United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1701
ELESMA OLIVERAS-SIFRE, CARLOS I. APONTE-ORTIZ, AND
RUBEN ROMAN-CRUZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PUERTO RICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, CARMEN FELICIANO-DE-MELECIO,
IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, INGRID FERNANDEZ-MILIAN, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY,
SYLVETTE SOTO-COLON, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Ricardo L. Torres Munoz for appellants.
Lynn Doble-Salicrup, Attorney, Federal Litigation Division,
with whom Gustavo A. Gelpi, Solicitor General, Edda Serrano-
Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
May 26, 2000
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellants are three
individuals who were hired by the Puerto Rico Department of
Health to perform advocacy work for persons with AIDS. They
claim that the Department’s failure to renew their contracts at
the end of their original terms stemmed from discrimination in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794, and provisions of Puerto Rico law. Defendants are
the Department of Health, the Secretary of that Department, and
two other supervisory officials.
The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety, finding various deficiencies in the
different counts. See Oliveras-Sifre v. Department of Health,
38 F.Supp.2d 91 (D.P.R. 1999). On appeal, appellants challenge
three of the court’s rulings: (1) the dismissal of
discrimination claims under Title I of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, (2) the dismissal of retaliation claims
under Title V of the ADA, and (3) the rejection of individual
liability for certain defendants. We affirm.
I. Discussion
-2-
We review the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
de novo, accepting as true all well pleaded allegations and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.
See Langadinos v. American Airlines, 199 F.3d 68, 69 (lst Cir.
2000); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16
(lst Cir. 1989).
The Ombudsman’s Office for Persons with HIV/AIDS in the
Puerto Rico Department of Health was created in 1993 pursuant to
an agreement with the United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Region II. All
three appellants were hired to work in that office: Elesma
Oliveras-Sifre as Ombudsman for HIV/AIDS, Carlos Aponte-Ortiz as
Strategies and Liaison Coordinator, and Ruben Roman-Cruz as
Investigation Analyst. They were contractual employees whose
contracts were not renewed upon expiration in 1997.1
Appellants allege that they were "the object of persecution,
discrimination, retaliation and harassment," culminating in
their termination, because of their advocacy on behalf of
individuals with AIDS. The specific conduct alleged to have
elicited defendants’ unlawful response is described as follows:
1 The First Amended Complaint indicates that at least
Aponte, and perhaps Roman as well, were transferred to new
positions in the Department of Health. See Complaint at ¶¶ 7,
8, 43, 44.
-3-
The active management performed by [plaintiffs] .
. . specifically, the report prepared on the
management of medical records of patients with
HIV/AIDS in the Fajardo Region; [their] opposition
related to the dispositions of Regulation 86
regarding, transfer, disposal, exhumation and
cremation of corpses of persons infected with
HIV/AIDS; [their] opposition to Regulation 87
regarding transmissible diseases and the dispositions
of patients infected with HIV/AIDS; [their] position
regarding the harmful effects that the schedule[]
changes, resulting from the Health Reform, could have
on PASET personnel, including the Regional
Immunological Clinics, on the clinical handling of
HIV/AIDS patients, caused a retaliation pattern from
defendants . . . .
See First Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 20, 27, 33. Oliveras
additionally contends that she experienced retaliation for
providing information to the OCR regarding the OCR’s
investigation on Regulation 87. See id. at ¶ 21.
To state a claim for employment discrimination under Title
I of the ADA, a plaintiff typically must show: (1) that he or
she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act; (2)
that he or she was able to perform the essential functions of
the job, either with or without reasonable accommodation; and
(3) that the employer discharged him or her in whole or in part
because of that disability. See Feliciano v. State of Rhode
Island, 160 F.3d 780, 784 (lst Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a).2
2
An employment discrimination claim under section 794 of
the Rehabilitation Act is analyzed under the same standards
-4-
The district court initially determined that neither
Oliveras nor Aponte established a prima face case of disability
discrimination because neither was disabled. Although Roman
did have a qualifying disability, blindness, the complaint
acknowledged that he had received accommodation for that
disability, leaving the AIDS-related allegations as the sole
factual foundation for his disability discrimination claims as
well. 3 Arguably going above and beyond its duty to assist
plaintiffs, the district court sua sponte considered whether
plaintiffs had stated a claim under the ADA’s "association
provision," which protects qualified individuals from employment
discrimination based on the "known disability of an individual
with whom the qualified individual is known to have a
relationship or association," 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
applicable to Title I of the ADA. See Feliciano, 160 F.3d at
784; 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). We therefore do not separately
consider the Rehabilitation Act claim.
3
Paragraph 35 of the complaint alleges that Roman "was
granted a reasonable accommodation (a reader and/or lecturer)"
on account of his blindness and that, two months before his
dismissal, he was informed that the lecturer’s contract would
not be renewed. Paragraph 41 alleges that, in addition to the
allegations of discrimination applicable to the other two
plaintiffs, he had been discriminated against "because of his
condition as a blind individual." No specific allegations
concerning the nature of that discrimination were alleged and,
in any event, the claim is not re-asserted on appeal. Thus, for
purposes of this appeal, Roman’s claims are the same as the
other appellants.
-5-
Appellants made no reference to this provision in their
complaint.
The district court concluded that the association claim also
fell short, however, and we agree. The legislative history of
section 12112(b)(4) makes clear that the provision was intended
to protect qualified individuals from adverse job actions based
on "unfounded stereotypes and assumptions" arising from the
employees’ relationships with particular disabled persons. See
Barker v. International Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15 (D. Me.
1998) (citation omitted); see also Den Hartog v. Wasatch
Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1081-85 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing
provision’s legislative history at length and stating that prima
facie case includes showing that plaintiff was known by his
employer to have "a relative or associate with a disability").
The EEOC also has concluded that this was the intended scope of
the provision, as indicated through the three examples of
forbidden association discrimination set out in its Interpretive
Guidance on this provision of the ADA:
(1) refusal to hire where the employer makes an
unfounded assumption that the employee will miss work
in order to care for a disabled relative; (2)
discharging an employee who does volunteer work with
AIDS victims, due to fear that the employee may
contract the disease; and (3) denying health benefits
to a disabled dependent of an employee but not to
other dependents, even where the provision of benefits
to the disabled dependent would result in increased
health insurance costs for the employer.
-6-
Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1085 (citing 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.8, App.
at 360).
Appellants’ contentions do not fit within this framework.
They do not allege a specific association with a disabled
individual, but contend, in essence, that they were punished for
their advocacy on behalf of individuals with AIDS. As the
district court recognized, such a claim implicates the
prohibition against retaliation contained in Title V of the ADA,
see 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(c), not the association provision.
See Oliveras-Sifre, 38 F.Supp.2d at 101; see also Barker, 993 F.
Supp. at 15. We therefore turn to appellants’ second claim on
appeal, that the district court erred in rejecting their
retaliation claim.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against an individual
"because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter." 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish retaliation under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she was engaged in protected
conduct; (2) he or she was discharged, and (3) there was a
causal connection between the discharge and the conduct. See
-7-
Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (lst Cir.
1997).
The district court fully analyzed appellants’ retaliation
claim in light of this standard, concluding that they failed to
plead facts satisfying its first element, participation in
protected conduct. The court reviewed the settings covered by
the ADA – employment, public accommodations, and the provision
of services and benefits by public entities – and concluded
that, "as stated in the Complaint, the actions described by
Plaintiffs do not relate to any forms of discrimination
prohibited by Titles I, II or III of the ADA." See 38 F.Supp.2d
at 101-02.
We agree that appellants’ vague allegations regarding policy
positions they took as employees of the Ombudsman’s Office, see
supra at 3, are insufficient to demonstrate that they engaged in
protected conduct. We reiterate the district court’s language:
It is not apparent to the Court how the management of
medical records of HIV/AIDS patients, treatment of
corpses of HIV/AIDS inflicted persons, disposition of
patients infected with HIV/AIDS, and the scheduling of
"PASET personnel" is related to the conduct prohibited
by the ADA regarding employment, public benefits, or
public accommodations. Without more specific
allegations as to how the positions Plaintiffs took as
part of their work at the Department of Health opposed
conduct made illegal by the ADA, the Court cannot
permit their claim to go forward.
-8-
38 F.Supp.2d at 102-03 (footnote omitted).4 Appellants merely
repeat on appeal the same conclusory statements contained in
their complaint, providing us no basis upon which to find that
the district court erred in failing to translate their
allegations into specific conduct protected by the ADA. 5
Although we construe appellants’ claims liberally, see, e.g.,
Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (lst Cir. 1996), it is
not our role to conjecture whether an actionable claim lurks
beneath their sketchy allegations, see Gooley v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (lst Cir. 1988) ("The threshold [for
stating a claim] may be low, but it is real . . . ."). We thus
affirm the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ retaliation
claims.
Our disposition of the substantive claims makes it
unnecessary to consider whether the defendants could be held
individually liable under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
II. Conclusion
4"PASET" is the Program of AIDs Affairs and Sexually
Transmitted Diseases of the Department of Health, which also is
known as the Ombudsman’s Office for Persons with AIDS.
5Appellants argue that "[t]he complaint makes specific
allegations of retaliatory conduct in response to plaintiffs’
conduct in their aid to patients with HIV/AIDS to exercise their
rights or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the ADA
and the RA." They do not, however, specify the rights "granted
or protected by the ADA."
-9-
Having concluded that the appellants have failed to allege
facts that, even when viewed most favorably to them, establish
a prima facie case of disability discrimination, we hold that
the district court properly dismissed their complaint.
Affirmed.
-10-