UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1823
ERNEST P. O'CONNOR, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEBORAH HUARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 96-1824
ERNEST P. O'CONNOR, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DEBORAH HUARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Eugene W. Beaulieu, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
William R. Fisher, with whom Ivy L. Frignoca and Monaghan,
Leahy, Hochadel & Libby were on brief for Deborah Huard.
William C. Knowles, with whom Jacqueline W. Rider and
Verrill & Dana were on brief for Ernest P. O'Connor, Jr.
June 27, 1997
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TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. On March 15, 1994, Plaintiff-
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
Appellee-Cross-Appellant Ernest P. O'Connor, Jr. ("O'Connor"),
who was a pretrial detainee at the Kennebec County Jail ("the
Jail") during all times relevant to the case, brought this
Section 1983 suit for compensatory and punitive damages and
declaratory relief against Alfred Cichon ("Cichon"), a
physician's assistant at the Jail, and Catherine Mesaric
("Mesaric") and Appellant-Cross-Appellee Deborah Huard ("Huard"),
Corrections Sergeants at the Jail. O'Connor contended that,
while he was being held as a pretrial detainee, Cichon deprived
him of medical attention, which amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment, and that he was punished in violation of his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. On January 20,
1996, summary judgment was granted in Cichon's favor. Prior to
trial, Mesaric was dismissed from the suit.
The case against Huard was tried before a jury in June
1996. At the close of O'Connor's case, Huard moved for a
directed verdict. The district court took the motion under
advisement. At the close of all evidence, Huard renewed her
motion, which the district court denied. The jury returned a
verdict in O'Connor's favor, finding that Huard had violated his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and awarding him one
dollar in compensatory damages. The court then instructed the
jury on punitive damages, which the jury, after deliberating,
declined to award. Huard filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial, which
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the district court denied. Huard appeals the district court's
jury instructions, the denial of her motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and the award of attorney's fees to
O'Connor. O'Connor cross-appeals the jury's refusal to grant him
actual compensatory and punitive damages. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
On review of a jury verdict, we recite the facts in the
light most favorable to that verdict. See Ferragamo v. Chubb
Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 26, 27 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996). Huard was a
Corrections Sergeant at the Jail during all times relevant to
this case. O'Connor was initially incarcerated in the Jail for a
brief period in January 1993. On January 18, 1993, O'Connor told
Huard that "he needed his medication." She instructed him to
fill out a Medical Request form, and when he did so, she
forwarded the form to the Medical Department. Pursuant to his
request, O'Connor met with the Jail's physician's assistant,
Cichon, for a medical evaluation. O'Connor asked Cichon for
Xanax or Valium to treat anxiety. Cichon diagnosed O'Connor as
suffering from "anxiety disorder," for which he prescribed Xanax.
Soon thereafter, O'Connor was released from the Jail.
On October 30, 1993, O'Connor was placed in pretrial
detention at the Jail, where he remained for approximately six
months. O'Connor again submitted a request for medication, which
Cichon now denied, because he could not verify O'Connor's medical
history, believed that O'Connor did not suffer from an anxiety
disorder, and wasconcerned about O'Connor's history ofdrug abuse.
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During this detention, an animosity developed between
Huard and O'Connor, eventually leading to daily verbal
confrontations. O'Connor called Huard names that evidenced
O'Connor's disdain for what he believed was Huard's sexual
orientation. Huard, in turn, called O'Connor "a scumbag, a low-
life, a dirtbag, a drug addict, creep." Huard taunted O'Connor
about his failure to get the medication he desired and his
inability to cope without it. O'Connor would react to these
taunts by kicking doors and banging the bars of his cell and by
hurling verbal abuse at Huard. As a result of these actions,
O'Connor would be removed from his cell and placed in
administrative lockdown. Frequently, during these administrative
lockdowns, the other inmates on the cell block would be
restricted to their cells. By the time he was transferred from
the Jail, O'Connor had spent 33 days in lockdown.
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
I. Jury instructions
I. Jury instructions
Huard argues that the magistrate's instructions to the
jury did not properly reflect the elements O'Connor was required
to prove in order to succeed on his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
In reviewing assertions of error in the jury charge, we determine
whether the instructions adequately reflect the law applicable to
the controlling issues without tending to confuse or mislead the
jury. See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1494 (1st Cir.
1997).
The instructions to the jury were as follows:
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Plaintiff claims that his constitutional
rights were violated when defendant
deliberately provoked him into rage attacks
and then disciplined him for his resulting
outbursts. Specifically, his allegation is
that he was punished without due process of
law, in violation of his rights under the 5th
and 14th Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
At the time of his incarceration at the
Kennebec County Jail plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee. In other words, he had not been
convicted of a crime, but was being held
pending trial. Under such circumstances,
plaintiff could only be subjected to the
restrictions and conditions of the detention
facilities so long as those conditions and
restrictions did not amount to punishment.
Not all restrictions and conditions during
pretrial detention amount to punishment in
the constitutional sense, however. Once the
government has exercised its authority to
detain a person pending trial, it may
obviously impose conditions or restrictions
necessary to effectuate the legitimate goals
of maintaining institutional security and
ensuring the detained person's presence at
trial.
The question for you to decide is whether
defendant imposed conditions or restrictions
upon plaintiff that were reasonably related
to those legitimate goals or whether they
were arbitrary or without purpose.
Absent a showing of an expressed intent on
defendant's part to punish plaintiff, that
question will generally turn on whether the
conditions or restrictions could have been
used for a legitimate purpose and whether
they are excessive in relation to that
legitimate purpose.
If you find the conditions or restrictions
were arbitrary or without purpose, you may
infer that the purpose of the conditions or
restrictions was punishment, and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
Trial Transcript, vol. III, at 440-41.
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These instructions accurately reflect the law as it
relates to a pretrial detainee's claim of punishment in violation
of the Due Process Clause. The government may detain one accused
of a crime prior to trial in order to ensure his presence at
trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). Prior to
an adjudication of guilt, however, a state government may not
punish a pretrial detainee without contravening the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 535. The government
may, however, impose administrative restrictions and conditions
upon a pretrial detainee that effectuate his detention, see id.
at 537, and that maintain security and order in the detention
facility, see id. at 536. When confronted with a charge by a
pretrial detainee alleging punishment without due process, the
"court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some
other legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 538.
Thus, if a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective, it does not, without more, amount
to "punishment." Conversely, if a
restriction or condition is not reasonably
related to a legitimate goal -- if it is
arbitrary or purposeless -- a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may
not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees qua detainees.
Id. at 538-39. The government has a valid interest in managing
the detention facility and, toward that end, may employ
administrative measures that may be discomforting or are of a
nature that the detainee would not experience if he were released
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while awaiting trial. See id. at 540. Barring "substantial
evidence" that an administrative measure is an exaggerated
response to these considerations, "courts should ordinarily defer
to their expert judgment in such matters." Id. at 540 n.23.
Huard's claim of error addresses a conceptually
different issue. Huard argues that the magistrate's instructions
were erroneous because they failed to incorporate the appropriate
standard, which she contends is the Eighth Amendment "deliberate
indifference" standard applied when a pretrial detainee alleges a
denial of appropriate medical care. Huard's contention
misconceives the claim at issue in this case. O'Connor's
allegation as it related to Huard was that she intentionally
provoked or incited him into "rage attacks" by relentlessly
taunting him. O'Connor claimed that Huard engaged in such
actions so that she could subsequently discipline him by imposing
"administrative lock down." Given the nature of O'Connor's
claim, the magistrate was correct in denying Huard's request to
incorporate "deliberate indifference" instructions into the jury
charge.
We emphasize that nothing in the resolution of this
case or in this opinion is meant to suggest that a detention
facility may not discipline a pretrial detainee who violates the
facility's administrative regulations employed to maintain order
and security. O'Connor's challenge was not that the Kennebec
County Jail's system of allowing a pretrial detainee's discipline
following a violation of its administrative regulations was
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suspect, but rather that Huard's intention was to punish O'Connor
and her provocative or instigative actions were directed toward
this end. Thus, the ability of a detention facility to
reasonably discipline detainees who violate rules is not
implicated by the issues presented in this case, in which a jury
found that Huard's acts were tantamount to arbitrary and
unreasonable punishment.
II. Qualified immunity
II. Qualified immunity
In her motions for directed verdict, both at the close
of O'Connor's case and at the close of all the evidence, Huard
argued that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based
on the merits of O'Connor's claim. In her motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, she again argued entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law on the merits and also raised, for
the first time, the defense of qualified immunity as a ground
entitling her to judgment as a matter of law.
Federal Rule of Procedure 50(b) specifies that a party,
having submitted a motion for a directed verdict may, after the
verdict and entry of judgment, "move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered
in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict[.]" Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(b). A party may not raise a ground for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict that was not previously presented to
the trial court in a motion for directed verdict. See Systemized
of New England, Inc. v. SCM, Inc., 732 F.2d 1030, 1035 (1st Cir.
1984) ("A party may not base its motion for a judgment n.o.v. on
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a ground that was not argued in its motion for a directed
verdict."). "The last opportunity to raise [qualified immunity]
is by motion for directed verdict." Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d
949, 953 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Systemized of New England,
Inc. in the qualified immunity context).
Having failed to properly preserve her qualified
immunity claim, Huard can prevail only upon a finding of plain
error. See Lewis, 944 F.2d at 953. "The fact that [Huard] lost
a very possible defense that would have eliminated liability for
fees is not enough; plain error requires much more." Id. Huard
never brought forward any evidence suggesting that her actions
were objectively reasonable in light of O'Connor's clearly
established due process right. Instead, she denied that she had
acted as O'Connor alleged. Because there was no evidence in the
record to support a finding of qualified immunity, the district
court's denial of her motion was not plain error. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court's denial of Huard's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
III. Attorney's fees
III. Attorney's fees
On November 13, 1996, the district court entered an
order granting O'Connor attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1988. The court essentially reasoned that, although O'Connor
received only nominal damages of one dollar, the jury had granted
the relief at the heart of O'Connor's claim by barring Huard's
actions in violation of his due process rights.
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Huard argues that we should reverse the order because
O'Connor is not entitled to attorney's fees. She contends that
under Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), although O'Connor is
properly characterized as the prevailing party, the award of only
nominal damages highlights O'Connor's failure to prove actual,
compensable damages. Having failed to obtain compensatory
relief, Huard appears to contend that O'Connor's success in this
case was technical or de minimis. We cannot agree.
Although the Farrar Court reversed the grant of
attorney's fees to a civil rights plaintiff because the
plaintiff's success was de minimis when compared to the outcome
and relief sought, the Court's opinion did not impose a per se
rule that a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded only nominal
damages is not entitled to fees. To the contrary, the Court's
opinion instructed district courts, in which discretion rests to
grant attorney's fees to civil rights plaintiffs, see 42 U.S.C.
1988 ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section[] . . . 1983, . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs."), that in exercising their discretion they
should consider the reasonableness of an award of fees in light
of the "'relationship between the extent of success and the
amount of the fee award.'" Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115-16 (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 438 (1983)); see also Wilcox
v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
"Farrar establishes that a district court should give primary
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consideration to the degree of success achieved when it decides
whether to award attorney's fees," and affirming a grant of
$66,535 in fees on award of one dollar in nominal damages), cited
with approval in Krewson v. Town of Quincy, 74 F.3d 15, 17 (1st
Cir. 1996).
Here, the district court recognized several important
factors warranting the grant of attorney's fees. First, the
district court's order recognized the importance of providing an
incentive to attorneys to represent litigants, such as O'Connor,
who seek to vindicate constitutional rights but whose claim may
not result in substantial monetary compensation. Second -- and
worth noting in light of the Farrar Court's emphasis on the fact
that Farrar sought only compensatory damages in the amount of $17
million and ultimately received one dollar from each defendant --
the most basic remedy O'Connor sought in this case was relief
from Huard's infliction of punishment without due process of law.
Third, the court underscored the deterrent impact of this
litigation, which will prevent "future abuses of the rights of
pretrial detainees." Fourth, the court deducted from the
requested amount for fees hours related solely to the two
defendants who were not part of the trial, hours spent in excess
of that reasonably required of a task, hours spent researching
inapplicable areas of law, and hours inadequately explained or
detailed. Based on the appropriateness of all of these
considerations, we find that the district court's grant of
attorney's fees was within its discretion.
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IV. O'Connor's claim regarding damages
IV. O'Connor's claim regarding damages
On cross-appeal, O'Connor appears to argue, for the
first time, that the jury's failure to award him punitive and
compensatory, rather than only nominal, damages was unreasonable.
The short answer to O'Connor's contention is that the issue
should have been raised before the district court in a motion for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a motion for new trial.
We generally will not review a party's contention that the
damages award is excessive or insufficient where the party has
failed to allow the district court to rule on the matter. See
Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1981) (no
appellate review of allegedly excessive or inadequate damages was
available where trial court was not given the opportunity to
exercise its discretion on the matter), cited with approval in
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850
F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1988); Braunstein v. Massachusetts Bank &
Trust Co., 443 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1971) (denying review of
claim that award was excessive because appellant failed to raise
the issue before the district court).
More importantly, however, we find that the jury was
not unreasonable in failing to award O'Connor compensatory or
punitive damages. O'Connor put forward evidence of damages
related to his mental and emotional suffering endured as a result
of Huard's actions, and did not present any evidence of economic
damages. Assuming the jury was properly instructed on the issue
of damages, and O'Connor does not challenge the instructions on
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appeal, the jury could reasonably have believed that O'Connor did
not suffer a compensable harm. See Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d
22, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1992).
Additionally, O'Connor appears to argue that Huard's
actions registered such malicious intent, reckless disregard, or
callous indifference to O'Connor's constitutional rights that the
jury was unreasonable in failing to award him punitive damages.
Our review of the record indicates "that the evidence does not
'point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant
[plaintiff] that a reasonably jury could not have arrived at
[its] conclusion.'" Id. at 30 (quoting Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v.
Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930, 934 (1st Cir.
1985)). Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury's
determination that punitive damages were not warranted in light
of the facts of this case. See id.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
affirm
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