Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan, J.), rendered February 10, 2010, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), attempted robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress certain identification testimony and statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the
The charges against the defendant arise from robberies of two bars that occurred on September 23, 2007, and September 30, 2007, respectively. The defendant also was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, with respect to an incident that occurred on October 15, 2007. The trial evidence established that, on October 15, 2007, the defendant was present at the bar that was the scene of the September 23, 2007, robbery (hereinafter the first bar). An individual at the first bar allegedly observed a vehicle outside; that vehicle bore the same license plate as a vehicle that another witness had seen leaving the scene of the September 30, 2007, robbery. A witness at the first bar called the police, and the defendant was apprehended in the vicinity of the first bar. The defendant subsequently told the police, among other things, that on October 15, 2007, he and his wife had driven to the first bar in the wife’s vehicle. The police subsequently found a firearm inside a bag, within a crate located in the cargo area of that vehicle, a sports-utility vehicle.
After a hearing, the Supreme Court denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his oral and written statements to police. The Supreme Court also denied that branch of the omnibus motion which was to suppress the identification testimony of a witness who identified the defendant after she observed him in a holding cell at a police station house.
After a jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of the charges relating to the robbery of September 23, 2007. The defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery in the first degree and one count of attempted robbery in the first degree with respect to the robbery of September 30, 2007. The jury also found the defendant guilty of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err in denying that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony related to the station-house identification by a witness. “Police-arranged identifications, confrontations between a witness and a defendant which have come about at the deliberate direction of the police for the distinct purpose of identifying the perpetrator, implicate due process concerns” (People v Gomez, 60 AD3d 782, 783 [2009]). However, accidental show-up identifications that result “from mere happenstance, such as where a witness is present in police
In addition, the Supreme Court did not err in denying that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials (see People v Gordon, 74 AD3d 1090 [2010]; People v Ward, 241 AD2d 767, 769-770 [1997]; People v Stokes, 233 AD2d 194 [1996]; see also People v DeCampoamor, 91 AD3d 669, 670 [2012]; People v Salamone, 61 AD3d 1400, 1401 [2009]; People v Alexander, 51 AD3d 1380, 1381-1382 [2008]).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant’s application to present an expert witness as to the reliability of identification testimony. Where a case “turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime,” a trial court must permit expert testimony as to eyewitness identifications where, inter alia, that testimony is relevant, based on generally accepted scientific principles, proffered by a qualified expert, and on a topic “beyond the ken of the average juror” (People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449, 452 [2007]; see People v Santiago, 17 NY3d 661, 669 [2011]; People v Abney, 13 NY3d 251, 267 [2009]). Here, however, there was sufficient corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes to obviate the need for expert testimony, including the defendant’s statements to law enforcement officials, and other corroborating evidence, such that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding the proposed expert testimony (see People v Abney, 13 NY3d at 269; People v Hall, 86 AD3d 450, 452 [2011]; People v Fernandez, 78 AD3d 726, 726-727 [2010]; People v Smith, 57 AD3d 356, 357 [2008]; People v Chisolm, 57 AD3d 223, 223-224 [2008]).
However, in connection with the two counts of criminal pos
The sentences imposed on the remaining counts — the two counts of robbery in the first degree, and the count of attempted robbery in the first degree — were not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Angiolillo, J.P., Belen, Chambers and Austin, JJ., concur.