National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, St. Johns Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
_____________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 15, 2004
No. 03-14690 THOMAS K. KAHN
______________________ CLERK

D.C. Docket No. 01-1070-CV-J-21-TJC

NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, ST. JOHNS INC.,
a not-for-profit Florida corporation, NAMI FLORIDA, INC.-JACKSONVILLE, ,
A.A., B.B., C.C., all natural persons and residents of St. Johns County, SEAN
O’HEARN, a resident of St. Johns County,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ST. JOHNS COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
______________________

(July 15, 2004)

Before TJOFLAT and HILL, Circuit Judges, and MILLS*, District Judge.

*
Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge of the Central District of Illinois,
sitting by designation.
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge:

I. BACKGROUND

This case centers on Appellee Board of County Commissioners of St. John’s

County (the “Board”) decision not to fund what would have been the first mental

health residential treatment facility (“RTF”) in St. Johns County, Florida. The

RTF would have been located at 38 Arenta Street in St. Augustine, Florida. On

April 18, 2000, the Board heard public comment on the proposed Arenta Street

facility and considered various parking, fire code, and traffic issues prior to its

decision. The Board subsequently voted against leasing or funding the facility.

On September 19, 2001, Sean O’Hearn and A.A. (two mentally ill residents

of St. Johns County), along with A.A.’s parents B.B. and C.C., the National

Alliance for the Mentally Ill, St. John’s Inc. (“NAMI-St. Johns”), and the National

Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Florida, Inc.-Jacksonville (“NAMI-Jax”)

(collectively “the Appellants”) sued the Board. Among other things, the

Appellants alleged that the Board’s decision not to fund the Arenta Street facility

violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), § 3601, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. § 12131. et seq., and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and

equal protection, U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.

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The Board moved for summary judgment on the Appellants’ claims and, on

August 14, 2003, Hon. Wayne E. Alley, U.S. District Judge, Middle District of

Florida, entered a seventy-six page summary judgment order dismissing the

Appellants’ case. The district court determined that the Appellants lacked

standing to sue and failed to establish violations of the FHA, the Rehabilitation

Act, the ADA, and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Appellants timely appealed the district court’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews a summary judgment ruling de novo, “view[ing] the

evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion.” See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175,

1186-87 (11th Cir.1999). A summary judgment motion should be granted when

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. ANALYSIS

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of federal

courts to adjudicating actual “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,

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cl. 1. The most significant case-or-controversy doctrine is the requirement of

standing. See Georgia State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d

1259, 1262 (11th Cir.1999). “In essence the question of standing is whether the

litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular

issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343

(1975).

The party who invokes federal jurisdiction must establish that it has

standing to assert its claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992). There are at least three distinct forms of standing: taxpayer standing

individual standing, and organizational standing. See Women’s Emergency

Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 943 (11th Cir. 2003)(citing Doremus v. Bd. of

Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434, 72 S.Ct. 394, 397, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952),

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119

L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79, 102

S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982)). To establish standing under any one of

these, a party must “demonstrate that he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that the

injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will

likely be redressed by a favorable decision.” See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,

162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks and

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citations omitted).

Since the Appellants initiated this suit, they have the burden of establishing

that the Appellees injured them via a violation of the FHA, the ADA, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or the Fourteenth Amendment. To establish an injury

under any one of these, the Appellants had to show that the Appellees

implemented or enforced housing policies against them in a discriminatory

manner. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132, 29 U.S.C. § 701, U.S.

CONST. amend XIV, § 2. As such, Appellants O’Hearn and A.A. would have to

show that they were qualified to live in a group home, sought to do so, and were

impermissibly rejected by the Board.

At best, O’Hearn asserts that he might have opted to live in a group home

had he been given the opportunity to do so and A.A. asserts that he might be a

candidate for group home living if his situation were to change such that he could

no longer live by himself. Assertions about what might happen do not establish an

injury that is “concrete and particularized.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct.

at 2136. Thus, O’Hearn and A.A. lack standing.

A.A.’s lack of standing means that Appellants B.B. and C.C. also lack

standing. Since the Board never deprived B.B. or C.C. of any of their rights, B.B.

and C.C. could only have standing as third-party litigants. In Singleton v. Wulff,

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428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), the Supreme Court

recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties so long

as three criteria are satisfied. The litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact,”

that gives him or her a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the

dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must

exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.

Id. at 112-116, 96 S.Ct., at 2873-2875. Because A.A. has not suffered an “injury

in fact,” B.B. and C.C. cannot establish third-party standing. See id.

NAMI St. Johns and NAMI-Jax, the two associations who sued the Board,

fair no better with respect to standing. NAMI St. Johns and NAMI-Jax assert that

they have standing to sue based on the injury they suffered as a result of the

Board’s decision not to fund the Arenta Street project.1 According to them, the

Board’s decision frustrated their agenda and wasted their “economic and human

resources.” NAMI-St. Johns and NAMI-Jax contend that this is enough to give

them standing pursuant to Havens. Id. 455 U.S. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. at 1124 (an

advocacy group’s alleged loss of resources can be sufficient to establish injury in

fact).

1
The parties gave very little attention to this issue on summary judgment. Consequently,
the district court did not reach any conclusion on the matter.

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The problem with NAMI-St. Johns and NAMI-Jax’s argument is that they

fail to provide any details about their lost resources. Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 28(a)(9)(A) requires an appellant to cite “parts of the record on which

appellant relies” for his claim. See id. NAMI-St. Johns and NAMI-Jax cite

nothing in the record that shows they lost resources. The Court has warned

litigants that “failure to comply with Rule 28(a)(9)(A) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure may result in waiver or abandonment of issues on appeal.”

See Mendoza v. United States Atty. Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1286 FN4. (11th Cir.

2003)(citing, Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 987

n. 16 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904, 122 S.Ct. 2356, 153 L.Ed.2d 178

(2002)). Because NAMI-St. Johns and NAMI-Jax have not satisfied Rule

28(a)(9)(A), the Court deems them to have waived any claim concerning their

individual standing.

Alternatively, NAMI-St Johns and NAMI-Jax claim they have associational

standing. “An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members

when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the

interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim

asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members

in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

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(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 120 S.Ct. 693, 704, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct.

2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)).

Unfortunately for NAMI-St. Johns and NAMI-Jax, they have not shown that

any of their members had standing to sue. The only constituents NAMI-St. John’s

and NAMI-Jax mention in their brief are O’Hearn and A.A., and neither of them

has been injured. NAMI-St. Johns and NAMI-Jax blame their failure to identify

any other injured constituents on the Board. According to them, the Board had

sole possession of the identities of individual patients. The district court analyzed

this assertion and correctly rejected it.

As the district court explained, the Board provided NAMI-St Johns and

NAMI-Jax with information pertaining to persons who were eligible for treatment

when it tendered discovery materials from the director of the Mental Health

Department, Dr. Kenneth Robertson. NAMI-St Johns and NAMI-Jax could have

used those materials to ascertain the identities of injured constituents. They did

not do so. NAMI-St Johns and NAMI-Jax failure to identify an injured constituent

prevents them from asserting associational standing. See Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1068, 137 L.Ed.2d 170

(1997)(“An association has standing to sue or defend in such capacity, however,

8
only if its members would have standing in their own right.”)(citations omitted));

Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999)(the right of an association to

sue on behalf of its constituents does not relieve it of its obligation to show that

one of its constituents otherwise had standing to sue).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss for

lack of standing.