Error: Bad annotation destination
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1042
(Opposition No. 115,438)
PALM BAY IMPORTS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN MAISON FONDEE EN 1772,
Appellee.
Edmund J. Ferdinand, III, Grimes & Battersby, LLP, of Norwalk, Connecticut,
argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Gregory J. Battersby.
Marie V. Driscoll, Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C., of New York, New York,
argued for appellee. With him on the brief was John Margiotta.
Appealed from: United States Patent and Trademark Office
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1042
PALM BAY IMPORTS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN MAISON FONDEE EN 1772,
Appellee.
___________________________
DECIDED: February 9, 2005
___________________________
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge,1 RADER, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
RADER, Circuit Judge:
Palm Bay Imports, Inc. (Palm Bay) appeals from the decision of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board)
refusing registration of the mark VEUVE ROYALE for sparkling wine on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with three of opposer Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin’s (VCP’s) marks.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Palm Bay Imports, Inc., Opp’n No. 115,438, 2000 WL
21953664 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2003). This court concludes that the Board did not err in
finding a likelihood of confusion, but substantial evidence does not support such a
finding for one of the marks. Even though this court reverses the Board’s conclusion as
to one of the marks, the Board’s refusal to register Palm Bay’s VEUVE ROYALE mark is
affirmed.
1
Paul R. Michel assumed the position of Chief Judge on December 25, 2004.
I.
In April 1998, Palm Bay filed an intent-to-use trademark application under
Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), for the mark VEUVE ROYALE for
“alcoholic beverages, namely, sparkling wine.” Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, slip op. at 1.
The examining attorney found no evidence of a similar mark that would bar registration
on the ground of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d). In response to the June 22, 1999 Official Gazette publication of Palm
Bay’s application, VCP filed an opposition with the Board, alleging a likelihood of
confusion between VEUVE ROYALE and five of its own marks. Specifically, VCP
asserted a likelihood of confusion based on the following marks: (1) VEUVE
CLICQUOT PONSARDIN; (2) VEUVE CLICQUOT; (3) VEUVE CLICQUOT
PONSARDIN Design; (4) THE WIDOW; and (5) LA VIUDA.
On August 4, 2003, the Board refused registration of VEUVE ROYALE, finding a
likelihood of confusion with (1) VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN, (2) VEUVE
CLICQUOT, and (3) THE WIDOW. The Board dismissed VCP’s Section 2(d) claim for
LA VIUDA finding the doctrine of foreign equivalents inapplicable to marks in two
different foreign languages, i.e., Spanish and French. Palm Bay appeals.
II.
Likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1025(d), is a legal
determination based upon factual underpinnings. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This court determines the question on a
case-specific basis, applying the thirteen factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973), without deference. In re Int’l
04-1042 2
Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999). At the same time,
this court reviews factual underpinnings for that legal conclusion, namely the DuPont
factors, for substantial evidence. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 156 (1999); Bose
Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., 293 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Evidence is
substantial if “a reasonable person might find that the evidentiary record supports the
agency’s conclusion.” On-Line Careline, 229 F.3d at 1085.
III. The VEUVE Marks
Palm Bay asserts that the Board erred in its findings on four DuPont factors
during analysis of VEUVE CLICQUOT and VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN: (1) the
similarity of the marks; (2) third-party use of the term VEUVE; and (3) the fame of VCP’s
marks; and (4) purchaser sophistication (corresponding to the first, sixth, fifth and fourth
DuPont factors, respectively).
A.
The first DuPont factor requires examination of “the similarity or dissimilarity of
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Palm Bay contends that the Board made two
errors in finding that VEUVE ROYALE was confusingly similar to VCP’s marks. First, it
claims that the Board misstated the legal test of similarity by treating “commercial
impression” as the ultimate conclusion rather than as a separate factor. Second, Palm
Bay claims the Board erred in finding that VEUVE was the “prominent feature” of VCP’s
marks. Instead, argues Palm Bay, CLICQUOT is the dominant feature.
04-1042 3
1. Test for Similarity
The Board phrased the legal test for similarity as whether the marks “when
compared in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound and connotation, are similar
or dissimilar in their overall commercial impressions.” Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, slip
op. at 26-27. After conducting a thorough analysis of the appearance, sound, meaning,
and commercial impression of the marks, the Board concluded that they were “more
similar than dissimilar in their overall commercial impression for purposes of the first
DuPont factor.” Id. at 29. In both instances, the Board treated “commercial impression”
as the ultimate conclusion under this prong rather than as a separate factor along with
appearance, sound, and meaning. Palm Bay contends that the Board’s inaccurate
paraphrase of the legal standard infected its analysis and constitutes reversible error.
This court declines to find reversible error merely because the Board, in two
instances, made a minor misstatement of the similarity test in an otherwise proper
analysis. Moreover, this court’s precedent counsels that the phrase “commercial
impression” is occasionally used as a proxy for the ultimate conclusion of similarity or
dissimilarity of marks resulting from a comparison of their appearance, sound, and
meaning. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (holding that PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES and HEWLETT PACKARD differ
in appearance and sound, but the marks convey a similar commercial impression
because consumers would be aware of Hewlett-Packard’s heavy involvement in
technology-based goods, and therefore the marks are similar in their entireties); Kenner
Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 355 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding
that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and
04-1042 4
FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the “same commercial impression” from the
marks); Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 531 F.2d 561, 562
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that RAINFRESH is confusingly similar to RAIN BARREL
given the close relationship of the goods and “similarity of commercial impressions”).
2. Significance of CLICQUOT
Palm Bay next asserts that the Board gave insufficient weight to the relative
dominance of CLICQUOT, while placing too much emphasis on the weaker VEUVE
portion of VCP’s marks. Palm Bay notes that VCP admitted that CLICQUOT was the
most distinctive portion of its marks in a World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Internet domain name proceeding, and that VCP has used CLICQUOT in its
marketing materials, including radio spots, promotional products, and as the URL of its
website (www.clicquot.com). Moreover, Palm Bay argues, VCP has no enforceable
trademark rights in the term VEUVE, and has never used the term, standing alone, on
its champagne bottles or in its marketing efforts.
The Board correctly weighed the relative importance of VEUVE and CLICQUOT.
VEUVE is an arbitrary term as applied to champagne and sparkling wine, and thus
conceptually strong as a trademark. See, e.g., Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health &
Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining an arbitrary mark as “a
known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way” and observing that such marks
are typically strong). Indeed, VCP has made VEUVE a theme of its marketing efforts
because of the history, and the widow Clicquot herself, connected with the origins of the
company. To be sure, CLICQUOT is an important term in the mark, but VEUVE
nevertheless remains a “prominent feature” as the first word in the mark and the first
04-1042 5
word to appear on the label. Not only is VEUVE prominent in the commercial
impression created by VCP’s marks, it also constitutes “the dominant feature” in the
commercial impression created by Palm Bay’s mark. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, slip
op. at 31-32 (VEUVE is first word in mark; significance of ROYALE is more laudatory
and less source-indicating than VEUVE or “widow”; arbitrary term VEUVE contributes
more to commercial impression of product than ROYALE). The presence of this strong
distinctive term as the first word in both parties’ marks renders the marks similar,
especially in light of the largely laudatory (and hence non-source identifying)
significance of the word ROYALE.
This case is distinguishable from cases upon which Palm Bay relies where this
court found no likely confusion between marks involving a common term. See, e.g.,
Kellogg Co. v. Pack ‘Em Enters, Inc., 951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (FROOTEE ICE for
flavored ice bars not likely to cause confusion with FROOT LOOPS for breakfast cereal
and related products); Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods. Inc., 866 F.2d 1386 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (PECAN SHORTIES not likely to cause confusion with PECAN SANDIES for
cookies). In these cases, the common term is a generic or non-distinctive term. Here,
the common term—VEUVE—is distinctive, and as such its presence in both parties’
marks enhances the likelihood of confusion. Substantial evidence therefore supports
the Board’s finding that the marks are similar under the first DuPont factor.
B.
Palm Bay next contends that the Board erred in rejecting evidence of third-party
use of at least five different alcoholic beverages that use the term VEUVE (or a foreign
equivalent). This assertion requires analysis of the sixth DuPont factor, which considers
04-1042 6
“the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 467 F.2d at
1361. Evidence of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods is relevant to show
that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.
General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1987); J. Thomas
McCarthy, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:88 (4th ed. 2001)
(hereinafter McCarthy on Trademarks).
In particular, Palm Bay argues that third-party evidence consists of at least five
different alcoholic beverages that use the term VEUVE: (1) VIUDA DE ROMERO
(tequila); (2) VEUVE CASTARDE BAS ARMAGNAC (brandy); (3) VEUVE ROTH
BRANDY (brandy); (4) VEUVE DE LALANDE (sparkling wine); and (5) VEUVE DU
VERNAY (sparkling wine). Each of these brands has at various points of time appeared
in an industry trade publication, the Beverage Media Guide, which lists all beverage
products in the wine and spirits categories sold by wholesalers to restaurants and retail
stores in New York State. The Board rejected this evidence on the ground that the
Beverage Media Guide is only distributed to the trade, and thus does not show the
extent to which consumers actually encounter these brands in the marketplace.
The probative value of third-party trademarks depends entirely upon their usage.
E.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“The significance of third-party trademarks depends wholly upon their usage.
Defendant introduced no evidence that these trademarks were actually used by third
parties, that they were well promoted or that they were recognized by consumers.”).
While the Beverage Media Guide is compelling evidence that distributors were aware
that the term VEUVE was used for other alcoholic products, it is not evidence that the
04-1042 7
consuming public was likewise aware. At best, the Beverage Media Guide is evidence
that the consuming public could potentially be cognizant of third-party use of the term
VEUVE. Absent evidence of the consuming public’s awareness, however, the
Beverage Media Guide standing alone does not suffice. As this court has previously
recognized where the “record includes no evidence about the extent of [third-party] uses
. . . [t]he probative value of this evidence is thus minimal.” Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
Lloyd’s Food Products, Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1993), does not
alter that reasoning. In Lloyd’s, this court held that the Board erred in failing to consider
evidence of third-party use of service marks in phone directories. Id. at 768. Unlike the
Lloyd’s phone directories that were distributed to the public, the Beverage Media Guide
is only sent to distributors, not to the consuming public. Additionally, the issue in Lloyd’s
involved service marks, for which advertising in phone directories is evidence of use.
Here, by contrast, the marks are trademarks applied to goods for which a mere listing in
a directory is not evidence of such use. Thus, the Lloyd’s holding is inapposite to the
facts of this case.
Palm Bay further argues that the Board erred in minimizing the import of retail
marketing evidence it presented for the third-party mark VEUVE DE VERNAY.
Specifically, Palm Bay notes that its private investigator discovered that six New York
stores displayed for sale the VEUVE DE VERNAY sparkling wine as well as internet
web sites and restaurant lists. Though the Board determined that such evidence
exhibited more than de minimis use, it did not credit the single mark use with much
weight. As the Board observed, “[t]he purpose of a defendant introducing third party
04-1042 8
uses is to show that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora of such
similar marks that customers ‘have been educated to distinguish between different
[such] marks on the bases of minute distinctions.’” Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, slip op.
at 25 (citing McCarthy on Trademarks, at § 11:88). Palm Bay’s evidence does not rise
to the level of demonstrating that the single third-party use was so widespread as to
“condition” the consuming public.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the strength
of VCP’s mark was not undermined by third-party use in either the Beverage Media
Guide or the retail market.
C.
Palm Bay argues that the Board erred in concluding that VCP’s marks are
famous, per the fifth DuPont factor, and therefore entitled to a wide scope of protection.
In its view, the Board applied an incorrect legal standard for measuring fame by
focusing on a narrow class of consumers limited to purchasers of champagne and
sparkling wine. The proper standard for fame, Palm Bay asserts, is whether a mark has
achieved “extensive public recognition and renown” among the general public. Kenner
Parker Toys, Inc., 963 F.2d at 353. Palm Bay further contends there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of fame.
Fame of an opposer’s mark, if it exists, plays a “dominant role in the process of
balancing the DuPont factors.” Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). Famous marks enjoy wide latitude of legal protection since they are more
likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind than weaker marks, and are
thus more attractive as targets for would-be copyists. Id. Indeed, “[a] strong mark . . .
