Nasi v. State Department of Highways

No. 87-415
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1988

LARRY E. NASI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS,
a Department of the State of Montana,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,
The Honorable Henry Loble, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William F. Hooks and Patrick F. Hooks; Hooks & Budewitz,
Townsend, Montana
For Respondent:
John Bobinski, Department of Administration, Helena,
Montana

Submitted on Briefs: March 11, 1988
Decided: April21, 1988

Filed: 'APR 2 1 1988'

df5irLl. *,
Clerk
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Plaintiff Nasi appeals the June 12, 1987, order of the
First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, grant-
ing State Department of Highways' motion for summary judg-
ment. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court
erred in applying res judicata to Nasi's wrongful discharge
action.
Nasi began working for the Department of Highways
(Department) at its Townsend maintenance shop on February 5,
1979. On June 18, 1982, his employment ended. Nasi claims
he was fired. The Department claims he voluntarily quit.
On March 12, 1984, Nasi filed a grievance with the
Board of Personnel Appeals (BPA). On April 17, 1984, the BPA
preliminary hearing examiner decided that Nasi had "quit
and/or walked off the job." The following day, Nasi filed
his rejection of the preliminary decision.
On April 23, 1984, Nasi filed a separate tort action in
District Court, alleging wrongful discharge and bad faith.
The Department filed motions to dismiss on several grounds
including (1) BPA had exclusive jurisdiction, (2) Nasi failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (3) the tort
action was barred by res judicata. On July 5, 1984, the
District Court ordered that all further tort proceedings
would be stayed until the BPA made a final determination on
the grievance.
On October 11, 1984, the BPA formal hearing examiner
found that Nasi had "voluntarily terminated his employment
with the Department of Highways." The examiner concluded
that Nasi had not been aggrieved by the Department. On
February 5, 1985, the BPA adopted t.he examiner's recommended
order as the final order.
 On March 5, 1985, Nasi filed a petition for judicial
review of the BPA final order. On August 15, 1986, the
District Court affirmed the BPA final order. Nasi did not
appeal the judicial review.
On August 29, 1986, the District Court lifted its stay
on the tort action. On October 27, 1986, the Department
filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, a
motion to dismiss the tort action. On June 12, 1987, the
District Court granted the Department's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the matter was res judicata.
The court stated: "BPA specifically found that Nasi quit.
Such a determination is dispositive in the court case. It
forecloses Plaintiff's wrongful discharge and bad faith
causes of action and any additional issues associated there-
with." Nasi appeals the summary judgment.

Res Judicata
Nasi contends that the BPA did not act in a judicial
capacity in its grievance decision and res judicata is there-
fore inapplicable. Nasi also asserts that the issues, reme-
dies and subject matter of his tort action differ from those
of his BPA grievance.
In analyzing this case, we note that Title 2, Chapter
4, Montana Code Annotated, establishes the Montana Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (MAPA) . Section 2-4-102 (2)(a), MCA,
defines agency as any agency defined in $ 2-3-102 (1) , MCA,
which provides: "'Agency' means any board ... of the state
. .
. authorized by law to . ..determine contested cases
... " Section 2-15-1705, MCA, creates a Board of Personnel
Appeals and subsection (6) provides: "The board is designated
a quasi-judicial board for purposes of 2-15-124.''
Title 2, Chapter 4, Part 6, sets forth the statutory
provisions relating to contested cases. Section
2-18-1001(1), MCA, grants the BPA the jurisdiction to conduct
hearings and resolve grievances of employees of the Depart-
ment of Highways. Title 2, Chapter 4, Part 7, provides for
judicial review of contested cases by the District Court with
a right of review of a final judgment of the District Court
by the Supreme Court.
As we have noted, Nasi had a contested case hearing
before the BPA. From its adverse decision, he sought and
received judicial review by the District Court. The District
Court affirmed the decision of the Board, but Nasi did not
assert his right of appeal.
The District Court decision rested on the doctrine of
res judicata. The doctrine reflects a policy of judicial
finality:
The basic proposition embraced by the
doctrine of res judicata has always
remained the same: a party should not be
able to relitigate a matter he or she
has already had an opportunity to liti-
gate. This policy reflects the notion
that a lawsuit should not only bring
justice to the aggrieved parties but
provide a final resolution of the
controversy.
Brault v. Smith (Mont. 1984), 679 P.2d 236, 238, 41 St-Rep.

Res judicata applies when administrative proceedings
possess a judicial character:
When an administrative agency is acting
in a judicial capacity and resolves
disputed issues of fact properly before
it which the parties have had an ade-
quate opportunity to litigate, the
courts have not hesitated to apply -res
judicata to enforce repose.
United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co. ( 1 9 6 6 ) ~
384
U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed. 642, 661.
 The application of res judicata rests on the following
four criteria: (1) the parties must be the same; (2) the
subject matter must be the same; (3) the issues must be the
same, and (4) the relationship among the parties, the subject
matter and the issues must be the same. Brault, 679 P.2d at
239, 41 St.Rep. at 530, citing Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co.
(1982), 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929.
In comparing Nasi's tort action and his BPA grievance,
we note an identity of the parties, the subject matter and
the relationship. Both the tort action and the grievance
flowed from the same set of facts. The pivotal issue was
identical: Did Nasi voluntarily quit or was he fired?
At each level of the administrative process, Nasi had
an adequate opportunity to litigate his claim. Nasi fully
utilized the procedural safeguards of MAPA, including notice,
right to counsel, evidence, cross-examination and judicial
review. At each level, the decision was the same: Nasi
voluntarily quit.
Nasi failed to appeal the judicial review. Instead, he
asked the District Court to reach an opposite decision with
an encore of the identical issue. We will not allow Nasi to
relitigate his grievance in a tort action raising the same
issue previously litigated.
We hold that the BPA acted in a judicial capacity and
provided Nasi with a full contested case hearing which was
subsequently judicially reviewed. We further hold the Dis-
trict Court correctly applied res judicata to Nasi's tort
action.
To preclude parties from contesting
matters that they have had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate protects
their adversaries from the expense and
vexation attending multiple lawsuits,
conserves judicial resources, and fos-
ters reliance on judicial action by
 minimizing the possibility of inconsis-
tent decisions.
Montana v. United States (1979), 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99
S.Ct. 970, 973-974, 59 L.Ed.2d 210, 217. The four res judi-
cata criteria of Brault have been satisfied. Where the
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law, we will uphold the District Court. Schaffer v. Champion
Homes Builders (Mont. 19871, 747 P.2d 872, 874, 44 St.Rep.
2196, 2198.
Affirmed.

We concur: