are both natives and citizens
of Iran. Both respondents were admitted to the United States as
nonimmigrant students on or about September 8, 1978. The female
respondent's status was subsequently changed to that of a spouse of
a nonimmigrant student. The respondents were authorized to
remain in this country until February 27, 1982, but they remained
beyond that time. Orders to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing
(Forms 1-221) were issued against them on August 28, 1984, charg-
ing them with deportability as overstays under section 241(a)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982).
At a joint deportation hearing begun on November 5, 1984, and
concluded on July 2, 1985, the respondents conceded their deport-
ability. The only issues at the hearing, and the only issues on
appeal, concern the male respondent's application for asylum and
withholding of deportation.'
An alien who is seeking withholding of deportation from any
country must show that his "life or freedom would be threatened
in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion." Section
243(h)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). In order to make
this showing, the alien must establish a "clear probability" of per-
secution on account of one of the enumerated grounds. INS v.
Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). This clear probability standard re-
quires a showing that it is more likely than not that an alien
would be subject to persecution. Id. at 429-30. Under the Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, withholding of depor-
tation is mandatory. Thus, once an alien has established that he
qualifies for that relief, and that he is not ineligible under the pro-
visions of section 243(h)(2), it must be granted, and he cannot then
be returned to the country where he would face persecution. He
can, however, be sent to another country under certain circum-
stances. In this important regard, withholding of deportation dif-

1 Only the male respondent submitted an application for asylum. The female re-
spondent is included in her husband's application. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1987). Refer-
ences hereafter to "the respondent" refer to the male respondent.

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 Interim Decision *3028

fers from asylum, which may be denied in the exercise of discretion
to aliens who establish statutory eligibility for the relief.
In order to establish eligibility for a grant of asylum, an alien
must demonstrate that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of sec-
tion 101(aX42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1.101(a)(42)(A) (1982). See sec-
tion 208 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). That definition includes
the requirement that an alien demonstrate that he is unwilling or
unable to return to his country because of persecution or a "well-
founded fear" of persecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The meaning of the term "well-founded fear" has been the subject
of considerable controversy and litigation. The Board previously
took the position that, as a practical matter, the showing required
to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for asylum purposes
was the same as that required to establish a clear probability of
persecution for purposes of withholding of deportation. Matter of
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). However, the Supreme Court
has recently rejected this approach. In /NS v. Camloza Fon.seca, 480
-

U.S. 421 (1987), the Court held that the clear probability and well-
founded fear standards do in. fact differ, and that it was Congress'
intent that they differ. The Court found it reasonable to assume
that Congress intended to make it more difficult to establish abso-
lute entitlement to withholding of deportation under section 243(h)
than to establish mere eligibility for asylum under section 208. Id.
at 443-44. In so ruling, the Court rejected that part of our decision
in Matter of Acosta, supra, wherein we held that the "clear proba-
bility" standard and the "well-founded fear" standard are not
meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge. Id.
at 229. That portion of our decision in Matter of Acosta has there-
fore been effectively overruled.
In INS v. Cardo na Fonseca, supra, the Court reiterated the rule
-

in INS v. Stevie, supra, that in order to establish a clear probability
of persecution under section 243(h) of the Act, an alien must prove
that it is "more likely than not" that he will be persecuted. Howev-
er, the Court held, such a probable showing of persecution need not
be made in order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution
under section 208 of the Act. The Court specifically declined to at-
tempt a detailed definition of "well-founded fear," or an explana-
tion as to how that term should be applied. Noting that there is
"obviously some ambiguity" in the term, the Court left a more con-
crete definition to the process of case -by-case adjudication. Id. at
448.
It is clear that to a large degree the meaning of "well-founded
fear" can in fact only be determined in the contexts of individual

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 Interim Decision #3028

cases. Whatever words may be used in a definition, the approach
must still be to assess each case independently on its particular
merits. Nevertheless, we think that some guidance can be provided
and would be helpful. We do not attempt a definitive statement on
the meaning of well-founded fear but rather are setting forth a
starting point for use in an ongoing effort to formulate a workable
and useful definition of the standard in question.
Although, as noted above, the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, supra, did not attempt to define "well-founded fear," the
Court in dictum in INS v. Stevie, supra, offered this guide for the
meaning of well-founded fear: "[S]o long as an objective situation is
established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation
will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecu-
tion is a reasonable possibility." INS v. Steuic, supra, at 424-25 (em-
phs gig added). In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, the Court noted
the "obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs" in assess-
ing whether a fear is well founded. Id. at 431. Perhaps more help-
ful, however, was the direction provided by the Court in Cardoza-
Fonseca when it compared the well-founded fear standard with the
clear probability standard of section 243(h) of the Act. Not only are
the two terms not identical, the Court noted, but since two differ-
ent standards were used in the same Act, they must have been in-
tended to have "significantly different" meanings. Id. at 448 n. 31.
The Court's view that the two terms are "significantly different"
thus serves as a starting point in defining the term "well-founded
fear." 2
As suggested by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, some guidance regarding the mean-
ing of well-founded fear can be found in decisions of the United
States courts of appeals. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in

2 In addition to footnote 31, the Court also indicated in the body of its decision its
approval of a "significantly different" standard for asylum as opposed to withhold-
ing of deportation. In discussing the old section 203(aX7) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1163(aX7) (1976), repealed by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96 212, 94 Stat.
-

102, the Court stated that it had been "repeatedly recognized" that the "fear of per-
secution" requirement for refugee admissions under section 203(aX7) was "signifi-
cantly different" from the requirement in section 243(h) that the alien show that he
"would be" subject to persecution. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 434. The Court
went on to conclude that when Congress replaced section 203(aX7) and its "fear of
persecution" with section 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982), and its "well-founded fear of
persecution," it "in no way wished to modify the standard that had been used under
§ 203(a)(7)." id. at 434 35. Since the term "well founded fear" 3S used in section 208
- -

as well as in section 207, the Court further noted, the same lower standard of proof,
"significantly different" from the section 243(h) standard, would apply to section 208
as well. Id. at 436 n. 18.

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Cardoza-Fonseca, and after the Court's decision in INS v. Stevie,
supra, a number of the lower courts addressed the issue of the well-
founded fear standard and attempted to define that term. The first
court of appeals to address the question was the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Carvajal-Munoz v.
INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984). The court there stated its view
that the evidentiary burden of proof in asylum cases was not iden-
tical to that in withholding of deportation cases, although it found
the two standards to be "very similar." Id. at 575. The Supreme
Court, as just noted, has indicated that the terms are significantly
different. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit's view of the showing
necessary to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is worth
considering. The court held that, in order to establish the well-
founded fear of persecution required for asylum,
Mlle applicant must present specific facts establishing that he or she has actually
been the victim of persecution or has some other good reason to fear that he or
she will be singled out for persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
Id. at 574. The court also elaborated on the type of evidence neces-
sary to make this showing:
Ordinarily, this must be done through objective evidence supporting the
cant's contentions. Sometimes, however, the applicant's own testimony will be all
that is available regarding past persecution or the reasonable possibility of perse-
cution. In these situations, the applicant's uncorroborated testimony will be insuf-
ficient to meet the evidentiary burden unless it is credible, persuasive, and points
to specific facts that give rise to an inference that the applicant has been or has a
good. reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on one of the
specified grounds, or, alternatively or in addition thereto, must show through tes-
timony and corroborative objective evidence that he or she has good reason to fear
persecution on one of the specified grounds.
Id. at 574. Thus, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the need for the
applicant to be specific in his claims, to show that there is a "rea-
sonable possibility" of persecution, and to show that he has "good
reason" for his fear of persecution.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after
first deciding in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1984), that the well-founded fear standard is a lesser one than the
clear probability standard, turned to the meaning of well-founded
fear in Cardoea-Fonseca v. United States INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th
Cir. 1985). The court accepted the rationale of the Seventh Circuit
that an applicant for asylum is required to "present 'specific facts'
through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or 'good
reason' to fear future persecution." Id. at 1453, citing Carvajal-
Munoz v. INS, supra, at 574. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit also addressed the issue of corroborative evidence. Recogniz-

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Interim Decision #3028

ing the difficulty of obtaining documentary evidence to support an
asylum claim, the court held that if such evidence is not available,
the applicant's testimony will suffice if it is credible, persuasive,
and specific. The court rejected the Government's contention that
such an approach to the well -founded fear standard rendered that
standard wholly subjective and emphasized that applicants
must point to specific, objective facts that support an inference of past persecution
or risk of future persecution. That the objective facia are established through the
credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant does not make those facts less
objective. "Mere assertions of possible fear" are still insufficient. Shoaee v. INS,
704 F2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir_ 1983). It is only after objective evidence sufficient to
suggest a risk of persecution has been introduced that the alien's subjective fears
and desire to avoid the risk-laden situation in his or her native land become rele-
vant.
Cardoza-Fonseca v. United States INS, supra, at 1453.
In Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth
Circuit attempted to refine its requirement that there be both sub-
jective and objective showings, saying: The subjective component
requires a showing that the alien's fear is genuine. The objective
component requires a showing, by credible, direct, and specific evi-
dence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear
that the petitioner faces persecution." Id. at 1492 (emphasis added).
The court concluded: What is critical is that the alien prove his
fear is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable." Id. The in-
quiry into the reasonableness of an applicant's fear was also allud-
ed to by the Ninth Circuit in Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370
(9th Cir. 1985), where the court stated that the well-founded fear
standard "implicates a requirement of objective reasonableness. In
other words, there must be some basis in reality or reasonable pos-
sibility that a petitioner would be persecuted." Id. at 1374.
The Sixth Circuit has similarly embraced the notion that the
"more generous" well-founded fear standard of proof comprises
both a subjective and an objective element. In Yousif v. INS, 794
F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1986), the court held that while an applicant for
asylum "may prevail upon establishing a subjective fear of persecu-
tion, the [applicant's] assertions of fear must nonetheless be sup-
ported by objective evidence." Id. at 243-44; see also Youkhanna v.
INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984).
Like the Seventh, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit
foretold the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
supra, and held. that the well founded fear standard requires a
-

lesser degree of proof than the clear probability standard. Guevara

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Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986).s The Fifth Circuit also
agreed with the other courts that the concept of a well-founded
fear was at least partially a subjective one, insofar as fear is a sub-
jective matter, and partially an objective one, because the fear is
required to be well founded. However, the Fifth Circuit offered a
somewhat more concrete definition. The court held: An alien pos-
sesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in
her circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be re-
turned to her native country." Id. at 1249. This reasonable person
standard was subsequently adopted by the Second Circuit,. in Car-
camo Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
-

We agree with and adopt the general approach set forth by the
Fifth Circuit; that is, that an applicant for asylum has established
a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his cir-
cumstances would fear persecution. As noted by the Second Circuit,
this "reasonable person standard appropriately captures the vari-
ous formulations that have been advanced to explain the well-
founded fear test." Carcamo-Flores v. INS, supra, at 68. It is a
standard that provides a "common sense" framework for analyzing
whether claims of persecution are well founded. Moreover, a rea-
sonable person may well fear persecution even where its likelihood
is significantly less than clearly probable.
In determining whether the alien has met his burden of proof,
we recognize, as have the courts, the difficulties faced by many
aliens in obtaining documentary or other corroborative evidence to
support their claims of persecution. Although every effort should
be made to obtain such evidence, the lack of such evidence will not
necessarily be fatal to the application. The alien's own testimony
may in some cases be the only evidence available, and it can suffice
where the testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently de-
tailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for
his fear. 4 On the other hand, as pointed out in the Office of the

3 The Third Circuit is the only court which, prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, consistently held that the well-founded fear stand-
ard under section 208 of the Act is equivalent to the clear probability standard
under section 243(h). The court first stated this view in Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139
(3d Cir. 1982), which was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Stevie, supra. The Third Circuit specifically reaffirmed its position following Stevie.
Sotto v. United States INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Sankar v. INS, 757
F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit declined to decide the issue. Cruz-Lopez v.
INS, 802 8.2d 1513 (4th Cir. 1986).
4 The requirement that an alien provide a "plausible and coherent account" of
why he fears persecution is rooted in the International Refugee Organization,
Manual for Eligibility Officers No. 175, ch. IV, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § C19, p. 24 (May
1950). See INS v. Carrioaa.Ponseca, supra, at 438 n. 20.

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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Geneva, 1979) ("Handbook"), the allowance for lack of
corroborative evidence does not mean that "unsupported state-
ments must necessarily be accepted as true if they are inconsistent
with the general account put forward by the applicant" Id. at
para. 197. Similarly, very generalized statements of fear will in
most cases not suffice. In general, the assessment of the application
for asylum should be a qualitative, not a quantitative, one.
Where the country at issue in an asylum case has a history of
persecuting people in circumstances similar to the asylum appli-
cant's, careful consideration should be given to that fact in assess-
ing the applicant's claims A well-founded fear, in other words, can
be based on what has happened to others who are similarly situat-
ed. The situation of each person, however, must be assessed on its
own merits. See Handbook, supra, at para. 43.
We note that although our decision in Matter of Acosta has been
effectively overruled by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, insofar as
Acosta held that the well-founded fear standard and the clear prob-
ability standard may be equated, ranch of our decision remains
intact and good law. Indeed, we still find in Acosta some guidance
regarding the meaning of a well-founded fear. In Acosta, we set
forth four elements which an applicant for asylum must show in
order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. What we re-
quired was that the evidence establish that
(1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in
others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware,
or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic;
(3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor
has the inclination to punish the alien..
Matter of Acosta, supra, at 226.
In our view, these requirements, for the most part, survive the
Supreme Court's decision in Cardona-Fonseca and are still useful
guidelines in assessing an asylum application. However, we have
determined that one small but significant change in these require-
ments should be made in view of the Court's ruling. The second re-
quirement should be changed by omitting the word "easily." Thus,
it is enough for the applicant to show that the persecutor could
become aware that the applicant possesses the belief or characteris-
tic in question. The omission of the word "easily" lightens the ap-
plicant's burden of proof and moves the requirements as a whole
into line with Cardoza-Fonseca. Of course, all these requirements

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must now be considered in light of the lower burden of proof which
will be imposed on asylum applicants generally.
It must also be remembered that an alien who succeeds in estab-
lishing a well-founded fear of persecution will not necessarily be
granted asylum. He must also show that the feared persecution
would be on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political. opinion. Thus, for example,
aliens fearing retribution over purely personal matters, or aliens
fleeing general conditions of violence and upheaval in their coun-
tries, would not qualify for asylum. Such persons may have well-
founded fears, but such fears would not be on account of their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571
(9th Cir. 1986); Contreras Aragon v. INS, 789 F.2d ITT (9th Cir.
1986); Diaz-Escobar v. INS, supra; Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th
Cir. 1985); Zepecia-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984);
Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982); Matter of
Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461 (3IA. 1975). Finally, an applicant for
asylum must also show that he merits the relief as a matter of dis-
cretion.
While under Matter of Acosta, Aupra, we were able to consider an
application for asylum and withholding of deportation as, for most
purposes, one, this approach requires some modification after INS
v. Carcloza-Fonseca, supra. Given that the core of evidence and tes-
timony presented in support of the asylum and withholding appli-
cations will in almost every case be virtually the same, such evi-
dence and testimony may still be presented in a single hearing.
However, in actually adjudicating the applications, a clear delinea-
tion of the findings should be made as to each application. We an-
ticipate that as a general rule the asylum application, with its
lower burden of proof, will be adjudicated first_ If the applicant is
found eligible for asylum, and worthy of the relief as a matter of
discretion, there may be no need to determine as well whether a
clear probability of persecution exists.
We now turn to the application of these new standards to the
case presently before us. The respondent fears persecution in Iran
primarily because of an altercation he had with an official or agent
of the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The respondent testified
and attested to the following facts regarding that incident. In Feb-
ruary of 1981, while in the United States, the respondent went
with an Iranian friend to the Iranian Interests Section at the Alge-
rian Embassy. His purpose was to document his continuing student
status in order to enable him to continue receiving funds from rela-
tives in Iran. To this end, he took with him photocopies of his pass-
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Interim Decision #3028

port and his Arrival-Departure Record (Form 1-94). When he pre-
sented the photocopies to a student who was working at the Embas-
sy, he was told that the originals were required. According to the
respondent, he was informed that the originals were necessary be-
cause students who did not have them had probably submitted
them to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in connection
with asylum applications. The student-employee was insistent, and
the respondent's friend asked to see the supervisor - The supervisor
appeared, but further trouble ensued. The student apparently
grabbed the respondent's friend's neck, but the supervisor separat-
ed them. The student then told the respondent's friend that he and
"his kind had better keep their eyes and ears open because 'their
day' would come soon." In response, the respondent told him. that
"he and his kind had robbed Iran of all that was worth living for
and that they were nothing more than religious fascists stuffing
their pockets with the nation's wealth." According to the respond-
ent, the student then drew a gun, and he and his friend ran out the
door. The respondent testified that there were cameras all around
the room recording these events. A witness for the respondent tes-
tified at the hearing that he accompanied the respondent and his
friend to the Algerian Embassy, although he waited in the car and
did not go inside with them. This witness testified that, when the
respondent and his friend returned to the car, they were nervous,
and a couple of people were following them. It is the respondent's
contention that he is now known to Khomeini officials and that as
a result he has good reason to fear persecution if returned to Iran.
The respondent also testified that he had participated in anti-Kho-
meini demonstrations in the United States.
After careful consideration of the entire record, we have conclud-
ed that a reasonable person in the respondent's circumstances
would fear persecution if returned to Iran. We find the respond-
ent's account of why he fears persecution based on his political
opinions to> be plausible, detailed, and coherent. The respondent's
account of the incident at the Embassy appears to as to be credible,
and there is nothing in the record to otherwise suggest that the re-
spondent lacks credibility. The respondent clearly expressed his po-
litical views at the Iranian Interests Section and his opinions were
extremely derogatory to the regime in power. The Service does not
dispute that opponents of the Ayatollah Khomeini are often perse-
cuted for their opposition. In this case, a reasonable person in the
respondent's position would fear that his opposition to that regime
has become known to those who are both in a position, and who
have the inclination, to punish him for it. Under these circum-
stances, we find that the respondent has met his burden of showing
448
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a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran. Given the statements
made to agents of the Khomeini regime by the respondent while in
the Algerian Embassy, any persecution which might occur would
ba on account of political opinion.
There are no adverse factors of record in this case. We find no
basis for considering a discretionary denial of relief. The applica-
tion for asylum will accordingly be granted. We therefore find it
unnecessary to decide whether the respondent has also established
a clear probability of persecution for section 243(h) purposes. Ac-
cordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The application for asylum is granted.

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