04-1042 9
casts a long shadow which competitors must avoid.” Kenner Parker Toys, 963 F.2d at
353. Fame for likelihood of confusion purposes and fame for dilution purposes,
however, are distinct concepts. The Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1164,
1170 (T.T.A.B. 2001).2 While dilution fame is an either/or proposition—fame either does
or does not exist—likelihood of confusion fame “varies along a spectrum from very
strong to very weak.” In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
This court’s statement in Kenner Parker Toys that fame for likelihood of
confusion purposes is to be measured by whether a mark has achieved “extensive
public recognition and renown” was not intended to require public awareness among
every segment of the U.S. population. Indeed, the court in Kenner Parker Toys did not
consider the issue of the extent of public renown necessary to qualify for treatment as a
famous mark. Palm Bay’s argument for a general public standard would be contrary to
the trend of our case law and improperly elevate likelihood of confusion fame to the
higher and more rigorous standard for dilution fame required under the FTDA. In this
case, some classes of consumers would not have occasion to be exposed to VCP’s
champagne products, such as children or adolescents below the drinking age, or adults
who for religious or other reasons choose not to consume alcoholic beverages. Thus, a
general public awareness standard does not adequately reflect the mark’s fame
amongst the purchasing public. Fame for confusion purposes arises as long as a
significant portion of the relevant consuming public, namely, purchasers of champagne
and sparkling wine, recognizes the mark as a source indicator. Although this court has
2
Under the 1996 Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c),
only “famous” marks are protected. The FTDA lists eight nonexclusive factors courts
are to consider in determining whether a mark is “distinctive and famous.” See 15
U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(A) – (H) (2004).
04-1042 10
not directly addressed the question of what segment of the consuming public must be
aware of a mark in order for it to be considered famous in a likelihood of confusion
analysis, it has indirectly suggested that a mark’s renown within a specific product
market is the proper standard. See Bose Corp., 293 F.3d at 1376 (2002) (“Large
market shares of product sales or large percentages of advertising expenditures in a
product line would buttress claims to fame.”). Similarly, this court’s precedent has
defined the relevant product market for purposes of determining likelihood of confusion
as customers and potential customers. Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that purchaser confusion is the
“primary focus” and, in case of goods and services that are sold, “the inquiry generally
will turn on whether actual or potential ‘purchasers’ are confused”). Accordingly, this
court holds that the proper legal standard for evaluating the fame of a mark under the
fifth DuPont factor is the class of customers and potential customers of a product or
service, and not the general public. The Board did not err in so holding.
Given this clarification of the proper relevant market for evaluating the fame of a
mark, this court finds that there was sufficient factual evidence of fame within the market
of purchasers of champagne and sparkling wine to support the Board’s conclusion. The
record indicates that VCP’s sales volume and advertising expenditures since 1990 have
been substantial. VEUVE CLICQUOT champagne is the second leading brand sold in
the U.S. The brand is sold in 8,000 restaurants nationwide, and in liquor stores, wine
shops, and other retail establishments. VCP advertises in general interest magazines
such as Vanity Fair and in wine specialty magazines, radio ads, point-of-sale displays,
through in-store and in-restaurant wine tastings and events, through sponsorship of
04-1042 11
events, and on its Internet site. VCP’s products have been featured in articles and
reviews in both specialized and general interest magazines. According to an April 2001
issue of Wine and Spirits, VEUVE CLICQUOT was the most-ordered wine in the
“sparkling wine” category of the 363 survey respondents. VCP’s products have also
been featured in Business Week, American Way (in-flight magazine of American
Airlines), The New York Times, the Boston Globe, Money magazine, and the Detroit
News. Moreover, Palm Bay’s President, David Taub, admitted that the VEUVE
CLICQUOT mark is famous. His later qualification that such fame was limited to the
“top-end” segment of the market does not diminish the significance of his admission in
view of the Board’s finding that high-end champagne and less-expensive sparkling
wines are marketed in the same channels of trade to the same consumers. Finally, the
Board noted that several WIPO domain name arbitration decisions had found VCP’s
marks to be famous. While acknowledging Palm Bay’s argument that a mark must be
famous among purchasers in the United States, whereas WIPO examined VCP’s marks
worldwide, the Board properly noted that such evidence nonetheless provided a
“confirmatory context” for VCP’s other evidence of fame. Considering this evidence in
its totality and in context, this court finds that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding of fame.
D.
The fourth DuPont factor examines the conditions under which, and to whom,
sales are made. DuPont, 467 F.2d at 1361. Purchaser sophistication may tend to
minimize likelihood of confusion. Conversely, impulse purchases of inexpensive items
may tend to have the opposite effect. Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1329.
04-1042 12
In concluding that this factor was “neutral, at best,” Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin,
slip op. at 15, the Board found that champagne and sparkling wines are not necessarily
expensive goods which are always purchased by sophisticated purchasers who
exercise a great deal of care in making their purchases. This court agreed with the
Board’s finding. Although some champagne can be expensive, many brands sell for
around $25 a bottle, and sparkling wines for less than $10 a bottle. Moreover, general
consumers, not just connoisseurs, occasionally purchase champagne or sparkling
wines on celebratory occasions, with little care or prior knowledge. And even more
sophisticated purchasers might be aware that champagne houses offer both types of
products under similar marks, and could easily conclude that VEUVE ROYALE was
Veuve Clicquot’s sparkling wine. This market expansion rationale undercuts Palm
Bay’s argument that because VCP has never sold a sparkling wine product or low-
priced champagne, and that it has always used its CLICQUOT house mark in
connection with its sales, consumers would be unlikely to confuse Palm Bay’s
inexpensive sparkling wine and VCP’s slightly more expensive champagne products.
Considering this evidence in its entirety, this court concludes that substantial evidence
supports the Board’s finding under this DuPont factor.
IV.
The Board held that Palm Bay’s VEUVE ROYALE was confusingly similar to
VCP's mark THE WIDOW, in part because under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, an
appreciable number of purchasers in the U.S. speak and/or understand French, and
they “will translate” applicant's mark into English as “Royal Widow.” Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin, slip op. at 36. The Board erred in so finding.
04-1042 13
Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words from common languages
are translated into English to determine genericness, descriptiveness, as well as
similarity of connotation in order to ascertain confusing similarity with English word
marks. See In re Sarkli, Ltd., 721 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Am. Safety Razor
Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1459, 1460 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (finding BUENOS DIAS for soap
confusingly similar to GOOD MORNING for shaving cream). When it is unlikely that an
American buyer will translate the foreign mark and will take it as it is, then the doctrine
of foreign equivalents will not be applied. In re Tia Maria, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 524
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (no likelihood of confusion between TIA MARIA for a Mexican
restaurant and AUNT MARY’s for canned vegetables).
In comparing VEUVE ROYALE with VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN and
VEUVE CLICQUOT, the Board found that “an appreciable number of purchasers are
unlikely to be aware that VEUVE means 'widow' and are unlikely to translate the marks
into English.” Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, slip op. at 11 (emphasis added). In comparing
VEUVE ROYALE with THE WIDOW, however, the Board found that “[A]n appreciable
number of purchasers in the United States speak and/or understand French, and they
will translate applicant's mark into English as ROYAL WIDOW.” Id., slip op. at 14
(emphasis added). An appreciable number of U.S. consumers either will or will not
translate VEUVE into “widow,” and the Board was inconsistent in its application of the
doctrine of foreign equivalents.
Although words from modern languages are generally translated into English, the
doctrine of foreign equivalents is not an absolute rule and should be viewed merely as a
guideline. In re N. Paper Mills, 64 F.2d 998, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1933); McCarthy on
04-1042 14
Trademarks, at § 11:34. The doctrine should be applied only when it is likely that the
ordinary American purchaser would “stop and translate [the word] into its English
equivalent.” In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. 109, 110 (T.T.A.B. 1976). This
court agrees with the T.T.A.B. that it is improbable that the average American purchaser
would stop and translate “VEUVE” into “widow.” Substantial evidence does not support
the Board’s finding regarding the doctrine of foreign equivalents. This court, therefore,
reverses the Board’s finding of likelihood of confusion for THE WIDOW.
CONCLUSION
This court affirms the Board’s decision that a likelihood of confusion exists
between applicant’s VEUVE ROYALE mark and opposer’s marks VEUVE CLICQUOT
PONSARDIN and VEUVE CLICQUOT. We reverse the Board’s conclusion of the
likelihood of confusion as to the THE WIDOW mark and we affirm the Board’s refusal to
register Palm Bay’s VEUVE ROYALE mark.
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED
04-1042 15
Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772
Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date filed: 2005-02-09
Citations: 396 F.3d 1369
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion