2014 IL App (1st) 132856
No. 1-13-2856
Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing filed September 4, 2014
FOURTH DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
LORRAINE PATTULLO-BANKS and ) Appeal from the
GEORGE BANKS, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) 12 L 1459
)
THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, a Municipal )
Corporation, ) Honorable
) Lynn M. Egan,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Epstein concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs Lorraine Pattullo-Banks and George Banks appeal from an order of the circuit
court of Cook County entering summary judgment in favor of defendant, the city of Park Ridge,
in the lawsuit they filed to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by Lorraine Pattullo-
Banks. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the city of Park Ridge breached its duty to
maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for intended and permitted users of the
sidewalk, which caused Pattullo-Banks’ injuries. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Pattullo-
Banks was walking near a train station on a city of Park Ridge sidewalk located along Touhy
Avenue when she encountered an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice which obstructed her
pathway. Plaintiffs alleged that the city of Park Ridge created the obstruction during snow
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removal operations when it plowed snow from the public streets onto the sidewalk, making the
sidewalk impassable. Because the sidewalk was obstructed, the complaint alleges, in order to
reach her destination Pattullo-Banks was forced to cross Touhy Avenue at the point of the
obstruction, where there was no marked crosswalk. Pattullo-Banks was injured when she was
struck by a car while attempting to cross the street. Plaintiffs sought damages for Lorraine's
personal injury and George Banks sought damages for loss of consortium.
¶2 The city of Park Ridge (the City) filed a motion for summary judgment. The City argued
that section 3-102(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-101 et seq. (West 2008)) provides that a local public
entity has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition
only for the ordinary use of intended or permitted users. See 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008).
The City argued it is immune from the damages claims because Pattullo-Banks was not an
intended or permitted user of the street where her injury occurred. In response, plaintiffs argued
that the city of Park Ridge did owe Pattullo-Banks a duty because she was an intended and
permitted user of the sidewalk.
¶3 The trial court agreed with the city of Park Ridge and dismissed the complaint, finding
that the City was immune from liability for Pattullo-Banks' injuries because Pattullo-Banks was
not an intended user of Touhy Avenue where she was injured.
¶4 In most of the cases cited by the parties construing section 3-102(a), the breach of the
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition and the alleged
resulting injury occurred on the same property. However, in this case the breach of duty
occurred on the sidewalk but the injury occurred in the street. This appeal presents us with the
following issue: Where a public entity allegedly breached its duty to maintain its property in a
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reasonably safe condition and the public entity asserts it is immune under section 3-102(a), is the
plaintiff’s status as an intended or permitted user determined by the place where the alleged
breach of duty to maintain property occurs or where plaintiff’s injury occurs? Based on our
reading of the statute we find that where a plaintiff alleges that a municipality breached its duty
to use ordinary care to maintain its property and the defendant invokes section 3-102(a) of the
Tort Immunity Act as a defense, the issue of whether the plaintiff was an intended and permitted
user is to be determined based upon the property for which the city is alleged to have breached
its duty rather than the place where the injury occurred. As such, we find the trial court applied
the wrong standard here when it dismissed plaintiffs' claim based on its finding that Pattullo-
Banks was not an intended or permitted user of the street, which was merely the place where her
injury occurred. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the city of Park Ridge, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
¶5 BACKGROUND
¶6 This is the second time this case has been appealed. Plaintiffs filed the first appeal from
the trial court's dismissal of the city of Park Ridge, as well as other defendants in the case,
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
(West 2008)). Banks v. City of Park Ridge, Nos. 1-10-0498 and 1-0901 (2011) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We found that the trial court improperly dismissed those
claims. Specifically, we found that for purposes of a section 2-619(a)(9) motion, it was
insufficient for the city of Park Ridge to attach an affidavit stating that there was no crosswalk
where Pattullo-Banks was struck by a car because that merely rebutted plaintiffs' well-pled
allegation that there was an unmarked crosswalk where she was struck by a car. Thus, because
the city of Park Ridge failed to offer an affirmative matter to negate the claim in plaintiffs'
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complaint, we reversed the trial court's dismissal pursuant section 2-619(a)(9) and remanded the
matter for further proceedings. In so ruling, we noted that we were not addressing the merit of
plaintiffs' allegations that the city of Park Ridge owed Pattullo-Banks a duty.
¶7 Following remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint. Count III of plaintiffs' second
amended complaint, titled "Breach of Duty, Negligence" against the city of Park Ridge alleges
that the city of Park Ridge owed Pattullo-Banks numerous duties that it breached, which
included: a duty not to create or aggravate an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice on the
public walkways; a duty to provide known and permitted users of the train station with safe and
reasonable means of egress from the train station; a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its
property in a reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people who
Park Ridge intended and permitted to use the property; and a duty to warn commuters and other
pedestrians that if they exited the train station onto the south side of Touhy Avenue, there would
be no safe way to get to the north side.
¶8 On April 2, 2013, the city of Park Ridge filed a motion for summary judgment. In the
motion, the City argued that it owed no duty to Pattullo-Banks pursuant to section 3-102(a) of
the Tort Immunity Act because she was not an intended user of Touhy Avenue where she was
struck by a car. In support of its motion, the City offered the testimony of a Park Ridge police
sergeant and accident reconstructionist Kirk Ashelman, the testimony of City Engineer Sarah
Mitchell, and numerous photographs of the property in question. Both witnesses offered
testimony that there was no marked or unmarked crosswalk where 3rd Street intersects Touhy
Avenue, the site where plaintiff was struck by a car.
¶9 In response, plaintiffs argued that the city of Park Ridge owed Pattullo-Banks a duty
because the City was negligent in creating an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice on the
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sidewalk. Plaintiffs argued that the issue of whether Pattullo-Banks was in a crosswalk was
irrelevant. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that Pattullo-Banks was in an unmarked crosswalk at
the time she was struck by a car. In support of this argument, plaintiffs offered the definition of
a "crosswalk" as defined by section 1-113 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625
ILCS 5/1-113 (West 2008)), as well as photographs of the property at issue.
¶ 10 On August 5, 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city of Park
Ridge because it found that the City did not owe Pattullo-Banks a duty. Specifically, the trial
court found that the testimony of the City's witnesses, along with the photographs of the property
at issue, showed that there was no marked or unmarked crosswalk where Pattullo-Banks was
injured. Finding that a city does not owe a duty to a pedestrian crossing the street outside of any
crosswalk pursuant to section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the city of Park Ridge.
¶ 11 Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the city
of Park Ridge. We reversed and remanded the trial court's ruling in a June 26, 2014, Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23 order (Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(b) (eff. July 1, 2011)). Banks v. City of Park
Ridge, 2014 IL App (1st) 132856-U. The city of Park Ridge subsequently filed a petition for
rehearing. We withdrew our Rule 23 order on August 14, 2014. For the reasons that follow, the
city of Park Ridge's petition for rehearing is denied and the trial court's ruling is reversed.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2008). Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is proper where the plaintiff fails to establish
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an element of a cause of action. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358 (1989). In order to
maintain a cause of action for negligence, plaintiffs must establish that the city of Park Ridge
owed a duty of ordinary care, breached that duty, and an injury was proximately caused by that
breach. See Curatola v. Village of Niles, 154 Ill. 2d 201, 207 (1993). The existence of a duty
and the existence of immunity are separate issues. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378,
388 (1996). We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern
Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). Section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act, titled "Care in
maintenance of property; constructive notice," states:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public
entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its
property in a reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise
of ordinary care of people whom the entity intended and permitted
to use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it
was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used, and shall not be
liable for injury unless it is proven that it has actual or constructive
notice of the existence of such a condition that is not reasonably
safe in reasonably adequate time prior to an injury to have taken
measures to remedy or protect against such condition." 745 ILCS
10/3-102(a) (West 2008).
¶ 14 In its motion for summary judgment, the city of Park Ridge argues that for purposes of
section 3-102(a) immunity, Pattullo-Banks was neither an intended or permitted user of the street
because she was crossing the street outside a crosswalk when she was struck by a car. As a
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result, the City argues, it did not owe her a duty of care under the Tort Immunity Act, and the
City is immune from any liability arising from her injuries. We disagree.
¶ 15 It is well established that the Tort Immunity Act does not create duties; "[r]ather, the Act
merely codifies those duties existing at common law, to which the subsequently delineated
immunities apply." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG
Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001). Section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act
codified the duty of the city of Park Ridge to exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of its
property for intended and permitted users of its property. 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008).
