Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (McGrath, J.), rendered January 18, 1995, which revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered September 11, 1996, which denied defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 to set aside the sentence, without a hearing.
In March 1990 defendant pleaded guilty in County Court (Dwyer, Jr., J.), to the crime of assault in the second degree and in May 1990 he was sentenced to a term of six months’ imprisonment and five years’ probation. In July 1994 the Rensselaer County Probation Department (hereinafter Department) filed a violation petition alleging that defendant violated his probation by virtue of a conviction in another county for assault in the third degree. However, in September 1994 County Court (McGrath, J.) dismissed the petition but advised defendant, on the record, that he would remain on probation.
We affirm. We reject defendant’s contention that evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should have been suppressed because the facts set forth in the application for the search warrant were false and unreliable. In order to justify the exclusion of evidence on the ground that a search warrant application contains false statements, “a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the false statements were made ‘knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth’ * * * and that without such misstatements, the remaining allegations would have been insufficient to establish probable cause” (People v Lavin, 220 AD2d 886, 887-888, lv denied 87 NY2d 904, quoting People, v Quinones, 139 AD2d 774, lv denied 72 NY2d 923). Furthermore, a suppression court’s resolution of credibility issues is entitled to great weight on appeal (see, People v Griffin, 234 AD2d 718, 720; People v Gagliardi, 232 AD2d 879, 880-881). Here, the statements in West’s supporting deposition were based on his personal observations and are consistent with his testimony at the suppression hearing.
We also reject defendant’s contention that County Court
Next, we reject defendant’s contention that County Court erred in denying his CPL 440.20 motion without a hearing. In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a postconviction motion to set aside a sentence pursuant to CPL 440.20, this Court must determine whether the sentence was “unauthorized, illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law” (CPL 440.20 [1]; see, People v Nazarian, 150 AD2d 923, lv denied 74 NY2d 744). While a sentence imposed for the violation of probation should be set aside as illegal if the individual was not subject to enforceable probation terms (see generally, People v Corley, 182 AD2d 537, lv denied 80 NY2d 902), summary denial of a motion to set aside a sentence on those grounds is warranted where the factual allegations of illegality are made solely by the defendant and unsupported by any other affidavit or evidence (see, CPL 440.30 [4]).
Here, defendant’s contention that he was not on probation when the October 1994 violation petition was filed is not supported in the record, which shows that he was sentenced to five years’ probation in May 1990. Significantly, at the September 1994 hearing, after County Court dismissed the previous violation petition, defendant was specifically reminded that his probation sentence was still in effect. The record is devoid of any proof indicating that a termination of defendant’s probation occurred at any time prior to January 18, 1995 when it was revoked by County Court in conjunction with defendant being sentenced to prison.
We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and find them lacking in merit.
White, J. P., Casey, Peters and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed.