Paraskevaides v. Four Seasons Washington

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 12, 2002 Decided June 14, 2002

Nos. 01-7121 & 01-7134

Thelma G. Paraskevaides, et al.,
Appellants

v.

Four Seasons Washington,
Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv02802)

Barbara I. Michaelides argued the cause for appellants.
With her on the briefs were Nicholas H. Cobbs and Susan J.
Condon.

Karla Grossenbacher argued the cause for appellee. With
her on the brief was Joseph R. Damato.

 Before: Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges, and
Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellants Thelma and Christina
Paraskevaides, together with their insurance company Ameri-
can Home Assurance Company, brought suit against Four
Seasons Washington after over one million dollars worth of
their jewelry was stolen from a convenience safe located in
their hotel room. The Four Seasons defended on grounds
that their liability was limited by District of Columbia law.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
hotel, finding that the Four Seasons had limited its liability
pursuant to the District of Columbia's Innkeeper Statute, and
on the alternate ground that the Paraskevaides1 were contrib-
utorily negligent for using their in-room safes rather than
safety deposit boxes. Because the Four Seasons failed to
comply fully with the Innkeeper Statute, and because we
conclude that placing valuables in a locked, in-room conve-
nience safe located inside a locked hotel room does not
constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, we
reverse and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings.

I. Background

Appellants Thelma and Christina Paraskevaides ("the Par-
askevaides") checked into the Four Seasons Washington ("the
Four Seasons") in Washington, D.C. on September 22, 1997.
They brought with them close to 1.2 million dollars worth of
jewelry to wear to various political functions around the city.

__________
1 The author recognizes that the rules of grammar dictate that to
create the plural form of a proper name that ends in an "s," one
must add an "es." E.g., The Chicago Manual of Style s 6.5 (13th
rev. ed. 1982). The plural of "Paraskevaides" would therefore be
"Paraskevaideses." However, the author finds the name "Paraske-
vaideses" so distracting that he chooses to ignore the rule. See In
re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 601 n.1 (2d Cir. 2001). No such
willingness to ignore the rules of the English language should be
imputed to Judge Garland or Senior Judge Silberman.

The Paraskevaides stayed in a suite that consisted of two
bedrooms adjoined by a living room. Each bedroom and the
living room contained a "convenience safe" that was located in
the back of a closet and accessible via keys provided by the
hotel. The Paraskevaides placed their valuables (i.e., jewelry,
travel documents, traveler's checks, etc.) in the bedroom safes
rather than the safety deposit boxes that were provided by
the hotel and located near the hotel's reception area.

On September 27, 1997, the Paraskevaides left their hotel
room with their room and safe keys. Upon returning to their
suite, they discovered that their room had been entered
(although not forcibly) and that their bedroom safes were
open and empty. Both hotel security personnel and the
Washington Metropolitan Police Department were notified,
but the items were never recovered. According to the hotel
manager, the suite doors and safes could be opened by either
of two master keys, as well as the guest room key. The
manager also testified that at least one master key ring had
been missing since March 1997. Apparently neither the room
locks nor the safe locks had been changed. The hotel did not
give any notice to appellants that the keys were missing.

District of Columbia Code s 30-101,2 "Liability for loss or
destruction of, or damage to, personal property of guests,"
states in pertinent part:

(a) If a hotel, motel or similar establishment in the
District of Columbia which provides lodging to transient
guests: (1) Provides a suitable depository (other than a
checkroom) for the safekeeping of personal property
(other than a motor vehicle); and (2) displays conspicu-
ously in the guest and public rooms of that establishment
a printed copy of this section (or summary thereof); that
establishment shall not be liable for the loss or destruc-

__________
2 At the time the parties filed the cross-motions for summary
judgment in this case, the Innkeeper Statute was codified at D.C.
Code s 34-101. Since that time, the statute has been re-codified at
D.C. Code s 30-101. For convenience purposes, we refer to the
Innkeeper Statute at issue in this case as D.C. Code s 30-101.

 tion of, or damage to, any personal property of a guest or
patron not deposited for safekeeping, except that this
sentence shall not apply with respect to the liability of
that establishment for loss or destruction of, or damage
to, any personal property retained by a guest in his room
if the property is such property as is usual, common, or
prudent for a guest to retain in his room. In the case of
any personal property of a guest or patron deposited in
such a depository for safekeeping, that establishment
shall be liable for the loss or destruction of, or damage
to, that property to the extent of the lesser of $1,000 or
the fair market value of the property at the time of its
loss, destruction, or damage.

On the back wall of each bedroom closet in the Paraske-
vaides' suite that contained a convenience safe, the Four
Seasons had posted a notice that explained the hotel's limited
liability with respect to objects not placed in the safety
deposit boxes provided by the hotel. This "NOTICE TO
GUESTS" stated in its entirety:

You are hereby notified that the Management provides
a suitable depository for the safekeeping of personal
property of its guests and you are invited to use the
same.

Under the laws of the District of Columbia, if a hotel
provides a suitable depository for the safekeeping of
personal property, the hotel is not liable for the loss or
destruction of, or damage to, any personal property of a
guest not deposited for safekeeping, except for property
as is usual, common, or prudent to retain in his room.
Where property is deposited in a depository for safe-
keeping, the hotel is liable for the loss or destruction of,
or damage to, that property only to the extent of the
lesser of $1000.00 or the fair market value of the proper-
ty at the time of its loss, damage or destruction.

These disclaimers were only located on the back walls of
closets that contained convenience safes; they were not post-
ed anywhere else in the hotel. The hotel had also placed a
disclaimer sticker that summarized the hotel's limited liability

on the door of each safe itself. These stickers stated in their
entirety:

This room safe is provided solely as a convenience for
our guests. It is not a substitute for the fireproof, front
office safe maintained by the hotel where your money,
jewelry, documents or other articles of value may be
placed for safe keeping. This hotel is not responsible for
valuables placed in this room safe. Use of this room safe
does not extend this hotel's liability under District of
Columbia Innkeeper Statutes. If you desire to use the
room safe, take the key with you when you leave. Leave
the key in the lock when you check out. In the event
that your key is lost, there will be a $25.00 charge for
opening the safe.

II. Proceedings Below

The Paraskevaides sued the Four Seasons for, inter alia,
gross negligence and breach of warranty of safety and securi-
ty for the theft of their jewelry. The Four Seasons asserted
two affirmative defenses: a statutory limitation of liability
pursuant to section 30-101 and contributory negligence. The
Paraskevaides moved for summary judgment on the issue of
liability, contending that the Four Seasons failed to comply
fully with the requirements of section 30-101 and therefore
could not take protection under the statute's limited liability
provision. The Four Seasons cross-moved for summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability, contending that they had
complied with the statutory requirements by providing a
suitable depository for guests' valuables and by conspicuously
placing notices of its limited liability on the walls next to the
in-room convenience safes. The Four Seasons also claimed
that the Paraskevaides had actual notice of the hotel's limited
liability through prior stays at the hotel and prior usage of
the safety deposit boxes. Finally, the Four Seasons contend-
ed that several of the Paraskevaides' claims were unrecog-
nized in the District of Columbia.

On June 19, 2001, the district court denied the Paraske-
vaides' motion for summary judgment and awarded summary

judgment to the Four Seasons on grounds that D.C. Code
s 30-101 limited the Four Seasons' liability to the Paraske-
vaides. The court then provided three alternative reasons for
granting summary judgment to the Four Seasons: 1) several
of the Paraskevaides' counts are not recognized in the Dis-
trict of Columbia; 2) the Paraskevaides failed to show that
the Four Seasons did not exercise reasonable care; and 3) the
Paraskevaides' contributory negligence, which resulted from
"choosing to place $1.2 million dollars worth of jewelry in a
hotel room safe," acted as a complete bar to recovery. Par-
askevaides v. Four Seasons Washington, 148 F. Supp. 2d 20,
27 (D.D.C. 2001). This appeal followed.

III. Analysis

A district court properly grants summary judgment if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986). In this case, the Paraskevaides appeal the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the
Four Seasons and to deny summary judgment in their favor
on the issue of liability. Thus to succeed on appeal, the
Paraskevaides must demonstrate that there is a genuine
dispute over a material fact, such that a reasonable jury could
rule in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. We review
the district court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Gil-
vin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

A. Liability

Under the general common law doctrine of infra hospiti-
um, an innkeeper is strictly liable for loss or damage to a
guest's property "unless the property is lost or destroyed by
an act of God, the public enemy, or by fault of the guest."
Hallman v. Federal Parking Services, Inc., 134 A.2d 382, 384
(D.C. 1957); see also Governor House v. Schmidt, 284 A.2d
660, 661 (D.C. 1971); Hotel Corp. of America v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 229 A.2d 158, 159 (D.C. 1967). Many jurisdic-
tions, however, have limited an innkeeper's common law

liability to his guests through statutory enactment. Section
30-101 of the D.C. Code is such a limiting statute, as the
district court recognized. See Paraskevaides, 148 F. Supp.
2d at 26. Under the statute, a hotel limits its liability to its
guests if it provides, and properly notifies its guests of, a
suitable depository for the safekeeping of their valuable items
and of the statutory limitations on its liability. Id.

The district court held that the Four Seasons complied with
the statutory requirements of section 30-101, reasoning that a
hotel is only liable for a guest's property loss if it fails to
display a copy of the statute, fails to post the notice conspicu-
ously, or if the guest's property is the type that would usually
or commonly be kept in a guest's room. See id. Finding that
the Four Seasons posted a conspicuous summary of section
30-101 next to the in-room convenience safes and finding that
it was not usual, common or prudent to place $1.2 million
worth of jewelry in such safes, the district court held that the
Four Seasons complied with the statutory requirements "and
no reasonable jury, based on the evidence proffered by the
plaintiffs, could make a finding to the contrary." Id.

We disagree. In limiting a hotel's liability, section 30-101
deviates from the general common law and must therefore be
strictly construed. See Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage
Corp., 727 A.2d 322, 325 (D.C. 1999) ("[N]o statute is to be
construed as altering the common law, farther than its words
import.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Picker
v. Searcher's Detective Agency, Inc., 515 F.2d 1316, 1319
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The plain language of the statute states
quite clearly that a hotel must "display[ ] conspicuously in the
guest and public rooms of [the hotel] a printed copy" of the
limiting statute (or summary thereof). D.C. Code s 30-
101(a) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the Four
Seasons only posted a copy of the limiting statute in the guest
rooms of the hotel, thereby failing to post notices in any of
the hotel's "public rooms." The Four Seasons nonetheless
contends that its posting of the "summary of the statute and
the accompanying disclaimer notice were sufficient to place
the Paraskevaides on notice of the liability limitations provid-

ed by the Innkeeper Statute." The district court agreed,
ruling that by posting a printed copy of section 30-101 next to
the in-room convenience safe, the Four Seasons "place[d] the
plaintiffs on notice and satisf[ied] [its] obligation under the
statute to do such." 148 F. Supp. 2d at 26. Perhaps the
Parasekvaides had notice; perhaps not. But whether they
did is irrelevant to our disposition of this case. The statute
says what it says: a hotel must "display[ ] conspicuously in
the guest and public rooms of [the hotel] a printed copy" of
the statute in order to limit its liability to guests. D.C. Code
s 30-101(a) (emphasis added). The Four Seasons undoubt-
edly displayed a copy or summary of the statute in its guests
rooms. It may even have done so "conspicuously," although
that remains unclear. What is clear is that the Four Seasons
did not display, conspicuously or otherwise, a copy or sum-
mary of the statute in its public rooms. Therefore, when we
strictly construe this statute, as we must, we conclude that
the Four Seasons failed to comply fully with the statute's
requirements for limiting its liability to the Paraskevaides.

Other courts interpreting similar Innkeeper Statutes agree
that strict compliance with a jurisdiction's Innkeeper Statute
is necessary before a hotel may avail itself of the statute's
limitation on liability. See Searcy v. La Quinta Motor Inns,
Inc., 676 So.2d 1137, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (literal compli-
ance with statutory provisions is required; fact that hotel
posted requirements behind guest door in partial compliance
with statute does not remove statutory requirement to post
statute behind registration area as well); Florida Sonesta
Corp. v. Aniballi, 463 So.2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (denying limited liability to hotel that posted required
notice on back of guest bathroom doors, but failed to post
notice in the office, hall or lobby of the hotel as required by
statute); Skyways Motor Lodge, Corp. v. General Foods
Corp., 403 A.2d 722, 723 (Del. 1979) (hotel found in non-
compliance with statute that required posting of hotel's limit-
ed liability "in every lodging room and other conspicuous
places" when it only posted notices on back of room doors and
on registration card); Insurance Co. of North America v.

Holiday Inns of America, 337 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-70 (App. Div.
1972) (hotel found in non-compliance with statute that re-
quired posting "in a public and conspicuous place and manner
in the office and public rooms, and in the public parlors of
[the] hotel," when it only posted notices in the guest rooms).

The Four Seasons attempts to strengthen its position be-
fore this Court by claiming that the Paraskevaides had actual
notice of both the availability of a "suitable depository" for
their valuables and the hotel's limited liability with respect to
their valuables because they had used the Four Seasons'
safety deposit boxes on prior visits to the hotel. Maybe so.
But if we must strictly construe the statute, then it is
altogether irrelevant whether the Paraskevaides had actual
notice of the hotel's limited liability if the Four Seasons
nonetheless failed to abide by the statute's terms to ensure its
limited liability. We are not alone in our position. Other
courts have similarly rejected the Four Seasons' "actual
notice" argument. See North River Ins. Co. v. Tisch Mgt.,
Inc., 166 A.2d 169, 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)
("Evidence of actual knowledge by the guest of the availabili-
ty of a hotel depository and of the limited statutory liability,
is, by the weight of the authority, with which we agree, not an
acceptable substitute for strict compliance with the statute as
to notice by the hotelkeeper."); Johnston v. Mobile Hotel Co.,
167 So. 595, 596 (Ala. Ct. App. 1936) (finding that actual
notice of a hotelkeeper's limited liability is not compliance
with the statute's requirements); Featherstone v. Dessert, 22
P.2d 1050, 1053 (Wash. 1933) ("The statute makes no provi-
sion for an actual notice, and a strict construction of the
statute does not permit the innkeeper who has failed to
comply with the terms of it to assert the actual notice of the
guest as a sufficient substitute for the statutory require-
ment."); Heinz v. Leeds & Lippincott Co., 55 F.2d 829, 830-
31 (3d Cir. 1932) ("Certainly there ought to be a strict
compliance with the act if the hotel owner is to claim its
benefits; and it is doubtful whether actual notice ... would
operate as a bar to plaintiff's recovery."). Although a few
courts have addressed the question of actual notice and
reached the opposite conclusion, we reject their analyses as

having preceded the long line of cases offered supra. See
Nesben v. Jackson, 109 S.E. 489, 490 (W.Va. 1921) ("An inn
guest's actual knowledge that his host requires a deposit of
his jewelry, money, and other valuables in the office, as a
condition of liability, is obviously binding upon him. Actual
notice is always more potent than merely constructive no-
tice."); Shultz v. Wall, 19 A. 742, 745 (Pa. 1890) ("[I]f notice
... is proved, then the provisions for constructive notice
become immaterial.").

Acknowledging that it failed to post the necessary notices
in the public rooms of the hotel, the Four Seasons nonethe-
less argues that "the most reasonable interpretation of the
statute is that a posting of the summary of the statute in the
public room was not required in this case." By way of
explanation, the Four Seasons asserts that "the posting re-
quired by the statute is to be in the guest rooms for guests of
the hotel, and the posting in the public rooms is for patrons of
the hotel." According to the Four Seasons, because the
Paraskevaides were guests of the hotel, they were only
entitled to a posting in their guest rooms. This interpreta-
tion of the statute is certainly not the "most reasonable" one
we can think of. In fact, it is altogether unreasonable. Only
through a strained (perhaps wishful) reading of the statute
would one conclude that the statute applies differently to
different classes of persons who visit hotels. The statute says
what it says: a hotel must "provide[ ] a suitable depository"
for one's personal property and must "display[ ] conspicuously
in the guest and public rooms" a copy or summary of the
hotel's liability with respect to that property. These two
criteria are set forth in the statute before the statute even
mentions its applicability to "guest[s] or patron[s]." D.C.
Code s 30-101. Thus the meaning of the statute is plain. If
a hotel provides a suitable depository for one's property, and
if a hotel posts a copy or summary of the statute in its guest
and public rooms, then the hotel has met its obligation under
the statute. If a guest nonetheless chooses to place $1.2
million worth of jewelry in her in-room safe, and if that
jewelry is subsequently stolen, then the statute applies. If,
however, a hotel provides a suitable depository but does not

post the statute in the guest and public rooms--in effect, if a
hotel only complies with part of the statutory requirements--
then the statute does not apply. No plain reading of the
statute leads us to conclude that different posting require-
ments are in effect for different classes of persons visiting a
hotel in the District of Columbia. Because the Four Seasons
failed to post a copy or summary of D.C. Code s 30-101 in its
public rooms, we hold that the Four Seasons cannot rely on
the statute to limit its liability to the Paraskevaides.

Once we conclude that the Innkeeper Statute does not
apply to the Four Seasons, we are left with the question:
What law, in fact, does apply? The district court noted, as do
we, that under the common law doctrine of infra hospitium
an innkeeper is strictly liable for loss or damage to a guest's
property. However, the district court reached no conclusion
as to whether this particular common law doctrine applies in
the District of Columbia. See 148 F. Supp. 2d at 26 ("The
common law rule of infra hospitium, to the extent that it
exists in DC, has been limited and qualified by" the Innkeep-
er Statute.) (emphasis added). Because we are reviewing the
district court's decision de novo, we could, if so inclined,
decide the issue of what form of the doctrine of infra hospiti-
um applies in the District of Columbia. But as this issue was
not briefed before us, we conclude that in the interests of
justice, the appropriate action is to remand this issue to the
district court for further proceedings. We simply note that
whatever precise rule of common law applies in the District of
Columbia, D.C. Code s 30-101 almost certainly deviates from
that common law and must be strictly construed.3 When the
statute is so construed, it is clear that the Four Seasons failed
to comply fully and consequently may not rely on the statute
to limit its liability to the Paraskevaides.

__________
3 In oral argument, the awkwardness of the Four Seasons' sug-
gested reading became quite clear when it was unable to answer the
question as to what category applied to a guest of a guest (not a
paying patron) who came to a private room.

 B. Contributory Negligence

After ruling that the statute limited the Four Seasons'
liability to the Paraskevaides, the district court provided
alternative bases for ruling in favor of the Four Seasons.
The district court ruled that several of the Paraskevaides'
counts, including breach of safety and security warranty,
breach of duty to invitee, and gross negligence, were not
recognized by the District of Columbia "as being actionable in
cases pertaining to property loss in hotel establishments" and
therefore dismissed them. 148 F. Supp. 2d at 26. The
district court then ruled that the Paraskevaides had "failed to
establish the bare bones of their negligence claim because
they have failed to show that [the Four Seasons] did not
exercise reasonable care." Id. at 27. The district court held
instead that it was the Paraskevaides, not the Four Seasons,
who were negligent for "choosing to place $1.2 million dollars
worth of jewelry in a hotel room safe." Id. The district
court then ruled that the Paraskevaides' contributory negli-
gence acted as a complete bar to their recovery. Id.

Before beginning our analysis, we briefly review the stan-
dard a court must apply when ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment: whether the moving party has shown that
there is no genuine dispute of material fact and it is therefore
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As such, it was
appropriate for the district court to rule that the Paraske-
vaides were contributorily negligent only if it is negligence, as
a matter of law, for hotel guests to place their valuables in a
locked safe within their locked rooms.

Whether a plaintiff is contributorily negligent is usually a
question for the jury. "Only in exceptional cases will ques-
tions of negligence [and] contributory negligence ... pass
from the realm of fact to one of law. Unless the evidence is
so clear and undisputed that fair-minded men can draw only
one conclusion, the questions are factual and not legal." Shu
v. Basinger, 57 A.2d 295, 295-96 (D.C. 1948) (footnote omit-
ted). Indeed, it is the rare case with "evidence so clear and
unambiguous that contributory negligence should be found as
a matter of law." Tilghman v. Johnson, 513 A.2d 1350, 1351

(D.C. 1986) (per curiam). The district court's decision re-
flects its conclusion that this is the rare and exceptional
case--that the Paraskevaides demonstrated such a "lack of
prudence in choosing to place $1.2 million dollars worth of
jewelry in a hotel room safe" that a fair-minded jury could
reach this and only this conclusion. 148 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
Based on the facts before us, we conclude otherwise.

The Paraskevaides provided evidence that even though
they normally do not travel with $1.2 million worth of jewelry,
they did so on this particular trip because they were sched-
uled to attend such functions as lunch on Capitol Hill, a
reception hosted by the First Lady, dinner with the Secretary
of State, and breakfast at the Vice President's residence.
They also provided evidence that they were uncomfortable
placing their jewelry in the safety deposit boxes provided by
the Four Seasons because the location of the boxes was "not
in a ... private place in the hotel," but was instead in a room
with a door that faced the lobby. According to the Paraske-
vaides, "when you go in to get some things or put things in
[the safety deposit boxes], then you walk [among] people [in
the lobby]." Given the location of the safety deposit boxes,
the Paraskevaides "felt it was safer" to place their valuables
in the locked in-room convenience safes.

We cannot conclude that by traveling with valuable jewelry
to attend high-level political functions in Washington, D.C.,
and by placing those valuables in a locked room safe because
it was more remote and appeared safer than a safety deposit
box, the Paraskevaides were negligent as a matter of law.
We conclude instead that these facts present a genuine issue
of material fact that is more appropriately resolved by a jury.
Traveling with valuables is not in itself negligent behavior.
Indeed, it is necessary and unavoidable in many cases. In
Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 396 So.2d 455, 459 (La.
Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 410 So.2d 1048, 1053 (La. 1982), the
court explained that for a plaintiff to be guilty of contributory
negligence, his own conduct must have been unreasonable in
view of the foreseeable risk. The court then held that it was
not contributorily negligent for plaintiffs to keep $25,000 in a

purse inside a motel room for purposes of buying a racehorse
during their trip. The court reasoned that "the risk of an
assailant opening their motel room door with a passkey in the
middle of the night, leaving them no time to defend them-
selves from attack or call for help, was not one which could
have been foreseeable to the plaintiffs." Id. In the case
before us, we are faced with facts that suggest a master key
was used to enter the Paraskevaides' room and then enter
their locked safes. Not knowing that a master key was
unaccounted for, the Paraskevaides were not unreasonable as
a matter of law in using the in-room safes. The in-room
convenience safe obviously serves some purpose to hotel
guests. If not to secure valuables, then what? While we
recognize that $1.2 million is considerably more than the
$25,000 at issue in Kraaz, we also recognize that the Four
Seasons Washington is not a popular price motel.

Perhaps the Paraskevaides should not have brought as
much jewelry as they did. Or, if intent on bringing their
jewelry, perhaps they should have made arrangements to
secure it elsewhere, perhaps a bank. But these are issues of
fact to be decided by a jury, not a court. It is not for courts
to determine as a matter of law the value of items that a
traveler may place in an in-room safe without being deemed
to have acted negligently. To do so raises questions that we
are ill-equipped to answer. Where would we draw the line,
and on what basis? Would it be negligent for a guest at a
motel to place a $500 watch in an in-room safe? If not, would
it be negligent for a guest at an economy hotel to place a
$5,000 necklace in the safe? What if a collector staying at the
hotel nearest a rare book auction placed a $35,000 signed,
first edition of To Kill a Mockingbird in his in-room safe? Or
if the lucky traveler placed her $1 million winning lottery
ticket in the in-room safe? More importantly, what if these
guests had used the hotel's safety deposit boxes, the hotel had
complied with the Innkeeper Statute, but their property was
nonetheless lost or destroyed? Should it make a difference
that the guests would recover at most $1,000? See D.C. Code
s 30-101.

 Based on the record before the court, we cannot conclude
that by placing items of value in locked convenience safes
located in their locked hotel room, the Paraskevaides were
negligent as a matter of law. The in-room safes are provided
to hotel guests for a purpose--we assume for the placement
of some valuables that require the security of a locked
depository. It is simply not for a court to decide as a matter
of law either the circumstances in which it is acceptable for a
guest to use the in-room safes, or the value of items that a
guest may place in the safes without being considered negli-
gent. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision
that the Paraskevaides were contributorily negligent as a
matter of law for placing their jewelry in the locked, in-room
convenience safes.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Four Seasons
failed to comply fully with the statutory requirements of D.C.
Code s 30-101, and is consequently unable to limit its liability
to the Paraskevaides as provided for in the statute. Because
the statute is not applicable to this case, we remand to the
district court for further proceedings to determine the issue
of the Four Seasons' liability. We also hold that the Paraske-
vaides were not contributorily negligent as a matter of law
and instead direct that the issue of contributory negligence be
submitted to the jury.