The immunity provided in section 3-102(a) applies where a public entity breaches its duty to
exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition but (1) the entity
did not have actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition in reasonably adequate time
prior to an injury to have taken measures to remedy or protect against the condition, or (2) the
injured party failed to use ordinary care or was not an intended and permitted user of the
property. 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008). In other words the issue of whether or not an
injured party is an intended and permitted user of property does not arise unless there is a claim
of a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain property for the benefit of intended
and permitted users.
¶ 16 In this case, plaintiffs clearly allege that the city of Park Ridge breached its duty of care
by failing to exercise reasonable care to maintain the sidewalk. Plaintiffs make no claim that the
city of Park Ridge breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the street or that
plaintiff was injured because of the improper maintenance of the street. Pattullo-Banks’ status as
a intended or permitted user of the street is irrelevant to a determination of whether the City has
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immunity under section 3-102(a) because there is no claim the City breached its duty to maintain
the street to which immunity could even apply. See 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008).
¶ 17 Under the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act, where a public entity has allegedly
breached the duty to maintain property for intended and permitted users of the property, we must
look to the property where the breach allegedly occurred to answer the question of whether the
injured party was an intended or permitted user of the property. Thus, Pattullo-Banks' status as
an intended or permitted user--and whether immunity applies--must be determined based on the
property where alleged breach of duty occurred (the sidewalk), not the property where the injury
occurred (the street), and not the mechanism of her injury (i.e., whether she was struck by an
automobile or tripped on a defect). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
city of Park Ridge based on its finding that Pattullo-Banks was not an intended and permitted
user of the street. The trial court granted summary judgment on an improper basis and its
judgment must be reversed.
¶ 18 The existence of a duty, whether there was a breach of that duty, and whether that breach
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries are each separate questions. The focus on
whether the City owed a duty to Pattullo-Banks while she was crossing the street was misplaced.
Plaintiffs note that their allegations arise from the claim that the city of Park Ridge negligently
failed to clear the sidewalk of an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice. Although the City
argued in its motion for summary judgment that it had no duty to clear the sidewalk at issue, it is
well established that a city has a duty to keep its sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition for
pedestrians. Kiel v. City of Girard, 274 Ill. App. 3d 821, 825 (1995) ("a public entity may be
liable for unnatural accumulations of ice and snow, provided that the public entity has violated
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its duty to exercise ordinary care, even absent a showing that the underlying sidewalk or street
was defective").
¶ 19 In Kiel, the plaintiff and her husband drove up to and pulled over alongside a sidewalk
that was bordered by a curb. Kiel, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 823. When the plaintiff exited the car, she
stepped over a mound of snow on the curb in order to reach the plowed sidewalk. Id. The
mound of snow on the curb was created as a result of plowing the sidewalk and a parking lot. Id.
After paying her bills and on her way back to the car, the plaintiff again attempted to step over
the curb where the mound of snow was located, and she fell and injured herself. Id. The jury
entered a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, but the appellate court reversed that verdict finding that
it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 828. Specifically, the court stated:
"Although the evidence was sufficient to establish that the City
created an unnatural accumulation of snow and that plaintiff's
injuries would not have occurred without this unnatural
accumulation, the evidence does not establish that the City
breached its duty of ordinary care.
The City created a small, but easily visible, mound of snow
on the curb as a side effect of its street- and-sidewalk-clearing
efforts. There was nothing unusual about the size or placement of
this mound. Snow cleared from pathways must be placed
somewhere. Elsewhere, the City took the extraordinary measure of
collecting snow from curbside and depositing it in the park.
However, the mere fact that the City failed to use extraordinary
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measures everywhere does not mean it failed to use ordinary care
here." Id. at 827.
¶ 20 Thus, while the court in Kiel held that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, it was because there was nothing unusual about “the size or placement of this mound.”
Id. The court in Kiel held that “[r]equiring prompt cleanup of all snow plowed curbside would
place an enormous burden on cities, and such a duty would have the consequence of
discouraging snow removal.” Id. at 828. The court held that “Illinois law imposes no such
duty.” Id.
¶ 21 To the extent the Kiel court found the city did not have a duty to immediately remove
plowed snow the holding is limited to the facts of that case and is inapplicable here and does not
affect its holding that a duty to maintain the sidewalk exists. Id. at 827-28. Kiel involved a small
amount of snow plowed “off the sidewalk and onto the curb.” Id. at 823. The court in Kiel still
clearly recognized the duty of a city to clear unnatural accumulations of ice and snow from its
sidewalks. Id. at 825 (“where a landowner negligently performs ice and snow removal, adding to
or creating a new hazard, he may be liable for a resulting injury”). In this case, we are not
dealing with a small amount of snow cleared from a sidewalk and onto a curb, but rather snow
that the City plowed onto the sidewalks and then failed to clear, allegedly making them
impassable in the exercise of ordinary care. “It is well settled that a city owes a duty to keep its
streets and sidewalks safe for the purpose for which they are intended and for the use of those
who are themselves exercising ordinary care.” Thorsen v. City of Chicago, 74 Ill. App. 3d 98,
107 (1979). Whether the City breached that duty is a factual matter for the trier of fact to decide.
Hornacek v. 5th Avenue Property Management, 2011 IL App (1st) 103502, ¶ 27.
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¶ 22 In its motion for summary judgment and petition for rehearing, the city of Park Ridge
argues three decisions by our supreme court control the outcome of this case. They are Wojdyla
v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417 (1992), Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155
(1995), and Boub v. Township of Wayne, 183 Ill. 2d 520 (1998). In each of those cases our
supreme court found that a city had no duty to a pedestrian injured in a street or roadway.
However, we find those cases are easily distinguished. In Wojdyla, 148 Ill. 2d at 419, the
plaintiff alleged that the city was negligent in the placement and maintenance of streetlights on
the highway. The plaintiff argued that the city's failure to maintain the street lights was the cause
of the decedent's death when a driver of a vehicle was unable to see the decedent and hit him as a
result. Id. Ultimately, the court found that the city was immune under section 3-102(a) of the
Tort Immunity Act because it determined that the decedent was not an intended user of the street
where he was hit. Id. at 424. The present case can be distinguished from Wojdyla because there,
the alleged breach of duty was failure to “maintain” the street (the failure to illuminate the street)
and the injury occurred at the site of the breach on the street (being struck due to the inadequate
illumination). Here, the alleged breach of duty was failure to maintain the sidewalk but the
injury occurred at a different site.
¶ 23 In Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d 155, the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries caused as a result of
stepping into a hole in the street while crossing. Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at 157. Ultimately, the
court found that the city was immune under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act because
the plaintiff was not an intended user of the street where he was injured. Id. at 158-65. In
Vaughn, the plaintiff was injured at the location of the alleged breach of duty to maintain
property. But in this case, the city of Park Ridge is alleged to have breached its duty to maintain
the sidewalk, which resulted in an injury in the street. That difference distinguishes this case
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from the Vaughn case. Similarly, in Boub, 183 Ill. 2d at 522, the plaintiff was thrown from his
bicycle when his front tire became stuck between two planks on a bridge. Boub, 183 Ill. 2d at
522. The court found that the city was immune under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act
because the plaintiff was not an intended user of the bridge, where he was injured. Id. at 535-36.
¶ 24 In the cases on which the city of Park Ridge relies, the plaintiffs made allegations that
their injuries were caused by the defendants' failure to exercise ordinary care to maintain a street
or bridge. In those cases, when the defendants raised section 3-102(a) immunity as a defense,
the court was required to determine whether the plaintiffs were intended and permitted users of
the street or bridge because the street or bridge was the property that the plaintiffs alleged had
been negligently maintained by the defendants. In those cases, the property the plaintiffs alleged
was negligently maintained and the property where the injury occurred were the same. Unlike
those cases, here plaintiffs allege that the City negligently maintained the sidewalk.
Accordingly, plaintiff's status as a permitted and intended user should be determined for the
sidewalk. Her status as a permitted and intended user of the street is irrelevant to the immunity
question, as her injuries are not alleged to have arisen out of a condition of the street.
