Mulder (Ronald) v. State

 procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual
prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the
State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the
rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).
First, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 132 S.
Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant claimed that he had good cause because he was
not appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. We
conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel
was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see NRS
34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or
provide an explanation for why he could not raise this claim earlier.
Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to
Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel,
130 Nev. , P.3d , (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014).
Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in
Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive
petition.
Second, appellant claimed that he had good cause due to
recent cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 US. , 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), to assert that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate additional plea offers
from the State. Appellant's good-cause argument was without merit
because his case was final when Cooper and Frye were decided, and he
failed to demonstrate that the cases would apply retroactively to him.
Even if Cooper and Frye announced new rules of constitutional law, he
failed to allege facts to support that he met either exception to the general
principle that such rules do not apply retroactively to cases which were

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 already final when the new rules were announced. See Colwell v. State,
118 Nev. 807, 816-17, 59 P.3d 463, 469-70 (2002). Moreover, appellant
merely presumed that there were additional plea offers and provided no
factual allegation that there were actual plea offers that his counsel failed
to communicate to him. A bare claim, such as this one, was insufficient to
demonstrate that appellant was entitled to relief. See Hargrove v. State,
100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).
Finally, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of
prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying
the petition. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

2,
Hardesty

, J.
ist7'€1
Douglas

CHERRY, J., concurring:
Although I would extend the equitable rule recognized in
Martinez to this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is
facing a severe sentence, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d
(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting), I concur in
the judgment on appeal in this case because the State pleaded laches
under NRS 34.800(2) and appellant failed to rebut the presumption of

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 prejudice to the State.

cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge
Ronald Jeffrey Mulder
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk

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