Paul Holmes v. Bob Crosby

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
June 27, 2005
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 04-15233
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-01754-CV-RWS-1

PAUL HOLMES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BOB CROSBY,
GARFIELD HAMMONDS, JR.,
EUGENE P. WALKER,
BETTY ANN COOK,
WALTER S. RAY,
BOBBY WHITWORTH,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________

(June 27, 2005)

Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

The defendants in this civil rights action, members of the Georgia Board of

Pardons and Paroles and an individual parole officer (collectively the “Board”),

appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTS

On December 10, 1996, Plaintiff Paul Holmes was released on parole after

serving his sentence in Georgia for armed robbery and aggravated assault. In

response to his request for relocation, he was permitted to serve his probation in

Florida. Upon his release from prison, he was issued a parole certificate, which

contained the conditions of his parole and a directive on how to contact the

Georgia Interstate Compact Unit if he lost contact with his assigned parole officer.

In 1999, Florida authorities informed the Board of several parole violations

which Holmes allegedly committed. At a probable cause hearing, Holmes pleaded

guilty to a single charge of violating his parole.1 Several months later, Georgia

authorities inquired into the status of pending criminal charges against Holmes,

and were informed that the charges were nolle prossequi. Georgia sent another

letter to Florida requesting that Florida continue its parole supervision of Holmes.

Florida did not respond expeditiously to this request, and subsequently released

1
Holmes admitted to refusing to undergo urine testing in violation of his parole. The
remaining charges were found to lack probable cause.

2
Holmes from his parole.

The Florida authorities eventually informed the Board that it had closed

interest in Holmes’s case and further indicated that the case could not be re-opened

without more information on Holmes’s location. When the Board received this

information, a member of the Georgia Interstate Compact Service contacted the

Miami Dade County Metro Police and attempted to locate Holmes at his last

known address, which was his sister’s residence. A man living at Holmes’s sister’s

residence indicated that Holmes no longer lived there. The following day, the

Board issued an arrest warrant and Order of Temporary Revocation of Parole for

Holmes based upon the Georgia Interstate Compact Service’s research and belief

that Holmes had absconded from parole supervision.

Holmes was arrested on Georgia’s parole warrant on December 28, 2000 and

subsequently returned to Georgia. Holmes was denied a preliminary hearing

because of his “parole absconder” status. A final parole revocation hearing was

not held until March 21, 2001. At the hearing, Holmes testified that he had written

to the Board for instructions after being told that he was no longer on parole in

Florida, but received no answer, and was never told that his parole supervision had

been transferred to Georgia. The Chief Parole Officer in Georgia, Bob Crosby,

testified that nothing had gone wrong in Holmes’s case, and that Florida had closed

3
interest in the case because authorities could not locate Holmes. Based on the

testimony provided at the hearing, the Board revoked Holmes’s parole.

Holmes applied for a writ of habeas corpus. The state court reversed the

findings the Board made at the initial hearing and ordered the Board to provide

Holmes with another final parole revocation hearing. At the second hearing on

October 3, 2001, Holmes contended that although he knew he was supposed to

report, he did not know to whom. The hearing officer agreed that “there seem[ed]

to be a serious breach in communication between Florida and Georgia in reference

to [Holmes].” Thus, the Board reparoled Holmes.2

On June 23, 2003, Holmes filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Bob

Crosby and the following members of the Board: (1) Garfield Hammonds, Jr.; (2)

Eugene Walker; (3) Betty Ann Cook; (4) Bobby Whitworth; and (5) Walter S. Ray

all in their individual capacities. Holmes asserted claims for false imprisonment

and violation of his due process rights. He requested both monetary and

declaratory relief.3

The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no

2
Holmes had been incarcerated on the parole violation for eleven months.
3
Specifically, he requested monetary relief in the amount of $100,000 jointly and
severally against each of the defendants for compensatory damages and $20,000 against each of
the defendants for punitive damages. The only declaratory relief he requested was a statement
indicating that the defendants had violated his constitutional right to due process.

4
constitutional right to parole and that Crosby and the Board members were entitled

to qualified immunity. The district court denied the Board’s motion for summary

judgment.4 The Board now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Evanston

Ins. Co. v. Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 852, 858 (11th Cir. 1997).

B. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity

To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a

violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed

by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108

S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed. 2d 40 (1988).

On appeal, the Board members contend that they are not only entitled to

qualified immunity, but that they are also entitled to absolute quasi-judicial

4
The district court denied summary judgment to the Board members in their individual
capacities but granted summary judgment to the Board members in their officials capacities. A
review of Holmes’s complaint, however, indicates that he did not sue the Board members in their
official capacities. Thus, we decline to address this issue.

5
immunity.5 We repeatedly have held that individual members of the Parole Board

are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a suit for damages. Fuller v.

Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988);

see also Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 641 n.2 (11th

Cir. 1990); Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated

and affirmed on other grounds after rehearing en banc, 35 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir.

1994). Thus, we hold that the district court erred in permitting the claims for

monetary damages to proceed against the individual Board members.

We have not yet determined, however, whether a parole officer is also

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. We held in Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489,

1490 (11th Cir. 1984) that probation officers receive immunity in preparing

presentence investigation reports. Additionally, we held in Jones v. Cannon, 174

F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), that witnesses in criminal trials and grand jury

proceedings are afforded absolute immunity even if their testimony is false. We

also stated that “the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 to give absolute

immunity to functions intimately associated with the judicial process.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).6 Although a parole hearing is not a criminal hearing or grand

5
The Board asserted this defense in its “Mandatory Disclosures” below, and therefore this
issue was properly raised before the district court.
6
We also note that in Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88
L.Ed.2d 507 (1985), the Supreme Court observed that several federal appellate courts have held

6
jury proceeding, we read the Supreme Court’s and our previous cases to imply that

parole officers enjoy immunity for testimony given during parole revocation

hearings when they act within the scope of their duties. Thus, because Crosby was

acting within the scope of his duties when he testified, we conclude that the district

court erred in permitting the claims for monetary damages to proceed against

Crosby.7

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we REVERSE the denial of summary judgment and REMAND

for the district court to dismiss the monetary claims against the Board members

and Crosby on the basis of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Furthermore, once

the monetary damages are dismissed, the only remaining claim is for declaratory

relief. As there is no declaratory relief available, summary judgment should be

granted on this claim.

that state parole officials have absolute immunity.
7
Because we hold that Crosby and the Board members are entitled to absolute quasi-
judicial immunity, their alternative qualified immunity defense is moot.