¶ 25 Aside from the plain language of section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act, we find
further support for our interpretation of section 3-102(a) in Nelson v. Northeast Illinois Regional
Commuter R.R. Corp., 364 Ill. App. 3d 181 (2006). In Nelson, a 15-year-old minor was injured
while she was trespassing on the defendant's rail road track and was struck by a train. Nelson,
364 Ill. App. 3d at 183. The rail road was owned by defendant METRA, a municipal
corporation. Id. The minor plaintiff filed a complaint against METRA under the frequent
trespass doctrine alleging that METRA was aware that children frequently trespassed on the
property and did nothing to prevent potential harm to those children. Id. at 186. In response, the
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defendant claimed that it was immune from the plaintiff's allegations under section 3-102(a) of
the Tort Immunity Act because the plaintiff was not an intended or permitted user of the railroad
tracks where she was injured. Id. at 188. The Nelson court held that "section 3-102(a) immunity
applies where the following two requirements are met: (1) the injured party was not an intended
and permitted user of the property; and (2) the injury arose from the condition of the property.
Section 3-102(a) immunity does not apply where the injuries arose from an unsafe activity
conducted on otherwise safe property." Nelson, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 190. The Nelson court went
on to state that "section 3-102(a) expressly refers only to the 'condition' of the property, not to the
activities thereon." Id.
¶ 26 Here, plaintiffs do not allege that Pattullo-Banks was injured as a result of a condition of
the street where she was injured. As such, it cannot be said that plaintiff's injury arose from a
breach of the City's duties to maintain the street. Instead, her "injuries arose from an unsafe
activity [crossing at an unmarked crosswalk] conducted on otherwise safe property [the street]"
(id.), and the Tort Immunity Act does not grant the City immunity under such a scenario. Id. As
such, the trial court's summary judgment order for the city of Park Ridge must be reversed.
¶ 27 If plaintiffs establish the City was negligent in creating an unnatural accumulation of ice
and snow on the sidewalk, the proper question at that point becomes whether the alleged breach
of duty to maintain the sidewalk was a proximate cause of Pattullo-Banks’ injury in the street.
The city of Park Ridge also raised in its petition for rehearing that the plaintiff violated state law
by failing to cross the street at a designated crosswalk. However, not only was this issue not
raised in the City's motion for summary judgment and not properly before us on appeal, but
Pattullo-Banks' crossing Touhy where she did and any alleged violation of traffic laws are
questions of proximate cause. Johnson v City of Rockford, 35 Ill. App. 2d 107, 120 (1962)
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(“Whether or not the piling of the snow and ice on the sidewalk and permitting it to remain there
was the proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the injury in question, we believe to
be a question of fact to be determined by a jury ***.”); Parkin v. Rigdon, 1 Ill. App. 2d 586, 593
(1954) ("such conduct on the part of the pedestrian will not of itself preclude recovery on the
ground of contributory negligence if the violation of the statute is not the proximate cause of the
injury").
¶ 28 In similar circumstances, the court has found that when it is established that a city has
breached its duty to maintain its sidewalks or otherwise provide a safe place to walk, or else give
notice that the street is closed to pedestrian traffic (Thorsen, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 107), the next
issue is whether the city’s breach constitutes a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Thorsen, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 107-09. In Thorsen, the plaintiff was struck by an automobile while
walking in the street. Id. at 101. The plaintiff testified that the city “failed to maintain a
sidewalk *** making it necessary for pedestrians to use the street.” Id. The area where the
plaintiff in Thorsen was struck had no sidewalks and the area where the sidewalk had been was a
dirt area, which at the time was very muddy with large puddles and may have been blocked by
construction trailers and equipment. Id. at 103-04. The Thorsen court first found that the city
had a duty to “maintain a sidewalk or provide a safe means of pedestrian travel.” Id. at 106. The
court cited Johnson for the proposition that “because it was reasonably foreseeable that the
plaintiff would be struck by an automobile after being forced into the street, the question [of
whether the breach of duty constituted a proximate cause of the injury] was one of fact for the
jury.” Id. at 109 (citing Johnson, 35 Ill. App. 2d at 114-20).
¶ 29 While the trial judge suggested in her ruling on summary judgment that Wojdyla
somehow overruled Thorsen and Johnson, this is not the case. Wojdyla dealt with injuries
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arising from a condition of the street where the injury occurred: inadequate lighting. Thorsen
and Johnson dealt with injuries that arose from an unsafe activity conducted on otherwise safe
property; which, as noted earlier, is an important distinction. Moreover, Thorsen and Johnson,
like this case, dealt with an allegedly negligent failure to maintain property in one location that
may be a proximate cause of an injury in another location. In our view, Thorsen and Johnson
remain unaffected by Wojdyla and are good law.
¶ 30 Ordinarily, questions concerning proximate cause are factual matters for the jury to
decide. Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 156 (1990). However, the issue of proximate
cause can become a question of law when the facts are not only undisputed but are such that
there can be no difference in the judgment of reasonable persons as to the inferences to be drawn
from them. Durbin v. St. Louis Slag Products Co., 206 Ill. App. 3d 340, 357 (1990). In
Arbogast v. Fedorchak, 44 Ill. App. 2d 160 (1963), the court determined the issue of proximate
cause as a matter of law where the plaintiff was struck by a car after she abruptly exited a bus
after realizing she had forgotten her bus pass. The plaintiff alleged that the bus driver stopped
over the crosswalk, forcing the plaintiff to cross the street outside of the crosswalk, where she
was then hit by a car. Arbogast, 44 Ill. App. 2d at 167. The appellate court found that judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant was appropriate, stating: "We do not
believe that reasonable minds should say that the bus driver could reasonably foresee plaintiff's
injury, as it occurred, following from his blocking of the rear crosswalk. In our judgment the
bus, standing where it was, merely created a condition which was at most a remote cause of
plaintiff's injury." Id. at 169.
¶ 31 On the other hand, in Scerba v. City of Chicago, 284 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439 (1996), the
court reversed the trial court's ruling on summary judgment in favor of the city where a Chicago
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Transit Authority (CTA) bus was blocking the crosswalk, forcing the plaintiff's child to cross the
street outside of a marked crosswalk, where the child was then hit by a car. In reversing the trial
court, this court noted “a reasonable jury could find an unbroken causal connection between the
blocked intersection and the injury.” Scerba, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 441. Although the court
recognized that the child foolishly rejected several safe routes for the risky path the child
ultimately took, the court noted that the “availability of another route, standing alone, is not
enough to erase the foreseeability of [the child] pursuing the path he traveled.” Scerba, 284 Ill.
App. 3d at 441. See also Thompson v. County of Cook, 154 Ill. 2d 374 (1993) (finding that a
driver's actions in driving drunk, speeding, and eluding the police were the sole proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries thereby breaking any causal connection between the city's alleged
negligence in failing to adequately warn motorists of a curve in the road and the plaintiff's
injuries).
¶ 32 In this case, whether the alleged breach of the city of Park Ridge's duty to use ordinary
care to maintain its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition was a proximate cause of Pattullo-
Banks being struck by an automobile while crossing Touhy cannot be decided as a matter of law.
We find that reasonable minds could say the City could reasonably foresee Pattullo-Banks'
injury, as it occurred, following from its blocking of the sidewalk. Assuming, arguendo, that her
chosen path was "risky" that is not enough to erase the foreseeability of her choosing that path.
As in Scerba, “a reasonable jury could find an unbroken causal connection between the blocked
[sidewalk] and the injury.” Scerba, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 441. Nor can we say that any alleged
violation of the traffic law was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Rigdon, 1 Ill. App. 2d at
593. "The question of whether the negligence of plaintiff was the sole proximate cause or a
contributing cause of the injury is an issue for the jury to decide under principles of comparative
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negligence." Buchaklian v. Lake County Family Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d
195, 205 (2000).
¶ 33 We reiterate that we are making no determination as to the presence of any marked or
unmarked crosswalks, that there was a breach of duty, or that a breach of duty was a proximate
cause of Pattullo-Banks’ injury. We are holding that the trial court misapplied section 3-102(a)
because the alleged breach of duty did not occur in the street, therefore, whether Pattullo-Banks
was a permitted an intended user of the street is irrelevant. Because the plaintiff here alleged the
City breached its duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the sidewalk, under the clear
language of the statute her status as an intended or permitted user of the sidewalk is the relevant
consideration. Conversely, because there is no allegation that the city of Park Ridge breached its
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the street, Pattullo-Banks’ status as an intended or
permitted user the street is irrelevant to determine whether immunity applies under section 3-
102(a). The trial court erred when it dismissed the case on that basis. Accordingly, its judgment
must be reversed.
¶ 34 CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the city of Park Ridge and remand this matter for further proceedings.
¶ 36 Reversed and remanded.
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Pattullo-Banks v. The City of Park Ridge
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
Date filed: 2014-09-05
Citations: 2014 IL App (1st) 132856
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