victim did not say anything to Morris except his name and did not reach
into her purse. Lastly, the State introduced a surveillance videotape that
captured the incident. Based on the evidence in the record, and viewing
that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude
that there is sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could reject
Morris's theory of self-defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of battery with the use of a deadly weapon. See NRS 200.481(1)(a),
(2)(e)(1); Pineda v. State, 120 Nev. 204, 212, 88 P.3d 827, 833 (2004) (right
to self-defense exists when there is "a reasonably perceived apparent
danger" or actual danger). It is for the jury to determine the weight and
credibility to give conflicting testimony, and the jury's verdict will not be
disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports its
verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981).
Second, Morris claims that the district court erred by failing to
give his jury instruction on self-defense. "The district court has broad
discretion to settle jury instructions, and this court reviews the district
court's decision for an abuse of that discretion or judicial error." Crawford
v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). The record reveals
that the district court considered the proposed instructions on self-defense
and determined that Morris's was taken from the State's proposed
instructions, that the State's proposed instruction would not preclude
Morris from arguing his position, and that the inclusion of Morris's
proposed instruction would be duplicative and could be confusing to the
jury. However, Morris's proffered instruction was not misleading,
inaccurate, or incomplete. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
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erred in refusing to give Morris's instruction on his theory of the case. See
id. at 754-55, 121 P.3d at 589. Despite the error, we are convinced that
the error was harmless, as the given instruction fully and accurately
instructed the jury on self-defense and was comparable to the proffered
instruction, and that the resulting verdict was not due to the error. See id.
at 756, 121 P,3d at 590.
Third, Morris contends that the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct by misstating the law of self-defense and suggesting that a
reasonable person would not believe him or herself in actual danger.
Morris did not object to the State's argument at trial, therefore we review
for plain error. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477
(2008). The prosecutor argued that, while actual danger is not necessary
to justify deadly force and self-defense, a reasonable person in Morris's
situation would not believe himself to be in apparent risk of danger and
would know that he was not in any actual danger. The challenged
statement was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence presented
at trial to rebut Morris's claim of self-defense and, therefore, was proper.
See Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 177, 931 P.2d 54, 67 (1997), receded
from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 235, 994 P.2d 700,
713 (2000); Jain v. McFarland, 109 Nev. 465, 476, 851 P.2d 450, 457
(1993). Therefore, we conclude that Morris fails to demonstrate plain
error.
Lastly, Morris claims that cumulative error entitles him to
relief. Because we have only found one error, there are no errors to
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cumulate. See United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
We conclude that no relief is warranted, and we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
cc: Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge
Dennis W. Hough
Attorney GenerallCarson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
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