Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally insufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as one of the people involved in a robbery that took place on March 9, 2007. We therefore vacate the convictions of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree pertaining to March 9, 2007, vacate the sentences imposed thereon, and dismiss counts 37 and 38 of the indictment.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court properly denied his request to have robbery in the third degree (see Penal Law § 160.05) charged as a lesser-included offense of robbery in the first degree (see Penal Law § 160.15 [4]), pertaining to the robberies committed on December 17, 2006, January 4, 2007, February 18, 2007, and March 16, 2007. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (see People v Devonish, 6 NY3d 727, 728 [2005]), the robbery victims’ testimony established that during each of these robberies, one or more of the perpetrators consciously manifested the presence of an object to one or more of the victims in such a way that the victim reasonably believed that the perpetrator had a weapon (see People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374 [1983]; People v Micolo, 30 AD3d 615 [2006]; People v Rogers, 19 AD3d 437 [2005]; see also Gonzalez v Reiner, 177 F Supp 2d 211 [SD NY 2001]; Taylor v Kuhlmann, 36 F Supp 2d 534 [ED NY 1999]). Thus, no reasonable view of the evidence supported charging robbery in the third degree, which does not require the display of a weapon, as a lesser-included offense (see Penal Law § 160.05).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780 [1992]; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513, 519 [1983]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 85-86 [1982]). Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.