Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Keegan, J.), entered June 15, 1999 in Albany County, which, inter alla, granted defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint as time barred.
In May 1994, plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against defendants seeking to recover for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a September 1991 automobile ac
We affirm. Under CPLR 205 (a), an action that is timely commenced but thereafter terminated may be recommenced within six months thereof unless the termination was due to voluntary discontinuance, a final judgment on the merits, neglect to prosecute or failure to obtain personal jurisdiction. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, her failure to appear on the scheduled trial date, despite her previous assertion that she was ready to proceed to trial, warranted dismissal for “neglect to prosecute” (see generally, Tleige v Troy Pediatrics, 237 AD2d 772, 774). Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of CPLR 205 (a), and the complaint was properly dismissed as time barred pursuant to the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]).
Cardona, P. J., Peters, Spain and Graffeo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.