That the Assessors, in this case, have disregarded the mandate of the statute, requiring them to put the price paid by the corporation for its real estate upon the assessment roll, is apparent from the return itself. That they have, by this error, put it out of the power of the Supervisors to assess a proper tax upon the capital of the Relators is, to my mind, equally clear. The Revised Statutes, as amended by the acts of July 21, 1853, and April 15, 1857, prescribe a complete scheme for taxing corporations. The second section (1R. S. 414) requires the president, cashier, secretary, or other proper officer of every such incorporated company, on or before the first day of July in each year, to make and deliver to the Assessors, or one of them, of the town
1. The real estate, if any, owned by the company, the towns or wards in which the same is situated, and the sums actually paid therefor.
2. The capital stock actually paid in and secured to he paid in, excepting therefrom the sums paid for real estate, and the amount of such capital stock held by the State, and by any incorporated literary or charitable institution ; and,
3. The town or ward in which the principal office, or place of transacting the financial business of such company, is situated; or, if there.be no such principal office] the town or ward in which its operations are carried on, or in which it is liable to be taxed.
By the sixth section of the said statutes, as' amended by chapter 654 of the Laws of 1853, the Assessors are required to insert in the first column of their assessment rolls, the name of every incorporated company in their respective towns or wards liable to taxation on its capital, or otherwise; and, under its name, they shall specify the amount of its capital stock paid in, and secured to be paid in; the amount paid by such company for real estate then belonging to such company, wherever the same may be situated; the amount of all sui’plus profits or reserved funds exceeding ten per cent, of their capital, after deducting therefrom the said amount of said real estate, and the amount of its stock, if any, belonging to the State, and to incorporated literary and charitable institutions; and, in the second column, they are required to enter the quantity of real estate owned by such company, and situated within their town or ward; and, in the third column, the actual value thereof, estimated as in other cases (1 B. S. 416); and, in the fourth column, they are required to enter the amount of the capital stock of every incorporated company paid in, and secured to be paid in, and of all surplus profits or reserved funds, as aforesaid, after deducting the sums paid out for all real estate of such company, wherever the same may be situated, and then belonging to it, and the amount of stock, if any, belonging to the people of this State, and to incorporated literary and charitable institutions
These provisions of the statute are all of them mandatory.
The language employed in the statute is, “ they shall enter ” these things in the assessment roll, and nothing short of a strict compliance with these requirements of the statute will excuse them. The effect of these provisions of the statute is to require the Assessors to put the real estate of the corporation into the assessment roll at the price paid for it, and no duty is imposed upon them at all in regard to assessing the value of the real estate, except that specified by the second subdivision of the sixth section of 1 R. S. 415, which requires them to enter in the second column the quantity of real estate owned by-such company, and situated within their town or ward; and, in the third column, the actual value thereof, estimated as in other cases. This is to enable the assessment to be made to conform to the provisions of the sixth section of 1 R. S. 389, which requires the real estate of all incorporated companies tobe “ assessed in the town or ward in which the same shall lie, in the same manner as the real estate of individuáis ” (1 R. S. 389, § 6). Rot so as to the real ¡ estate owned generally by the corporation; there is nothing in any of the provisions of the statutes requiring the Assessors to carry into the assessment roll the quantity of real estate generally owned by such corporation, or to assess the value thereof. And no such general assessment of the- value of the real estate generally of these corporations, when situated out of their town or ward, is ever made by the Assessors, and if they were so to assess the real estate outside of the limits of their own jurisdiction their assessment would be without any warrant of law. They would simply perform extra-judicial duties having no binding force. A corporation may own lands in any State in the Union, whenever they can obtain the consent of such State to do so, and the Assessors can have no means of assessing their value. This impracticability has led, as we have already seen, to an entirely different mode of ascertaining to what extent the capital of the corporation is invested in real estate.
The act of April 15, 1857, amends the fifteenth section, 1 R. S. 417, so as to read as follows: “ The amount of taxes assessed on all incorporated companies liable to taxation, shall be set dowp by the Board of Supervisors in. the fifth column of the corrected assessment roll, and shall form a part of the moneys to be collected by the collector.” This is precisely the same as the fifteenth section of the Revised Statutes, and the amendment then declares that
These several statutes are “ in pari materia,” and relating to the same subject, and must be read together in construing them, because they are considered as having one object in view, and acting upon one system (Smith on Stat. Con. 752, § 639). This rule of taxation is certainly just when based upon the amount of capital paid in, or secured to be paid in, and after deducting the amount actually paid out for real estate, to assess the remaining capital at its actual value, leaving the real estate, as the law leaves it, to be assessed like other real estate upon individuals in the town or ward where situated. This, I am satisfied, is the scheme and mode of taxation of the property of corporations as prescribed by these statutes, taken ánd considered in their connection, which is the only legal rule of construction to be applied to them.
There is, however, another construction of section 3 of the statute of 1857, which no less clearly shows the error in the assessment under consideration. It is this: that the direction, in that section, to deduct the assessed value of the real estate, applies only to the manner of ascertaining the amount of the surplus pi’ofits — that is to gay, from the whole value of the réal estate, and all shares of its stock of other corporations owned by said company which are faxable on their stock. Obviously, the balance will be the amount taxable, as capital and surplus (ten per cent, being deducted from such surplus, as previously directed).
This rule was wholly disregarded by the Defendants in this ease, in making up the assessment roll against the Relators. In the sworn statement furnished to the Defendants by the Relators, as required by the statute, the capital paid in, and secured to be paid in, is put down at $1,000,000, and the amount paid out at $856,358.26. The Assessors refused to make the assessment roll against the Relators-conformably to said statement, and determined to deduct from the amount of the capital stock' only what they estimated the actual value of the real estate of the said corporation to be, instead of the sum which the said corporation actually paid for the real estate then owned by it. They assessed the real estate only of the value of $214,800, and deducted the same from its capital of $1,000,000, leaving a balance of $785,200 of its capital subject to taxation. How, it is no answer to say that a portion of this real estate, as embraced in the Relators’ statement
¥e must look to the statute, instead of the common law, in determining whether these iron mains which run under the streets of the city are to be regarded, for the purposes of taxation, as real estate or not, as it is a matter of statute regulation entirely.
The .statute declares that “The term ‘land,’ as used in this chapter, shall be construed to include the land itself, all buildings and other articles erected uj)cri% or affixed to the same, all trees and underwood growing thereon, and all mines, minerals, quarries and fossils, in and under the same, except mines belonging to the State; and the terms real estate,’ and ‘ real property,’ whenever they occur in this chapter, shall be construed as having the same meaning as the term land,’ thus defined ” (1 R. S. 387, § 2 ; 1 R. S., 5th ed., 905, §3).
Under this statute was held, in the case of Boreel et al. v. The Mayor, that incorporeal hereditaments were not subject to taxation as land, or real estate (2 Sandf. S. C. 552; see also 4 Paige, 394). These mains running under the streets of the city, not being erected upon or affixed to the Relators’ land, cannot be regarded as real estate, under the statute, for the purpose of taxation. The mains are not real estate, as that term is defined in the statute regulating the assessment of taxes, and I do not think they can be held as fixtures under the common doctrine upon that subject. The only remaining question is, whether the Supreme Court, in virtue of its supervisory power over inferior tribunals by means of the common law writ of certiorari, had jurisdiction, and ought in plain and clear duty, under the law, to have corrected this error of these Assessors.
It is claimed and insisted by the Defendants, that how far, and in what cases the Supreme Court will exercise this power of review, are questions addressed to the sound discretion of that
I cannot assent to the proposition, that when the Supreme Court have issued the writ, heard the case upon the return, and have committed a plain error in law, and have come to the conclusion, erroneously, as in this case, that the Assessors have kept within the boundaries prescribed by the statutes, and therefore hold that the Belators can take nothing by the writ, and give judgment quashing the writ, that such judgment is not subject to review in this Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court, in such a case, is not rendered upon the ground that the proceedings ought not to be reviewed by the .writ, or that it was improvidently issued, bnt upon the ground that the allegations of error have not been sustained in the given case. Since the decision of the several suits growing out of the tax assessments in the city of Poughkeepsie, there is no redress to the citizen against illegal assessments like