Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the People’s challenges for cause to three prospective jurors and that he is entitled to a new trial because the People exhausted their peremptory challenges. We need not and do not decide whether defendant would be entitled to a new trial under these circumstances if the trial court erred in granting one or more of the People’s challenges. Here, the court properly exercised its discretion in granting the People’s challenges for cause to the three jurors (see People v Williams, 63 NY2d 882, 885 [1984]). Two of the panelists at issue made strong statements of anti-police bias, coupled with inability to accept the concept of constructive possession, and the third panelist expressly stated that he could not convict anyone who might be sent to prison. To the extent that each panelist ultimately provided a purported assurance of impartiality, such assurance was “less-than-unequivocal” (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 363 [2001]) when viewed in context. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals has often observed, erring on the side of disqualification is prudent because “the worst the court will have done in most cases is to have replaced one impartial juror with another impartial juror” (People v Culhane, 33 NY2d 90, 108 n 3 [1973]).
The charges were properly joined pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2) (c) as similar in law, and defendant failed to establish good cause for a severance (CPL 200.20 [3]). There was strong identification evidence as to each of the three drug transactions, and there was no “substantial likelihood” that the jury would be unable to consider the proof of each offense separately (see People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1 [1982]; People v Streitferdt, 169 AD2d
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.
Defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would reject them. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Friedman, Marlow, Nardelli and McGuire, JJ.