delivered the opinion of the Court:
Section 350 of the Code provides that “no executor or ad- ■ ministrator who shall, after the lapse of one year after the date of his letters, have paid away assets to the discharge of just claims, shall be answerable for any claim of which he had no knowledge or notice by an exhibition of the claim, legally
It may be stated as a general proposition that, where the relation of attorney and client exists, the law of principal and agent generally applies, and that the client is bound by the acts of the attorney within the scope of his authority. But it by no means follows that, because the attorney is engaged in a particular suit, that notice to him in reference to a cause or proceeding with which he has nothing to' do, and over which he has no authority or control, constitutes notice to his client. On the contrary, notice to the attorney is notice to the client only when the notice is a part of the particular case in which the relation exists. Pacific Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 8 Wash; 352, 36 Pac. 273; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Benton, 42 Kan. 698, 22 Pac. 698; Stewart v. Sprague, 71 Mich. 60, 38 N. W. 673. Tested by the rule announced, it is apparent that the letter to counsel engaged in the prosecution of said claim did not constitute notice to their client in reférence to a matter pending in the probate court, and not concerning in any way the subject-matter of their employment. In Mr. Conrad’s letter it is distinctly stated that counsel “have made no investigation of the aifairs of the estate, beyond what we have found to be necessary in the preparation of the particular case placed in our hands.” If this means anything, it means that their authority ended with the prosecution of the particular case intrusted to them. The record in the probate proceeding shows that Mr. Potbury was counsel for the executrix in that proceeding, and there is nothing in this record to justify the assumption of Hedges, that Messrs. Conrad and Robinson, at that time, were authorized to represent the executrix before the probate court.
Thus far we have assumed that, had said letter of Charles Hedges been addressed to counsel authorized to represent exe
Various other questions have been raised by appellant, but, in view of the conclusion that the executrix had no notice of the existence of appellee’s claim when she settled the estate, it is not necessary to notice them.
The point is made in the brief of appellee that this court is without authority to entertain this appeal and to reverse the action of the court below in vacating its order approving the account of the executrix, for the reason that the action of the
Under the law of its creation (act of Feb. 9, 1893, 27 Stat. at L. 434, chap. 74), this court is authorized to .allow an appeal from any interlocutory order of the supreme court of the District, or of any justice thereof, whenever it is made to appear to this court, upon petition, that it will be in the interest of justice to allow such an appeal.
In the present case more than four years intervened between the issuance of letters testamentary and the settlement of the estate. There was compliance with the provisions of the statute. All known claims against the estate were adjusted and the remaining assets distributed. When appellee filed his petition, the order which he sought to nullify had gone into effect,—the distribution had been made. In such a situation the law says the executor shall not be answerable for any new claim unless he had notice of such claim before the settlement of the estate. We have found a lack of such notice in this case; hence, the order setting aside the order of settlement, and requiring appellant to give an additional bond in the sum of $15,000, is sure to work hardship and injustice to her.
Because of his laches, appellee had no legal status before the court, and the order appealed from imposed upon appellant burdens from which the statute exempts her. In allowing an appeal from this order, this court exercised the discretion intrusted to it by statute, and that discretion cannot be questioned here.
In Connor v. Peugh, 18 How. 394, 15 L. ed. 432, cited by appellee, the plaintiff in error, Mrs. Connor, was not a party to the original suit, which was an action of ejectment to recover possession of a lot, Mrs. Connor being the tenant in possession. Judgment by default was entered against the casual ejector and the tenant in possession, and a writ of habere facias possessionem was sued out. On the return day of the writ, counsel for Mrs. Connor moved to set aside the judgment and to quash said writ upon the ground of lack of notice to her. The motion was overruled and her petition dismissed. The court
The order appealed from must be reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. - Reversed.