Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dowling J.), rendered October 26, 2005, convicting him of assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Prior to jury selection, the prosecutor made a motion in limine to preclude defense counsel from cross-examining certain
While extrinsic proof tending to establish a motive to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground, when the evidence is too remote or speculative of a motive to fabricate, the trial court may, in its discretion, exclude such proof (see People v Thomas, 46 NY2d 100, 105 [1978]; People v Mestres, 41 AD3d 618 [2007]; People v Walsh, 35 AD3d 637 [2006]; People v George, 197 AD2d 588, 589 [1993]). Moreover, the cross-examination aimed at establishing a motive to fabricate must proceed upon some good-faith basis (see People v Farooq, 304 AD2d 772 [2003]; People v Sandel, 299 AD2d 373, 374 [2002]; People v Ashner, 190 AD2d 238, 247 [1993]).
Here, the proposed line of inquiry was too remote and speculative to infer a motive to fabricate (see People v Mestres, 41 AD3d 618 [2007]; People v Walsh, 35 AD3d 637 [2006]; People v Martinez, 177 AD2d 600, 601-602 [1991]; People v Ayers, 161 AD2d 770, 771 [1990]; see also People v Wright, 291 AD2d 577 [2002]; cf. People v Ocampo, 28 AD3d 684 [2006]). Moreover,, since defense counsel never identified which witnesses she sought to question about their immigration status, and did not establish some “reasonable basis” (People v Alamo, 23 NY2d 630, 633 [1969]) to believe that any of them were, in fact, in this country illegally, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in precluding that line of questioning (see People v Mendez, 306 AD2d 143, 144 [2003]; People v Rodriguez, 191 AD2d 723 [1993]; cf. People v Anonymous, 275 AD2d 210, 212 [2000]).
While the challenged sentence is greater than that offered to the defendant in return for a plea of guilty, sentences imposed after trial may be more severe than those proposed in connection with a plea bargain (see People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400, 412 [1980]; People v Norfleet, 146 AD2d 812, 813 [1989]). We conclude that the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Santucci, Lifson and Carni, JJ., concur.