Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, of four counts of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [2] [b]) and one count of attempted robbery in the second degree (§§ 110.00, 160.10 [2] [b]). We reject the contention of defendant that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. A police officer testified at the suppression hearing that, within 30 minutes of the robbery, she observed an individual who matched the description of the perpetrator near a vehicle that also matched the description of the perpetrator’s vehicle. We thus conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based on the totality of the circumstances (see People v Evans, 34 AD3d 1301, 1302 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 845 [2007]; People v Casillas, 289 AD2d 1063, 1064 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 752 [2002]).
Contrary to defendant’s further contention, Supreme Court properly refused to suppress the showup identifications of defendant by two of the robbery victims. It is well settled that
Defendant’s contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction under count one of the indictment, arising out of the robbery of a convenience store, is not preserved for our review (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). We reject defendant’s further contention that the verdict with respect to that count is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel inasmuch as none of the errors allegedly committed by defense counsel was so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial (see generally People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).
We reject the further contention of defendant that the court erred in denying his Batson challenge. Defendant failed to establish “[t]he more difficult aspect of the prima facie case delineated in Batsonl, i.e.,] the second element—a showing of ‘facts and other relevant circumstances’ that would support an inference of impermissible discrimination” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 [1993]; see People v Jones, 284 AD2d 46, 50 [2001], affd 99 NY2d 264 [2002]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the verdict sheet improperly contained the name of the victim and the date and location of each robbery (see People v Dalcin, 300 AD2d 1129 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 627 [2003]). He also failed to preserve for our review his contention that he was improperly sentenced as a second felony offender (see People v Anderson, 35 AD3d 1209 [2006], Iv denied 8 NY3d 919 [2007]). We decline to exercise our