F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 15 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 01-1051
DURANGO AIR SERVICE, INC., a
Colorado corporation; DONLEY E.
WATKINS; ELLEN ROBERTS, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Morten Borcher; JAMIE L. ROSS,
individually and as surviving spouse of
COLT H. ROSS, deceased, and as natural
parent of JAYLIE B. ROSS and JAIDA
S. ROSS, minor children of Colt H. Ross;
CRYSTAL L. ROSS, individually and as
surviving spouse of JON DIRK ROSS,
deceased, and as natural parent of JON
TALON ROSS, TESSA M. ROSS,
STARR L. ROSS, and CASH D. ROSS,
minor children of Jon Dirk Ross;
AMBER ANNE ROSS; and BRANDI L.
ROSS,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 98-D-2371)
John W. Grund (Della S. Nelson, with him on the briefs), Grund & Breslau, P.C.,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Zane R. Moseley of Zarlengo, Mott, Zarlengo & Winbourn, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee Durango Air Service, Inc.; John D. McClune of Schaden, Katzman,
Lampert & McClune, Broomfield, Colorado, for the Ross Defendants-Appellees, (Reed
L. Winbourn of Zarlengo, Mott, Zarlengo & Winbourn, P.C., Denver, Colorado; Bruce
A. Lampert of Schaden, Katzman, Lampert & McClune, Broomfield, Colorado; and G.
Raymond Goodwin of Watrous Ehlers Mielke & Goodwin, P.C., Littleton, Colorado,
with them on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, GARTH,* and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the interpretation of two insurance policies after a fatal
airplane crash. Although we initially determined that we did not have proper appellate
jurisdiction over the matters presented, that infirmity has since been cured by an
agreement of the parties to dismiss with prejudice any claims outstanding in the district
court. On the merits, we now affirm the district court’s decision granting summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellees.
I.
This case arose from an airplane crash on October 10, 1995, in which the pilot,
Morten Borcher (“Borcher”), and both passengers, Colt H. Ross and Jon Dirk Ross
Honorable Leonard I. Garth, United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of
*
Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
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(collectively “Decedents”), were killed. Durango Air Service (“Durango”) owned the
aircraft and employed the pilot. As a result of the accident, the wives and children of the
Decedents brought a wrongful death suit in state court against Durango, Donley E.
Watkins (“Watkins”), the president of, and a substantial shareholder in, Durango, and
Ellen Roberts (“Roberts”), as the personal representative of Borcher’s estate. (App. 24.)
Durango, Watkins, and Borcher (hereinafter “the Insureds”) were insured by Plaintiff-
Appellant Old Republic Insurance Co. (“Old Republic”) under two policies, commonly
referred to as the Aviation Policy and the “CGL” Policy, the Airport Liability Policy.
In a Colorado state court proceeding, the Insureds confessed judgment in favor of
the Decedents’ families in the amount of $4.05 million. (App. 133, 194-95.) Old
Republic had rejected a settlement of $800,000. The Colorado state court entered
judgment upon the Insureds’ Confession of Judgment on January 26, 1999. In response
to the state court’s judgment, Old Republic paid the Insureds $200,000 pursuant to the
Aviation Policy’s $100,000 per passenger liability limit. It paid them nothing under the
CGL Policy.
Old Republic then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado on October 29, 1998, claiming that the $200,000 it had
already paid the Insureds was the limit of its liability under the Aviation Policy, and that
Old Republic had no obligations to the Insureds under the CGL Policy. (App. 21-23.) It
sought a declaratory judgment that it had discharged the full extent of its obligation to
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indemnify the Insureds.
The Insureds filed counterclaims alleging causes of action against Old Republic
for breach of contract, willful and wanton breach of contract, negligence, breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. (App. 128-33.)
Among other things (e.g. triple damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, etc.), the
counterclaims sought indemnification from Old Republic for the $4.05 million judgment
(minus the $200,000 Old Republic already had paid) resulting from the state court
wrongful death action. Both the Insureds and Old Republic filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on May 14, 1999. (App. 154-63.)
The district court denied Old Republic’s cross-motion for summary judgment on
November 30, 2000. It held in favor of the Insureds, concluding that the full extent of
Old Republic’s duty of indemnification under its two policies was $1.7 million (Aviation
Policy: $700,000; CGL Policy: $1 million). It then dismissed the case with prejudice,1
but without deciding the Insureds’ counterclaims.2 The judgment reflecting the district
1
We question the district court’s order, which dismissed the case with prejudice,
in light of the fact that a dismissal of a case is inappropriate once a judgment has been
entered. See, e.g., Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 121 n.2 (3d Cir.
1999). Of more importance, however, is the fact that the case could not be dismissed
with the non-separable counterclaims undecided, even pursuant to an order of
bifurcation. The district court acknowledged that the counterclaims were still pending
when it entered its order of January 19, 2001.
2
The magistrate judge’s scheduling order had bifurcated the Insureds’
counterclaims from Old Republic’s declaratory judgment action.
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court’s decision of November 30, 2000 was entered on December 6, 2000.3 All
provisions of the November 30, 2000 order were incorporated into the December 6, 2000
order.
On December 18, 2000, Old Republic filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).4 The Insureds filed a Motion for Clarification and
3
Because of the dual manner in which the district court entered its orders
disposing of Old Republic’s declaratory judgment claim and granting summary judgment
to the Insureds, we will treat both the November 30, 2000 order and the December 6,
2000 order as the relevant order through which the district court disposed of Old
Republic’s claim, identifying it throughout this opinion as the December 6 order.
The December 6 order stated that “[p]ursuant to and in accordance with the Order
filed on November 30, 2000 . . . and incorporated herein by reference . . . it is
ORDERED that declaratory judgment is entered in favor of [the Insureds] and against
[Old Republic] and [Old Republic’s] duty of indemnification under the Aviation Policy
is $700,000 and [Old Republic’s] duty of indemnification under Commercial General
Liability Policy [CGL] is $1,000,000.” (App. 175.)
The district court explained that the December 6 order incorporates by reference
the order of November 30, 2000, in which the district court:
ORDERED that [Old Republic’s] Motion for Summary Judgment [on Old
Republic’s declaratory judgment claims] filed May 14, 1999 is DENIED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that [the Insureds’] Motion for Summary Judgment
[on Old Republic’s declaratory judgment claims] filed May 14, 1999 is
GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . . . . It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court enter declaratory judgment
that [Old Republic’s] duty of indemnification under the Aviation Policy is
$700,000 and [Old Republic’s] duty of indemnification under the CGL policy is
$1,000,000.
(App. 172.)
4
Rule 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
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Reinstatement of their counterclaims on December 21, 2000. Both motions were granted
by the district court on January 19, 2001, when the district court certified the December 6,
2000 order as final with no just reason for delay. (App. 178-81.) This appeal followed.
II.
Our initial concern after oral argument was that the December 6th order entered by
the district court did not constitute a valid Rule 54(b) certification because the Insureds’
counterclaims and Old Republic’s claim were not separate but were rather inextricably
related.
Rule 54(b)’s finality requirement is only satisfied if “the claims resolved are
distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.” Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v.
Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001); see also McKibben v. Chubb, 840 F.2d
1525, 1528-29 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that order was final for purposes of Rule 54(b)
certification because claims were separable); 19 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice ¶ 202.06[2] (3d ed. 1999).
In its declaratory judgment action, Old Republic sought an interpretation of its
policies which would limit its exposure and its indemnification duties to $200,000. The
Insureds, on the other hand, through their counterclaims, sought an interpretation of the
very same policies and clauses that would provide increased coverage, but that would
direction for the entry of judgment.
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also indemnify them for their “wrongful death” state judgment. The parties’ respective
claims were based on identical facts and on the same policies - indeed, on the same
clauses of the same policies. Rather than being independent and separable, the record
disclosed that the claims of both the Insureds and Old Republic all stemmed from the
same occurrence and were inextricably intertwined and related. On appeal, we therefore
were prepared to hold that the district court’s certification of its December 6th order under
Rule 54(b) was improper, as it was not a final order.5
Accordingly, having determined that the 54(b) certification had been rendered in
error, we were compelled to conclude that we had no appellate jurisdiction and therefore
could not address the merits of Old Republic’s claim. On January 16, 2002, however,
and while our initial opinion was circulating and therefore was not yet filed, the Insureds
dismissed their counterclaims, thereby making final that which was non-final. As a
result, we now exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the merits of Old Republic’s claim.
III.
5
In our discussion holding the Rule 54(b) certification inappropriate, we
suggested that as a matter of better practice (indeed, the most desirable practice) district
courts, in their future considerations of Rule 54(b) certification requests, clearly articulate
their reasons and make careful statements based on the record supporting their
determinations of “finality” and “no just reason for delay” so that we could review a
54(b) order more intelligently, and thus avoid jurisdictional remands.
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We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standard used by the district court. Wark v. United States, 269 F.3d 1185,
1187 (10th Cir. 2001). We also review the district court’s interpretation of the insurance
policies de novo. Mauldin v. Worldcom, Inc., 263 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001). We
apply Colorado contract law in this case.6 Under Colorado law, in the absence of an
ambiguity, an insurance contract must be given effect according to the ordinary and
accepted sense of the terms contained therein. In the Matter of the Estate of Daigle, 634
P.2d 71, 79 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
A. The Aviation Policy
The Insureds purchased an Aviation Policy from Old Republic. Although both
parties agree that the Insureds are entitled to coverage under the Policy regarding the
crash on October 10, 1995, they disagree as to the precise amount. The Insureds contend
that the Aviation Policy entitles them to $700,000 in coverage. Old Republic asserts that
the Policy limits the Insureds’ recovery to $200,000. The district court ruled in favor of
the Insureds.
The Aviation Policy’s general liability provision represents an agreement by Old
6
Colorado law governs because Colorado has the most significant relationship to
the insuring transaction and to the parties. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938); ITT Specialty Risk Servs. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 985 P.2d 43, 47 (Colo.
App. 1998) (citing Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d
1369 (Colo. 1979)). Furthermore, neither party contests the application of Colorado law
in this case.
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Republic:
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury sustained by any person
(excluding any passenger unless the words “Including Passengers” appear in Item
4 of the Declarations) and property damage, caused by an occurrence and arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the aircraft.
(App. 77 (emphasis added).)
Item 4 of the Declarations contains the phrase “including passengers.” (App. 32.)
Pursuant to the Policy’s Definitions, bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury, sickness,
disease or mental anguish sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period,
including death at any time resulting therefrom.” (App. 81 (emphasis added).)
Old Republic’s exposure is limited under the Aviation Policy, however, by a
liability limitation provision which reads, in pertinent part:
The total liability of the Company for all damages . . . shall not exceed the
limit of liability stated in the Declarations as applicable to “each occurrence.”
And further provided that if the Declarations are completed to show
“passenger Liability [sic] limited to,” the total liability of the Company for all
damages, including damages for care and loss of service because of bodily injury
to passengers shall not exceed:
(a) as respect any one passenger, the amount stated in the declarations as
applicable to “each person.”
(b) as respect two or more passengers, subject to the above provisions
respecting any one passenger, the amount stated in the Declarations as
applicable to “each person” multiplied by the number of passengers on
board the aircraft . . . but in no event shall the Company’s Liability for all
bodily injury . . . exceed the limits stated in the Declarations as applicable to
“each occurrence.”
(App. 80.) The Declarations limit the amount applicable to “each occurrence” to $1
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million, and to “each person” to $100,000. (App. 32.)
Old Republic argues, and the Insureds do not contest, that the Aviation Policy
limits recovery for bodily injury for each passenger to $100,000. Old Republic then goes
on, however, to argue that this limit pertains to all claims made in connection with the
October 10, 1995 crash. More specifically, Old Republic maintains that the Decedents’
families’ claims for mental anguish are included within the liability limit for each
passenger because these claims derive from the actions for bodily injury to each
passenger, i.e. they could not have been made but for the injury to the particular
passenger.
We are not persuaded by Old Republic’s “derivative argument.” In this case, the
Policy clearly provides coverage for non-passengers’ claims of emotional distress as well
as passengers’. As we have recited, the Policy’s definition of bodily injury specifically
includes “mental anguish sustained by any person,” (App. 81), and its general liability
provision expressly states that coverage is available to “any person”7 who suffers from
mental anguish that is “caused by an occurrence and arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the aircraft.” (App. 77.) The Decedents’ families’ mental anguish
claims clearly arose from the “use” of the crashed aircraft, and are therefore covered by
the Policy’s general liability provision.
The term “any person” of course is limited by the Policy to those individuals
7
whom the Insureds “shall become legally obligated to pay.” In this case, those persons
would be the Decedents’ families.
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Old Republic argues, however, that under its Policy “the total liability of the
Company for all damages, including damages for care and loss of service because of
bodily injury to passengers shall not exceed . . . (b) as respect two or more passengers . . .
the amount stated in the Declarations as applicable to “each person” multiplied by the
number of passengers on board the aircraft . . . .” (App. 80.) According to Old Republic,
the phrase “for all damages” limits the Insureds’ coverage to $100,000 per passenger,
regardless of any injury that non-passengers may have experienced as a result of the
crash.
We can not agree. The Policy provision relied upon by Old Republic explicitly
refers to passenger liability. (App. 80.) That provision makes no mention of limiting
liability for non-passenger bodily injury. (App. 32.) This makes it clear that the Policy
limitation was intended to apply to bodily injury sustained by passengers, but not to
injuries sustained by non-passengers.
In short, if Old Republic had meant to limit its coverage for mental anguish and
other noneconomic injuries to non-passengers by including such claims within the scope
of coverage for injury to passengers, it could have done so explicitly. The language of the
Policy clearly explains that non-passengers’ claims for mental anguish are covered and
are independent of the $100,000 limitation for passenger injury.8
Colt H. Ross, who was a passenger and was killed in the crash, had three family
8
members who brought claims in Colorado state court against the Insureds as non-
passengers. Jon Dirk Ross, who was also a passenger and was killed in the crash, had
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Finally, the cases relied on by Old Republic are distinguishable from the one at
hand. In In the Matter of the Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981) (en banc), the
policy in that case did not include mental anguish within the definition of bodily injury, as
it does in the Old Republic Policy. Hence, the non-passenger claimants in Daigle were
limited to a $100,000 per passenger recovery because they were not covered for mental
anguish by the Daigle policies. Moreover, since the decision in Daigle, the Colorado
Wrongful Death Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-202 et seq., has now been amended to
include noneconomic damages similar to those found in the Old Republic Policy.
Because it involved different policy language and was decided under different Colorado
law, the Daigle case is inapposite.
Spaur v. Allstate Insurance Co., 942 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1997), is similarly
inapposite. Admittedly, Spaur was decided after the amendment to the Wrongful Death
Act and did find that the liability provision at issue “plainly restricts coverage to those
who have sustained bodily injury and includes within that coverage any derivative claims
of other persons.” Id. at 1263. What distinguishes Spaur from this case, however, are the
differences in the two policies. Unlike the Aviation Policy in this case, the policy in
Spaur defined bodily injury only as “bodily injury, sickness, disease or death,” and did not
include mental anguish as an element of damages. Id. at 1263. By contrast, the Aviation
seven family members who brought claims in Colorado state court against the Insureds as
non-passengers.
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Policy here explicitly includes all non-passengers in its coverage provision and defines
mental anguish as a compensable bodily injury.
Because the Aviation Policy clearly provides coverage for all persons suffering
from mental anguish as a result of aircraft operation, the Decedents’ families’ mental
anguish claims are not limited by the $100,000 “each person” limitation. They are
limited, however, by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-203, which prohibits recovery for
noneconomic loss or injury in wrongful death cases “in excess of two hundred fifty
thousand dollars.” This limit is applied collectively for each decedent, see Mitson v. AG
Eng’g & Dev. Co., 835 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1993), and is not contested by the
Insureds. As a result, the Insureds are entitled under the Aviation Policy to a total
recovery of $700,000; $500,000 for mental anguish to each of the Decedents’ families
($250,000 x 2), and $200,000 for the injuries to the Decedents themselves ($100,000 x 2).
B. The CGL Policy (the Airport Liability Policy)
Old Republic entered into another policy with the Insureds, the CGL Policy.
Under that Policy, Old Republic agreed that it “will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . .
bodily injury . . . . The insurance afforded applies separately to each insured against
whom claim is made or suit is brought, except with respect to the limits of the company’s
liability.” (App. 94-96 (italics added).) The amount of coverage available for “each
occurrence” is limited to $1 million. (App. 100.)
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Thus, Watkins, who by reason of the state court wrongful death judgment is legally
responsible to the Decedents’ families under the Colorado Wrongful Death Act, would be
entitled to up to $1 million in coverage under the CGL Policy if he is not excluded from
coverage by the Policy.
The exclusionary provision of the Policy eliminates coverage for:
(B) . . . bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of
(1) any . . . aircraft owned or operated by . . . the named insured, or
(2) any . . . aircraft operated by any person in the course of his employment
by the named insured.
(App. 94.) The parties agree this exclusion precludes coverage with respect to Durango
and Borcher, as the owner and operator of the airplane, respectively. They disagree,
however, with respect to Watkins’ coverage.
However, the CGL Policy contains Special Airport Provisions, one of which states
that the exclusion cited above also “applies only to aircraft . . . in flight by or for the
account of the insured.” (App. 87 (italics added).) The parties’ dispute as respects the
CGL Policy therefore focuses on whether the flight that crashed on October 10, 1995 was
a flight “by or for the account” of Watkins, a corporate officer of Durango and one of two
Durango shareholders.9 If it was for the “account” of Watkins, the policy would not
cover Watkins’ liability. If it was not for his “account,” as we hold here, Watkins is
9
The parties do not dispute that the aircraft was in flight “by” Borcher and “for
the account of” Durango.
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covered for up to $1 million.
Both parties note the silence of Colorado law interpreting the Special Airport
Provision and therefore rely, inter alia, on Boeing Airplane Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Indem.
Co., 268 P.2d 654 (Wash. 1954). See also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keenan, 216
Cal. Rptr. 318, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (applying Boeing).
Boeing had contracted with the government to modify a B-50 aircraft. In
connection with that contract, Boeing had taken out insurance policies. After the aircraft
crashed during a test flight, Boeing became responsible to pay some $58,000 in damages
to other parties. Boeing sought to recoup those monies from the Fireman’s Fund
Insurance Co. For Boeing to be covered under its policy with the Fireman’s Fund, any
accident would have to occur after Boeing had relinquished possession of the aircraft; if
Boeing had maintained possession, it was not covered. The policy also provided that it
would not apply to the use of any aircraft and its coverage was not available where the
aircraft was “in flight by or for the account of the insured [Boeing].” The Washington
Supreme Court summarized these conditions by stating:
Under the specific provisions of the . . . policies, there can be no coverage and the
judgment [in favor of the insurance company] must be affirmed if (1) the accident
occurred before Boeing had relinquished possession of the plane to others, or (2) if
the plane was “in flight by or for the account of” Boeing.
Id. at 658.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Boeing had
not relinquished possession of the plane at the time of the crash, and therefore there was
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no coverage for Boeing. Additionally, the court also held that the insurance policy did
not apply to Boeing, thereby denying coverage, because the test flight was “by or for the
account of” Boeing, inasmuch as the completion of the test flight would have resulted in a
direct benefit to Boeing. On the present appeal, we are concerned only with the court’s
discussion of “for the account of,” and not with the particulars of Boeing’s liability or
maintenance of possession of the plane.
Boeing, however, is not the answer to this appeal, although its analysis is of
substantial assistance in resolving the present case. First, of course, Boeing is a
Washington state case and therefore is not binding in the instant Colorado context.
Second, Boeing, while interpreting a different insurance contract than the one at issue
here, nevertheless holds that where a direct benefit is received by the insured (in that case
Boeing), such a direct benefit satisfies the condition that the flight was “by or for the
account of” the insured. Boeing, of course, while finding that a direct benefit was present
in that case, does not address the more relevant question presented in this case of whether
an insured (a stockholder and corporate officer) who does not receive a direct benefit
profits sufficiently, if at all, from the use of a plane by its corporate owner so as to come
within the insurance policy’s condition of “by or for the account of” the insured, Watkins.
This question of indirect or intangible benefit has not been resolved in the case law of
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Colorado or, to our knowledge, of any other jurisdiction.10
Due to the lack of guiding precedent, we are left with only the language in Boeing
that a “direct financial benefit” to the insured is evidence of an activity being “for the
account of the insured.” See Boeing, 268 P.2d at 661. In the absence of Colorado law
interpreting “for the account of,” we would be hard-pressed to expand and extend the
“direct benefit” holding of Boeing so as to construe the “account” clause to apply to an
indirect, intangible, or incidental benefit (if one existed) that an insured who is a
shareholder and officer such as Watkins may have received. Corporations’ shareholders
and officers are not normally, if ever, on the front line of the benefits received by a
corporation so as to individually profit from that corporation’s activities.
Certainly, a stockholder and corporate officer of an airline cannot be said to
receive a direct financial benefit from that airline’s flights. To decide otherwise would be
to blur, if not totally eliminate, the distinction between the plane’s actual owner, in this
case Durango, and Durango’s shareholders. Although Watkins, as a shareholder, may
possibly receive a minimal indirect or intangible benefit from each of Durango’s flights,
this benefit is simply not substantial enough to imply, let alone hold, that the crashed
10
The few cases that interpret “for the account of the insured” did not do so with
regard to a stockholder or corporate officer. See, e.g., Keenan, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 328
(finding that plane was being flown “for the account of insured” when the insured was a
plane rental company and the plane that crashed was one of the insured’s planes being
flown by a renter); Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Alfa Aviation, Inc., 312 S.E.2d
426, 428 (N.C. 1984) (finding that renter of airplane was not covered under the policy
exclusion).
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flight was “by or for the account of” Watkins.
Although Old Republic takes the position that the clause “for the account of” is
unambiguous, (Appellant’s Br. at 17), we are not that confident that Old Republic’s
characterization is a reasonable one in the present context. A policy provision is
ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Terranova
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo. 1990). The CGL Policy
provision excluding the owner and operator of the aircraft from coverage is certainly
unambiguous. However, in the absence of a comparable express exclusion in the CGL
Policy that denies coverage to a shareholder or officer of the company owning the
aircraft, we are not prepared to say that the instant CGL Policy excludes such individuals
from coverage.
At the very most, Watkins, as an officer and shareholder, is an indirect beneficiary
of Durango’s operations. Because it is established in Colorado jurisprudence, where an
ambiguity is found, that an insurance policy is construed against the drafter, see Bengtson
v. USAA Property & Cas. Ins., 3 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Colo. App. 2000), in this case Old
Republic, we can not hold on this record that the crashed aircraft was in flight “for the
account of” Watkins rather than “for the account of” Durango. But even if we were to
accede to Old Republic’s position that the exclusionary clause in this context is
unambiguous, our reading of the policy provision in light of reason and the Boeing
analysis would result in no different conclusion: i.e., that Watkins is covered to the extent
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of $1 million under the CGL Policy.
IV.
The District Court correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Aviation Policy
and the CGL Policy to the facts of this case. The Insureds are therefore entitled to
$700,000 under the Aviation Policy and to $1 million under the CGL Policy. The district
court’s decision will therefore be affirmed.
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No. 01-1051, Old Republic Ins. v. Durango Air Service, Inc.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority's holding that the CGL Policy provides $1,000,000 in
coverage in this case and would affirm the district court on that issue. I respectfully
dissent, however, from the majority's holding that the Aviation Policy provides the
Insureds with $700,000 in coverage rather than $200,000.
The Aviation Policy contains a limitation on liability, which expressly limits all
damages which arise “because of bodily injury to passengers”:
Regardless of the number of (1) Insureds under this policy, (2) persons or
organizations who sustain bodily injury to property damage, (3) claims
made or suits brought on account of bodily injury or property damage, or
(4) aircraft to which this policy applies, the Company's liability is limited
as follows:
...
. . . the total liability of the Company for all damages, including
damages for care and loss of service because of bodily injury to passengers
shall not exceed:
(a) as respect any one passenger, the amount stated in
Declarations as applicable to “each person.”
(b) as respect two or more passengers, subject to the
above provisions respecting any one passenger, the amount
stated in the Declarations as applicable to “each person”
multiplied by the number of passengers on board the aircraft.
Aplt. App. at 80 (emphasis added). The Insureds argue that the Aviation Policy not only
provides coverage of $100,000 for each of the two passengers who died in the crash, but
also provides coverage for the mental anguish sustained by the ten non-passengers who
sued the Insureds. In its pleadings before the district court, the Insureds sought
$1,000,000 in coverage under the Aviation Policy, which is the maximum amount of
coverage the policy provides for “each occurrence.”
The district court agreed in part with the Insureds' contentions and concluded the
Aviation Policy provided $700,000 in coverage. The district court agreed that the
Aviation Policy covered the mental anguish of non-passengers and that the limitation of
liability statement in the policy did not apply to damages sustained by non-passengers.
However, the court determined that the statutory cap set forth in C.R.S. § 13-21-203
applied and limited the amount payable under the policy for the mental anguish of the
non-passengers to $250,000 per passenger death, for a total of $500,000. The court
therefore concluded that the Aviation Policy provided $700,000 in total coverage –
$200,000 for bodily injury sustained by two passengers, and $500,000 for mental
anguish sustained by the non-passengers.
While it cannot be denied that the non-passengers suffered mental anguish, the
question presented is whether the non-passengers can recover damages under the
Aviation Policy for their mental anguish.1 Mental anguish is listed as a bodily injury
under the policy. However, the non-passengers were not directly injured as a result of
the accident, i.e., they were not at the scene of the accident. Instead, their mental anguish
occurred “because of bodily injury to passengers.” The Aviation Policy plainly limits
1
While noting Old Republic's arguments to the contrary, the assertion that a
wrongful death claim is derivative in nature is unhelpful. Whether the Aviation Policy
provides coverage for the mental anguish of non-passengers is governed by the language
of the policy, not by the character of the action.
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liability for damages which arise “because of bodily injury to passengers” to $100,000
per passenger involved. Unless there is ambiguity in the language of an insurance policy,
the policy should be enforced as written. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Stein, 940
P.2d 384, 387 (Colo. 1997). Therefore, regardless of the fact that the policy in question
covers injury to non-passengers in some circumstances, the particular injury to the non-
passengers at issue falls within the policy limitation for damages which arise “because of
bodily injury to passengers.” The coverage for the mental anguish arising out of the
wrongful death of the two passengers is limited to $200,000.
The majority interprets the policy limitation as applying only to bodily injury
sustained by passengers, and not to injuries sustained by non-passengers. However, the
policy limitation at issue expressly references “damages for care and loss of service” as
damages falling within the limitation. This reference within the policy limitation
indicates the limitation applies to injuries, such as mental anguish, sustained by non-
passengers. For example, damage for loss of service is not the type of damage which
could be sustained by the passenger who is directly involved in an accident and is injured
or killed. Damage for loss of service could only be sustained by a non-passenger
“because of bodily injury to passengers.” The damages for mental anguish alleged here,
like damages for care and loss of service, are damages sustained by non-passengers but
the damages arise “because of bodily injury to passengers.”
I would reverse the district court's ruling with regard to the coverage provided by
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the Aviation Policy and remand for entry of judgment in the amount of $200,000 on that
policy. In all other regards, I would affirm.
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Old Republic Insurance v. Durango Air Service, Inc.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2002-03-15
Citations: 283 F.3d 1222
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