Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (George R. Villegas, J.), rendered July 6, 2010, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of 18 years to life, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing in accordance with this decision, and otherwise affirmed. Order, same court and Justice, entered July 3, 2013, which denied defendant’s CPL 440.20 motion to set aside his sentence, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the motion granted as indicated above.
Under the circumstances of the case, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the July 6, 2010 sentencing proceeding when he failed to challenge the constitutionality of defendant’s 2000 New York County conviction, which was used as a predicate conviction in adjudicating defendant a persistent violent felony offender (see CPL 400.15 [7] [b]; 400.16 [2]). It is undisputed that at his 2000 plea proceeding, defendant was not advised that his sentence would include postrelease supervision (see People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242 [2005]).
In connection with the 2000 conviction, Supreme Court, New York County added postrelease supervision to the sentence in 2009 to cure an unlawful administrative imposition of PRS (see People v Sparber, 10 NY3d 457 [2008]). In May 2010 that court removed PRS from the sentence in accordance with People v Williams (14 NY3d 198 [2010]). Contrary to the People’s sole argument on appeal addressing the Catu issue, the vacatur of defendant’s PRS could not cure the Catu error, or give defendant the benefit of his plea, since at the time of the vacatur he had already served four years of PRS, and had also spent time in jail in violation of that supervision. Accordingly, neither Penal Law § 70.85 nor People v Pignataro (22 NY3d 381 [2013]) has any applicability to the issues here.
Turning to issues raised on defendant’s direct appeal from his 2010 judgment of conviction, we find that defendant’s purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid (see People v Braithwaite, 73 AD3d 656 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 849 [2010]). However, defendant’s excessive sentence claim is academic because we are ordering a plenary sentencing proceeding, and his pro se claims are without merit. Concur — Tom, J.E, Acosta, Saxe, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ.