Legal Research AI

Noone v. Fink

Court: Montana Supreme Court
Date filed: 1986-07-17
Citations: 721 P.2d 1275, 222 Mont. 273
Copy Citations
2 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                                No. 85-601

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA




AUDREY D. NOONE,
                 Plaintiff and Petitioner,


ROBERT RAYMOND FINK, WALLACE J. PAYER
and THOMAS J. NOONE
                 Defendants and Respondents.



ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:




COUNSEL OF RECORD:
         For Plaintiff/Petitioner:
                 Sandall, Cavan, Smith, Howard & Grubbs,
                 W. Corbin Howard, Billings, Montana
         For Defendants/Respondents: Robert Raymond Fink
                                     and Wallace J. Payer

                 Alexander & Baucus; J. David Slovak,
                 Great Falls, Montana
         For ~efendant/Respondent:Thomas J. Noone
                 Moulton, Bellingham, Longo    &   Mather; Douglas James,
                 Billings, Montana


                                   Submitted on Briefs: March 21, 1986
                                     Decided: ~ u l y17, 1986

         JbL 1 1 19Ifj
Filed:



                                               8
                         k *,L     Clerk
Mr. Justice John C.        Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.


     This   is    an    original     proceeding    for    a    declaratory
judgment on two certified questions from the United States
District Court sitting in Billings.
     There are two questions certified from the United States
District Court:        first, does the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity bar the claim of a wife-passenger against her
husband-driver for her husband's negligence in the operation
of a motor vehicle?         Second, if so, does the doctrine of
interspousal     tort    immunity    bar   the    cross-claims     of   the
husband's   codefendants and         joint tortfeasors against the
defendant husband for indemnity and/or contribution?
     Audrey and Thomas Noone were married in 1974.               They love
each other and plan on remaining married.            Both are employed
and commingle their incomes in a single bank account.               Audrey
Noone was injured in a car accident near Broadus in 1982.
Audrey was a passenger in a Bronco being driven by her
husband, defendant Thomas Noone.           As the Bronco attempted to
make a left turn, a following truck attempted to pass and the
vehicles collided.       The truck was owned by defendant Wallace
Payer and driven by defendant Robert Fink.
     This personal injury action is maintained by Audrey
Noone against defendants, Payer, Fink, Noone.                 Audrey Noone
alleges the accident and her injuries were caused by the
joint negligence of: each defendant.              Fink and Payer have
denied any negligence on their part and cross-claimed against
defendant   Noone       seeking     indemnity    and/or       contribution.
Defendant Noone has also denied any negligence on his part
and cross-claimed against Fink and Payer seeking indemnity
and/or contribution.
      Defendant     Noone,         who    is    being   represented       by    his
insurance company, filed a motion for summary judgment based
on the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.                     Fink, Payer,
and Audrey Noone opposed the motion.                At the conclusion of a
hearing on the motion               for summary judgment, the Federal
District Court agreed to certify the questions to this Court.
      The    first question           certified    to us       is whether       the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity bars the claim of a
wife-passenger against her husband-driver for negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle.                       In Miller v.       Fallon
County, et al. (1986, No. 85-350) we abolished the defense of
interspousal tort immunity because the historical reasons for
that immunity are no longer valid.                Therefore the doctrine no
longer     operates   as       a    bar   to    negligence      claims    against
spouses.
      The   second question certified to us                    is whether the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity bars the cross-claims
of the husband's codefendants and joint tortfeasors against
the defendant husband               for indemnity and/or contribution.
Since we have abrogated the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity,     the     contribution         statute,      S     27-1-703,       MCA,
controls.     It states:
      Whenever the negligence of any party in any action
      is an issue, each party against whom recovery may
      be allowed is jointly and severally liable for the
      amount that may be awarded to the claimant but has
      the right of contribution from any other person
      whose negligence may have contributed as a
      proximate cause to the injury complained of.
Therefore the husband's co-defendants and joint tortfeasors
may    cross-claim         against        him     for        ind.emnity    and/or
contribution, under        $       27-1-703, MCA.       However, we make no
comment   as   to the applicability   of   indemnity theories   in

automobile accident cases.      See Panasuk v. Seaton   (u.s.D.C.
Mont.   1968),   277 F.Supp.   979 and Consolidated Freightways
Corp. of Del. v. Osier (1979), 185 Mont. 439, 605 P.2d 1076.




We Concur:
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