OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
Order reversed, and the indictment dismissed. The seven-month delay between defendant’s felony indictment and his arrest constitutes a denial of the statutory right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30, subd 1, par [a]).
The People contend that the delay was caused by "exceptional circumstances”, and hence falls within a statutory exception (CPL 30.30, subd 4, par [g]). They urge as an excuse an ongoing narcotics investigation. However, the proof of such investigation was deficient. No activity of any significance was
Since the indictment must be dismissed, it is unnecessary to determine whether the court’s erroneous characterization of a defense witness, in a supplementary charge, as "an admitted interested party”, would otherwise require a new trial.
Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur in memorandum.
Order reversed, etc.