Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (LaBuda, J.), rendered June 17, 2004, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, criminal trespass in the third degree, trespass and unlawful possession of marihuana.
Because 15 Fulton Street in the Village of Monticello, Sullivan County, was a known location for narcotics dealing, the absentee landlord had given the police a key to the front door and permission to enter the common areas of the apartment building to remove trespassers and to attempt to limit the amount of criminal activity occurring on the premises. On October 1, 2003, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Detective Thomas O’Connor of the Monticello police, having checked the premises, returned to his police vehicle in front of the house where he was visiting with another village officer in an adjacent patrol car. At that time, O’Connor observed defendant coming from the backyard of the premises toward him. O’Connor had known defendant for approximately 10 years, had previously arrested him at least twice at 15 Fulton Street for trespass and possession of a controlled substance, and had numerous times ordered him off the premises without arresting him. O’Connor also knew that defendant had relatives who resided at 15 Fulton Street.
On appeal, defendant asserts that County Court erroneously denied his suppression motion. We agree. Police pursuit of a fleeing individual “must be justified by reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed” (People v Holmes, 81 NY2d 1056, 1057-1058 [1993]). Where the police have observed specific conduct indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, pursuit is justified (see e.g. People v Matienzo, 81 NY2d 778 [1993]; People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448 [1992]; People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734 [1986]). Here, no such specific conduct was observed. “Flight alone, however, or even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might justify a police request for information, is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has a right ‘to be let alone’ and refuse to respond to police inquiry” (People v Holmes, supra at 1058 [citations omitted]; cf. Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124-125 [2000]). While defendant’s flight may be considered in context with the time, the location and any other conduct indicative of criminal activity (see People v Martinez, supra at 448), no indicia other than location exists in this case. It therefore follows that the pursuit by the officer was not justified, and the arrest for trespassing on the neighboring property—which occurred during the pursuit—was unlawful. Moreover, as O’Connor was in continuous close pursuit of defendant, defendant’s act of throwing away the cocaine was a “spontaneous reaction to the sudden and unexpected pursuit by the offi
Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and indictment dismissed. [See 3 Misc 3d 1103(A), 2004 NY Slip Op 5036KU) (2004).]