OZKOK

Interim Decision #3044

MAi OF OZKOK

In Deportation Proceedings

A-12150228

Decided by Board April 26, 1988

(1) A conviction exists for immigration purposes where an alien has had a formal
judgment of guilt entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld,
where all of the following elements are present: (1) a judge or jury has found the
alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty, (2) the judge has ordered some form
Of punishment, penalty, or restraint un the peraon'a liberty to be imposed, and (3)
a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the
terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's
order, without availability of further proceedings regarding his guilt or innocence
of the origiast charge. Matter of Garda, 19 I&N Dec. 270 031A 1985); Matter of
Zangwill, 18 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981); Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 BIA 1980);
Matter of Robinson, 16 I&N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter of Varagianis, 16 I&N
Dec. 48 (BIA 1976); Matter of Pikkarainen, 10 I&N Dec. 401 (131A 1963); and Matter
of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 BIA 1959), overruled in part.
(2) A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may not support an order of
deportation if it has been expunged. Matter of Gutnick, 13 I&N Dec. 672 BIA
1971); Matte:- of Tharra-Obanda, 12 I&N Dec. 576 BIA 1966; A.G. 1967); Matter of
G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961), followed.
(3) A conviction for a narcotics or marihuana violation is final regardless of the pos-
sibility of expunction. Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA, A.G. 1959), followed.
(4) The respondent, whose adjudication of guilt was stayed and whose proceedings
were deferred after his plea of guilty to possession of cocaine and who was or-
dered to complete 3 years of probation and 100 hours of volunteer community
service pursuant to a state statute which allowed the court to enter judgment and
proceed with disposition of the person upon violation of probation as if probation
had not been ordered, has a final conviction sufficient to support an order of de-
portation under section 241(aX11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1982).

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CHARGE:
Orden Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX11) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX11)]—Convicted of narcotics
violation
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Konstantine J. Frevas, Esquire David M. Dixon
Suite 950—Ninth Floor Appellate Counsel
5 Light Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21202

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members

In a decision dated September 13, 1985, the immigration judge
found the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1982), as an
alien convicted of a narcotics violation, and ordered him deported
from the United States. On October 18, 1985, the immigration
pri his decision for our review.' The respondent has
judge certified
also filed a motion to vacate the order of deportation and terminate
proceedings. The decision of the immigration judge will be affirmed
in part. The record will be remanded for further proceedings. 2
The respondent is a 32-year-old native and citizen of Turkey who
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident
on October 9, 1967. The record reflects that he pleaded guilty on
August 20, 1981, to unlawful possession with intent to distribute co-
caine in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. On Oc-
tober 23, 1981, the court stayed judgment and placed the respond-
ent on probation for 3 years pursuant to the provisions of Article
27, section 641 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 3 The judge fur-

Subsequent to the issuance of the immigration judge's decision and his certifica-
tion thereof to the Board, the respondent requested that the immigration judge
render a supplemental order in view of the fact that an application for a waiver of
inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982), which had
been filed on November 17, 1983, was still pending. On October 31, 1985, the immi-
gration judge issued a supplemental order vacating the order of deportation subject
to the presentation of the respondent's waiver request. That order has also been cer-
tified to the Board. Inasmuch as the immigration judge no longer retained jurisdic-
tion over the case following his certification of the order of deportation dated Sep-
tember 13, 1985, his supplemental order is of no effect. However, in view of our deci-
sion to remand the record for consideration of the respondent's waiver application,
the issue is moot.
2 This decision was originally entered on January 26, 1988. We have reopened the
proceedings on our own motion in order to vacate that decision, withdraw it from
publication, and substitute the following decision.
3 The statute in effect at that time provided in pertinent part:
Continued

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Interim Decision #3044

ther ordered the respondent to perform 100 hours of volunteer com-
munity service and to pay a fine of $1,500 plus court costs.
On October 8, 1982, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221)
charging the respondent with deportability under section 241(a)(11)
of the Act. The record reflects that the respondent denied deport-
ability and sought termination of the proceedings on the ground
that the action of the criminal court did not constitute a conviction
for immigration purposes under the standards set forth by the
Board. The Service opposed termination, arguing that a conviction
existed. After a thorough analysis of the Maryland statute and
Board precedent decisions, the immigration judge determined that
the action of the criminal court would support a finding of deport-
ability under section 241(a)(11) of the Act. We agree with his con-
clusion, although for different reasons.
The question of what state action constitutes a conviction with
sufficient finality for purposes of the immigration laws is one with

(a) Probation after plea or finding of guilt; power of court to provide terms and
conditions; waiver of right to appeal from judgment of guilt.—(1Xi) Whenever a
person accused of a crime pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of an
offense, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, if satisfied that the best interests
of the person and the welfare of the people of the State would be served thereby,
and with the written consent of the person after determination of guilt or accept-
ance of a nolo contendere plea, may stay the entering of judgment, defer further
proceedings, and place the person on probation subject to reasonable terms and
conditions as appropriate. The terms and conditions may include ordering the
person to pay a fine or pecuniary penalty to the state, or to make restitution, but
before the court orders a fine, pecuniary penalty, or restitution the person is enti-
tled to notice and a hearing to determine the amount of the fine, pecuniary penal-
ty, or restitution, what payment will be required, and how payment will be made.
The terms and conditions also may include any type of rehabilitation program or
clinic, or similar program, or the parks program or voluntary hospital program.

(2) By consenting to and receiving a stay of entering of the judgment as provid-
ed by this subsection, the person waives the right to appeal from the judgment of
guilt by the court at any time. Prior to the person consenting to the stay of enter-
ing of the judgment, the court shall notify the person that by consenting to and
receiving a stay of entry of judgment, he waives the right to appeal from the judg-
ment of guilt by the court at any time_
(b) Violation of probation.—Upon violation of a term or condition of probation,
the court may enter judgment and proceed with disposition of the person as if the
person had not been placed on probation.
(c) Fulfillment of terms of probation--Upon fulfillment of the terms and condi-
tions of probation, the court shall discharge the person from probation. The dis-
charge is final disposition of the matter. Discharge of a person under this section
shall be without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for purposes of
any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of conviction of crime.
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 641 (1982).

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which the Board has wrestled for many years. As early as 1942, we
considered the effect of a state expunction statute on the status of
a conviction for immigration purposes. Matter of F-, 1 I&N Dec.
343 (BIA 1942). In 1955 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the conviction issue in a. per curiam decision, stating only that the
alien's conviction under a Massachusetts procedure, which permit-
ted the sentence to be revoked and the case to be put "on file," had
not "attained such finality as to support an order of deportation."
Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). Recognizing the need for a fed-
eral standard for a final conviction, the Board analyzed the possi-
ble courses of action by a court that could result in a conviction in
Matter of 0-, 7 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1957). We concluded there that a
final conviction existed where, after a finding of guilt was made, a
fine or sentence to imprisonment was imposed or either the execu-
tion or imposition of a sentence was suspended. We also found that
if the court postponed further consideration of the case so that it
was still pending for imposition of some sentence, an examination
under Pino would be necessary to determine if the conviction had
achieved sufficient finality to support a deportation order.
A few years later the Board enunciated the three-pronged test
which has been the standard we have applied since then to deter-
mine whether a conviction exists for immigration purposes. Matter
of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 031A 1959). 4 During this same period, the
Attorney General also examined the effect of expunction proce-
dures on convictions for narcotics offenses, concluding that Con-
gress did not intend for a narcotics violator to escape deportation
as a result of a technical erasure of his conviction by a state.
Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (MA, A.G. 1959). In so finding, the
Attorney General noted the federal policy to treat narcotics of-
fenses seriously and determined that it would be inappropriate for
an alien's deportability for criminal activity to be dependent upon
"the vagaries of state law." Id. at 446. He further pointed out that
in 1959, when his decision was rendered, only a few states had ex-
punction procedures, concluding that it was unfair to give preferen-

4 According to our definition as set forth in Matter of L-R-, supra, a conviction
exists for immigration purposes where all of the following elements are present:
(1) there has been a judicial finding of guilt;
(2) the court takes action which removes the case from the category of those
which are (actually, or in theory) pending for consideration by the court—the
court orders the defendant fined, or incarcerated or the court suspends sentence,
or the court suspends the imposition of sentence;
(3) the action of the court is considered a conviction by the state for at least some
purpose.

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Interim Decision #3044

tial treatment to only a few aliens who were convicted in those ju-
risdictions. 5
It is apparent from a review of our decisions published since the
Attorney General's opinion in Matter of A-F-, supra, that most
states now employ some method of ameliorating the consequences
of a conviction. See also Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.,
460 U.S. 103, 121 (1983). The procedures vary from state to state
and include provisions for annulling or setting aside the conviction,
permitting withdrawal of the plea, sealing the records after com-
pletion of a sentence or probation, and deferring adjudication of
guilt with dismissal of proceedings following a probationary period.
See e.g., Matter of Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270 (BLA. 1985) (Texas);
Matter of Carrillo, 19 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1984) (Texas), Matter of
Forstner, 18 I&N Dec. 374 (BIA 1983) (Oregon); Matter of Golshan,
18 I&N Dec. 92 BIA 1981) (Washington); Matter of Zangwill, 18
I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981) (Florida); Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550
031A 1980) (Georgia); Matter of Varagianis, 16 I&N Dec. 48 BIA
1976) (New Hampshire); Matter of Tstmbicly -Rochtt, 13 I&N Dec. 56
(131A 1968) (Nevada). Many states have more than one ameliorative
provision, some applying only to youthful or first offenders, and
others being available to the convicted population at large. See, e g.,
Matter of Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 1979) (Virginia); Matter of
Haddad, 16 I&N Dec. 253 BIA 1977) (Michigan); Matter of Werk, 16
I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977) (Wisconsin); Matter of Moeller, 16 I&N
Dec. 65 (BIA 1976) (California); Matter of Lima, 15 I&N Dec. 661
BIA 1976) (California); Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 BIA
1974) (California).
In keeping with the opinions of the Supreme Court and the At-
torney General, the Board has attempted over the years to recon-
cile its definition of a final conviction with the evolving criminal
procedures created by the various states. Having reviewed our deci-
sions in this regard, we must acknowledge that the standard which
we have applied to the many variations in state procedure may
permit anomalous and unfair results in determining which aliens
are considered convicted for immigration purposes. For example,
alien A, who has been found guilty of a narcotics violation by a
jury or judge, but against whom no formal judgment has been en-
tered by the judge, and who was placed on probation, fined, and
even incarcerated as a special condition of probation, but who has

A few years later, however, the Attorney General approved the Board'a "long-
standing rule" that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude that had
been expunged would not support a fading of deportability under section 241(aX4)
of the Act. Matter of 0-, 9 I&N Dec. 159,169 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961).

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no right to appeal and is subject to automatic entry of a judgment
upon violation of probation, would not be considered "convicted"
under our three-pronged test because there has been no judicial ad-
judication of guilt. On the other hand, we would find a conviction
in the case of alien B, who pleaded nolo contendere to the same
charge and against whom a formal judgment was entered by the
court, but whose sentence was deferred with no other penalty im-
posed, so long as the state also considered him convicted for some
purpose.
We find no rational or legal reason for according these two aliens
different immigration status based on the criminal procedures of
the states where they committed a crime. Under the approach we
have taken in the past, form has been placed over substance, and
aliens who are clearly guilty of criminal behavior and whom Con-
gress intended to be considered "convicted" have been permitted to
escape the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a
conviction. We therefore find that a revision of our standard for a
final conviction has become necessary.
As in the past, we shall consider a person convicted if the court
has adjudicated him guilty or has entered a formal judgment of
guilt. Since such a judicial action is generally deemed a final con-
viction in both federal and state jurisdictions, it will be sufficient to
constitute a conviction for immigration purposes without consider-
ation of the other two factors of our former test. 6 See generally
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., supra, at 112-13 & nn. 6-7.
Where adjudication of guilt has been withheld, however, further
examination of the specific procedure used and the state authority
under which the court acted will be necessary. As a general rule, a
conviction will be found for immigration purposes where all of the
following elements are present:
(1)a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty;
(2)the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the
person's liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to incarceration, proba-
tion, a fine or restitution, or community-based sanctions such as a rehabilitation
program., a work-release or study-release program, revocation or suspension of a
driver's license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community
service); and

6 The third prong of the standard set forth in Matter of L-R-, supra, required
that the state also consider the court action a conviction_ We note, however, in
regard to our current change, a long-standing rule that whether a conviction exists
for purposes of a federal statute is a question of federal law and should not depend
on the vagaries of state law. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., supra, at 111-
12, 117; Matter of A-F-, supra.

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(3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the
terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's
order, without availability of further proceedings regarding the person's guilt or
innocence of the original charge.'
We are aware that this standard represents a significant depar-
ture from many of our previous decisions. For this reason it is nec-
essary to overrule the following cases to the extent they relied on
our former test for conviction and are inconsistent with the stand-
ard enunciated by the Board today: Matter of Garcia, supra; Matter
of Zangwill, supra; Matter of Seda, supra; Matter of Robinson, 16
I&N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter of Varagianis, supra; Matter of
Pikkarainen,, 10 I&N Dec. 401 (BIA 1963); and Matter of L-R-,
supra.
We note that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
may not support an order of deportation if it has been expunged.
We shall continue in this regard to follow the rule which was set
forth by the Attorney General in Matter of G-, supra, and subse-
quently reaffirmed in Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576
(BIA 1966; A.G. 1967), and Matter of Gutnick, 13 I&N Dec. 672 (BIA
1971). Furthermore, it is the policy of the Service to defer institu-
tion of deportation proceedings until an alien who is eligible to
have his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude expunged
has had a reasonable opportunity to apply for expunction. Matter
of Tinajero, 17 I&N Dec. 424 (BIA 1980); Immigration and Natural-
ization Service Operations Instructions 242.1(a)(29). However, pur-
suant to the Attorney General's determination in Matter of A-F-,
supra, a conviction for a narcotics or marihuana violation is final
regardless of the possibility of expunction.
Applying our new standard to the respondent's case, we look first
to the record of conviction, which indicates that the respondent
pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of cocaine in sufficient quan-
tity to reasonably indicate an intent to distribute the drug. It fur-
ther reflects that the judge stayed entry of the judgment pursuant
to Article 27, section 641 of the Annotated Code of Maryland and
placed the respondent on probation for 3 years. In addition, he or-
dered the respondent to donate 100 hours of volunteer community

7 It is well established that a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of fi-
nality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has
been exhausted or waived. Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); Aguilera-Enri-
quez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Will v.
INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971). We note in this regard that; although it is unclear
from the facts stated in Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), whether Pine's
conviction continued to be appealable after his case was placed "on file," the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit assumed that his right to appeal had
been retained.

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service and to pay a $1,500 fine plus court costs. Since the respond-
ent entered a plea of guilty and the judge imposed several forms of
punishment, the first two parts of our test for a conviction have
been met.
We must next examine the statutory authority under which the
judge acted to determine whether the third element is satisfied. Ac-
cording to subsection (To) of section 641, the court may enter judg-
ment and proceed with disposition of the person upon violation of
probation as if the person had not been placed on probation. It is
clear from the statute that, if a violation of probation occurs, judg-
ment may be automatically entered without further review of the
question of guilt. This third requirement of our test having been
met, we conclude that. the respondent's conviction is sufficiently
final to support an order of deportation. Accordingly, we shall
affirm the September 13, 1985, decision of the immigration judge to
the extent that the respondent was found deportable on the basis
of his conviction. However, inasmuch as the respondent had an ap-
plication for section 212(c) relief pending at the time of the immi-
gration judge's decision, we find that a remand of the record for
consideration of his waiver request is appropriate.
ORDER: The September 13, 1985, decision of the immigration
judge is affirmed in part.
FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the immigra-
tion judge for consideration of the respondent's application for sec-
tion 212(c) relief and the entry of a new decision.